TWARDOWSKI: CONTENT AS MEDIATOR BETWEEN THE ACT AND THE OBJECT OF PRESENTATION

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Abstract: The purpose of this article is to investigate the notion of content of presentation as stated by Kasimir Twardowski in his opuscule Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen. In proposing the distinction between act, content and object, Kasimir Twardowski thinks he is making a correction of the Brentanian theory of psychic phenomena that in the face of the physics phenomenon always has an immanent object, intentional. Thus, in Franz Brentano’s Psychologie vom Empirischen Standpunkt, considers content and object as synonyms. However, with a new structure of psychic phenomena, which is now divided into three elements by Twardowski (act, content and object), doubts arise regarding the status of the content. This is due to the way the Polish philosopher presents and assimilates his notion of content to Höfler’s notion, where content functions as a mere psychic “copy” (Abbild), as if it were a mental substitute for the object. There is in Twardowskian thought a positive definition of content rather than a mere distinction between content and object, nor the claim that content functions as a mere psychic image (Bild) of the object. The Polish philosopher thus reformulates the theory of the functions of the name by establishing a parallel between names and presentations, where meaning has the mediating function, such as content. In this respect, we can see points of convergence between Frege’s differentiation between sense and reference and Twardowski’s between content and object. We infer, therefore, that conceiving the content as mediator between the act and the object is one of the peculiarities of the distinction proposed by Twardowski in Zur Lehre.

Keywords: Twardowski. Content and object. Presentation.

TWARDOWSKI: CONTEÚDO COMO MEDIACÃO ENTRE O ATO E O OBJETO DA APRESENTAÇÃO

Resumo: O objetivo deste artigo é investigar a noção de conteúdo da apresentação, como afirma Kasimir Twardowski em seu opulento Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen. Ao propor a distinção entre ato, conteúdo e objeto, Kasimir Twardowski pensa que está corrigindo a teoria brentaniana dos fenômenos psíquicos que, diante do fenômeno físico, sempre tem um objeto imanente, intencional. Assim, na Psychologie vom Empirischen Standpunkt, de Franz Brentano, considera conteúdo e objeto como sinônimos. No entanto, com uma nova estrutura de fenômenos psíquicos, que agora é dividida em três elementos por Twardowski (ato, conteúdo e objeto), surgem dúvidas sobre o status do conteúdo. Isso se deve à maneira como o filósofo polonês apresenta e assimila sua noção de conteúdo à noção de Höfler, onde o conteúdo funciona como uma mera “cópia” psíquica (Abbild), como se fosse um substituto mental para o objeto. Existe no pensamento
Twardowskiano uma definição positiva de conteúdo, em vez de uma mera distinção entre conteúdo e objeto, nem a alegação de que o conteúdo funciona como uma mera imagem psíquica (Bild) do objeto. O filósofo polonês reformula, assim, a teoria das funções do nome, estabelecendo um paralelo entre nomes e apresentações, onde o significado tem a função mediadora, como o conteúdo. A esse respeito, podemos ver pontos de convergência entre a diferenciação de Frege entre sentido e referência e a de Twardowski entre conteúdo e objeto. Inferimos, portanto, que conceber o conteúdo como mediador entre o ato e o objeto é uma das peculiaridades da distinção proposta por Twardowski em Zur Lehre.


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1 Introduction

An important point about the distinction between content and object in work Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen¹ can be expressed in the following question: what is the function the content exercises in psychic activity of presenting? Obviously, we could ask some question with respect to the object, however, as a delimitation of our research, we will only treat of notion of content and more specifically its function in triple division of the psychic phenomena.

Thus, the determining factor for the distinction between Twardowski’s content and object is conceiving the first as a mean term between the act and the object of presentation, that is, the content has a specific function in this structure. There is in Twardowskian thought a positive definition of content in such a way that we cannot conceive it as mere opposition in the object and as little as its psychic image or as a mental substitute of it. This interpretation can be confirmed when we look at the distinction made in the linguistic plan that is also presented in Zur Lehre, where the meaning of a name is the means by which we refer to an object that is designated by the name. Such an approach bears some similarity to Frege’s distinction between sense and reference, and we will establish the proximities and divergences between both philosophers in this regard.

We will begin our presentation dealing with the proposed distinction by Twardowski before Alois Höfler and Franz Brentano and then we shall approach the analogy between names and presentation, in order to put in evidence our interpretation of the author’s notion of content.

2 The distinction between content and object of presentation

From the Brentano’s theses, his disciples Höfler and Twardowski pointed to an ambiguity in the statement that something is given as an immanent object to every psychic phenomenon (cf. BRENTANO, 1973, I, § 5 pp. 124-5). This ambiguity refers to the very expression “immanent or intentional object”, which could be interpreted, sometimes, as an object, and sometimes as content.² Twardowski (ZL, p. 4) cites

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¹ We will use for this work the abbreviation ZL, with the pages referring to the German edition of 1894. When using the English and Portuguese translations, indicate the year of the respective editions.

² We will limit ourselves to presenting the way Twardowski interprets this Brentanian thesis, without discussing its validity before what Brentano supposedly wanted to assert with it. Such an analysis
Höfler’s distinction at the beginning of his text, and certainly his arguments were the starting point for the analysis of the Polish philosopher (cf. WOLEŃSKI, 1998, p. 24). But if, on the one hand, Twardowski proposes to distinguish between content and object by quoting Höfler, on the other hand, this would lead one to believe that the differentiation which both perform would be identical, whereas in fact there is an essential dissimilarity between both treatments about content and object (cf. PORTA, 2007, p. 268).³

In Höfler’s case,⁴ there seems to be only a mere distinction between content and object. This means that what he intends is not to establish a positive relationship, but an opposition, between content and object. Thus, “the content-object opposition is reduced to the opposition immanent object – transcendent object (‘an-sich bestehendel’)” (PORTA, 2007, p. 269). In the following excerpt (which is even the text of Höfler that Twardowski quotes), we can better understand such questions:

(I). What we called “content of the presentation and the judgment”, lies just as much completely within the subject as the act of presentation and of judgment itself. (2). The words ‘thing’ and ‘object’ are used in two senses: on the one hand for that independently existing entity … at which our presentation and judgment aim, as it were; on the other hand, for the mental, more or less approximated, “picture” of the real entity which exists “in” us. This quasi-picture (more accurate: sign) is identical with the content mentioned under (I). (ZL, 1977, p. 1-2).

Content is taken as the immanent or intentional object that differs from the object transcendent to the act. The first lies in the subject in the same way as the act, and the second is the “thing in itself” (independent of thinking) for which the act of presenting is directed.⁵ The central question is that the relation between object and content for Höfler is a relation of copying, not of mediation, as in Twardowski’s case.⁶

This information is essential to understand the peculiarity of the Twardowskian distinction. Twardowski does not define the object by its transcendence, nor the content as mere copy, that is, he does not merely make a distinction between content and object, but establishes a positive relation between them (cf. PORTA, 2007, p.

would require a much more detailed study of Brentano and Twardowski, which would transcend the nature of this research.

³ According to Mario Porta (2007), this procedure is not very happy precisely because it is doubtful whether the distinction made by Twardowski and Höfler is the same.

⁴ The reference we make to Höfler is intended here only to show the difference and peculiarity of Twardowski in relation to the latter as regards the difference between content and object. For this, we will use Mario Porta’s (2007) reading on this subject and some considerations by Woleński (1998) on Höfler.

⁵ For Woleński, Höfler’s thesis can be summarized as follows: “(a) contents are within subjects and mental acts, (b) the term ‘object’ is ambiguous, because it can refer either to act-independent entities or to pictures (or: signs) of real entities existing ‘in’ us, (c) in order to avoid the ambiguity, one can call objects existing in us ‘immanent or intentional objects” (1998, p. 24).

⁶ With this, Höfler would be committed to a form of Lockean representationalism (cf. PORTA, 2007, p. 269).
That is, content functions as a mediator between the act and the object: “content is the means, as it were, by which the object is presented.” Referring to Zimmermann, Twardowski (ZL, p. 18) says that content is presented in (in) presentation, while the object is presented by (durch) the presentation content. What is presented in a presentation is its content, and what is presented by a presentation is its object. Thus, the relations that are established between the act and the content and between the act and the object are different. According to Porta (2007, p. 269), the content for Twardowski fulfills two functions: a) it constructs the relation of the act to an object and b) determines which object the act refers to.

In this perspective, we point out again that, for Twardowski, content is not merely a mental “copy” (Abbild), as if it were a mental substitute for the object, but that content functions as a bond (Bindglied) between the act and the object; the act refers to the object through the content. No other relation between content and object can be established beyond the intentional, that is, the object of presentation is presented through its content and both belong to the same act of presentation (ZL, p. 81).

3 Twardowski’s distinction from the linguistic perspective

This structure of the psychic phenomenon where the content has the mediation function between the act and the object has a linguistic counterpart that evidences this reading on Twardowski.

3.1 Analogy between names and presentations.

The parallel between names and presentations is made from the functions of the name (Name). For Twardowski, there is an analogy between psychic phenomena and the forms of language, and this comparison helps to clarify the distinction between content and object of presentations.

At this point, addressing the concept of name, Twardowski mentions John Stuart Mill (cf. MILL, A System of Logic Ratiocinative and Inductive, 1974, Book 1, Chapter 2, § 1, pp. 89-103). Mill had raised the question whether names are properly names of things or of our ideas about things (Mill, 1974, p. 89). Thing (Ding), in Mill’s perspective, is interpreted by Twardowski as corresponding to what he calls the object of presentation. In answering this question, Mill would be making a distinction between the content and the object of a presentation. “The word ‘sun’, thinks Mill, is the name of the sun and not the name of our presentation of the sun” (ZL, p. 10).

7 Just to make explicit, the “positive” sense of the distinction between content and object is that in which it establishes an intentional relationship between them, namely, content is the way of referring to the object. To this, it can be contrasted a “negative” sense (if one can use this term) between the content-object distinction, which does not establish an intentional relationship, but only a contrast between the two, as Höfler’s approach seems to suggest. It is from this perspective that we speak of a positive definition of content.

8 “[...] der Inhalt sei gleichsam das Mittel, durch welches der Gegenstand vorgestellt werde“ (ZL, p. 18).

9 “And this link, the content in our sense, is not the same as the act” (ZL, 1977, p. 29). “Und dieses Bindglied, der Vorstellungsinhalt in dem von uns angenommenen Sinne, ist nicht ein und dasselbe wie der Act.” (ZL, p. 31)
Thus, the name communicates to the listener a content of presentation and, at the same time, it names an object.

But, on the face of it, we may ask: what are names? Twardowski’s answer refers to two concepts developed by traditional logic, namely: the categorematic terms and the syncategorematic terms. The former are all means of language designation which are not merely co-signifiers, but simply the expression of a presentation (ZL, p. 11). In other words, categorematic terms are those that, taken by themselves, have a determined meaning, that is, they express something, and therefore express a presentation. Syncategorematic terms, on the other hand, are co-signifiers, that is, they alone do not have a determined meaning, do not express something, and cannot express presentations. Thus, names are categorematic terms, while the syncategorematic ones cannot be considered names, but only parts of names.

In the Twardowskian perspective, the names fulfill three functions: a) they inform an act of presentation; b) they evoke a psychic content and c) they name an object.

At first, it seems to be only a mere analogy between language and presentation, that is, between the functions of the name and the threefold division of the psychic phenomenon that Twardowski proposes to do. However, if we look closely at the consequences of all that Twardowski is affirming with this comparison, we will perceive both subtle points about the concept of content that he presents as well as the problems that will result from this, above all, in identifying meaning with psychic content (psychischen Inhalt), which will be criticized by Edmund Husserl.

Let us look at the details of these three functions of the name announced by Twardowski. First of all, if the name names something, that is because there is someone who announces it: it indicates the presence of a psychic act, so there is always an act of presentation that occurs in the speaker. Second, in announcing a

10 “According to Ockham: ‘The categorematic terms have and certain definite signification, just as the name ‘man’ signifies all men, and the name ‘animal’ all animals, and the name ‘whiteness’ all whiteness. Categorematic terms are linguistic units which, when taken in isolation, have a meaning. On the other hand, the syncategorematic terms: ‘[...] do not have a definite and certain meaning, nor do they mean things distinct from the things signified by the categorematics’. They are examples of syncategorematic terms, ‘all’, ‘none’, ‘and’, ‘or’, ‘while’, ‘only’ etc. Strictly speaking, syncategorematic terms taken in themselves have no meaning, that is, they are not meaningful units but functional units. They acquire signification (co-signify) when they are together with the categorematic terms, and thus modify or affect (denying, uniting, quantifying, etc.) their signification. Ockham compares them with the function of zero in arithmetic, which taken in isolation means nothing but gives meaning to the number to which it is added” (LEITE JÚNIOR, 2005, pp. 69-70)

11 “Words which are not capable of being used as names, but only as parts of names, were called by some of the schoolmen Syncategorematic terms [...] A word which could be used either as the subject or predicate of a proposition without being accompanied by any other word, was termed by the same authorities a Categorematic term” (MILL, 1974, I, § 2, p. 26-27).

12 Accordingly, the three functions of a name are: firstly, to make known an act of presentation which occurs in the speaker; secondly, to arouse a mental content, the meaning of the name, in the person addressed; thirdly, to designate an object which is presented through the presentation meant by the name” (ZL, 1977, p. 10)

13 Husserl criticizes Twardowski’s position in three places, namely: In his Critical Discussion (Besprechung) on Zur Lehre of 1894, Intentionale Gegenstände of 1894 and in Logische Untersuchungen 1901. On this subject see Cavallin (1997); Schuhmann (1993) and Van der Schaar (2015).
name, the one who does it intends to evoke in the listener the same psychic content that such a name fulfills for itself. Through the name, a psychic content is determined, it is revealed, and this content lies in the announcer himself. He presents to himself what he wants the listener to presents for himself. This determined psychic content, as it is called by Twardowski, is the “signification” (Bedeutung) of the name. Third, the name names things (Dinge) and not our presentations of things, so the names serve to communicate something (etwas) about things. The third function of the name appears as the denomination of objects that are presented by the presentation (meanings by the names).

There are certain similarities between Frege’s distinction between sense (Sinn) and reference (Bedeutung) (cf. FREGE, 2009, pp. 129-58) and the Twardowskian differentiation between content and object. In advance, we can say that what Twardowski calls an act of presentation (or, in the linguistic counterpart: name), Frege calls a sign (Zeichen) or name (Name) and by them he understands any designation that plays the role of a proper name (cf. FREGE, 2009, p. 131). What Twardowski calls content (or meaning of a name), kept in due proportion, Frege calls sense; and what Twardowski calls the object of a presentation, Frege, in turn, designates reference of sense. Frege distinguishes, therefore, between a sign (name), its reference and its sense.

In order to organize our exposition, we will present some similarities and dissimilarities between these two authors, thus highlighting the issue at hand.

In Fregian terms, sense also seems to intermediate the signal and the reference. Sense indicates the way in which we refer to a referent (FREGE, 2009, p. 131), in the sense is contained the mode presentation of the object. The way we refer to Venus may be different in both cases: “the morning star” and the “evening star”.

Let us consider the following passage by Frege *Sense and reference* (1948, p. 213), in which the intermediate character of sense is evidenced, but also an essential difference between him and Twardowski.

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14"When someone says: ‘sun, moon, and stars,’ he wants those who listen to think, just as he does, of the sun, the moon, and the stars.” (ZL, 1977, p. 9)

15 “It is this content which is the ‘meaning’ of a name” (ZL, 1977 p. 9). In a footnote, Twardowski (cf. ZL, p.11), quoting Marty, makes explicit that what he calls meaning (Bedeutung) of an expression (Ausdruck) is the content of the soul (Seeleninhalt), and that the name is sign (Zeichen) of a presentation.

16 Proper name, for Frege, is an expression that designates or refers to a given object and in a certain way. Some of the proper names were later named by Russell as “definite descriptions”, for example: “Plato’s disciple and Alexander’s master” (cf. FREGE, 2009, p. 131, translator’s note n. 11; p. 148, translator’s note n. 57).

17 “Es liegt nun nahe, mit einem Zeichen (Namen, Wortverbindung, Schriftzeichen) außer dem Bezeichneten, was die Bedeutung des Zeichens heißen möge, noch das verbunden zu denken, was ich den Sinn des Zeichens nennen möchte, worin die Art des Gegebenseins enthalten ist.” (FREGE, 1986, p 41).

18 “Sense is the mediator between the expression (proper name, conceptual term or sentence) and its referent” (FREGE, 2009, p. 132, note of the translator n.15).
The referent of a proper name is the object itself which we designate by its means; the conception which we thereby have, is wholly subjective; in between lies the sense, which is indeed no longer subjective like the conception, but is yet not the object itself. The following analogy will perhaps clarify these relationships. Somebody observes the moon through a telescope. I compare the moon itself to the referent; it is the object of the observation, mediated by the real image projected by the object glass in the interior of the telescope, and by the retinal image of the observer. The former I compare to the sense, the latter to the conception or experience. The optical image in the telescope is indeed on-sided and dependent upon the standpoint of observation; but it is still objective, inasmuch as it can be used by several observes. At any rate it could be arranged for several to use it simultaneously. But each one would have his own retinal image.

By means of sense, we designate an object, or in the Fregian terms, we refer to a referent, just as in the Twardowskian terms, by means of a content, we refer to an object of presentation. But if there is something similar in the treatment of both authors, there is also an effective difference between them. While the designated (or object) of Twardowski is compatible with Frege’s reference, the same does not occur in relation to the “meaning” of the first and the “meaning” (or sense) of the second (cf. GROSSMANN, 1977, pp. XXVIII-XXIX). The meaning, as already pointed out, is the content (psychischen Inhalt) of presentation and therefore is something psychic, sense, in Fregian terms, is not a psychic entity, that is, it is not something immanent, subjective, pertaining to presentation. This is a decisive difference, for Frege, rejecting the principle of immanence, denies that sense is something psychological or reducible to the plane of immanence (FREGE, 1986, p. 43-44). In one sentence, Frege compares the sense to what he calls “thought” (Gedanke), because one can substitute a word for a sentence, thus changing its meaning and hence its sense, and yet not changing its reference.

Finally, for Frege, there may be names that have no reference or that only have sense, while for polish this is a problem. Every name necessarily has a meaning and something that is designated. Thus, there are no presentations without object, but presentations in which the object does not exist.

It is evident that there is a certain closeness in the way these two philosophers treat the question of the distinction between names and their referents, even though there is an essential difference, especially with regard to the status of (Frege’s) meaning and content (Twardowski’s). We can say that Twardowski’s thesis is a psychological counterpart to Frege’s distinction (cf. BETTI, 2011, p. 11; CAVALLIN, 2011).

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19 On this subject, cf. another article by Frege (2002, p. 20) entitled Der Gedank.
20 “One may perhaps admit that an expression always has a sense, if it is grammatically well-constructed, and plays the role of a proper name. But this does not mean that there is always a reference corresponding to the sense. The words ‘the most distant celestial body on earth’ have a sense, but it is very doubtful that they also have a reference. [...] Therefore, to grasp a sense never assures the existence of its reference” (FREGE, 2009, p 139).
21 “What is not a problem for Frege’s theory of meaning of language – i.e., that some names do not have reference but only sense – becomes a critical issue for Twardowski. For the analogy between the level of presentations and the level of names in language to hold, all genuine names must (by definition) refer, or ‘have reference/referents’” (CAVALLIN 1997, p. 115).
1997, p. 53), because it confirms the interpretation that Twardowski’s content must be seen as a medium term.

Leaving aside the problems generated by Twardowski’s assertion that meanings of names are psychic contents, his initial goal here is to show that through the linguistic perspective one can both make a distinction between content and object, as well as confirm this distinction in the plane of presentations.

3.2 The equivalent presentations (*Wechselvorstellungen*)

One of the arguments used by Twardowski to distinguish content of object is the detection of what he calls equivalent presentations (*Wechselvorstellungen*). These are presentations that have “the same extension, but a different content” (ZL, p. 32), in other words, that have different contents that refer to the same object. Examples of these types of presentations are expressions such as “Mozart’s hometown” and “the Roman city Juvavum”. These express content and designate an object, but the content that each expresses is different, whereas the object designated by them is the same.

The mediating function of the content can therefore be perceived in the case of equivalent presentations, thus, the two names mean (*bedeuten*) something different, but they name (*nennen*) the same object. Thus, the meaning of a name coincides with the content of the presentation designated by it, and what is named by the name is the object of presentation. Equivalent presentations are, therefore, presentations in which the content is different, but by which the presented object is the same.

For one conceives of something quite different when conceiving of the city which is located at the site of the Roman Juvavum from what one conceives of when conceiving of the birthplace of Mozart. These two presentations consist of very different parts. The first contains as parts the presentations of Romans and of an ancient city forming a fortified camp; the second presentation contains as parts the presentations of a composer and of the relation in which he stands to his native city, while the relation to an old settlement formerly occupying that site, which was presented by the first presentation, is absent (ZL, 1977, p. 29).

From this argument used to differentiate the content and the object of presentation, following the parallel between the functions of the name established by

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22 For Frege, there are also cases where the sense of an expression are different, but their reference is the same. Examples of these types of expression are: “the morning star” and “evening star”, in which the reference is the same (i.e. Venus), but the sense of each expression is different. Frege also quotes another example: “The intersection point of $a$ and $b$ is the same as the intersection point of $b$ and $c$. We thus have different designations for the same point, and these names (‘intersection point of $a$ and $b$’ and ‘intersection point of $b$ and $c$’ ) also indicate the ways in which these points are presented. [...] the reference of the expressions ‘the point of intersection of $a$ and $b$’ and ‘the point of intersection of $b$ and $c$’ would be the same, but not its senses [...] The regular connection between a signal, its sense and its reference is such that the signal corresponds to a given direction and to sense, in turn, corresponds to a given reference, whereas a reference (an object) can receive more than one signal” (FREGE, 2009, pp. 130; 132).
Twardowski, we can perceive the mediating function of the content. The fact that we can mean the same object in different ways demonstrates that content (such as the meaning of the name) is the mean by which we refer a certain object. That is, one can have several ways of referring to a presentation object.

It should be noted that the existence of equivalent presentations is one of the arguments used by Twardowski to distinguish object of content. The three main arguments are: 1) content exists, whereas the object may or may not exist (ZL, § 6); 2) the content is never real and the object may or may not be real (ZL, § 6); 3) there are equivalent presentations (Wechselvorstellungen) (ZL, § 6).

Our aim was to highlight only the relevant points of the distinction between content and object of Twardowski with respect to the character of content as a mediator, that is, research from the psychological point of view that allows Twardowski to develop a theory of intentionality different from that of Brentano and Höfler.

4 Final remarks.

The Polish philosopher thus reformulates the theory of the functions of the name by establishing a parallel between names and presentations, in which meaning has the mediating function, such as content. This is, in fact, a particularity of his thesis (cf. PORTA, 2007, p. 281).

Many philosophers had distinguished content and object before Twardowski, but the novelty is that it reshapes the theory of intentionality from a new perspective, placing the content in an intentional relation with the object.

From this concept of content proposed by Twardowski it can be said that he tends to overcome a kind of representationalism existing in Höfler’s position and to

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23 We can clarify this problem a little more by considering that Twardowski’s treatment of the distinction between act, content and object is done in three planes: psychological, logical and metaphysical. Our analysis in this article has focused only on the foreground which deals with the concept of intentionality as presented in Zur Lehre. This point is nevertheless important, because if we consider, for example, Twardowski’s second argument for the distinction between content and object, we thus enter the plane of metaphysical inquiry, and this argument shows that the properties of the content are different from those of object. The act is always real, whereas the content always lacks reality and the object may or may not be real. When we present a “mountain of gold”, for example, the same object that is presented possesses properties that are foreign to its content, that is, a mountain of gold possesses the property of being mountain (spatially extended), of being of gold and of being greater or lesser than other mountains. The properties and relations of magnitude do not apply to the content, but to the presented object, even if it does not exist or is impossible (Cf. ZL, 2011, p. 303). On the other hand, from the logical point of view, the same distinction between content and object can be made in the judgments, but in this context the content does not have the function of mediation as in the presentations. The object of judgment is that which is recognized or rejected by the judgment itself, and to the extent that this object is recognized or rejected, its existence is also recognized or rejected; thus, the content of the judgment is an affirmation or negation of the existence of the object. “The content of a judgment is thus the existence of an object, with which every judgment is concerned […] What is judged in the real sense is the object itself; and in being judged, there is judged also, but in another sense, its existence” (ZL, 1977, 7). This argument is decisive for Twardowski’s critique of the theory of presentations without object, and it allows us to affirm that every presentation has an object, even if this object does not exist and is only presented, whereas the content always exists.

24 A detailed study on the different types of representationalism and the situation of Twardowski before them is offered by Ryan Hickerson (2007).
reformulate the theory of intentionality present in Brentano (cf. PORTA, 2007, p. 269).

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