Peirce’s last philosophic will and testament: Uberty in the logic of instinctive reasoning

O último testamento filosófico de Peirce: Uberdade na lógica do raciocínio instintivo

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Abstract: In essential continuity with his argument for Musement in “A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God” of 1908, Peirce’s last unfinished papers MS 682 and MS 683 of 1913 contain his self-considered “legacy” contribution to the history of logic, as well as reprising his career-long integration of epistemological and ontological dimensions of an idealism-realism, which he expressed as a “universe perfused with signs.” Peirce’s semiotic universe involves the coalescent plasticity of evolutionary nature and mind, the heuristic front edge of which is the quale-consciousness of instinct-rooted abductive inference, for which he introduced the technical term uberty (“gravid with new births”), in distinction from deduction and induction, in reasoning.


Resumo: Na continuidade essencial do seu argumento para o Devaneio em “Um Argumento Negligenciado para a Realidade de Deus” de 1908, os últimos artigos inacabados de Peirce MS 682 e MS 683 de 1913 contêm a contribuição do seu “legado” à história da lógica, como também reprisa sua integração, ao longo de sua carreira, das dimensões epistemológicas e ontológicas de um idealismo-realismo que ele expressou como um “universo infundido com signos.” O universo semiótico de Peirce envolve a plasticidade coalescente da mente e da natureza evolucionária, cujo destaque heurístico é a quale-consciência da inferência abdutiva instinctivamente enraizada, para a qual ele introduziu o termo técnico uberdade (“grávido de novos nascimentos”) no raciocínio, distintamente de dedução e indução.


“Logic is the science of security and uberty in reasonings.”

Charles S. Peirce, MS 683.
1 Uberty as Peirce’s legacy pronouncement

A former generation of Peirce studies has tended to concentrate on Peirce’s earlier-phase writings. Certain scholars, like conjurers on a vaudeville stage, have gone so far as to divide Peirce’s career in half, separating out his earlier “epistemological” from his later “metaphysical” writings. Such an approach fails to employ the heuristic of his own “keystone of the arch,” his principle of synechism methodically employed to trace the developmental teleology of his leading concepts.1 The record of these leading concepts bears witness to Peirce’s integration of epistemic and metaphysical levels of discourse throughout his career.

In particular in this regard, Peirce’s last papers on “the logic of reasoning in security and uberty”—papers thematizing the potentially pregnant form of instinctive inference in the coalescent plasticity of nature and human intelligence—should be regarded as capping the trajectory of his long stretch of philosophic accomplishment. These last papers were not scripts of a narrow-band epistemic stamp; rather, they reset Peirce’s doctrine of heuretic (truth-discovering) inquiry within a theory of objective idealism-realism (“the one intelligible theory of the universe”) which in turn underwrote his doctrine of a “universe perfused with signs.”2

Taking such a holistic approach to Peirce’s career-text, we gain purchase on the maturation of his first-tier philosophic genius. Peirce, in the course of over fifty years during which he probed root implications of his multifaceted mathematical, logical, and scientific engagements, produced landmark speculations that decisively put out of date the old Cartesian dichotomies of subject and object and of mind

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1 See Thomas A. Gouge, *The Thought of C. S. Peirce* (N.Y.: Dover Publications, 1950). Gouge and the “empiricist” Justus Buchler appear to be the original sources of this “two Peirce” interpretation. The truncating approach, which sins against Peirce’s own injunction against the forms of dyadic hermeneutics that “chop with an axe” (EP 2:2), can take the less drastic approach not of dismissal but simply of neglect of Peirce’s metaphysical side. For a recent example, see William H. B. Mcauliffe, “How did Abduction Get Confused with Inference to the Best Explanation?” in *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society*, v. 51, n. 3 (Summer 2015), 300-315. This article, admirable in its astute polemic against misconstruals of Peirce’s theory of abduction as a theory of inference to the best explanation in the literature of the philosophy of science, remains an example of a primarily “epistemological” (professionally speaking, “analytic”) approach to Peirce. While referring twice to Peirce’s sense of “uberty” in abductive inference, and indicating that instinctive hypotheses are those that “naturally recommend themselves to the mind” and have value “because of the human capacity to devise plausible theories” (p. 303), it does not provide any further approach into the “natural” basis of this human capacity, though the latter is precisely the foundational metaphysical doctrine of connatural semiosis at the heart of Peirce’s “universe perfused with signs.”

2 “It seems a strange thing when one comes to ponder over it, that a sign should leave its interpreter to supply a part of its meaning; but the explanation of the phenomenon lies in the fact that the entire universe,—not merely the universe of existents, but all that wider universe, embracing the universe of existents as a part, the universe we are all accustomed to refer to as ‘the truth,’—*that all this universe is perfused with signs, if not composed exclusively of signs.*” The connatural semiotic imagination—Peirce goes on say in this context—“has a bearing upon the question of pragmatism.” (EP 2:394, *my emphasis*).
and matter. He evolved synechistic integrations of the Cartesian dichotomies in a combined phenomenological and ontological categoriology—namely, in symmetrical categories of First, or qualitative immediacy, of Second, or resistance as force and counter-force, and of Third, or vital growth, evolution, generality, and continuity—which he reset in the semiotic terms of iconic, indicative, and symbolic signifiers of our humankind’s naturally embodied experience in and of a semiotic universe.3

It is a miraculous story of accomplishment. Notwithstanding the trammels of personal, professional, and societal existence, Peirce’s genius for innovative philosophic ideas continually surfaced. From youthful studies centering first on Schiller and then on Kant, his self-estimated “one of the births of time” doctrine of Three Categories budded into original form in “A Guess at the Riddle” (1887-88) and five ensuing metaphysical essays of 1891-93. These speculations of a “Schelling-fashioned idealism” set his categorical framework for further epistemic and ontological groundings of Phenomenology, the Normative Sciences, and Pragmaticism. And the momentum of these accomplishments carried over into the textual fabric of such later-phase speculations as “A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God” (1908) and “An Essay toward Improving Our Reasoning in Security and Uberty” (1913).4

What it is crucial to observe is that, in this maturing of signature articulations, Peirce consistently featured a baseline doctrine of the “connatural” affinity and potential “uberosity” of instinctive intelligence in a “universe perfused with signs.”5 And he self-consciously underlined this doctrine all the way to the end. “A Neglected Argument” of 1908 featured the primacy of instinctive quale-consciousness in his (Emersonian) Transcendentalist doctrine of Musement; and his unfinished papers on “reasonings in security and uberty” of 1913 recast the same emphasis as his essential contribution to the history of logic.

These latter unfinished papers, written just a few months before his death in Milford, PA during September-October of 1913, cannot be expected to be breakaway trajectories toward new speculative horizons but rather reminiscences of bygone blazoned days. Nevertheless, they provoke more than a Proustian recollection of past time in Peirce’s fresh estimation of the historical status of his signal concept of connatural, that is, instinct-rooted, abductive inference in a semiotic universe.

3 Consult Ivo Ibri (2015, 2016) for illuminating articulations of the symmetrical character of each of Peirce’s three categories.

4 CP 8.255: Letter to James on Peirce’s understanding that he had constructed a “completely developed system.”

5 Peirce’s mature semiotic worldview intertwines themes of phenomenological semiosis: “Man is a sign” (CP 5.505, 5.283); signs anthropomorphically constitute mental behavior (CP 5.253); we are in thought, not that thoughts are in us (CP 5.289n, 8.256, CP 5.314, 6.270, 7.583); Man is a true symbol (CP 7.593); and of cosmical semiosis: “this universe is composed of signs” (CP 5.448n1), such that “If you ask me what part Qualities can play in the economy of the universe, I shall reply that the universe is a vast representamen, a great symbol of God’s purpose, working out its conclusions in living realities. […] The Universe as an argument is necessarily a great work of art, a great poem—for every fine argument is a poem and a symphony—just as every true poem is a sound argument” (CP 5.119).
The historian of ideas, taking a cue from Peirce’s own articulation of the theme of “the divinization of genius,” should harvest these philosophical accomplishments in the broader Zeitgeist of his times. After Emerson, James, Dewey, Royce, and other exponents of the classical “American” (itself trans-Atlantic!) Pragmatist tradition complemented Peirce’s sign-expressive universe in versions of their own. But arguably more than any other of his contemporaries, Peirce, with his polymathic mathematical, logical, and scientific background, contributed the superlative theoretical hardwires to this trajectory featuring the transactional modalities of nature and experience.

Of special interest here, Peirce re-summoned his theoretical powers in final manuscripts that prioritize the “uberous” form of prospective imagination so as to define logic itself as “the science of security and uberty in reasonings.” He inscribed this definition in two different versions, MS 682 and MS 683, of 1913. The latter, MS 682, is in fact the most complete of several unfinished manuscripts that date from this time frame. Now published as Item 31 of volume two of The Essential Peirce, it is written “in a retrospective mood,” the paper showing Peirce “continuing to assess the completeness of his logic and the scope of his pragmatism.” But as well, the evidence is that “A Neglected Argument” (1908) and the two papers, MS 682 and 683 of 1913, form a thematic continuum concerning the heuristic primary of quale consciousness, bequeathing his “legacy” doctrine of the prospective potency of instinctive hypothesis-making among the three forms of valid inference. Arguably his most original contribution to the republic of letters, this was his doctrine of abduction as the “uberous” front edge of “vital” human experience in general and of the “logic of inquiry” in its scientific and aesthetic modes in particular.

2 Nuances of uberty in MS 683

In the unpublished MS 683 of 1913, Peirce reflected on his own motives for introducing his late terminological innovation of “uberty in reasoning.” Speaking

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6 EP 1:364.
7 And it can be thought that Peirce, the “Exact Logician,” mused here as self-described authority “in the same rank” as his only rivals in logic, Aristotle, Scotus, and Leibniz. (BRENT, 1993, p. 324).
8 Robin Catalog, MS 680, 681, 682, 683, 684.
9 EP 2:463.
10 Etymologically the Latin root of instinguere refers to instigation and impulse, as well as, combining in + stinguere, means to prick, thus to spur, to incite, to excite a new stimulation Thus Peirce’s key concept of instinct connotes the inborn tendency of a species, what is (con-) natural in both afforded or acquired modes, to respond to transactionally viable signs, thus functioning as aptitude, or bent, knack, adroit turn, of nature’s life-sustaining gift for non-mechanistic, spontaneous adaptation to a sustaining environment. Peirce assigns this resourceful vitality of life to the evolutionary plasticity of human intelligence par excellence. In due course (below) we shall see that his doctrine generally dovetailed with that of James’ descriptions of instinct in his Principles of Psychology, though Peirce’s sense of abductive quale-consciousness is set within an explicit categorical and cosmological framework.
autobiographically, “[…] while senility is too plainly overcoming me,” he still has “the ardent passion to be useful, which we all feel as children, and which defines itself more and more as our years advance”; and thus he is “trying to pass on the little insight that I have been able to acquire into this momentous business of reasoning, to one or more younger heads who shall carry the quest further” (MS 683:11). We will see that, in its own minor register, this charming sentiment expressive of the “Firstness” of childlike ardor and youthful prospects, was Peirce’s metaphor for introducing the theme of “uberty.”

As for this “little insight” into “this momentous business of reasoning,” MS 683 has much to say of a distinctly Peircean stamp. It begins from a discussion of “the fallacious understanding of mathematics,” which—he says—alone among the sciences is still wrongly considered as professing “necessary reasoning” of the “must be” or “apodictic” type. In rejecting this time-honored misunderstanding, Peirce reprised in miniature here many passages of his former writings as to a conception of the apodictic nature of corollarial mathematics stemming from Euclid—an erroneous conception which he charged has infected metaphysical thinking in Western philosophy from the Pythagoreans to Hegel as well.11

Peirce argues, to the contrary, that “the great steps in the sciences have not been so.” Even the major propositions of geometry, though given the high-sounding title of “theorems,” “never do necessarily follow from their premises.” Rather—he avers—“the geometrically gifted pupil sees the truth of the theorem but cannot tell how he does so; he only imagines he sees the truth of the concluded theorem through the process of reasoning.” Reasoning from premises to conclusion is, rather, a “natural, or shall I say instinctive operation, the inverse of analyzing one’s thought”; and it is “an art to be acquired only by a long course of experimentation and training.” And—he continues—it is “by this art alone that we can discover how one reasons at different times,” so as to acquire materials of the conditions requisite “for imparting a given kind of reasoning a degree of security appropriately proportioned to the damage that would ensue should its conclusion be false in this or that respect or to this or that degree.”12

Now, it is in this context of MS 683 that Peirce segues to choose the word “security” to replace the terms “absolute” and apodictic” or “must be,” and to introduce the word “uberty” as a technical term of logic. He selects “uberty,” he says, “not because it strikes him as a supremely charming word,” nor has he preferred it to “fruitfulness” “because it spells its three syllables with only half as many letters.” “Fruitfulness” may continue indefinitely without fulfilling its promise, while “uber, or udder, is sure to be often gravid with nutritious food every time the hour-hand goes round.”

This pronouncement already takes us to the heart of Peirce’s essential bequest to the history of logic. The udder-full “uberty in reasoning” expresses the character of being “actually gravid with living and prolific truth”; it “especially distinguishes the type of reasoning the most contrary to that which alone is ever perfectly secure (and it is by no means always so), but whose uberty, or value in increasing knowledge, is extremely small, quite vanishing in the quite necessary kind [of apodictic reasoning],

12 Robins Catalogue, MS 683:4-6, my emphases.
while its contrary type on the other hand is the one that offers the least security and consequently is apt to be despised by men of science, the more thoroughly so the more their methods are dominated by science.” Nevertheless—Peirce continues to aver—this type of uberous reasoning is “by far the most indispensable of all,” since through it we might perhaps have become acquainted with every kind of truth that has been brought to light by any other kind of reasoning, and “since such assurance as it affords results from a principle without which no other kind of reasoning would have any worth at all.” Accordingly, this type of reasoning can be reckoned to “range in our ordinary experience over much greater differences both of security and of importance than those of any other type,” and should be “the true policy for men of science.”

Indeed, all of this is essential Peirce. From the inception of his career Peirce, the self-styled “Exact Logician,” described authentic scientific discovery as spearheaded by probabilistic methods of inductive and hypothetical inference as distinguished from that of the traditional apodictic type. The former two types, and especially the logical functioning of hypothetical (abductive/retroductive) inference, took on another huge significance in his Tychism of ontological “variescences,” a doctrine already appearing in “The Order of Nature” (1878) and continuing in his metaphysical essays of 1891-93, and which he eventually articulated as a co-valent component of his agapistic metaphysics.

Peirce ultimately set the forward-prospecting heuristic of hypothetical inference in ingenious scientific practice within his connaturally reflexive idealism-realism, thus consistently arguing against the a priori apodictic method of fixing beliefs in the general run of the Cartesian epistemic and ontological traditions of dogmatic certitude, as for example in polemical exchanges with necessitarians, including the “fact-free” nature of Hegel’s internal logical anancasm.

Peirce’s break-through metaphysical essay, “A Guess at the Riddle” (1887-88), was in fact its own huge improvisation, taking the form of a hypothetical inference with regard to the potential applicability of his newly announced Three Categories as heuristic templates of nature-and-experience and therefore of fallibilistic modes of discovery for the entire gamut of physical, psychological, and metaphysical sciences. A forerunner to the pregnancy metaphor of his “uberty” concept, he estimated that that essay’s “guess of the secret of the sphinx” will be “one of the births in time.”

13 Robins Catalogue, MS 683:7-10.
14 Deduction “proves that something must be”; induction “shows that something actually is operative; abduction “merely suggests that something may be”—in which regard abduction, the first stage of inquiry, “is the only logical operation which introduces a new idea” (CP 5.171; EP 2:216, 1903). Peirce noted that he only achieved a clear distinction between induction and abduction around the turn of the century, before which time “I more or less mixed up hypothesis and induction” (CP 8.227, 1910). This acknowledgment should be considered a significant aspect of Peirce’s later-phase insistence on the instinctive character of abduction.
3 Expanded nuances of uberty in MS 682

Turning now to the more developed though also unfinished MS 682, Peirce begins by defining “inference or reason” as involving “a new belief consciously generated from a previous belief in consequence of some third belief (stored away in some dark closet of the mind, as a habit of thought.)”

“A full belief”—Peirce continues here—“substantially leans one to think it is probable, or promising, or has some other title to intellectual honor.” Thus while this essay only does so “in a pretty broad sense,” it is necessary to scrutinize what passes through our minds “during the incubation and birth of beliefs very closely and critically.”

In this precise regard of the promising incubation of new belief, Peirce goes on to direct the discussion to “the Instinctive basis of reasoning,” as well as, pointedly, “for a real person, with all the instincts of which we human beings are so sublimely and so responsibly endowed.” “The real person” he elsewhere refers to as the “normal person”—and “normality” in Peirce’s semiotics is significant in connoting the semiotics of Thirdness.

The real person is a medium of embodied sign-transferences carrying a so-to-speak vitally accommodating metaphysical DNA out of the human race’s evolutionary past into the future. In “A Guess” Peirce had featured this synthetic power “of the intuitions of space and time […] by the realistic hypostatization of relations,” which he says “is the one sole method of valuable thought.”

17 “Stored away in some dark closet of the mind” recalls his image of consciousness as “a bottomless lake”—both metaphors variations on his One Law of Mind: “There are such vast numbers of ideas in consciousness of low degree of vividness, that I think it may be true,—and at any rate is roughly true, […] that our whole past experience is continually in our consciousness, though most of it sunk to a great depth of dimness. I think of consciousness as a bottomless lake, whose waters seem transparent, yet into which we can clearly see but a little way. But in this water there are countless objects of different depths; and certain influences will give certain kinds of those objects an upward impulse which may be intense enough and continue long enough to bring them into the upper visible layer. After the impulse ceases they commence to sink downward.” (CP 7.547; cf. 7.554). In the terms of this paper, this is no mere psychologistic description within a nominalistic epistemic account; it can be thought that the “bottomless lake” is no less than nature’s evolutionary past, cosmogonically considered.


19 As noted above, MS 683 adds to the definition of uberty in noting that uber is related to udder, as in the swelling of the full udders of mothering lambs—which was already a prominent trope in Greek literature, as in the Homeric poems. In another writing Peirce employed the noun “uberosity” to convey a similar effect in reference to Aristotle’s idea of growth (EP 2:373). Cf. note 36 below.


21 “The work of the poet or novelist is not utterly different from that of the scientific man.” (EP 1:261). The passage goes on to speak of the creatively synthetic activity of the artist and the geometer with respect to “the genius of the mind, that takes up all these hints of sense, adds immensely to them, makes them precise, and shows them in intelligible
Of this theme of the (very Emersonian!) instinctive semiosis of the human mind, Peirce wrote elsewhere in grand generalization: “Must we not say [...] there is an energizing reasonableness that shapes phenomena in some sense, and that this same working reasonableness has molded the reason of man into something like its own image?”22 Peirce expressed this same truth of “the logic of things” in various assertions on the anthropomorphic character of our human conceptions of nature.23 Of the sublimity, responsibility, and ontological opportunity for the conduct of life of real persons, there is his so-to-speak grand cru assertion: “The very being of the General, of Reason, consists in its governing individual events. [...] It must always be in a state of incipiency, of growth [...] So, then, the development of Reason requires as a part of it the occurrence of more individual events than ever can occur. It requires, too, all the coloring of all qualities of feeling, including pleasure in its proper place among the rest. This development of Reason consists, you will observe, in embodiment, that is, in manifestation.”24

The normal instinctive embodiments of real personal life, then, are no less than the bottom line evidences of the primary qualitative powers of human reasoning.25 And Peirce conceived this heuristic primacy of quale-consciousness as informing all the phases of his pragmaticism and its normative requirements.

By such implication, MS 682 “recollects” no less than a significant range of Peirce’s vintage philosophy. Here such an instinct-based energizing reasonableness is described as “Reasoning-power, or Ratiocination, called by some Dialectic Reason,” which is “the power of drawing inferences that tend toward the truth, when the premises or the virtual assertion from which they set out are true.” The description goes on to sound the keynote of this power in challenging the entire form in the intuition of space and time.” Peirce concludes by saying “The true percept is not to abstain from hypostatization, but to do it intelligently.” (EP 1:261-262.) Not limited to the artist or the geometer, hypostatization here refers to synthetic embodiment in the general course of normal experience, individual and societal.

22 EP 2:68.
23 “Anthropomorphic’ is what pretty much all conceptions are at bottom, otherwise other roots for the words to which to express them than the old Aryan roots would have to be found. And in regard to any preference for one kind of theory over another, it is well to remember that every single truth of science is due to the affinity of the human soul to the soul of the universe, imperfect as that affinity no doubt is. To say, therefore, that a conception is one natural to man, which comes to just about the same thing as to say that it is anthropomorphic, is as high a recommendation as one could give to it in the eyes of an Exact Logician.” (EP 2:152).
25 In this doctrine Peirce is on the same page as William James, who describes the anthropomorphic, non-utilitarian, originary quality of instinct in many contexts, as for example: “We can only interpret the instincts of brutes by what we know of instincts in ourselves. [...] Science may come and consider these ways, and find that most of them are useful. But it is not for the sake of their utility that they are followed, but because at the moment of following them we feel that that is the only appropriate and natural thing. [The operation of an instinct] is absolute and selbstverständlich, an ‘a priori synthesis’ of the most perfect sort, needing no proof but its own evidence.” (The Principles of Psychology, v. 2, chapter 24, “Instinct,” p. 386).
apodictic-rationalist tradition of logic: “I regard this power as the principal of human intellectual instincts. [...] I select the appellation ‘instinct’ in order to profess my belief that the reasoning power is related to human nature very much as the wonderful instincts of ants, wasps, etc., are related to their several natures.” Moreover, as the principal of human instincts, whether open to outward inspection or purely mental and knowable by outward symptoms or indirect effect, or partly inward and partly outward—as when a person talks”—the rational instinct “is a way of voluntary acting prevalent almost universally among otherwise normal individuals of at least one sex or other unmistakable natural part of a race, [...] which action conduces to the probable perpetuation of that race.”

Peirce’s evolutionary terminology of “voluntary acting” here expresses the explicit maxim of favoring the instinctive generation of pragmatic conduct. But in this context of MS 682 of 1913, Peirce jogs his old memory with regard to an essay he says he has postponed for nearly fifty years. “I have long ago,” he reminisces, “come to be guided by this maxim: as it is practically certain that we cannot directly, nor even without much accuracy even indirectly, observe what passes in the consciousness of any other person, while it is far from certain that we can do so (and accurately record what [we] can even glimpse at best or very glibberly), even in the case of what shoots through our own minds, it is much safer to define all mental characters as far as possible in terms of their outward manifestations.” But what is more, in the case of any consciousness that is “of the nature of Thought,” it is “an even more imperative reason for following the maxim than that methodological, or prudential, one just given, though this ought to be sufficient to determine us [in most cases].”

This remembered “rule of pragmatism”—“pertaining to outward manifestations in conduct to understand another’s or even our own thoughts”—Peirce now avers—“is, roughly speaking, equivalent to the one that I used in 1871.” But here he turns a theoretical corner in postulating that that older pragmatic maxim, while it “certainly aids our approximations to [the] security of reasoning [...] “does not contribute to the uberty of reasoning, which far more calls for solicitous care.”

Now, in Peirce’s deliberate trajectory of expression here, not only as pertaining to outward or inward manifestations in conduct of an individual’s thought, but, more significantly, in consideration of how history informs us that secure reasonings in any number of fields have remained sterile for millennia, “the basic issue to be addressed is how the human race has gotten beyond, and is to get beyond, preconceived conclusions in general. There follows one of his perhaps most famous sentences: “Yet the maxim of Pragmatism does not bestow a single smile upon beauty, upon moral virtue, or upon abstract truth;—the three things that alone raise Humanity above Animality.”

27 Ibid., Peirce’s emphasis.
28 See EP2, fn. 6, p. 553, which references fn. 3, p. 502, and fn. 15, p. 551. Peirce’s Pragmatic Maxim was first expressed in print in his 1878 paper “How to Make Our Ideas Clear” (EP 1:132). In the first version of the Additament to “A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God” (1908), he informs the reader that he first formulated his logical doctrine and named it Pragmatism in 1873; in a second version of the “Additament” he pushed back the year of his fathering of Pragmatism from 1873 to 1871.
29 MS 682:465.
Weaving these several strands of consideration together, Peirce has now associated pragmatic reasoning with the evolutionary habits of lower animals, but as well has elevated its human endowment in a specially “uberous” sense raising Humanity above Animality. What, then, precisely is the difference between the ostensible “inductive” psychology of objectively observed pragmatic conduct of individuals and animals and the more significant Humanity-elevating “smile” that instinctive hypothesis, “gravid with new births,” may bring? Here it patently concerns the matter of historical blockage in the way of prospective inquiry by preconceived conclusions. Accordingly, Peirce reprises his “legacy” doctrine of the primacy of instinct-rooted abduction among the modes of valid inference when he goes on to aver that “even modern science” is to be faulted for “its neglect systematically to consider possibilities among which there are likely to be keys to undiscovered treasures of truth.”

In contrastive illustration of this deficiency in scientific uberosity, Peirce adds a long footnote against Francis Bacon concerning “the Lord Chancellor’s rejection of final causes,” a clear violation of his methodic maxim Do Not Block the Way of Inquiry. Peirce first notes that “historical progress in science” with respect to “growth in knowledge about unchanging conditions” has almost been confined to modern times. Citing the names of Petrus Peregrinus, Roger Bacon, “the blessed Galileo Galilei” and “the Shrewd John Kepler,” he avers that “No such glad tidings had been published since the Gospels.” Francis Bacon—he continues—“helped spread the news while trying to steal credit for the message.” However, “Since Galileo, the progress of science has been accelerated more;” and in this context Peirce again attacks Bacon’s “despairing belief” concerning the substantive unknowability of nature, as in the Lord Chancellor’s dictum that “The subtlety of Nature far exceeds the subtlety of the human mind.”

Peirce’s assertion as to “such glad tidings” comparable to the historical impact of the Gospels (!) serves to remind us that, against such “parabolic worldview” necessitarians as Paul Carus and Hegel as well as against the Duneses and empiricist-skeptics such as Francis Bacon and followers—and not to speak of the nominalistic trends in postmodernism today that reject every model of ontological and ethical rationality—Peirce stands out among the major philosophers as a champion of the Western Enlightenment scientific revolution par excellence after Kant, and especially after Kant’s new ground breaking third Critique.

30 MS 682:466. The connatural “key” analogy occurs below in Peirce’s adaption of Edgar Allen Poe’s metaphor of “smoothly-fitting keys” in “A Neglected Argument.”
31 Peirce’s rejection of Bacon’s “despairing belief” traces back to “A Guess at the Riddle” (1887-88) where Peirce, in dismissing the principle of the inexplicable as a principle of explanation, paraphrases Kant’s concept of the reflective judgment as transcendental presupposition as to the systematicity of contingent nature which Kant expressed in the published Introduction of the Critique of the Power of Judgment (1890).
32 MS 682:466.
In the companion MS 683 Peirce expressed the same “glad tidings” accelerating the progress of Western scientific rationality in another way. Comparing technical terms needed in science—e.g. “uberty” in logic vs. the more complicated terminology of botany, and considering the more limited scope of the vocabulary of mental science than that of the physical sciences—Peirce noted that “the mental science of phenomena” “only dates from about AD 1860.” Indeed, many ramifications of this historical evangelism crop up in his writings. Thus, for example, in his polemic against necessitarianism Peirce put his Enlightenment cards on the table in extolling the years “from 1846 to the appearance of Darwin’s *Origin of Species* in 1859” as “the most productive period of equal length in the entire history of science until now.”

This passage has the added interest of situating Peirce’s own career within the timeframe of which he speaks. He was a young 21-year-old surveying in the wilds of Louisiana when the news of Darwin’s *Origin of Species* was conveyed to him by his colleague Chauncey Wright. Now in old age, against the background of his own considerable expertise in a formidable range of the mathematical and positive sciences, Peirce was in a position as perhaps no other philosopher of his times to valorize the *in futuro* prospects of Western Enlightenment rationality. His valorization consisted in upgrading the received theories of scientific rationality in the form of his Three Categories, and in that architectonic framework in featuring the *prospective* role of instinct-based abduction in mental inquiry.

Peirce was aware of these same personal credentials in the opening paragraph of “The Law of Mind” (1892) when he referred to his contracting from Emerson, Hedge, and other Concord Transcendentalists, as well as from Schelling, Plotinus, Boehme, and Eastern mystics, “some cultured bacilli […] that now, after long incubation, comes to the surface, modified by mathematical conceptions and by training in physical investigations.” His metaphor of incubation is again pertinent to our topic here.

Emerson, for sure, in such early works as *Nature* (1836) and “The Young American” (1841), wrote the script for the *prospective potential* of the human mind in the generation before Peirce. And yet, as metaphysical logician *par excellence* who (after Kant) harvested the burgeoning legacy of the Western Enlightenment, we are seeing here that Peirce specifically wrote the script for the heuretic (truth-discovering) primacy of *instinctive rationality in scientific abduction*.

Peirce already began appropriating reflections on the logical form of hypothesis-making in historical resources of Chauvin, Newton, Sir Wm. Hamilton, Kant, Johann Friedrich Herbart, and J.S. Mill (adding that the list could be longer) in “Some Consequences of Four Incapacities” (1868). For the “American” Pragmatist tradition, Peirce shared with William James this trajectory of featuring the forward edge of intelligent experience that is irreducible to the standard empiricist account of induction. In broader historical perspective, Peirce and James—and in important respects, Dewey—spearheaded doctrines of *prospective experience* in the connatural

34 MS 683:12-14.
36 CP 5.64.
37 EP 1:34-35.
semiosis of nature and mankind that is traceable to Emerson, and from Emerson back to Goethe, Kant, Schiller, and Schelling. In his time, I am suggesting here, Peirce produced the superlative logical-theoretical hardwires to this trajectory.

4 Asymptotic growth in the metaphysical plasticity of human intelligence

Let us now repair to Peirce’s retrospective musings in MS 682 written a few months before he died of cancer in 1914. He returned to one of his former pools of thought in asserting that while the instincts of men and the more intelligent animals are not infallible, they are also decidedly not mechanical. In face of the “materialistic assumptions” of the scientific community of his day, he emphasized the indeterministic character of nature’s habits, in tandem with which the spontaneity of instinctive adaptation of organisms to their environments occupies the tychistic front-end of teleological-evolutionary functions in general. Nature loves to hide, as Heraclitus said, but also to learn—and Nature learns by activating its ubiquitously arrayed instincts to learn.

Peirce’s early interest in Friedrich von Schiller’s phenomenological-ontological descriptions of the Spieltrieb (play-instinct) was only one of many important indications of this doctrine of the degrees of the proliferating plasticity of nature and human intelligence. After Schiller, whose doctrine of the Spieltrieb reprised the “free play” of the aesthetic imagination in Kant’s formulations of the reflective judgment in his third Critique, Schelling and Emerson owned this doctrine; and—as

38 This paper was originally conceived as a two-part paper, the other half featuring the provenance of Emerson’s ubiquitous doctrine of connatural semiosis which Peirce absorbed. The following is only one of dozens of Emerson’s expression of connatural semiosis that are already conspicuous in his first work, Nature (1836) and continue all the way to his final writing, “The Natural History of Intellect” (1870-71): “This guiding identity runs through all the surprises and contrasts of the piece, and characterizes every law. Man carries the world in his head, the whole astronomy and chemistry suspended in a thought. Because the history of nature is characterized in his brain, therefore is he the prophet and discoverer of her secrets. Every known fact in natural science was divined by the presentiment of somebody, before it was actually verified. A man does not tie his shoe without recognizing laws which bind the farthest regions of nature; moon, plant, gas, crystal, are concrete geometry and numbers. Common sense knows its own, and recognizes the fact at first sight in chemical experiment. The common sense of Franklin, Dalton, Davy, and Black, is the same commonsense which made the arrangements which now it discovers.” (Emerson, E&L, 548).

39 As an historical “additament” to this topic—which I also hope to pursue elsewhere—the “Enlightenment” provenance of Peirce’s doctrine of instinctive rationality can be traced to the “moral writings” of—yes!—David Hume, and, through Hume’s influence in Germany, to Hamann, who was Hume’s follower and interlocutor with Kant. But it is important to return to the consideration that Peirce, in working from the Schellingian-Emersonian line of “naturalistic” orientation, regarded himself as diverging from predominantly “psychological” and/or “culture”-centered versions of experience, as he found in Hume and even in James or Dewey.

40 See Dilworth (2014) on Peirce’s convergence with and transformation of Schiller’s Aesthetic Letters.
indicated above—Peirce followed suite, incorporating it as part of his theoretical repertory in such essays as “The Architecture of Theories” and “The Doctrine of Determinism Examined” (1891-92). In “A Guess at the Riddle” (1887-88) and “Man’s Glassy Essence” (1892) he specifically addressed the spontaneous vitality of instinct in the terms of the non-reductive “accommodations” of protoplasmic organisms to their environments.

And we are seeing that he reprised this indeterminist theme here in MS 682: “It is true that neither man nor beast has any immediate appeal from a judgment rendered by his instinct. Yet the instincts of the more intelligent mammals, birds, and insects, sometimes undergo modification under new experience.” What is more, “The instincts of mankind, owing to the vastly greater range of our ideas, can be anticipated and prove more mutable by far than the vital instincts of beasts.”

Now, then, given the base line that reasoning begins as an instinctive performance, and thus coming “first” in the transactions of organism and environment, can alone be employed to correct itself, it is necessary to ascertain “what makes the difference between genuine reasoning and other things that pass through the mind.” But again, if animals—“dogs, horses magpies, canaries”—as well as humans have “both comprehensible and incomprehensible instincts,” it is necessary to decide the “natural” foundation of “correct” human reasoning, especially of an authentic scientific kind. In this regard Peirce—still donning his hat as logician and metaphysician—goes on to reject “modern psychology” as capable of providing the foundation of authentic scientific reasoning. “Although it can be of precious service in planning and executing the observations on which the reasonings depend and from which they spring”—he avers—“Observation qua Noticing, as in Attentive Sensation” characteristic of the Secondness of inductive empirical method, “does not make up the whole of Scientific Observation.” “Science”—Peirce rather avers—is “something erected upon a foundation of Observation, but distinct from that foundation.”

Moreover, it is in this crucial context of MS 682 that Peirce asserts that, beyond inductive observation, reasonings may be udder-full. Repeating why he chose the unusual word “uberty” (Latin for ubertas meaning abundance, copiousness) instead of “fruitfulness” “merely because it is spelled with half as many letters,” he affirms that “Observations may be fruitful as you will,” but they cannot be said to be “gravid with young truth in the sense in which [abductive] reasonings may be, not because of the nature of the subject it considers, but because of the manner in which it is supported by the ratiocinative process.” This “manner” concerns the question of “the

41 MS 682:467-468. Here again it is a useful illustration to refer to William James’ chapter on “Instinct” in The Principles of Psychology, volume two, 1890, where under the heading that “animal and human instincts are not always blind or invariable,” James describes how “Man has a far greater variety of impulses than any lower animal” (p. 390); how variations in contingent circumstances account for the “masking of the elementary constitution of the instinctive life” (p. 392); how reason cannot inhibit an instinctive impulse, but rather that “the only thing that can neutralize an impulse is an impulse the other way” (p. 393); and all this in James’ magisterial phenomenological description of the “minuteness of adaptations” in the ways of both “structure” and of “conduct” of organisms (p. 384).

42 Ibid., p. 470.

43 Ibid., p. 471, Peirce’s emphases.
degree of confidence” reached by different ways of reasoning, and, further, what ways of reasoning, “though more hazardous, may put us on the track of important truths that no safer ways of reasoning could ever suggest to us,” but which, once suggested, “may be supported by such a multitude of independent lines of reasoning to commend a common conclusion.”

Back, then, to the question of the “pragmatic maxim” applying to an individual’s psychology: “Consciousness” in the sense of “being aware of”—“as the psychologists strangely talk, the content of my consciousness,”—“is evidently the entire universe, so far as I am concerned.” Yet, as there are “wonderful revelations through error”—Peirce continues—he has an *instinctive awareness* that “the universe will go on in some definite fashion after I am dead and gone independently of my awareness of it.” In fact, our reasoning instinct “makes us pretty much aware of it all in advance of any such reflections.” Given our instinctive embodiment of this overarching premise of fallibilism in the future course of nature and history, what, then, is the “authority of instinct,” considering that instinct itself is but a “generalization of abstractions”—“one of the brood of language or of thought”—even though it is one that can be said to be “as intimate as that between body and mind”?

As to this question of the authority of instinct, Peirce does not provide a further articulation here, but rather simply returns to his bottom line categorical commitment to the Firstness, or immediate self-evidentiary basis, of connatural imaginative semiosis. He re-probes the “authority of instinct” by reasserting that we call an action “instinctive” when the animal action is “not mechanical” but “voluntary” in the sense of exhibiting species-beneficial “accommodations” with respect to effects beyond the range of observational knowledge. “Voluntary” in this broad usage implicates the trivalence of the Three Categories applied within an evolutionary perspective that cannot be examined by any linear apriorism of necessary causality. And Peirce, once again, sets the free imaginative plasticity of human quale-consciousness on the high end of that.

MS 682 concludes with an oblique reference to the Thirdness of evolutionary consciousness by way of a brief, but also undeveloped, discussion of the organic sedimentation of general and particular instincts in terms of “extensive” and “intensive” senses, or the two quantities of “breath and depth” (MS 682:473).

Now, then, though this MS 682 on “Uberty” remains unfinished, let us gather together the threads of Peirce’s articulation up to this point and frame them in the terms of his overall phenomenological and metaphysical commitments. As noted above, Peirce himself has invited us to do this retroductive work.

These interwoven pieces of his discussion of “the logic of uberty” clearly recapitulate the leading categories of his career-text. Thus they rehearse a long-standing theme as to the non-mechanical character of nature’s habit-formation

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44 Ibid., p. 472. Peirce’s following remark is worthy of a separate paper: “In the first place all that science has done is to study those relations between objects which were brought into prominence and conceiving which we had been endowed with some original knowledge in two instincts—the instinct of *feeding*, which brought with it elementary knowledge of mechanical forces, space, etc., and the instinct of *breeding*, which brought with it elementary knowledge of psychical motives, of time, etc.” (BUCHLER, 1955, p. 53); CP 1.118.

articulated in such essays as “The Doctrine of Necessity Examined,” “Man’s Glassy Essence,” and ‘Evolutionary Love.’ According to these articulations, we **instinctively recognize** that the signs not only of habit-formation but also of the possibilities of habit-formation are **ubiquitous in nature**, not just “mental” in the sense of confined to human consciousness (CP 5.492). And we **live in** and by these signs in a “universe perfused with signs.” Therefore Peirce's non-nominalistic “One Law of Mind” portrays the intellect as consisting of a plasticity of natural habits (CP 6.86), of which instinct is the front edge of this very **plasticity**—of this very **vitality**, by which we **live**, and **breathe**, and **feed**, and **have**, and **reproduce** our connatural being. Plants too feed on their habits; the bed formed by a stream of water does no less (CP 1.390). And this doctrine of the ubiquity of signs of ongoing qualitative origination in nature and experience co-implicates Peirce’s objective idealism and underlying cosmogony, doctrines which retroduct how law is developed out of pure chance, irregularity, and indeterminacy (CP 6.213). They retroduct “a growing virtue” after the universe started the germ of a generalizing tendency (and so too with a human *vir* who exercises rational self-control) (CP 6.33). Peirce’s regulative principle of synecism therefore underwrites the perspective that there is continuous growth in the universe (CP 1.175, 1.362), such that “The evolutionary process is, therefore, not a mere evolution of the existing universe, but rather a process by which the very Platonic forms themselves have become or are becoming developed” (CP 6.194). Accordingly, “We must search for this generalizing tendency in such departments of nature where we find plasticity and evolution still at work. The most plastic of all things is the human mind, and next after that come the organic world, the world of protoplasm. Now the generalizing tendency is the great law of mind, the law of association, the law of habit taking” (CP 7.515).

It will be recognized that Peirce produced many such systematic variations on these signature themes regarding the connatural plasticity of human intelligence as a habit-taking resource.

But, in sum, we are noting that the “Uberty” manuscripts of 1913 presuppose the full gamut of such foundational phenomenological-and-metaphysical themes under the heading of *Reason originating in the spontaneous Firstness of instinct*. They patently inform Peirce’s later-phase penchant to assert the heuristic primacy of quale-consciousness in the logic of inquiry *tout court*. He thus set this heuristic primacy, for example, within an overall theory of the continuity of nature and the human mind in his 1898 lectures on *Reasoning and the Logic of Things.*

These articulations of “the logic of events” bypass the consideration of “security in reasoning” of the merely individualized psychological effects of outer and inner “pragmatic” conduct in favor of “uberty in reasoning” featured in the historical-natural potentials of “the will to learn” as distinguished from the psychologized attitude of “the will to believe.” But again, this is part and parcel of his conception of the essentially hypothetical character of mathematics, which no longer validates the exclusive paradigm of apodictive certainty in traditional metaphysics.

Co-incidentally—I am suggesting in this paper—Peirce’s “logic in uberty” culminates his career-long transformation of Kant’s heuristic principle of the

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47  EP 2:47.
“reflective judgment” with regard to our “regulative” transcendental presumption (“hope”) as to the intelligibility of the “contingency of nature” (in aesthetic and teleological judgments). And at bottom, it is of a single piece with Peirce’s insistence on the—now in an Emersonian sense—exercise of the form of transparently uberoous quale-consciousness he came to feature in “A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God” of 1908.

5 Instinctive reasoning gravid with new births in “A Neglected Argument”

On Peirce’s terms, all reasoning has its basis in the instinctual inheritances, performances, and accomplishments of our evolutionary past. This “natural” (i.e. synechistic) dynamic extends in degrees through all the specific proliferations of animals, plants, and insects. At the same time, Peirce’s text has marked the difference between observational intelligence of the ordinary inductive kind and of intuitive reasoning in “uberty,” the latter referring to the “insecure” but “gravid with new births” inferences of hypothetical instinct, which alone puts a “smile” on esthetic, moral, and scientific life of the distinctively human kind.

Further purchase on this “smile” results when we backtrack a little from 1913 to mark the continuity of his late-phase declaration of the instinctive primacy of quale-consciousness in his “A Neglect Argument for the Reality of God” (1908). In this mature essay on phaneroscopic “Musement” that was three months in the making at Arisbe, Peirce, drawing once again on Schiller’s Spieltrieb in tandem with a “transparent-eyeball” Emersonian Transcendentalism,48 re-declared his doctrine of the truth-discovering potency of Abduction qua Instinctive Reasoning.

After offering his “Musement” hypothesis concerning “the reality of God”—one, he insists, that will affect “any normal man” who considers one or more of “the three Universes”—Peirce moves on to discuss its “logicality.” He says he intends to lay down “a series of plausible points through which the reader will have to construct the continuous line of reasoning for himself.”49 (A similar invitation to the reader’s retroductive power we have seen in the later papers on “Uberty.”) Here he reaffirms his bedrock orientation that “every inquiry whatsoever takes its rise in the observation, in one or another of the three Universes, of some surprising phenomenon, which engenders “some point of view whence the wonder shall be resolved.”50 But this resolution pertains not to inductive, but rather to the felt inciency of embodied quale-consciousness per se. In this “First” phenomenological modality he addresses the character of a “Plausible conjecture” that furnishes a “possible Explanation” of such a “wonderful phenomenon” in terms of “the bursting out of the startling conjecture.” He continues by remarking on such a startling conjecture’s “smooth-fitting to the anomaly” by way of repeating an allusion to Edgar Allan Poe’s lock-key metaphor (437).51

48 See KRUSE, 2014.
49 EP 2:440.
50 EP 2:441.
51 Referring to how we venture beyond direct observation—while obliquely invoking his methodic maxim of Not Blocking the Road of Inquiry—Peirce writes: “Illustrations of
And it is precisely in the context to employing Edgar Allan Poe’s metaphor that Peirce goes on to pen his perhaps most famous Transcendentalist declaration on Instinct, one where “logical analysis can be put to its full efficiency in Musement”: “Enter your skiff of Musement,”—he writes in Emersonian fashion—“push off into the lake of thought, and leave the breath of heaven to swell your sail. With your eyes open, awake to what is about or within you, and open conversation with yourself; for such is all meditation.”\(^52\) The passage patently implies a meditative mind self-absorbed in connatural semiosis.

Directly in the sequel to this famous passage, Peirce proceeds to fit the “smoothly-fitting” lock-key heuristic to “the First Stage of Inquiry,” whose “characteristic formula of reasoning I term Retroduction, i.e. reasoning from consequent to antecedent.”\(^53\) This—Peirce says—is the form of “Argument rather than of Argumentation” he endeavors to employ in the N.A. And—we can further note—it appears as another anticipation of the later unfinished “Uberty” paper on “this momentous business of reasoning” of 1913 when he goes on to affirm that this kind of inferential Retroduction “does not afford security.” The examination of the “Musement” hypothesis must be tested, and this is done not in Retroduction itself but by mustering all sorts of conditional experiential consequences which follow from its truth—and this constitutes “the Second Stage of Inquiry” going under the name of Deduction.\(^54\)

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\(^{52}\) EP 2:437. The metaphor of “pushing off on the skiff of Musement” has a precedent in Emerson: “My house stands on low land, with limited outlook, and on the skirt of the village. But I go with my friend to the shore of our little river, and with one stroke of the paddle, I leave the village politics and personalities, yes, and the world of villages and personalities behind, and pass into a delicate realm of sunset and moonlight, too bright almost for spotted man to enter without noviciate and probation. We penetrate bodily this incredible beauty; we dip our hands in this painted element; our eyes are bathed in these lights and forms. A holiday, a villeggiatura, a royal revel, the proudest, most heart-rejoicing festival that valor and beauty, power and taste, ever decked and enjoyed, establishes itself on the instant. These sunset clouds, these delicately emerging stars, with their private and ineffable glances, signify it and proffer it. I am taught the poorness of our invention, the ugliness of towns and palaces. Art and luxury have early learned that they must work as enhancement and sequel to this original beauty.” Emerson, “Nature,” Essays: Second Series, 1844, E & L, 543.

\(^{53}\) EP 2:441.

\(^{54}\) Deduction has two parts, Explication of the hypothesis to render it as perfectly distinct as possible, and Demonstration, or Deductive Argumentation, a “corollarial,” as distinguished from a “theorematic” procedure, which corollarial aspect Peirce says is best learned from Book I of Euclid’s Elements. Peirce reintroduces his doctrine of the nature of a diagram, comprised of Icon, Indices, and Symbols, here. (EP 2:441-442).
Such inquiry then enters upon a “Third Stage,” itself having three parts, first, that of Classification, which is “an Inductive Non-Argumentational kind of Argument,” by which general ideas are attached to objects of Experience; second, Probations, which are direct Inductive Argumentations (in the form of either “precariously Crude” or “Gradual”); and, third, a Sentential stage which “by Inductive reasonings appraises the different Probations singly, then their combination,” on the way to passing final judgment on the whole result. After further remarks on the degrees of logical certainty obtained by Deductive and Inductive procedures, Peirce returns to address “the bottom question of logical Critic,” namely “what sort of validity can be attributed to the First Stage of inquiry?” This is to return to the question of the “insecurity of reasoning” in Retroduction/Abduction characteristic of Musement that blossoms forth again in the “Uberty” essay.

And here again Peirce repeats his signature doctrine that “neither Deduction nor Induction contributes the smallest positive item to the final conclusion of the inquiry.”55 For the span of millennia during which Mankind made its way from primitive communication to scientific inquiry, Mankind has built “a cantilever bridge of induction.” “Yet every plank of its advance”—he continues—“is first laid by Retroduction alone, that is to say, by the spontaneous conjecture of instinctive reason, and neither Deduction nor Induction contributes a single new concept of the structure. Nor is this less true or less important for those inquiries that self-interest prompts.”56

Accordingly, Peirce goes on further to adumbrate the doctrine of the “Uberty” papers in saying that “the strength of the [hypothetical] impulse is a symptom of its being instinctive.” “Animals of all races rise far above the general level of their intelligence in those performances that are their proper function, such as flying and nest-building for ordinary birds; and what is man’s proper function if it not be to embody general ideas in art-creations, in utilities, and above all in theoretical cognition.”57 The “proper function of the human kind” here (in 1908) then also anticipates the famous remark in the “Uberty” essay (MS 682 of 1913) that pragmatic behavior, which is witnessed in the naturalistic accounts of the higher animals, “does not bestow a single smile upon beauty, upon moral virtue, or upon abstract truth:—the three things that alone raise Humanity above Animality.”

Be that as it may, the text now returns to the general question of “impulsive reasoning,” analogous to the instincts of birds and wasps, as involving “some hypothesis, or else forgo all further knowledge than that which we have already gained.” It is not, however, a “magical faculty” that produces “guessing right” the first time, nor perhaps the second; “but [still, that]. […] the well-prepared mind has wonderfully soon guessed each secret of nature, is historical truth. All the theories of science have been so obtained.”58

In the sequel Peirce argues against his doctrine of Abduction being returnable to fortuitously grounded chance modifications (as in tychastic Darwinism) or to those brought forward by the deductive necessitarians (as in anancasm). He rather

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56 EP 2:443.
57 EP 2:443.
58 EP 2:444.
pointedly re-invokes his core doctrine of the semiotic connaturalism of the mind and nature: “man’s mind must have been attuned to the truth of things in order to discover what he has discovered. It is the very bedrock of logical truth.”

Now, as can be documented in further study, this “very bedrock of logical truth” has its provenance in the Transcendentalist writings of Emerson which carried over the Naturphilosophie of Goethe and Schelling to a previous generation of 19th-century trans-Atlantic American thought. Peirce transparently acknowledged his debt to Schelling, Emerson, Frederic Hedge and other Transcendentalists in his mid-career metaphysical essay, “The Law of Mind” of 1892. As well, he developed three forms of evolution (tychasm, anancasm, agapasm) subtending epistemological accounts of the appearance of historical ideas in “Evolutionary Love” of 1893. Here, fifteen years later in 1908, he re-cites “the model of Galileo” who founded modern science on il lumen naturale, the natural light of instinctive reasoning, in its function of discovery of the “simpler” hypothesis—not the logically simpler, but the simpler “in the sense of the more facile and natural, the one that instinct suggests, that must be preferred; for the reason that unless man have a natural bent in accordance with nature’s, he has no chance of understanding nature, at all.”

And thus “if the maxim is correct in Galileo’s sense,” it follows that “man has, in some degree, a divinatory power, primary or derived, like that of a wasp or bird,” whence “instances swarm to show that a certain altogether peculiar confidence in a hypothesis, not to be confounded with rash cocksureness, has a very appreciable value as a sign of the truth of the hypothesis.”

From these phenomenological remarks on the degree of assurance afforded by natural and normal instinct, Peirce then returns to the main trajectory of the essay to assert that “The N.A. excites this peculiar confidence in the very highest degree” when experienced in tandem with “the Pragmatistic correlative,” namely “its Plausibility”—the ultimate value of which lies in its influencing a person’s “conduct of life.”

Further to solidify this point, we know that in his later-phase writings Peirce rang many changes on the criterion of “the conduct of life” in the “vitally important

59 Ibid.
61 EP 2:445. Cf. W8:94-95. Peirce’s draft of his first Monist paper Architecture of Theories refers to Galileo’s il lume naturale and the instinctual connatural capacity of the human intellect to understand nature. Peirce also discusses Galileo’s principle in the published version, together with some additional interesting lines. He says that dynamics “has been in large part pumped up from the well of truth WITHIN US,” il lume naturale, and “how amazingly slender is his [Galileo’s] experimentation.” The context here is important too. Peirce is reviewing the history of the sciences in order to see what philosophy can learn from them. In dynamics, aka physics—the MOTHER of the natural sciences—he finds that it relies on our natural capacity to guess correctly; it is not based exclusively on “secure” experiment, but also on the liberty of our connatural imagination. It should be added that this would be unsavory to a positivist or analytic philosopher who deferentially defers to the methods of the natural sciences assuming that they are the exclusive “secure” ground for philosophy.

62 EP 2:446.
matters of life.” (The phrase itself appears to be a direct terminological influence from Emerson’s 1860 publication of that title.) Prior to his 1908 N.A., his 1906 remarks on the pragmatist’s necessarily “vague” concept of God also adumbrated this sense of the plausibility of “instinctive argument.” In referring to the lessons of the Buddha, Confucius, Socrates and the superhuman courage of missionaries working among lepers, he writes that “the only guide” to the answer concerning whether all this is just a figment of the imagination or just fanaticism lies in “the power of the passion of love which more or less overmasters every agnostic scientist and everybody who seriously and deeply considers the universe.” The passage continues: “But whatever there be of an argument in all this is as nothing, the merest nothing, in comparison to its force as an appeal to one’s own instinct, which is to argue what substance is to shadow, what bed-rock is to the built foundations of a cathedral.”

If we now return to another of Peirce’s compresent pools of thought, we can also note that this Pragmatistic correlative of Musement further coincides with the so-to-speak Agapistic correlative of a person’s “conduct of life.” In “Evolutionary Love” of 1893 this has to do with an ethical life characterized as a “circular” projecting of creations into independency and drawing them into harmony, such as “in sacrificing your own perfection to the perfectionment of your neighbor.” Such harmonious ethical “creations” obtain in Peirce’s adaption of St. John’s gospel to an evolutionary philosophy, which teaches “that growth comes only from love”; they further extend to the greater circle of one’s vital ideas, which are to be made to grow “by cherishing and tending them as I would the flowers of my garden.” Accordingly, “The philosophy we draw from John’s gospel is that this is the way mind develops; and as for the cosmos, only so far as it is yet mind, and so has life, is it capable of further evolution.”

In sum, the reader inevitably divines that these phenomenological-metaphysical pools of thought inter-circulate in Peirce’s mind, and that their conscious and unconscious thought ensembles concerning the ethical vitality of mind are undercurrents in his discussion of “Uberty” in 1913. (To change to Peirce’s other metaphor, they are smoothly-fitting keys to one another.)

But in his mature phase Peirce also conceived the “first” normative theoretical science of Esthetics to consist in the Idea, qua an “unanalyzable impression,” of the Admirable per se of Concrete Reasonableness, governing the normative functions of Ethics and Logic. As a regulative principle, this Esthetic ideal of quale-consciousness is to be “cherished and tended” at the head of the list of the

63 Emerson’s 1860 The Conduct of Life. The first of Peirce’s Cambridge Conference lectures of 1898, “Philosophy and the Conduct of Life,” (EP2 Item 4, pp. 27 ff.) centers on his distinction between matters of vital importance and the selfless advancement of knowledge; for the former, reason is said to be a poor substitute for sentiment and instinct.
64 BUCHLER, 1955, p. 377; CP 6.502-03.
67 MS 310 (1903); EP 2:377-378, 388.
Peirce’s last philosophic will and testament: Uberty in the logic of instinctive reasoning

efficaciously civilizing ideas of prospective ethics, logic, and metaphysics.\(^68\) No wonder that “uberty” is smiling!

Both in “A Guess” of 1887-88 and again in writing on “Spiritualism” in 1906 Peirce cast these orientations of his thought in terms of what he called an Asymptotic Hyperbolic Worldview. This is the open-ended, forward-moving process of cosmic growth which includes but subordinates the Epicurean (and Darwinian) tychastic worldview he characterized as Elliptic and the pre-established necessitarian universe he characterized as Parabolic.\(^69\) Peirce’s doctrine of Instinct is implicated here. On the one hand, Instinct takes one all the way back, in Schellingian nostalgia, to firstly a Zero of absolute freedom and secondly to a Platonic World, of the cosmogonic beginning,\(^70\) while on the other, in its normative trajectories, Instinct presuppose a Kantian and Emersonian progressive “Taste for the Beautiful”—or rather, of Beauty in Peirce’s theoretically reconstructed sense of Esthetics, his open-ended sense of Pragmaticism’s regulative ideal of the Admirable \textit{per se}.\(^71\)

The expanding thesis of this paper, then, has been that in his last months Peirce harvested the various bottom line doctrines of his career-text in the “smiling” uberty concept concerning the “new gospel” of \textit{prospective} rationality. In this “legacy” doctrine of the function of the connatural imagination in abductive reasoning, he combined Schelling’s sense of a “progressive metaphysical empiricism” with an attendant claim that he had reinvented “logic” in the uberous service of metaphysical philosophy, placing it within an asymptotic hyperbolic reformulation of St. John’s Logos.

\(^{68}\) “The pragmaticist does not make the \textit{summum bonum} to consist in action, but makes it consist in that process of evolution whereby the existent comes more and more to embody those generals which were just now said to be destined, which is what we strive to express in calling them reasonable” (CP 5.43).

\(^{69}\) EP 1:251 (1887-88); cf. CP 6.552-555 (1906): “Hyperbolic philosophy. Reason marches from premisses to conclusion; nature has ideal end different from its origin.” “Hyperbolic philosophy has to assume for starting-point something \textit{free}, as neither requiring explanation nor admitting derivation. The free is living; the immediately living is \textit{feeling}. Feeling, then is assumed as starting-point; but feeling uncoordinated having its manifoldness implicit. For principle of progress or growth […] a tendency to generalization.”

\(^{70}\) GUARDIANO, 2016.

\(^{71}\) Peirce came to ground his doctrine of the governing priority of the normative science of Esthetics in his Three Categories (EP 2:189-201). It may be worth noting one affine precedent to this in the early 19th c. writings of Johann Friedrich Herbart (1776-1841), who is considered the founder of modern psychology and educational theory and was regarded by his contemporaries as a philosopher of the first rank as polemical critic of the German Idealists (as well as impacting Helmholtz, Wundt, Natorp, Freud, and Husserl). Herbart’s doctrine of the normative or “ideal” primacy of “Aesthetics” such that Ethical judgments are a kind of resultant aesthetic judgment involves revelation of the “simple relations” that generate absolute judgments of approbation or depreciation in case of a “perfect” paradigm of aesthetic Idea of representing, and thus making us conscious of the possibility of originary perfection of any particular relationship whatsoever. For a fuller account, see Alan Kim, “Herbart,” in the \textit{Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy}, http://plato.standford.edu/win2015/enties/johann-herbart, first published 12/7/2015.
Coincidentally to mentioning Schelling’s influence, it is worth noting that, while Peirce appears to have hewed close to Hegel’s grand system of *The Phenomenology of Spirit* and subsequent works on certain essential points, Peirce regarded Hegel’s doctrine of “three stages of thought” as falling short of the indecomposable Tritism of his Three Categories. Hegel’s “three stages” of a singular self-consciousness of the Absolute Spirit do not coincide with Peirce’s “Three Universes,” to say nothing of Transcendental Musement in the N.A. Hegel’s way of thinking—Peirce, following Schelling, polemically charged—is essentially retrospective, a *vis a tergo* dialectical sublation of past processes into the unity of an a priori Absolute Knowledge. The Owl of Minerva flies at dusk. Against Hegel’s parabolic anacasm, Peirce set vitally prospective natural *instinct*, the world’s hyperbolic habit-formation of connatural imagination, as the basis of “insecure” abductive/retroductive reasoning in “uberty.”

In conclusion, we can return to Peirce’s own musing on the term itself. As witnessed above in his sense of the word in MS 683, he pointedly chose “uberty” “not because it strikes him as a supremely charming word,” nor has he preferred it to “fruitfulness” because it spells its three syllables with only half as many letters. “Fruitfulness” may continue indefinitely without fulfilling its promise, while “uber; or udder, is sure to be often gravid with nutritious food every time the hour-hand goes round,” [...] thus expressing the character of being “actually gravid with living and prolific truth.” *Instinct is itself truth-making life,* which is to say, *manifestation of the very vitality of life.*

And thus a few months before he died, Peirce reaffirmed the signature profile of his career in highlighting that his multifaceted contribution to the history of logic and, in tandem with that, of phenomenology, the normative sciences, metaphysics, and semiotics—bottoms out in his account of the connatural semiosis of nature and inventive human intelligence. This doctrine of a “universe perfused with signs” involves a “First” categorical obligation that instinct-based reasoning *may be udder-full.* By this logic of uberous abduction Peirce accounts for all the past, present, and future discoveries in the entire range and registers of the sciences and the arts as well as the vital impulses of experience in general. Superior to bluff inductive-empiricist and apriorist-apodictic forms of inquiry seen in the history of philosophy and science (though these are still erroneously insisted on in our contemporary period), the prospective character of “uberty in reasoning” was in effect Peirce’s “last word.”

**Bibliography**


Peirce’s last philosophic will and testament: Uberty in the logic of instinctive reasoning

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