Rethinking Peirce’s Esthetics Through a Phenomenology of Pleasure and Pain

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Abstract: As Beverley Kent notes in her definitive study of Peirce’s classification of the sciences, it was not until late 1902 that his classification of normative science fully embraced esthetics and ethics. Even in the “Minute Logic” Peirce resisted including them among the normative sciences. This initial reluctance to affirm the normativity of these sciences in large part resulted from a fear that if logic were based in ethics and, even more to the point, if ethics were based in esthetics, both logic and ethics would be surrendered to hedonism. Peirce eventually would come to see this objection as resting on a “fundamental misconception” of the nature of the three normative sciences as well as on a misunderstanding of the fallacy of hedonism. First of all, the paper will consider Peirce’s analysis of the fallacy of hedonism and how he defended his classification of the normative sciences against it. The nature of the interdependence of the three normative sciences cannot be understood without first showing how hedonism is averted. Secondly, the paper will examine the positive account Peirce gives of the foundation of logic in ethics and of ethics in esthetics. Of particular interest in connection with this problem will be the analogy that is drawn between the esthetically good and pleasure. Even as Peirce rejected the hedonist doctrine that logical reasoning is reducible to a feeling of logicality, he nonetheless would insist that reasoning depends in an important respect on esthetic feeling. The paper will reflect on the nature of this dependence by examining the relationship between phenomenology and normative science. It will be argued that Peirce’s refutation of hedonism calls for a new phenomenology of pleasure and pain rather than the dissociation of either concept from logic. Since self-criticism and self-control begin with the formation of habits of feeling, Peirce’s conception of esthetic feeling will have important consequences for the relationship between philosophy and conduct. The paper will conclude by attempting to draw out some of these consequences.


Resumo: Como observa Beverly Kent em seu estudo definitivo da classificação das ciências feito por Peirce, foi somente ao final de 1902 que sua classificação das ciências normativas acolheu plenamente a estética e a ética. Mesmo em “Minute Logic” (Lógica Menor) Peirce resistiu em incluí-las. Sua relutância inicial em confirmar a normatividade destas ciências deveu-se em grande parte ao temor que, se a lógica se baseasse na ética e, mais pontualmente, se a ética se baseasse na estética, tanto uma quanto a outra estariam se rendendo ao hedonismo. Peirce finalmente reconheceria que esta objeção se baseava num “erro fundamental de concepção” da natureza das três ciências normativas, bem como na falha de compreensão da falácia do hedonismo. Este artigo considerará, primeiramente, a análise feita por Peirce da falácia do hedonismo e como ele defendia sua classificação das ciências normativas contra essa visão. A natureza da interdependência das três ciências normativas não poderá ser compreendida sem primeiro demonstrarmos como o hedonismo é afastado. A seguir, o artigo examinará a avaliação positiva feita por Peirce em relação ao embasamento da lógica na ética e da ética na estética. A analogia que se estabelece entre o esteticamente bom e o prazer é de particular interesse em relação a este problema. Mesmo quando Peirce rejeitava a doutrina hedonista segundo a qual o raciocínio lógico é reduzível a um sentimento de logicidade, ele não obstante insistia que o ato de raciocinar depende do respeito importante ao sentimento estético. Este trabalho refletirá sobre a natureza desta dependência ao examinar a relação entre fenomenologia e ciência normativa. Será argumentado que a refutação feita por Peirce em relação ao hedonismo demanda uma nova fenomenologia do prazer e da dor, ao invés da dissociação de ambos os conceitos do campo da lógica. Considerando-se que a autocrítica e o autocontrole começam com a formação de hábitos de sentimento, a concepção de Peirce quanto ao sentimento estético terá consequências importantes para a relação entre filosofia e conduta. A conclusão do artigo compreenderá a tentativa de delinear algumas dessas consequências.
Introduction

It was not until late 1902 that Peirce’s classification of normative science fully embraced esthetics and ethics. Even in the “Minute Logic” Peirce resisted including them among the normative sciences. This initial reluctance to affirm the normativity of esthetics and ethics in large part resulted from a fear that if logic were based in ethics and, even more to the point, if ethics were based in esthetics, both would be surrendered to hedonism. Peirce eventually would come to see this objection as resting on a “fundamental misconception” of the nature of the three normative sciences as well as on a misunderstanding of the fallacy of hedonism. Even as Peirce rejected the hedonist doctrine that logical reasoning is reducible to a feeling of logicality, he nonetheless would insist that reasoning depends in an important respect on esthetic feeling. In this paper I will reflect on the nature of this dependence by examining the relationship between phenomenology and normative science. It will be argued that Peirce’s refutation of hedonism calls for a new phenomenology of pleasure and pain rather than the dissociation of either concept from logic.

The paper will proceed according to the following outline. First of all, I will survey the early discussions of hedonism in “Grounds of the Validity of Logic” and from the 1878 Popular Science Monthly Series. Next, I will consider, very briefly, the terms on which phenomenology is distinguished from psychology in Peirce’s classification of the sciences. Thirdly, I will consider how he defends this classification against hedonism and will argue that this later position against hedonism is underwritten by a turn to phenomenology. The fourth part of the paper will work through the new phenomenology of pleasure and pain called for by this new argument. Finally, I will discuss the consequence of this phenomenology for the classification of the normative sciences, focusing specifically on the relationship between logic and esthetics.

I. Early Arguments against Hedonism

One of Peirce’s earliest published discussions of hedonism is found in “Grounds of the Validity of Logic.” In the concluding pages of the paper, two distinct arguments are presented against the view that “man cannot act without a view toward his own pleasure” (CP 5.355). First of all, Peirce criticizes the psychological theory on which hedonism rests by citing examples that “show conclusively that men do not make their personal interests their only ones, and therefore may, at least, subordinate them to the interests of the community” (5.355). The course of argument pursued here attempts to invalidate the facts of human psychology to which hedonism appeals by appealing to a

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1 Hedonism will be defined very broadly as the theory that “man cannot act without a view to his own pleasure” (5.355). Since for Peirce the control of thinking is a special determination of the control of action (1.573), unless otherwise noted, I will understand hedonism in the widest possible sense as inclusive of both the moral argument that one cannot act except with a view toward pleasure and the logical argument that one cannot think except with a view toward pleasure.
different set of facts. Because the argument itself requires an appeal to psychology, it is quickly abandoned.

The second argument that is presented rests on an appeal to logical principles rather than to facts of human psychology. Probable inference is a form of inference that moves from parts to whole and which has no meaning relative to single events or isolated cases. However, because the number of inferences we can make is infinite, while human existence is finite, we can grasp the ratio of parts to whole only as the statistical result of a process of inquiry to be carried out in the long run by an indefinite community of inquirers. Thus, the standard of inductive validity requires the identification of our interests with the interests of this indefinite community: “He who would not sacrifice his own soul to save the whole world, is illogical in all his inferences, collectively. The social principle is rooted intrinsically in logic” (5.355).

It is worth repeating that this second course of argument works independently of the appeal to facts made in the first argument, though an appeal to such facts certainly could strengthen it. It does not matter that we might not actually identify ourselves with the interests of a wider community, or that it might even be the case that no person in the history of the world has ever succeeded in doing so. The second argument requires only “the revelation of the possibility of this complete self-sacrifice in man, and the belief in its saving power” (5.355). This argument then is two-pronged: the logicality of our reasoning requires our self-identification with an indefinite community of inquirers; and belief in the possibility of such self-identification is sufficient for it:

For he who recognizes the logical necessity of this complete self-identification of one’s own interest with those of the community, and its potential existence in man…will perceive that only the inferences of that man who has it are logical, and so views his own inferences as being valid only so far as they would be accepted by that man. But so far as he has this belief, he becomes identified with that man.

Hedonism is the view that we cannot think or act except with a view toward our own pleasure. Peirce’s argument against hedonism in “Grounds of the Validity of Logic” asserts that the standard of inductive validity requires our self-identification with an indefinite community. The argument works not by asserting the fact of such self-identification but by asserting the possibility of belief in it. The logicality of our reasoning is saved from hedonism by virtue of the nature of belief.

Peirce makes the same argument ten year later in the *Popular Science Monthly* Series. In the third article from that series, “The Doctrine of Chances,” he writes: “Now, it is not necessary for logicality that a man should himself be capable of the heroism of self-sacrifice. It is sufficient that he should recognize the possibility of it, should perceive that only that man’s inferences who has it are really logical…” (2.654). The next article in the series, “The Probability of Induction,” concludes with a discussion of the belief theory on which this argument rests: “Though a synthetic inference cannot by any means be reduced to deduction, yet that the rule of induction will hold good in the long run may be deduced from the principle that reality is only the object of the opinion to which sufficient investigation would lead. That belief gradually tends to fix itself under the influence of inquiry is, indeed, one of the facts with which logic sets out” (2.693). The logic of induction is thus referred to the belief theory previously worked out by Peirce in “The Fixation of Belief” and “How to Make Our Ideas Clear.” However, does this argument from the nature of belief rest on an appeal to psychology? In the 1903 Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism, Peirce, in the context of a discussion of the pragmatic maxim, would criticize his 1878 papers for making just such an appeal:
The argument upon which I rested the maxim in my original paper was that belief consists mainly in being deliberately prepared to adopt the formula believed in as the guide to action…But how do we know that belief is nothing but the deliberate preparedness to act according to the formula believed? My original article carried this back to a psychological principle. The conception of truth according to me was developed out of an original impulse to act consistently, to have a definite intention. But in the first place this was not very clearly made out, and in the second place, I do not think it satisfactory to reduce such fundamental things to facts of psychology. For man could alter his nature, or his environment would alter it if he did not voluntarily do so, if the impulse were not what was advantageous or fitting. Why has evolution made man’s mind to be so constructed? That is the question we must nowadays ask, and all attempts to ground the fundamentals of logic on psychology are seen to be essentially shallow (5.27).

Whether Peirce has fairly judged his own position in this passage is not important. Even if the belief theory developed in the Popular Science Monthly papers does not rest on psychology, it is still not clear how else it could be grounded.

I refer to Peirce’s self-criticism at this juncture in order to underscore the role that phenomenology will play in his refutation of hedonism. His early arguments against hedonism fail, or at least are incomplete, because it is not clear how or that they would work apart from an appeal to psychology. Far from being the “quite unsuccessful sleight of hand” that Murphey has called it (368-369), Peirce’s phenomenology will allow him to assert the dependence of reasoning on a special kind of feeling—esthetic feeling—without grounding logic in psychology. Logic can be saved from hedonism only through a phenomenological redescription of the facts under discussion. Therefore, as I have suggested in the preceding paragraphs, more is at stake in the discussion of hedonism than its simple refutation. This discussion is concerned, more importantly, with the proper grounding of logic and ethics in esthetics. Peirce would appreciate the interrelationship of the three normative sciences only after he had worked through the relationship between phenomenology and normative science, and the refutation of hedonism plays an important role in the development of his thoughts on their relationship. Hedonism states that man can only act with a view toward pleasure. Hence, its refutation requires a new phenomenology of pleasure and pain.

II. Phenomenology and Psychology

I now would like to underscore some of the more important differences between the sciences of psychology and phenomenology (or phaneroscopy, as it is sometimes called). Peirce insists on the importance of sharply distinguishing between the two sciences in a letter to William James from 1904: “Psychology, you may say, observes the same facts as phenomenology does. No. It does not observe the same facts. It looks upon the same world;—the same world that the astronomer looks at. But what it observes in that world is different. Psychology of all sciences stands most in need of the discoveries of the logician, which he makes by the aid of the phenomenologist” (8.297). In the same letter phenomenology and psychology are contrasted in two other important respects: they are distinguished with respect to the principles to which they must appeal and with respect to their standards of certainty. Over the following paragraphs I will examine how phenomenology and psychology are distinguished in these two respects in order to understand the different world of facts observed by each.

Firstly, they are distinguished according to the principles to which they must appeal. Phenomenology is preceded only by mathematics in Peirce’s classification of the sciences and, as a result, is dependent upon that sciences alone for principles.
Phenomenology describes the phaneron, or “all that is in any way or in any sense present to the mind” (1.284), and its description, as discussed above, is conditioned only by what the mathematician has shown could be the case, “if not in our universe, then in some other” (5.40). Mathematics differs from the positive sciences in not being responsible for the truth of its hypotheses, since it makes no assertion about how the world actually is but only about how it might be. Phenomenology is the first branch of cenoscopy. It is concerned with the world of common experience rather than with merely hypothetical worlds; however, that being said, it still makes no assertion as to whether what appears to the mind actually corresponds to any reality (1.284). Worried that the language of appearance might suggest an actually existing thing that appears to the mind, Peirce in the “Minute Logic” amends his definition of phenomenology as the description of what appears to the mind by saying that it might “rather be defined as the study of what seems than as the statement of what appears” (2.197). Psychology, by contrast, receives principles from metaphysics and normative science, in addition to the principles it receives from phenomenology and mathematics. It is bound by the conceptions formed in normative science and metaphysics, respectively, about how the universe ought to be and actually is.

In the second place, phenomenology and psychology are contrasted with respect to their “standards of certainty.” Peirce states in the “Minute Logic” that phenomenology should be understood “in the broadest sense conceivable” (2.197), and it is understood in the broadest sense conceivable only if its scope is extended to all conceivable experience, to whatever appears or even just seems to appear to the mind. This test of inconceivability supplies the one standard to which phenomenology subjects common experience. Peirce illustrates this test through the following example involving perceptual judgment: “that any man should have a percept similar to mine and should ask himself the question whether this percept be red, which would imply that the had already judged some percept to be red, and that he should, upon careful attention to this percept, pronounce it to be decidedly and clearly not red, when I judge it to be prominently red, that I cannot comprehend at all” (5.186). The test here described is conducted with even more rigor in phenomenological description. Such description is concerned not even with whether red, or any other particular quality, is a property of a percept qua appearance, but with whether quality as such is an indecomposable element of what appears to the mind. Phenomenology and psychology are both observational sciences; however, they observe the world out of fundamentally different moods. As Peirce writes to James in 1909:

I mean to begin by drawing a distinction between what I call "Psychology Proper," meaning an account of how the mind functions, develops, and decays, together with the explanation of all this by motions and changes of the brain…and what I call "Phaneroscopy" on the other, or a description of what is before the mind or in consciousness, as it appears, in the different kinds of consciousness (8.303).

Of course, it is also must be remembered that the perceptual judgment, even in phenomenological observation, is highly fallible. It is fallible because there is no clear line of demarcation between perceptual judgment and abduction: “we can never be absolutely sure that a judgment is perceptual and not abductive” (5.187).

I would like to briefly review the respects in which phenomenology and psychology have been contrasted. Peirce asserts to James that phenomenology and psychology do not observe the same world of facts. This claim is somewhat misleading. Phenomenology and psychology observe the same world but under different conditions and in different moods of observation, and these differences have important
consequences for the facts to which each science attends. Phenomenology is bound only by the principles that it receives from mathematics, which is concerned only with how things could be, if not in this world, then in some hypothetical world. As such, its only standard of certainty is the test of inconceivability. Its scope extends to all conceivable experience—the phaneron—and it attends in conceivable experience only to the formal elements without which such experience could not be conceived. By contrast, psychology is additionally constrained by normative science and mathematics. Most significantly, its observations are accountable to the metaphysical conception of reality, that is, to the universe of mind and matter that is actually present to the mind. Psychology can only make assertions about how the mind actually “functions, develops, and decays” (8.304).

III. The Phenomenological Arguments against Hedonism

I now would like to revisit Peirce’s position against hedonism in light of how phenomenology and psychology have been distinguished in the preceding section. In “Grounds of the Validity of Logic,” the first argument against hedonism attempted to falsify the psychological facts to which it appeals. Secondly, Peirce argued against hedonism by appealing to the logic of induction as requiring our self-identification with the interests of an indefinite community of inquirers. These early arguments were deficient in that they fell back on psychology. Even the normative appeal to the standard of inductive validity flirts with a belief-theory psychology.

Peirce’s classification of the normative sciences reconcentrated his attention on this issue. His initial reluctance to classify esthetics and ethics among the normative sciences resulted from a fear that by doing so logic would be surrendered to hedonism. Consequently, his interest in hedonism intensified after 1902 as he sought to fortify his classification against just this threat. Phenomenology allowed Peirce to ground the normative study of logic without resting it on psychology. Peirce distinguishes normative science from practical science precisely according to the principles it receives from phenomenology: Normative science “inquires into what the purpose shall be, and then out of the very considerations which have gone to determine the purpose, with whatever other considerations may be strictly needed, proceeds to evolve the general considerations that must hold good, whenever the results of phenomenology holds, for the realization of the end” (MS 693a.124-26). Under this conception of normative science, esthetics, ethics, and logic inquire, respectively, into the general conditions of a form’s being beautiful, of an action being well-purposed, and of reasoning attaining truth (128-132).

I will now examine Peirce’s phenomenological arguments against hedonism, focusing on the Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism from early 1903, the first Lowell Lecture from late 1903, and “The Basis of Pragmaticism in the Normative Sciences” from 1906.

In “The Categories Defended” Peirce defended his phenomenology against the objections of the German logicians Schröder and Sigwart. Their position had denied the irreducibility of Secondness: “…the question of whether a given inference is logical or not must in the last resort come down to a question of how we feel,—a question of logical Gefühl, to use his own expression, which is to refer truth to the category of Quality of Feeling” (5.85). This logical argument is roughly analogous to the moral argument that “the question of what is good morals and what bad must in the last resort come down to a question of feeling of pleasure or pain.”
Peirce’s defense of the Category of Secondness against these objections asserts nothing about “the parts [the three Categories] play in the economy of the Universe” (5.85). It strictly engages hedonism in connection with the question of whether the three Categories are “the three irreducible and only constituents of thought.” Peirce, at least at this point, is asserting nothing else about the world. With that having been said, his defense of the Category of Secondness is two-sided. In the first place, the hedonism reduces all higher Categories—and most importantly, in this context, the Category of Secondness—to the Category of Firstness. Of course, this objection taken by itself merely begs the question under discussion, which is whether or not the Category of Secondness is actually an indecomposable element of thought. The second side of Peirce’s defense aims at answering this question. Peirce applies the test of inconceivability in order to show that logical hedonism in fact attributes, and cannot but attribute, to Firstness—the logical Gefühl—a causality and agency conceivable only through the same higher categories of thought that it tries to deny. Peirce explains: “What they [Sigwart and Schroeder] assume to be necessary is, on the contrary, impossible. No desire can possibly desire its own gratification; no judgment can judge itself to be true; no reasoning can conclude itself to be sound” (5.86). This is because the causality or agency that is here attributed to Feeling, a first, is inconceivable apart from the thought of a second or a third.  

This position is further developed in the first Lowell Lecture from late 1903, “What Makes a Reasoning Sound.” As this lecture provides Peirce’s most thorough published treatment of hedonism, I would like to quickly present his reconstruction in this text of the hedonist position, or the “defendant argument” as it is now called. The argument proceeds as follows. Every reasoning takes place in some mind and is accepted only if it satisfies that mind’s feeling of logicality. Since every reasoning is accepted because it satisfies a feeling of logicality, no reasoning can be criticized, so that “every reasoning is as good as any reasoning can be” (EP2:244). From this, it is concluded that no meaningful distinction can be drawn between good or bad, valid or invalid, reasoning. Once again, this logical argument is seen as being equivalent to the moral argument that no distinction can be drawn between good and bad conduct: Everyone must act with a view toward their own pleasure because pleasure is the one thing that is desirable for its own sake. As a result, no distinction can be drawn between good and bad conduct because any criticism of conduct could have been motivated only by pleasure. Peirce later observes that the defendant argument, in both its logical and moral forms, rests on two main premises: “first, that it is unthinkable that a man should act from any other motive than pleasure, if his act be deliberate; and second, that action [or reasoning] with reference to pleasure leaves no room for any distinction of right and wrong” (CP 1.603).

Peirce’s rejection of the argument is once again two-sided. First of all, he argues that it is caught in “a tangle of different fallacies.” He explains: “…it is impossible that

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2 Peirce also demonstrates this semeiotically by showing that every proposition, as a symbol, involves all three relations, even if only degenerately: “It is, therefore, quite impossible that a proposition should assert its own truth, or what comes to the same thing, that a desire should desire its own gratification, or that an argument should conclude its own cogency, excepting only in that sense in which a point may map itself to itself, namely as a special case under a general representation” (EP2:169). Peirce would make a similar argument the following year in the “New Elements” (EP2:322-323).
a desire should desire its own gratification; and it is so far from being true that every inference must necessarily be based upon its seeming satisfactory, that it is, on the contrary, impossible that any inference should be based in any degree upon its seeming satisfactory” (EP2:245). As in “The Categories Defended, the impossibility of both things once again is established by appealing to the standard of inconceivability. In other words, Peirce’s argument appeals to the categorial structure of the phaneron rather than to facts of human psychology, to whatever at anytime and in any way appears to the mind rather than to what is actually present to it. Peirce explains: “I want to lead you to see clearly that the defendants confound two disparate categories, and, having identified objects belonging to these categories, attribute to them a nature belonging to a third category” (EP2:245). First of all, Secondness and Thirdness, or efficient agency and “general mental formulation,” are confounded. Secondly, this degenerate conception of efficient agency is classified as a feeling, further confounding it with the category of Firstness.

In the case of the moral argument, Peirce attempts to disentangle this web of fallacies through a redescription, a phenomenology, of self-control. Every case of controlled conduct is shown to involve all three categories: an esthetic recognition of an ideal; the formation of a general resolution to act in conformity with this ideal; and the determination of conduct through this general resolution. Self-control is irreducibly triadic. No one category by itself, but only all three category related in genuine Thirdness, can adequately account for the phenomenon of self-control. Since reasoning is a special case of moral conduct, this example can be extended to the logical argument as well. Peirce explains: “Indeed reasoning is a species of controlled conduct and as such necessarily partakes of the essential features of controlled conduct” (CP 1.606).

In review, Peirce’s response to the first main premise in the defendant argument focuses on the category errors committed by it. As had been argued in “The Categories Defended,” hedonism reduces all higher categories to Firstness, while at the same time attributing to Firstness a causality that is only conceivable through those higher categories. The second main premise in the defendant argument asserts that the phenomenon of pleasure admits of no distinction between good and bad action or between good and bad reasoning. Peirce’s response to this second premise focuses on the assumption that pleasure is a monadic quality belonging to the category of Firstness. This assumption confounds “the judgment after the act that that act satisfied or did not satisfy with a pleasure or pain accompanying the act itself” (1.604).

This phenomenological argument against hedonism is further developed in “The Basis of Pragmatism in the Normative Sciences” from early 1906. First of all, Peirce reformulates the already discussed objection that hedonism fallaciously attributes causality to Feeling: “A feeling is positively such as it is, regardless of aught else. It refers to nothing but itself. That which consists in feeling does not have to involve any comparison of feelings, or any synthesis of feelings. Properly speaking because a feeling knows nothing but itself, no feeling can have, or even claim, any authority” (EP2:386). Similarly, in a manuscript on phaneroscopy from around the same time, “Phaneroscopy or the Natural History of Concepts,” Peirce dismisses the hedonists’ position as being “preposterous, in that they make mere feelings to be active agencies, instead of being merely conscious indications of real determinations of our subconscious volitional beings” (1.333). In the “Basis of Pragmatism in the Normative Sciences,” Peirce rejects the hedonist view of pleasure by drawing a distinction between primary and secondary feelings, between a quality of feeling, or a feeling as the “conscious indication” of an action or reasoning, to use the language of
the “Phaneroscopy” text, and the comparison or synthesis of feelings taking place upon the review of action or reasoning. Pleasure and pain are secondary feelings and as such do not properly belong to the category of Firstness. The following section will develop this new phenomenology of pleasure and pain and contrast it with the assumptions made about these phenomena in the hedonist argument. The purpose of Peirce’s refutation of hedonism is not simply to dissociate pleasure and pain from logic and ethics; more importantly, it aims at redescribing these phenomena (1.574).

IV. Peirce’s Phenomenology of Pleasure and Pain

Already in “A Guess at the Riddle” Peirce had distinguished between two classes of feelings. The first class is comprised of our “immediate and instantaneous consciousness” of the present (EP1:259). By contrast, secondary feelings do not belong to immediate consciousness; instead, they are “feelings produced by feelings, whenever the latter reach a certain degree of subjective intensity, that is, produce a certain amount of commotion in the organism” (EP1:258). Peirce, as early as 1885, classifies pleasure and pain as secondary feelings, though he would not always consistently adhere to this classification in the years leading up to his work on the normative sciences (CP 7.540). Pleasure is identified with a state of contemplation (the example given in the text is of the contemplation of a geometric theorem), while pain is identified with a state of exertion.

These remarks are made in the context of a discussion criticizing Kant’s identification of feeling with pleasure and pain. Peirce would further elaborate on this issue in an undated manuscript believed to have been written around 1900. Once again, Kant is criticized for restricting his conception of feeling to feelings of pleasure and pain. However, the definition of feeling that Peirce adopts from Tetens would not seem to admit as readily of a distinction between classes or degrees of feeling. Feeling is defined as “whatever is directly and immediately in consciousness at any instant...just as it is, without regard to what it signifies, to what its parts are, to what causes it, or any of its relations to anything” (7.540). In other words, feeling is the perfect analogue of pure Firstness (though just an analogue, since even the most “immediate” and “instantaneous” state of consciousness is nonetheless highly mediated just by its having duration, however infinitesimal that duration may be). By confounding feeling with pleasure and pain, which, if feelings at all, belong to a derivative class of feelings, Kant is said to have “hindered the perception of the real relations of [the] triad.” Similarly, it was shown above that hedonism, by reducing Secondness and Thirdness to Firstness, hinders our recognition of the interrelatedness of the Categories. In this manuscript Peirce is concerned with how the mischaracterization of feeling as pleasure will hinder our recognition of pure Firstness as an indecomposable element of consciousness. On the other hand, in the context of his work with the normative sciences between 1903-1906, Peirce will be more concerned with how the mischaracterization of pleasure and pain as monadic feelings will hinder our recognition of pleasure and pain as analogues of the esthetically good and bad.

Peirce further develops this critique of the identification of feeling with pleasure and pain in a 1905 manuscript on phaneroscopy. But by this time the focus of the discussion has shifted from the reduction of feeling to pleasure and pain to the reduction of pleasure and pain to qualities of feeling. Peirce is skeptical that any quality of feeling can be found that is common to either pleasure or pain. If forced to think about pleasure and pain in these terms, Peirce reverts back to a distinction roughly analogous to his original distinction between primary (immediate) and secondary feelings. Pleasure and
pain are defined as “feelings of states of volition” rather than as monadic qualities of feeling: “…in our opinion if there be any quality of feeling common to all pleasurable experiences or components of experience, and another one quality of feeling common to all that is painful (which we are inclined to doubt, to say the least), then we hold the opinion that the one is the feeling of being attracted, the other that of being repelled, by the present state of experience” (1.333).

In the “The Seven Systems of Metaphysics,” Peirce rests this distinction on a phenomenological description of the categorial structure of the phaneron. The context for these remarks is a discussion of the classification of the normative sciences and of the threat posed by hedonism to this classification. The discussion begins by calling it “a great mistake to suppose that the phenomena of pleasure and pain are mainly phenomena of feeling” (5.112). Peirce then proceeds to dismiss, on terms similar to those discussed above, the claim that a quality of feeling common to either pleasure or pain could ever be defined. Finally, after stating what pleasure and pain are not, Peirce positively relates pleasure and pain to elements of common experience: “[Pleasure and pain] mainly consist (Pain) in a Struggle to give a state of mind its quietus, and (Pleasure) in a peculiar mode of consciousness allied to the consciousness of making a generalization, in which not Feeling, but rather Cognition, is the principal constituent” (5.113). Pleasure consists in a mode of consciousness “belonging to the category of Representation though representing something in the Category of Quality of Feeling” (5.113). When analyzed as an element of the phaneron, pleasure is an analogue neither of pure Firstness nor pure Thirdness; instead, it is an analogue of the Firstness belonging to Genuine Thirdness. This phenomenological description of pleasure foreshadows how Peirce will define the aesthetic quality in an alternative draft of the fifth lecture in the series (1903): “the esthetic Quality appears to me to be the total unanalyzable impression of a reasonableness that has expressed itself in a creation. It is a pure Feeling but a feeling that is the impress of a Reasonableness that Creates. It is the Firstness that truly belongs to a Thirdness in its achievement of Secondness” (MS 310). In the final draft of this same lecture Peirce—“in light of the doctrine of categories” —classifies as esthetically good whatever has a “multitude of parts so related to one another as to impart a positive simple immediate quality to their totality” (5.132). Pain, on the other hand, might be described as the resultant quality of feeling imparted to an experience upon that experience’s having been broken up by the shock of experience. Far from being a monadic quality of feeling, pain belongs to the Category of Secondness and is predominant in the experiences of struggle and exertion.

This analogy between pleasure and pain and the esthetically good and bad is more fully developed in “The Basis of Pragmaticism in the Normative Sciences.” In “What Makes a Reasoning Sound” (late 1903), Peirce had expressed reservations over the identification, or even analogy, between pleasure and the esthetically good. Since ethics is concerned with conduct as it relates or conforms to an ultimate aim, it is left to the esthetician to give and account of what is good or admirable in itself “regardless of any ulterior reason.” Peirce finds the idea that the esthetically good is pleasure “too revolting to be believed unless one is forced to believe it”: “It would be the doctrine that all the higher modes of consciousness with which we are acquainted in ourselves such as love and reason, are good only so far as they subserve the lowest of all modes of consciousness” (1.614).

Here Peirce seemingly has collapsed two senses of pleasure that formerly had been differentiated: pleasure as a quality of feeling concurrent with action; and the feeling of pleasure that is felt upon the review of an action when we judge our conduct
to have conformed to our ideals (1.604). This distinction plays an important role in the analogy that Peirce will draw in 1906 between the esthetically good and pleasure. Peirce defines an ideal of conduct, as distinguished from a motive of action, as “the kind of conduct that attracts an [actor] upon review” (1.574). Under this conception of an ideal, pain is defined as “a symptom of a feeling which repels us,” while pleasure is defined as a “symptom of an attractive feeling” (5.552).

However, normative science is not concerned with what actually attracts or repels us under the conditions in which we find ourselves in the present stage of our evolution, but with what ought to attract us “whenever the results of phenomenology hold” (MS693a:126). The account given in esthetics of what ought to attract us—that is, of what is admirable in itself—in no way depends upon the conception of the universe that metaphysics will give to the special sciences. As was discussed above, it is bound only by the phenomenologist’s description of the indecomposable elements of the phaneron based on what the mathematician proves could be the case in some hypothetical world. Phenomenology thus observes only what appearance forces upon any mind, not of course because it is a necessary condition of all possible experience—Peirce is not Kant—but because it is inconceivable that the world could appear otherwise. Phenomenology, we are told by Peirce, appeals to observations “that each of you must make for himself.” He adds: “The question is what the phenomenon is. We make no vain pretense of going beneath phenomena. We merely ask, What is the content of the Percept?” (EP2:154). Perceptual judgment is distinguished from reasoning by virtue of its being uncontrolled and unconscious, and since what is unconscious and beyond control also cannot be criticized, perceptual judgment is also acritical. It is in this sense that the content of the percept is forced upon us in phenomenological observation.

This appeal to phenomenology avoids psychologism. As was discussed above, logic, ethics, and esthetics inquire into the conditions of right thinking, right action, and right feeling “that must hold good, wherever the results of phenomenology holds, for the realization of the end” (MS693a:126). However, the normative sciences are not similarly dependent on psychology. For example, esthetics does not define the beautiful “with reference to its pleasing A, B, or C, but in terms of those universal elements of experience that have been brought to light by phenomenology” (MS693a:128). There can be a normative science of esthetics only if this relationship holds. To return to the discussion of pleasure and pain found in “The Basis of Pragmaticism in the Normative Sciences,” the feelings of pleasure and pain to which the esthetically good and bad are “closely akin” consist in “what would be pleasure or pain to the fully developed superman.” Peirce thus concludes that “the good is the attractive,—not to everybody, but to the sufficiently matured agent; and the evil is the repulsive to the same” (5.552).

The account given in esthetics of what would be pleasure or pain for the “sufficiently matured agent” evolves from a phenomenological redescription of the phenomena of pleasure and pain.

Peirce’s first argument against hedonism in “Grounds of the Validity of Logic” had tried to invalidate the psychological facts to which hedonism had appealed by appealing to a new set of facts. The phenomenological argument against hedonism, in a certain sense, rehabilitates the appeal to facts disallowed in 1868 as a form of psychologism. However, the appeal made here to facts is not to facts of human psychology but to what is irreducible in the phaneron. As seen above, Peirce had found the idea of the esthetically good as pleasure “too revolting” to be accepted unless forced upon us by experience. This recalls his initial reluctance to admit esthetics as a
normative science in the “Minute Logic.” Peirce was led to both positions by the threat of hedonism. What he eventually finds is that experience does force upon us a conception of the esthetically good, the admirable in itself, as pleasure; only the feeling of pleasure to which the esthetically good is “akin” is not a monadic quality as Peirce had feared, but is the quality resulting from our judgment about what attracts upon review. The feeling of pleasure, as a feeling of attraction, thus belongs to the mode of consciousness of making a generalization. Similarly, the feeling of pain, as a feeling of repulsion, belongs to the mode of consciousness characteristic of struggle and exertion. What experience forces upon us is the idea of the irreducibility of struggle and generalization, which are predominant in the feeling of repulsion and attraction, in common experience.

V. Conclusion

I now would like to discuss the implications of this phenomenology of pleasure and pain for Peirce’s classification of the sciences. What is at stake philosophically in the refutation of hedonism is the grounding of logic and ethics in esthetics. In “The Basis of Pragmaticism in the Normative Sciences,” Peirce states that deliberate conduct consists in the following stages: self-criticism [the review of action], the formation of a general resolution, and the determination of a habit. Esthetics plays an important role in the review of action leading to the formation of general resolutions and the determination of habits: “the ideal must be a habit of feeling which has grown up under the influence of a course of self-criticisms and of heterocriticisms; and the theory of the deliberate formation of such habits of feeling is what ought to be meant by esthetics” (1.573-74). The result of this process is the modification of future conduct.

In “Consequence of Pragmatism” (1906) Peirce remarks that an esthetic ideal modifies conduct “by modifying the rules of self-control” (5.402n3). In a separate manuscript from that same year, he further distinguishes several grades of self-control. Even “mere brutes” are capable of a certain kind of control, however bound by instinct their exercise of control is. Humans are distinguished from other animals by virtue of our “greater number of grades of self-control.” Peirce even suggests that the number of grades of self-control is indefinite. Not only are we capable of exercising control over our actions; we are also capable of exercising control over control, and of exercising control over the control of control, and so forth. The formation of habits of feelings concerns these higher grades of control: “To [exercise a control over his control of control]. To do this he must have in view something higher than an irrational rule. He must have some sort of moral principle. This, in turn, may be controlled by reference to an esthetic ideal of what is fine” (5.533). Esthetics is not concerned, at least immediately, with the control of a particular action or even of a particular kind of action; its most profound employment is concerned with the very constitution of self-control.

As was discussed above, perceptual judgment is distinguished from reasoning because it is unconscious and therefore beyond control. Since it is pointless to criticize what cannot be controlled, the distinction between good and bad reasoning holds only for those kinds of inference that can be controlled and therefore criticized (EP2:188-190; 200; 210). The validity of our reasoning then consists in the degree to which control can be exercised over it. But the perceptual judgment also shades into abduction, spurring Peirce to ask about whether and how the control we do exercise over perception, however infinitesimal in degree it might be, can grow: “In the future we may be able to control more but we must consider what we can now control. Some
elements we can control in some limited measure. But the contents of the perceptual judgment cannot be sensibly controlled now, nor is there any rational hope that they ever can be.” Peirce adds:

But the sum of it all is that our logically controlled thought compose a small part of the mind, the mere blossom of a vast complexus which we may call the instinctive mind in which this man will not say that he has faith because that implies the conceivability of distrust, but upon which he builds as the very fact to which it is the whole business of his logic to be true. (5.212)

Esthetic feeling relates this instinctive part of the mind to our logically controlled thoughts. It conditions the formation of habits of every kind, including the habituation of thought and action, by increasing our capacity for self-control. Esthetic feeling modifies conduct by modifying our capacity to exercise control over it, not just quantitatively but, more importantly, qualitatively. Moreover, esthetic training is required even in order for logic “to be true” to the instinctive part of the mind that is beyond conscious control. We increase our capacity for self-control not just through the active determination of habits of conduct, but also through adoption of the right attitude toward what cannot be controlled. The adoption of such an attitude is an important part of any esthetic education. As Peirce remarks, the best esthetic critic is the one “who founds his judgments upon the result of throwing himself back into [a perfectly] naïve state,—and the best critic is the man who has trained himself to do this the most perfectly” (5.111; cf. 7.172).

As such, esthetic feeling is indispensable to all synthetic reasoning and in particular to abductive inference. Peirce, on too many occasions to count, marvels at the propensity of the human intellect to guess right as often as it does. He explains our success in the art of guessing by positing a basic affinity between the human intellect and the universe. All probable reasoning requires such an assumption. For example, Peirce concludes in “The Order of Nature” (1878) that “it seems incontestable…that the mind of man is strongly adapted to the comprehension of the world; at least, so far as this goes, that certain conceptions, highly important for such comprehension, naturally arise in his mind; and, without such a tendency, the mind could never have had any development at all” (6.417). Similarly, he argues in a manuscript from 1896 that “retroduction goes upon the hope that there is sufficient affinity between the reasoner's mind and nature's to render guessing not altogether hopeless, provided each guess is checked by comparison with observation” (1.121). Yet again in “The Neglected Argument for the Reality of God” from 1908, it is asserted that our understanding of the universe depends on our having a “natural bent in accordance with nature’s” (6.477). Finally, the terms on which hypothesis and induction are distinguished physiologically in “Deduction, Induction, and Hypothesis” (1878) strongly foreshadow the conception of the esthetic quality, discussed above, as whatever has “a multitude of parts so related to one another as to impart a positive simple immediate quality to their totality” (5.132):

Hypothesis substitutes, for a complicated tangle of predicates attached to one subject, a single conception. Now, there is a peculiar sensation belonging to the act of thinking that each of these predicates inheres in the subject. In hypothetic inference this complicated feeling so produced is replaced by a single feeling of greater intensity, that belonging to the act of thinking the hypothetic conclusion. (2.643)

This affinity between the human intellect and the universe is not simply innate; importantly, it is the result of evolution. Furthermore, by increasingly adapting ourselves to the universe through the formation of habits of feeling in conformity with an esthetic ideal, we contribute to the wider evolution of the universe: “…it is by the
indefinite replication of self-control upon self-control that the vir is begotten, and by action, through thought, [a person] grows an esthetic ideal, not for the behoof of his own poor noodle merely, but as the share which God permits him to have in the work of creation” (5.402n3). While I have not been able to develop here the implications of Peirce’s esthetics for his evolutionary cosmology, it is worth remembering that the conception formed in metaphysics of how the universe actually is is constrained by the theory of the formation of habits in conformity with how the universe ought to be. In this paper I have tried rethink Peirce’s esthetics by rethinking the relationship between phenomenology and normative science as it gets thematized in his arguments against hedonism. However, a discussion of the relationship between normative science and metaphysics could similarly benefit from an examination of the phenomenology underwriting these arguments.

Works Cited:


