A PRAGMATIC FORM OF CINEMA
DELEUZE THROUGH PEIRCE AND BERGSON

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Abstract: In his two essays on Cinema, Movement-Image (1983) and Time-Image (1985), Gilles Deleuze analyzes cinematographic images re-elaborating the general classification of signs made by Charles Sanders Peirce. His explicit intention in film analysis is to make a taxonomy of its objects. But Deleuze’s references to the father of Pragmatism and to Henry Bergson’s Matière et Mémoire might hide another implicit intention: an attempt to use the cinema as a pragmatic tool. Peirce’s correlative signs, as well as Bergson’s overcoming of the opposition between movement as the external physical reality and image as the psychic reality of consciousness, help Deleuze to build a pragmatistic cinema that can translate the truth into a pragmatic way using the audience as medium. Therefore in his two essays about cinema Deleuze does not only work on a philosophical translation of films, nor on a cinematographic translation of theoretical concepts. He does not subordinate images to thoughts, but he builds indeed a place where thoughts and images work in mutual correlation. Especially through his first essay, the one about the movement-image, he builds a tool that all along the present article we will call pragmatistic cinema. So the pragmatistic argument that the meaning of a linguistic proposition can identify with a set of practical consequences coming from its acceptance, can work at the same time on the meaning of a cinematographic image: as well as the first, the latter represents the truth so to offer it to the experience and the existential activity of a subject. It is the audience: not the passive subject who contemplates a preordained reality or just a percipient subject who feels external sensitive objects. In front of a pragmatistic cinema, audience becomes an active subject that works on a process of active intervention in reality.


Resumo: Em seus dois ensaios sobre Cinema, Movimento-Imagem (1983) e Tempo-Imagem (1985), Gilles Deleuze analisa imagens cinematográficas re-elaborando a classificação geral de signos feita por Charles Sanders Peirce. Sua intenção explícita na análise cinematográfica é fazer uma taxonomia de seus objetos. Mas as referências de Deleuze ao pai do pragmatismo e ao Matière et Mémoire de Henry Bergson podem esconder outra intenção implícita: uma tentativa de usar o cinema como uma ferramenta pragmática. Os sinais correlativos de Peirce, bem como a superação de Bergson da oposição entre o movimento como realidade física externa e a imagem como a realidade psíquica da consciência, ajudam Deleuze a construir um cinema pragmático que possa traduzir a verdade de forma pragmática usando o público como médium. Portanto, em seus dois ensaios sobre cinema, Deleuze não trabalha apenas em uma tradução filosófica de filmes, nem em uma tradução cinematográfica de conceitos teóricos. Ele não subordina imagens a pensamentos, mas constrói de fato um lugar onde pensamentos e imagens funcionam em correlação mútua. Especialmente, por
During the years between 1983 and 1985 French philosopher Gilles Deleuze dedicates his studies to the cinema. His work seems to have two qualities: first of all, he seems to be the first philosopher who tries to establish a connection between philosophy and the seventh art; second, he often refers to Charles Sanders Peirce, who didn’t write anything about cinema, and to Henri Bergson, who was critical about it.

Deleuze’s studies on cinema have produced two essays: *Movement-Image* (1983) and *Time-Image* (1985). Unfortunately these essays seem to be quite underrated by the scholars of Deleuze’s thought, maybe because their true intention is not explicit. In fact he does not only work on a philosophical translation of films, nor on a cinematographic translation of theoretical concepts. He does not subordinate images to thoughts, but he builds indeed a place where thoughts and images work in mutual correlation.¹

In the introduction to his first essay on the cinema, *Movement-Image*, Deleuze states his explicit intention:

>This study is not a history of the cinema. It is a taxonomy, an attempt at the classification of images and signs. [...] We will frequently be referring to the American logician Peirce (1839-1914), because he established a general classification of images and signs, which is undoubtedly the most complete and the most varied. It can be compared with Linnaeus’s classification in natural history, or even more with Mendeleev’s table in chemistry. Another comparison is no less necessary. Bergson was writing Matter and Memory in 1896: it was the diagnosis of a crisis in psychology. Movement, as physical reality in the external world, and the image, as psychic reality in consciousness, could no longer be opposed. The Bergsonian discovery of a movement-image, and more profoundly, of a time-

¹ Deleuze calls this place, as every place where there is a concrete work of Science’s, Art’s and Philosophy’s objects, a “plane of immanence”: DELEUZE G, *What is Philosophy?*, translated by TOMLINSON H and BURCHELL G, Columbia University Press, New York 1994.
image, still retains such richness today that it is not certain that all its consequences have been drawn.\textsuperscript{2}

We assume that the underrating of Deleuze’s cinema essays concerns these issues: what is exactly the goal of correlating thoughts and images? What is the purpose of a collaboration between a taxonomy of cinematographic images and a new way of thinking the res cogitans-res extensa relationship? Where is the Deleuzian effort to put cinema and philosophy precisely asserted on a concrete plane where they can actively work together?

Deleuze himself gives an answer to that through what he calls movement-image and time-image: the actual film is exactly the place where the external physical reality of movement joins the psychic reality of consciousness and where their ensambles, the images, are classified in a way that they can work together in a system. This system is the engine that connects two forms – movement and image, physical reality and psychic reality, external world and consciousness – in just one substance – movement-image or time-image.

In other words such a particular system offers a new way of thinking the res cogitans-res extensa relationship. This system is a sequence shot that is not a simple expression of “the duration of a whole which changes”, but it is a whole itself. It is something that turns the incessant variation of the image setting into an “open whole – as Deleuze writes –, whose essence is constantly to ‘become’ or to change, to endure”\textsuperscript{3}. According to Deleuze the first who realized that cinema is an overcoming of the Cartesian’s dualism was Jean Epstein, because he clearly understood the essence of the cinematographic image as different from the photographic image and more immediate than cubist or simultaneist paintings. Therefore through the movement-image cinema creates time as perspective, because “movement takes on the power to slow down or accelerate”; and through the time-image cinema creates time as relief, because time “takes on the power to contracts or dilate”\textsuperscript{4}. Both cinematographic images, movement-image and time-image, overcome the dualistic relationship between res cogitans and res extensa, because these two kind of image are images of time as a duration. The difference between movement-image and time-image depends on the kind of montage that expresses time in an indirect way by movement-image and in a direct way by time-image.

Anyway, as we will explain later, only the movement-image is able to let the audience work on the image it is watching, through an active intervention into reality. That is why we are going to talk about this kind of image while we will try to show what a pragmatistic cinema means.

According to us, it is since his first analysis of Kant’s criticism that Deleuze endows his image-system with the task of overcoming the problem of Cartesian dualism. In 1963\textsuperscript{5} he writes about ‘Kant’s Revolution’, meaning namely the critique of

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{2} DELEUZE G, \textit{Cinema 1. The movement-image}, translated by TOMLINSON H and HABERJAM B, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis 1997, p. xiv
  \item \textsuperscript{3} DELEUZE G, \textit{Cinema 1. The movement-image}, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis 1997, p. 23
  \item \textsuperscript{4} DELEUZE G, \textit{Cinema 1. The movement-image}, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis 1997, p. 24
  \item \textsuperscript{5} DELEUZE G, \textit{Kant’s Critical Philosophy. The Doctrine of the Faculties}, Translated by TOMLINSON H and HABERJAM B, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis 1985
\end{itemize}
the Cartesian distinction of two substances - *res cogitans* and *res extensa*, through the idea of a trascendental subject whose essence is divided in two forms: the external sensibility and the internal rational elaboration that work in an active relationship.

In this way we understand that the cinematographic image as movement-image can be precisely like a linguistic proposition from a pragmatistic point of view: it identifies itself through a set of practical consequences coming from its acceptance by a subject. It means that the cinematographic image represents the truth just like the linguistic proposition, but only because it refers to a subject and, precisely, to its experience and its existential activity.

The double form of movement-image seems to be exactly the trascendental, so that it necessarily refers to a trascendental subject: as well as the correlation that founds the movement-image corresponds to the correlation that founds the trascendental subject, the movement-image needs the subject’s trascendental activity as *medium* to fulfill its correlation. That is to say that the movement-image needs an active audience to fulfill itself: Deleuze offers a movement-image that works exactly like a linguistic proposition and represents what Peirce calls ‘belief’. So a cinematographic image is not just a still representation, but a cognitive action: it conveys a belief that needs the action of the audience to verify its truth through the realization of its expected effects.

Such an analogy seems to be more than just a chance. Deleuze’s answer to this question, the movement-image, is the proposal for a pragmatistic cinema.

As we said, in his cinema studies Deleuze refers to Henri Bergson’s effort to overcome the opposition between movement as the external physical reality and image as the psychic reality of consciousness, and he comes across three theses on movement: the first one – deduced from the first chapter of *Matter and Memory* - distinguishes movement and space ‘covered’ as the difference between present and past, so that movement is the act of ‘covering’, while covered space is the accomplished action. It means that when we rebuild movement by immobile ‘sections’ (*coupe*), spatial positions or temporal instants, we rebuild covered space and not real movement. The attempt to rebuild movement by i sections, makes it just a mechanical sequence, an illusory form of movement. Deleuze summarizes it in this way: Hence we oppose two irreducible formulas: “real movement – concrete duration”, “immobile sections + abstracted time”. 6

The second thesis – deduced from *Creative Evolution* – distinguishes an old way to think of the illusion of movement, and a new way caused by the scientific revolution.

According to the old thought movement is made of some unintelligible elements, the ‘Ideas’, that become material forms. From this persective movement is a dialectic of forms with an order and a measure: it is the transition from a form to another, from a ‘pose’ to another, from a ‘privileged instant’ to another, following a télos to the key form. 7 It is an intelligible synthesis of movement.

7 That form was called by Sergej Eisenstein the “pathetic”.
Modern thought indeed makes a sensitive analysis of movement. If time is considered as an independent variable, movement is based on material and immanent elements Deleuze calls ‘sections’, which are not formal and transcendent elements (poses). It is a composition of ‘Any-Instant-Whatever’ and not privileged instants; it is a matter of rebuilding movement through the description of a figure in constant evolution or dissolution, through the movement of lines and points taken in Any-Instant-Whatever of their motion, equidistant moments that give a the feeling of continuity.

As Deleuze writes, old and modern thoughts show two different illusions of movement following two ways of dialectic: [Old dialectic] is the order of trascendental forms which are actualised in a movement, while [modern dialectic] is the production and confrontation of the singular points which are immanent to movement.\(^8\)

And according to Deleuze, the cinema arose from the modern way, because it reproduces movement bringing it back to the Any-Instant-Whatever. That makes cinema something different from art and from science too, something Deleuze calls ‘industrial art’.

It is exactly the reason why Bergson attacks the cinema, because it is just an illusion of movement: even if it is made by immobile sections instead of eternal poses, rebuilt movement rests upon a given whole while real movement lies just where the whole is not given and cannot be given.

Bergson’s refusal of the cinema allows Deleuze to expose Bergson’s third thesis about movement that expands beyond Bergson himself and gives new momentum to the Seventh Art: “Not only is the instant an immobile section of movement, but movement is a mobile section of duration, that is, of the Whole, or of a whole. […] Now, movement expresses a change in duration or the whole”\(^9\).

It means that cinema brings back movement to some Any-Instant-Whatever and so it is able to convey a singular and meaningful section of movement as a new creation. Through Bergson, Deleuze explains that movement involves change, a quantitative and especially qualitative change that allows something new to emerge. Every single movement can change the whole of which it is a part, as Bergson shows in his example: “I am starving at A, and at B there is something to eat. When I have reached B and had something to eat, what has changed is not only my state, but the state of the whole which encompassed B, A and all that was between them”\(^10\).

That’s the Bergsonian idea of ‘vibration’, the duration engine. It allows Bergson to think about the whole as the ‘Open’: duration is the essence of the whole and the vibrations it releases mean that it constantly changes and always gives birth to something new.\(^11\)

Therefore the whole changes because it is the Open, says Deleuze, but also because it is the ‘Relation’: Relation is a whole’s feature that discloses a spiritual or

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\(^{8}\) DELEUZE G, *Cinema 1. The movement-image*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis 1997, p. 6

\(^{9}\) *Ivi*, p. 8

\(^{10}\) *Ibid*

\(^{11}\) As Deleuze reminds: “It is widely known Bergson initially discovered duration as identical to consciousness. But further study of consciousness led him to demonstrate that it only existed in so far as it opened itself upon a whole, by coinciding with the opening up of a whole.”, *Ivi*, p. 9-10
mental existence in the whole itself (it is not the feature of an object). The whole is the Open and the Relation and it cannot be confused with a closed mathematic set, because the whole is a pure becoming that constantly passes through a qualitative condition to another. The whole doesn’t stop changing, so it is the duration itself. That’s why it is spiritual and mental.

In this way through Bergson’s third thesis about movement we can understand the strictness of first two thesis: “immobile sections – abstracted time” refers to a closed set and “real movement – concrete duration” refers to the Open and the Relation, to the whole.

Bergson’s three theses seem to show overall that movement is a transition from distinct parts to the whole and, conversely, from the whole to distinct parts. It is the philosophical relationship between particular and universal, as summarized through the concepts of induction and deduction. On Deleuzian terms we can translate it as the relationship between objects and duration, motionless sections and mobile sections:

Thus in a sense movement has two aspects. On one hand that which happens between objects or parts; on the other hand that which expresses the duration or the whole. The result is that duration, by changing qualitatively, is divided up in objects, and objects, by gaining depth, by losing their contours, are united in duration. We can therefore say that movement relates the objects of a closed system which it forces to open up. Movement relates the objects between which it is established to the changing whole which it expresses, and vice versa. Through movement the whole is divided up into objects, and objects are re-united in the whole, and indeed between the two ‘the whole’ changes. We can consider the objects or parts of a set as immobile sections; but movement is established between these sections, and relates the objects or parts to the duration of a whole which changes, and thus expresses the changing of the whole in relation to the objects and a mobile section of duration.12

Thus the conclusion of the three theses is that, in addition to motionless sections of movement, we have mobile sections of duration called movement-image.

On the other way of the movement-image Deleuze exhibits the time-image as a direct image of time. The different use of montage in time-image makes it closer to a psychic movement, a contraction or dilatation of image in itself, through past and present time. Therefore in front of a time-image the audience does not translate the cinematographic image into action. Indeed the time-image compels the audience to withdraw into itself by virtue of an inner movement through past and present time.

Hence time-image and movement-image are mobile sections of the Bergsonian duration in which images, characters and objects live in a dynamic relationship. So that both images distinguish the cinema from sculpture, painting and photography, by creating the undetermined condition of the “Any-Instant-Whatever”.

12 Ivi, p. 11
However we think that only the movement-image let the audience translate an image into action. So only movement-image makes cinema a pragmatic tool that can respond to the problem of a new society: the increase of movement in conscious life and of images in the material world makes it impossible to insert images in consciousness and movement in space. The cinema works through an idea of image that includes everything that appears in motion: the image of a thing consists of all its actions and its reactions, all kinds of movement it can have.

Bergson’s model of movement is a ‘flowing-matter’ constantly changing with no absolute centre or point of anchorage. The flowing-matter centres indeed are fixed by instantaneous views at any point in space and time. Cinema is an art that lacks a centre of anchorage, so that it can open its image as a universal to the particular view of a conscious perception. It is as if the latter produces itself through a cinematographic image.

Bergson’s model of movement and cinema fade into one another as the conception of a Whole constantly changing: “It is a world of universal variation, of universal undulation, universal rippling: there are neither axes, nor centre, nor left, nor right, nor high, nor low […]”

Such a Whole is a sort of ‘plane of immanence’, as Deleuze writes, composed by all images in-themselves, that is to say as matter, in their concrete identity of image and movement. Movement-image is the flowing-matter itself in a material universe opened and founded on relations, like a mobile section. Thus as the Whole is the ‘machine assemblage’ of movement-images, the material universe is the machine assemblage of the matter: the idea of a plane of immanence makes us think of “the universe as cinema in itself, a meta-cinema”.

When Deleuze writes about a plane if immanence composed by images in-themselves, he exactly means ‘pure’ images. Through this expression Deleuze wants to prove the existence of images which are not for anyone and not addressed to anyone. He writes about images which are not for any eye and far from a body whose conception used to replace movement with the idea of a subject who carries it out and an object who is submitted to it.

Thinking about movement-image as flowing-matter means thinking about a constant propagation. In Cinema 1, Deleuze uses the idea of ‘light’: a plane of immanence that is entirely made of it, any kind of body, any kind of rigid lines, “but only lines or figures of light”.

In his last essay, written with Félix Guattari What is Philosophy?, Deleuze explains it when he speaks of images (and all the objects of art, all the artworks) as ‘blocks of space-time’, blocks of ‘sensations’, rather a composition of ‘percepts’ and ‘affects’. What Deleuze means is pure sensations, pure perceptions and pure affections: they go beyond human experience, they exceeds any lived experience, they exist where no human being exists.

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13 Ivi, p. 58
14 Ivi, p. 59
15 Actually he formerly writes it in Cinema 1 (p. 60), but he only touches on the expression
Hence images, as material things, exist in themselves. The eye is inside them because percepts and affects they are made of are not reflected or stopped, as light is.

Deleuze follows Bergson through the distinction between consciousness and a single consciousness, or ‘*our* consciousness of fact’. According to him consciousness is not a light that draws things out of darkness, but it is a thing among other material things the way in which all things have light. Thus on the Deleuzian plane of immanence such a consciousness “is diffused everywhere and yet does not reveal its source: it is indeed a photo which has already been taken and shot in all things and for all points, but which is ‘translucent’”16.

Indeed a *de facto* consciousness, our consciousness of fact, is a ‘black screen’ on which an image is exhibited; it is a slate on which light stops and reflects; it is the opacity that allows to reveal the translucent pure consciousness. Here is the importance of the subject as the active audience, because “the photograph of the whole is translucent: here there is wanting behind the plate the black screen on which the image could be seen”17.

Hence the human subject is the medium between pure consciousness and a *de facto* consciousness through which the material world becomes lived experience, or better what Bergson calls time as duration. As well as the human subject, the audience is the medium between image and sensation, through which art becomes lived perception and affection.

However we can make such an analogy in connection to the cinematographic structure of the Deleuzian movement-image. Deleuze analyzes it through the taxonomy of signs made by Charles Sanders Peirce and turns it into a taxonomy of cinematographic images which founds the movement-image. We can well understand Deleuze’s effort following the glossary he writes at the end of *Cinema 1*, through which we can grasp the differences between his and Peirce’s taxonomy. Here he explains the movement-image as “the acentred set *ensemble* of variable elements which act and react on each other”: as we said, an image is in itself unconnected to any human eye. Thus the centre of this specific image is the “gap between a received movement and an executed movement, an action and a reaction (interval)”.

Deleuze calls ‘perception-image’ the elements that act on this centre and that change in relation to it. The perception-image corresponds exactly to the thing in itself, such as an independent matter. It is composed by three kind of signs. First is the *Dicisign* which designates “the sign of the proposition in general” and here it indicates the general status of perception (solid, geometric and physical) as “a perception in the *frame* of another perception”. Differently, Peirce means with this term the sign of the proposition in general. The second sign is the *Reume* which designates the liquid status of perception, that is to say “the perception of that which crosses the frame or flows out”. That is not Peirce’s term, as emphasized by Deleuze himself, who warns not to confuse it with Peirce’s ‘retheme’, which means ‘word’. The third sign that composed the perception-image is the *Gramme* which designates “the gaseous state of a molecular perception”, strictly connected to that dynamism

16 *Ivi*, p. 61
17 *Ivi*, note 17, p. 61
which corresponds to the genetic element of the perception-image: this is what Deleuze calls ‘engramme’ or ‘photogramme’, something pretty different from a photo.

The act of perception-image makes a gap between an action and a reaction. Such a gap is occupied by the ‘affection-image’ “which absorbs an external action and reacts on the inside”. It means that affection-image turns percepts and affects of image into perceptions and affections that belong to an audience. This too is composed by three signs. The ‘Icon’ designates the result of a close-up, “the affect as expressed by a face, or a facial equivalent”. In Peirce’s taxonomy it designates indeed a sign whose internal characteristics allow it to refer to its object (resemblance). The second sign is the ‘Qualisign’ which is used by Peirce to designate the sign itself (not as an adjective of the sign, but as a sign itself); Deleuze uses it to “designate the affect as expressed (or exposed) in an any-space-whatever”. The third sign is Deleuze’s neologism, the ‘Dividual’, which is the state of what “is expressed in an expression”, an image that is “divided (or the brough together)” by a change of nature (changing qualitatively).

The perception-image and the affection-image give a centre to the a-centred set of movement-image, so to make a transition from an action to a reaction possible. The “reaction of the centre to the set” is called ‘action-image’. Through this kind of image the reaction on the inside (affection-image) to the external action (perception-image) becomes an external reaction: “the force or act”, as Deleuze writes. Differently from the previous images, this is composed by four signs translated from Peirce’s taxonomy. First is the ‘Synsign’, a “Set of qualities and powers as actualised in a state of things, thus constituting a real milieu around a centre, a situation in relation to a subject”. Its definition corresponds exactly to Peirce’s ‘sinsign’. The second sign is the ‘Impression’ which designates a link on the inside between situation and action. The third sign is the ‘Index’ through which Peirce designates a sign that “refers to its object by a material link”; Deleuze translates it into the link between an action and a not-given (or an equivocal and a reversible) situation. ‘Vector’ or ‘line of the universe’ is the fourth sign that composes the action-image: it is a “broken line which brings together singular points or remarkable moments at the peak of their intensity”.

As we can see, the structure of the movement-image is able to perfectly support itself as an independent object of the material world through its three principal kinds of image. Nevertheless its own structure allows to be perfectly reached by an eye at the same time.

Anyway it is a peculiar eye, because the audience who can reach a movement-image seems to be a transcendent subject. Indeed through some studies about Immanuel Kant18, Deleuze pushes the interpretation of Kant’s criticism toward a concept of ‘creation’ that he thinks is essential especially inside the Critique of Judgment: through the concept of the ‘sublime’ the transcendent subject becomes a creator, so that next to an ‘Aesthetic of the spectator’ there could be an ‘Aesthetic of the creator’. According to Deleuze that is possible by virtue of the revolutionary meaning of ‘transcendental’ which designates the division of the subject in two forms.

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18 We refer to: DELEUZE G, Kant’s Critical Philosophy. The Doctrine of the Faculties, Translated by TOMLINSON H and HABERJAM B, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis 1985; and the Deleuze’s lessons at Université VIII de Paris Vincennes-Saint-Denis, in particular the 1978 lessons edited in DELEUZE G, Fuori dai cardini del tempo. Lezioni su Kant, by PALAZZO S, Mimesis, Milano 2004
(and not in two substances, as Descartes thought), a passive and receptive one (imagination), and another active and able to provide perceptions (intellect and reason). The relationship between these forms makes the subject a cognitive subject, when its passive and active forms find an agreement, a condition of harmony. But when they are in discordance the disharmony gives birth to a subject’s ‘sublime’ experience that prevents knowledge and lets imagination follow the ideas of reason. The subject can never reach such an idea through imagination, but he can try to represent it by an analogical production. In this way, according to Deleuze, we can talk about the transcendent subject as a creator\(^{19}\).

Deleuze describes the movement-image as unconnected to any subject, as well as object that a transcendent subject receives through its own passive form. He receives its pure form (perception-image), its affect and its percepts (affection-image) and its reaction (action-image): he is the audience, as it were, the eye that it does not need.

However that eye belongs to a subject whose transcendent condition allows him to make an active elaboration of the objects he receives. So that an audience can make active elaborations of images. Deleuze himself explains that the the audience’s elaboration can fulfill the movement-image through two last kinds of image: ‘Image at transformation’ and ‘Mental-image’. Both are composed by signs that Deleuze explicitly elaborates from Peirce.

The first one, Image at transformation IN CORSIVO\(^{19}\), is defined by Deleuze as a ‘reflection’: an ambiguous term that means, on one hand, a returning of light through an image, and on the other hand an action of thinking. It is composed by a particular sign, the ‘Figure’, “a sign which, instead of referring to its object, reflects another (scenographic or plastic image); or one which reflects its own object, but by inverting it (inverted image); or one which directly reflects its object (discursive image)\(^{19}\)”.

A Figure seems to refer the movement-image to the activity of the audience, as well as to the elaboration of the transcendent subject. By the discursive image the audience can sense the harmony between image and the reflection, such as the agreement between imagination and intellect. On the contrary, by an inverted image and a scenographic or plastic image he can feel the collapse of any cognitive agreement, the disharmony that gives birth to the ‘sublime’ experience and makes the audience a creator.

The creation he makes is supported by the Mental-image. Indeed it is composed by five specific signs. The ‘Mark’, which designates the natural relations between images linked by a habit. The ‘Demark’, which designates an image that breaks the natural relation of the mark. The ‘Symbol’, which designates a link between images as independent from their natural relations (abstract relations), differing from Peirce’s designation as a “sign which refers to its object by virtue of a law”. The ‘Opsign’ and the ‘Sonsign’, which are pure optical and sound images; an image that “breaks the sensory-motor links, overwhelms relations and no longer lets itself be expressed in terms of movement, but open directly on to time”.

\(^{19}\) And such a creation, in our opinion, could be thought as the argumentation of a ‘repetition of difference exposed by Deleuze in his most important essay: DELEUZE G, Difference and Repetition, translated by PATTON P, , translated by PATTON P, Columbia University Press, New York 1995
Mental-image is defined by Deleuze as a ‘relation’, that is to say the connection of signs and reflection realised by a mental effort of the audience. Thus mental-image is the audience’s mental activity that enables it to create something external to the movement-image itself, like a thought or an action that follows that thought.

Conclusion

According to Deleuze, the movement-image is fulfilled by these two last kinds of image. But the end of the movement-image corresponds to the beginning of the time-image that supports the overcoming of the Cartesian dualism between res cogitans and res extensa as well as the movement-image. But time-image, as we wrote, is a direct expression of time that contracts and dilates itself inside the audience’s inner reality, in such a way that it lets the cinematographic image stimulate the passive part of the audience.

Therefore both the movement-image and the time-image let a film becomes an artwork, as Deleuze means it: a block of pure sensations, of percepts and affects, an object independent from any unitary subject. Nevertheless the audience internalizes pure sensations, percepts, affects, and makes them its own sensations, its own perceptions and its own affections. Hence only the pure sensations of the movement-image, percepts and affects let the audience make them active sensations, active perceptions and active affections that encourage not just a reaction, but an active intervention in reality.

Through Deleuze’s Kantianism the movement-image is able to correlate itself to a subject by its passive trascendental form and it is able to let the subject become a creator thanks to its active trascendental form.

Through Deleuze’s Bergsonism the movement-image works as matter. Thus the audience behaves in front of the movement-image as the subject in front of external matter: they feel the external duration of the object through their interior duration and do create real duration.

Hence through the convergence of Peirce’s, Kant’s and Bergson’s philosophies, Deleuze’s first essay on cinema - the cinema as the ‘plain of immanence’ in which concepts and percepts interact freely - shows how the cinema overwhelms fiction and actively works in the real world through the medium of the audience.

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Bibliography


