

The Place of Logic in Pragmatism¹

O Lugar da Lógica no Pragmatismo

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Abstract: This paper argues that the tendency in contemporary discussion to overlook the logical roots of pragmatistic philosophy is a symptom of taking language as a universal medium of expression. My thesis is that the two presuppositions concerning the role of logic in pragmatism, universalism and its denial of calculism, delineate two kinds of pragmatisms, pragmatism and pragmaticism. I conclude that the latter, which was Peirce's original formulation, is methodologically the more tolerant of the two and hence embraces pluralism over and above pragmatism.

Key words: Pragmatism. Pragmaticism. Logic. Universalism. Calculism. Peirce.

Resumo: Este trabalho argumenta que a tendência de negligenciar as raízes lógicas da filosofia pragmatística nas discussões contemporâneas, é sintomática da consideração da linguagem como um meio universal de expressão. Minha tese é que as duas pressuposições sobre o papel da lógica no pragmatismo, universalismo e sua negação do calculismo, delineiam dois tipos de pragmatismos: pragmatismo e pragmaticismo. Concluo que este último, que era a formulação original de Peirce, é metodologicamente o mais tolerante dos dois e, daí, abarca o pluralismo além do pragmatismo.

Palavras-chave: Pragmatismo. Pragmaticismo. Lógica. Universalismo. Calculismo. Peirce.

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1. Introduction: Logic and Pragmatism

According to Max Meyer's dictum, which was replicated by F. C. S. Schiller and countless others over the early years of pragmatism, "there are as many pragmatisms as there are pragmatists" (MEYER 1908: 326). This phrase was kidnapped by both the proponents and the antagonists of the movement. Bertrand Russell used it to ridicule the idea that pragmatism was to be taken seriously at all, while Charles W. Morris took it to welcome the fruitfulness and open-mindedness of the approach. We would probably be well-advised not to agree with either of these extremities, as both were changing their opinions so many times that Morris himself can really be seen as a proxy for any of the pragmatists and Russell a proxy for any of their antagonists.

In response to Meyer, in his attempt to identify certain 'unit ideas' in the history of intellectual thought, Arthur O. Lovejoy, Charles Peirce's belated follower in philosophy at Johns Hopkins University, did a bit better and managed to delineate thirteen pragmatisms, many of which he found incompatible with one another (LOVEJOY 1908).²

Though I am not a fan of simple dichotomies, I shall argue here against Meyer, Lovejoy, and Schiller that in the end, there are two pragmatisms.³ There is pragmatism and then there is its original statement, which Peirce later on renamed pragmaticism. So much is certainly unsurprising, but wherein lies the ultimate difference? What is the relationship between the two? Which one is in fact more general and which one more narrow? Which one suffices better to embrace pluralism? I shall argue that here the received wisdom breaks down. It is in fact pragmaticism, and not pragmatism, which is the pluralistic and wider expression of pragmatist thought.

The line between the two approaches can be drawn, I will argue, according to the role a pragmatistically inclined philosopher takes logic to play in the philosophical system building and thought. By a 'role of logic' I do not mean whether among their scholarly output we find studies on some glamorous areas of logic. I mean whether their most general philosophical stance on the nature of logic permits us to isolate certain 'absolute presuppositions' according to which their thought can be classified, to appeal to a phrase coined by another prominent historian of ideas, R. G. Collingwood. Identifying this presupposition will enable us to reveal the deep difference between pragmatism and pragmaticism.

But isn't the question of the role of logic in pragmatism an analogous question to the role of logic in philosophy in general? Two preliminary comments can be made here. According to what is a fairly common view now, and which was Peirce's conviction from the very beginning, pragmatism is not really a system of philosophy but a method of doing philosophy. As such, its operationalisation lies in a certain principle, maxim, or rule in accordance of which philosophical theorising is to be done. According to such a maxim of pragmatism, to get at the highest clarity of meaning of an intellectual concept or a term, we need to associate with it its practical bearings or experimental consequences.

² Peirce sent one letter to Lovejoy in 1906 after receiving "two strong papers" from him (*Peirce to Lovejoy*, 27 May 1906). It is not known which Lovejoy's papers Peirce received.

³ This demarcation has nothing to do with "the two pragmatisms" argued for by Mounce (1997).

Such a generic formulation of the maxim admits of a number of variations, qualifications, and interpretations. In fact, my claim is that the ensuing versions are so different that the philosophers who maintain them can be said to subscribe to different absolute presuppositions.⁴ Accordingly, the question of the role of logic in pragmatism boils down to the question of whether the maxim of pragmatism is taken to be a principle of logic or a principle of something else.⁵ And, if it is not a principle of logic, we are owed an explanation of what the maxim in that case is supposed to be.

For Peirce, the maxim was indeed a principle of logic, as comes clear from one of his later formulations:

Consider what effects that *might conceivably* have practical bearings – especially in modifying habits or as implying capacities – you conceive the object of your conception to have. Then your (interpretational) conception of these effects is the whole (meaning of) your conception of the object.⁶

My second initial comment is that who counts as a pragmatist philosopher is not at all obvious. If we take up the daunting task of comparing some of the early and later philosophers, the so-called classical and neo-pragmatists, with one another, their presuppositions turn out to be so different that at least some of them, take for instance Peirce and Rorty, have virtually nothing in common concerning their methods of approach in philosophy.

2. Logic as Calculus vs. Logic as Language in Pragmatism

What are these presuppositions concerning the role and nature of logic in pragmatism? Two broad classes can be distinguished, and here I am following Jean van Heijenoort's classic 1967 article "Logic as Calculus and Logic as Language" taken forward by Jaakko Hintikka in his numerous works. Heijenoort's article focuses on the presuppositions concerning Frege's philosophy of logic. According to the tenet of *logic as language*, we must have a *lingua* in which the whole of our scientific knowledge and thought is expressed. That *lingua* is universal, that is, it talks about each and every object there is; it concerns the totality of the world. The universe of discourse is the static collection of all that comprises our ontology; that universe is fixed and given, once and for all, and it

⁴ Or perhaps to have none, which is the case with Richard Rorty.

⁵ The former is the original position that Peirce took. In the early book-length treatises on pragmatism, Peirce's role as the originator of the idea is seldom mentioned. Bawden (1910: 8) remarks that "[p]ragmatism originated as a principle of logical method, first formulated by Mr. Charles Peirce in 1878, in a series of articles published in 'The Popular Science Monthly.'" Pratt (1909) and Moore (1910) do not mention Peirce's formulations at all. Riley (1915: 287) acknowledges Peirce quite correctly: "Only that man who should care equally for what was to happen in all possible cases could act logically". Riley remarks how James preferred expressing Peirce's principle in terms of "particular consequences in our future practical experience" (p. 281).

⁶ Letter for *The Nation*, MS 324: 11-12, 1907. Peirce mentions a curious instance of the maxim as "the maxim of logic that the meaning of a word lies in the use that is to be made of it" (CN 2.184, 1899, *Matter, Energy, Force and Work*).

must not exclude anything. Logic concerns formal systems that capture our ‘logical thought’, and such systems consisting of formal languages supplant natural language. There are few genuine metalogical issues to be raised, and questions such as consistency or semantic completeness of quantification theory are suppressed. To these characterisations I would add that according to the logic-as-language view, there is a plain and unproblematic division between logical and so-called extra-logical (such as metaphysical) questions.

According to *logic as calculus*, in contrast, the universes of discourse are many, and they can be changed at will and in response to the contexts and purposes at hand. Metatheoretic questions are central while ontological import is not.⁷ Provability in formal systems tends to be replaced by considerations of validity, usually the notion of ‘truth in all models’.⁸ A model-theoretic approach is thus central. The distinction between logical and material truth becomes important, while what is supposed to lie outside the scope of logic, which universalists portray as ‘extra-logical’, cannot be determined in advance, since we cannot foretell what kinds of extensions and methods will be invented by the creative thought of logicians.

However, in order to successfully apply this distinction to pragmatistic philosophies, we still need a general characterisation of the overall situation. For instance, Peirce and Schiller both levelled some harsh criticism on purely formal approaches to logic, as it was being understood, predominantly by Russell at that time, in terms of a study of formal systems by which the vagaries of natural language was hoped to be taken care of once and for all. Moreover, in his letter intended to Schiller, Peirce in fact generously greets him because Schiller’s pragmatism “seems to be nearer me”, as Peirce reveals in a letter to Schiller in 1905, and “at any rate in its conclusions nearer my own, than does any other man’s” (*Peirce to Schiller*, draft, 12.5. 1905, see Appendix). At that time, both Schiller and Peirce agreed that William James’s hasty generalisations of the notion were utterly unwarranted.

3. Universalism vs. Calculism in Pragmatism

But soon the agreement between the two gentlemen was to come to an end. For, pushing the logic as language vs. logic as calculus presupposition deeper, to bear on our actual colloquial language, the true differences are revealed. According to the logic as language conception, our lingua is *inescapable*. It must faithfully reflect the structures of our conceptual framework concerning the world from which we inherit the structures of our concepts. It must do so in an unmediated and direct manner. Semantic relations between language and the world are *ineffable*, to use Hintikka’s term (HINTIKKA 1997), since we cannot step outside of our conceptual framework, which ranges over the whole of our domain of discourse. We cannot freeze the language and say: “this is what

⁷ An early example of such a metalogical concern was Peirce’s recognition of ‘completeness’ of the rules of transformation for the alpha part of existential graphs in his *Lowell Lectures* of 1903.

⁸ As early as in 1885, Peirce was concerned with the notion of the validity of formulas of propositional logic, in terms of truth in “all states of affairs”. Validity was also Löwenheim’s key concern in his path-breaking paper of 1915.

I meant". And so the semantic relationships are given to us by the actual world we inhabit. We live, act, and speak in this actual world and base our judgments concerning our meaning-constitutive practices and actions upon the specifics of the actual world. Accordingly, modalities are dispensable in metaphysics. Language becomes a universal medium of expression. Nothing of use can be said outside of such lingua.

The contrasting view now is that our language is not inescapable because it is *re-interpretable*. Its purpose is to study the processes of human thought and reasoning. Semantic relationships are not given but constituted by practices and actions concerning everything that we could, would, might, can, or will make, not only in this actual life-world of ours but also in any conceivable situation or a figment of a possible world alike. Hence, modalities are important ingredients of study in metaphysics and in theories of logic and language. In being endlessly re-interpretable, language becomes a calculus-like system, just as we can have so many logical means to study the structures of our expressions or processes of human cognition. And we are not bound by our current means of expression, since we can devise new methods to understand them or to develop entirely new ones. I would add to these that *self-control* is an important metatheoretic principle in operation and that such rules of self-control are given in conditional forms. Self-control of habits of action is in fact fundamental in making language re-interpretable. Witness, for instance, Peirce's note to Schiller (1905, see Appendix) where he explains how "the power of self-control is... in how one will act in the future".

Now Peirce and Schiller indeed part company. Aptly noted by De Waal (2005: 62), Schiller subscribes to the view that all propositions must be actually verified to be true. Here is an example of what he has to say:

On its entry into the world of existence, a truth claim has merely commended itself (perhaps provisionally) to its maker. To become really true it has to be tested, and it is tested by being *applied*. Only when this is done, only, that is, when it is *used*, can it be determined what it really means, and what conditions it must fulfil to be really true. Hence all real truths must have shown themselves to be useful; they must have been applied to some problem of *actual* knowing. (SCHILLER 1966: 61, last emphasis added)

By "applying" and "using" a "truth claim" Schiller means actual application and actual use that has to take place in this world of ours and nowhere else. In his 1907 book *Studies in Humanism* he notes how pragmatism "essays to trace out the actual 'making of truth'" (SCHILLER 1907: 4). Schiller hence becomes a prime example of a 'one-world' philosopher, as the advocates of the universalist conception of language may be dubbed (HINTIKKA 1997). What follows from taking the meaning of propositions to be making such truth claims is that Schiller's heavily empirical rendering of verificationism is bound to lead to semantic holism and linguistic relativism.⁹

⁹ Pietarinen & Snellman (2006) present a more detailed argument. Another major difference between Peirce and Schiller concerns psychologism. Peirce writes to Schiller: "When you say that Logical consequences cannot be separated from psychological effects, etc. in my opinion you are merely adopting a mode of expression highly inconvenient which cannot help, but can only confuse, any sound argumentation. It is a part of nominalism which is utterly antipragmatic, as I think, and mere refusal to make use of valuable forms of thought" (*Peirce to Schiller*, draft, 10 September 1906; CP 8.326).

A few years later, in *Formal Logic* of 1912, which was Schiller's vicious attack on uninterpreted logic,¹⁰ continued in his *Logic for Use* (1929), he states that "It is *not* possible to abstract from the actual use of the logical material and to consider 'forms of thought' in themselves, without incurring thereby a total loss, not only of truth but also meaning" (SCHILLER 1912: *ix*). Calculists such as Peirce would certainly have agreed that use is the key here, but that it must not be confined to "actual use", precisely because of its consequences of semantic holism and linguistic relativism, which in the end would make all communication impossible.

Nonetheless, without the modal restatement of his maxim, Peirce would have been committed to nominalism and consequently to relativism. If only one, actual world of ours suffices to modify our habits of conduct that constitute the contents of our beliefs, then, in experimenting upon assertions, an experiment would affect the way in which situations are mapped to actions, which corresponds to the habit. But then all action that is actually performed constitutes meaning, and thus language cannot be misused, and there will be no false sentences. Hence, we need to resort to the idea of possible worlds in order to interpret our intellectual concepts and assertions. "According to the pragmatist", Peirce wrote in April 1905, meaning is

that form in which the proposition becomes applicable to human conduct, not in these or those special circumstances, nor when one entertains this or that special design, but that form which is most directly applicable to self-control under every situation, and to every purpose. (EP 2:340, *What Pragmatism Is*)

4. The Two Pragmatists

What about other pragmatists? Can all of them be thus classified? My hypothesis is that the varying formulations of pragmatism with the aid of principles or maxims necessarily instantiate one of the two presuppositions.

Since it is impossible to go through all pragmatist philosophers or even the most well-known ones, I will only give a few examples. I will also skip arguments for Peirce as a member of the calculist tradition, since such arguments have been presented before.¹¹

Earlier, I noted Schiller's universalism. What about William James? The two certainly seem to side with one another. For James, practical consequences may be limited to the person holding the belief. In him or her alone are the consequences determined. Practical consequences are thus particular and singular for James rather than general and real.¹² Experiences are individual rather than common. Truth claims must be "verified concretely by *somebody*", James (1977: 433) urges. He does not say that they be *verifiable*. This limitation to individualism makes him a one-world pragmatist. How Peirce described the

¹⁰ Another prominent critic of formal, uninterpreted logic was Alfred Sidgwick.

¹¹ Hintikka (1996) argues that Peirce's calculism comes clear from his works in the algebra of logic, iconicity, metalogical methods, scholastic realism, the use of semantic and model-theoretic tools, and taking syntax/semantics/pragmatics as a unity. Pietarinen (2006) contains further discussion of these points.

¹² James is not disdaining generals altogether, but unlike Peirce he is not taking them to be *real* generals.

situation was that he took James to have performed a transmogrification of a “method into a doctrine” that “opposes sound logic” (CP 6.482, 1908, *A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God*).

Moving on to the Florence pragmatists, it is often stated that Giovanni Papini and Giuseppe Prezzolini sympathised James’s rendering of pragmatism, whereas Giovanni Vailati and Mario Calderoni supported Peirce’s original method. The reason that has routinely been given is that Papini and Prezzolini’s orientation was towards humanist philosophy indifferent to logic, and Vailati and Calderoni’s towards the more technical and analytic approach, and that they kept on encouraging others to adopt such methods and approaches.

However, the deeper and real reason for such an alignment has to do with the two ultimate presuppositions concerning the status of modalities. According to Vailati, “[T]o represent, for example, the properties that a given body *has*, is not to represent some present facts, but rather some facts that it *will have*, or *would have*, if the body in question were placed in such and such circumstances” (VAILATI, *Scritti*: 578, quoted in ZANONI 1968: 154).

Moreover, Vailati goes on to argue that:

Peirce’s methodological rule presents itself [...] as signalling the importance of discerning in our affirmations that portion which, by implying predictions /or “conditional expectations”, *previsioni*, A.-V. P.), is capable of being confirmed or disconfirmed by ulterior experiences, from that portion which, by referring instead to some actual state of our consciousness (sensations, tastes, valuations, etc.) cannot give place to controversies resolvable by appeal to new facts (VAILATI, *Scritti*: 922-23, quoted in ZANONI 1979: 613).

According to the proper pragmatist conception, Vailati argues, propositions can vary their meanings depending on the logical medium into which they are embedded. He says that the whole “ensemble” of theoretical context contributes to the production of “verifiable consequences” and that to speak of the meaning of a proposition is only sensible in relation to that ensemble constituted by other propositions and conceivable situations (VAILATI, *Scritti*: 759).¹³

These remarks suffice in establishing Vailati as a many-world philosopher. Besides this, the previous quotations demonstrate how badly off the mark the criticism is of the so-called scientific approach to knowledge. The critics take scientific knowledge to mean the activities of mirroring or copying reality and then somehow spectating it. Already Vailati, and Peirce before him, had noted that representation is bound to involve grasping, understanding, interpreting, and experimenting with what the issue at hand is. Such activities have little to do with copying or mirroring. No one can simply be mirroring nature as such and then observing the outcomes without a whole variety of means and resources for doing so. But as soon as we have such resources at our disposal, what is going on is already very different from the mere activities of mirroring or copying.

As the reader might have expected, this brings us to Rorty, whose belief in the universalism of language is incontestable. According to Rorty, philosophical views can

¹³ Vailati remarks to Papini in 1907 that “he has written to Peirce” (VAILATI 1971: 452). No letter from Vailati has survived, only an empty envelope deposited at the Harvard Peirce Archives.

only be assessed by social practices and by engaging in a conversation on them. Much earlier, Schiller had favoured logic to be replaced by a socially constructed “psychologic” (SCHILLER 1912). Rorty goes further than Schiller in stating that the meaning of concepts is invariably linked with our *desires* and *expectations* about them. However, the view that meaning has to do with desires and expectations is orthogonal to Peirce’s method. In Peirce’s later attempts to prove the method he went through all the possible general psychological processes directed towards acting for a purpose. He then asked “what constituents of our psychical life are general?” (*Letter to Papini*, p. 7, 10 April 1907) and finds four such general constituents: “Conceptions, desires (including hopes, fears etc.), expectations, and habits” (EP 2:412, 1907; see Pietarinen & Snellman 2006). He goes on to reject conceptions, desires, and expectations as having to do with meaning, or being the essence of logical interpretants, the reason being that they are generals only either *qua* concepts or in relation to concepts, and as such are something antecedent, and not consequent, to the facts.¹⁴ And it is facts that Peirce takes Schiller to have missed in his pragmatism. What remains are the general habits of action by which our intellectual signs receive their meaning.¹⁵

Rorty admittedly states that “the pattern of all inquiry [...] is deliberation concerning the relative attractions of various concrete alternatives” (RORTY 1982: 164). Here he indeed takes the deliberation concerning alternatives as the constitutive pattern of inquiry. Do such musings then make him a many-world philosopher after all? No, because he does not take these alternatives as real possibilities that may remain unactualised. He takes them to be alternative constructions of the actual world, all of which are concrete and all of which can be defended and criticised with equal confidence. There is no irreducible modal character to be attributed to Rorty’s alternatives.

Earlier, I quoted Peirce from an unpublished letter he sent to Papini in 1907. In that letter Peirce recapitulates the essential steps of his late proof of pragmatism. Papini did not approve Peirce’s pragmatism and preferred certain radical interpretations of James’s version. And Prezzolini soon followed suit. At any event, it is important to recognise how courteous Peirce was in his letter as he simply went through his mature version of pragmatism to Papini, explaining it step by step and placing his argument for habits as real generals as the centrepiece. He did not seem to care anymore whether his formulation outperformed James’s, Dewey’s, Royce’s or Papini’s versions; that was an issue he left for future inquirers to decide. The point I want to make concerning the motivations for this letter is that, although Peirce claimed to have been blissfully ignorant about what had been going on in pragmatism over the last 18 years or so,¹⁶ he obviously saw what the key point of departure between the rival formulations amounts to.

¹⁴ The only exception would be an expectation given in a subjunctive conditional form, but that is not what Rorty has in mind.

¹⁵ Moreover, what counts against Rorty here is the fact that, from having some general psychological processes at our disposal it is still a long conceptual leap to be taken to arrive at the claim that the practices that these processes instantiate are social.

¹⁶ “I cannot say how my pragmatism is related to other kinds of pragmatism, because for the last 18 years (and practically longer) I have been a recluse, remote from libraries, unable to subscribe to any journals, and very rarely communicating with any philosopher” (*Peirce to Schiller*, draft, 12 May 1905).

Let me make a few lingering remarks on some other pragmatist thinkers. John Dewey is somewhat elusive here. Peirce's assessment of his philosophising is found in a draft letter apparently never sent to Dewey, in which Peirce says, "although I am strongly in favour of your Pragmatistic views, I find the whole volume [*Dewey's Studies in Logical Theory*] penetrated with the [*this*] spirit of intellectual licentiousness, that does not see that anything is so very false" (*Peirce to Dewey*, draft letter, 9 June 1904; CP 8.241). At any rate, Dewey went on to develop a descriptive and non-normative, experimental logic, with strong psychologistic undertones. Like Peirce, Dewey sees pragmatism as a method of doing philosophy, but unlike Peirce and Schiller (though in quite different respects), agrees with James's urge to interpret and apply it as widely as possible. On the other hand, Dewey subscribes to the concept of the control of inquiry (though not the same as Peirce's notion of self-control) and restates the Peircean search for the "method of methods" in terms of the "inquiry of inquiry". Because of these metasystematic questions omnipresent in Dewey's work, I hesitate to classify him into one of the two camps definitely. His leanings towards the universalists are quite evident in his conception of experimental logic (DEWEY 1916), but metatheoretic elements elsewhere suggest an alternative possibility.

Concerning Royce, his philosophy is of a somewhat different temperament. Unlike Dewey, Royce develops a normative, non-psychological philosophy of logic in his *Principles of Logic* (1914). He took thirdness and the realm of "possible modes of action" to be real and operative constituents of the world. He invented several original logical systems, which are not merely formal systems, for the purposes of solving not only logical but also philosophical problems. Following Peirce, Royce even came to contribute to the introduction of three-valued logics (CROUCH 2004).

These examples suffice to confirm Royce's calculist presupposition. Indeed, C. I. Lewis grants Royce's method the status of a "path-finder" in philosophy, precisely because by their application Royce was able to advance knowledge in "previously unexplored fields" (C. I. Lewis, quoted in CROUCH 2004: 623). I suppose there can be no doubt about Lewis himself partaking in the same group with Royce, shown for instance by his keen adoption of modal logics, an inspiration which he got while studying Peirce's manuscripts deposited at Harvard soon after his death (MURPHEY 2005).¹⁷

Charles Morris, in contrast, is in fact of a broadly Rortyan stripe. Morris declares that "the meaning of a symbol is the *expectation* it arouses" (MORRIS 1937: 28, emphasis added). As expectations precede facts, his statement clashes with Peirce's and Royce's calculist presupposition. An implication is that Morris must take semantics and pragmatics as separate subjects of study. This is incompatible with calculism according to which the language-world relationships are constituted by such habits and practices that predominantly involve self-controlled usages of expressions.

¹⁷ Among the calculist thinkers we may also group the early pragmatist epistemologist and critical realist Charles A. Strong (1923).

4. Conclusions

Pragmatism makes some alluring suggestions to the effect that the meanings of our natural or colloquial language are constituted by various human practices and actions. But this view, though essentially correct, hinges on very different presuppositions. The real question is whether the meanings of our expressions are something that can be captured and discussed in language by different *self-controlled usages*, *re-interpretations*, and *meta-linguistic mechanisms*. Given the answer to this as the dividing criterion, pragmatist thinkers show under very different lights. The latter, one-world presupposition is revealed as soon as we take meaning to be constituted by the *actual* use of expressions by *actual* speakers of language in *real* conversational situations. The alternative, many-world presupposition concerns what is at issue in meaning as related to how we *would* rationally act, in *any conceivable* situation.

Which one is right? Well, Papini, one of our many ‘one-world’ pragmatist thinkers, had observed in a 1907 essay “What Pragmatism is Like” that “Pragmatism is really *less a philosophy than a method of doing without philosophy*” (Papini 1907, quoted in De Waal 2005: 86). Perhaps we can take this statement a bit further and say that “Pragmatism is really *less a philosophy if it is a method of doing without logic*”.

It is a widespread belief that pragmaticism is a narrower and non-pluralistic version of pragmatism. One implication of my argument is that in fact the contrary is likely to be the case. Methodologically, pragmaticism is the more permissible and open-minded one. It does not make communication a mere discourse. It can be used to settle disputes. It can be used to rank competing opinions. A pragmaticist’s mind lies in the future. It is many-world philosophy in the deep ontological and logical sense. Given its presupposition to interpret all assertions with respect to conceivable possibilities, it admits an open-ended number of reinterpretations and methods of approach in philosophy, and in that sense embraces pluralism over and above what pragmatism does.

Appendix: Excerpts from the Peirce-Schiller Correspondence¹⁸

Schiller: I am ashamed to say that I have not yet been able to grasp wherein the specific peculiarity of ‘pragmaticism’ consists as compared with other pragmatisms. (30 April 1905)

Peirce: I am not sure of understanding you; for there is one word whose meaning in your mouth I cannot guess. It is *reality*. I should be particularly obliged to you if you would send me a definition of it. (Draft, 23 May 1905)

¹⁸ Letters from the Peirce-Schiller Correspondence are mostly unpublished.

¹⁹ Here Peirce agrees with the three key points of Schiller’s anthropomorphism: that the needs of life asseverate philosophical perspectives, that ideals take human shape, and that instincts ought to be trusted (*Peirce to Schiller*, undated, draft, apparently 23 May 1905).

But while I seem to agree with your philosophical opinions,¹⁹ we are separated by two differences much deeper. (Draft, 23 May 1905)

[One is that] the word *real* was introduced as a technical term (first of law and then of logic) and was so little used before Scotus & so continually by him that it ought to be regarded as his word; and my ethics of terminology will not permit me to give it any other meaning than that it is that whose characters do not at all depend upon what any man or men think that they are. (Draft, 12 May 1905)

Another difference seems to be that I think the very first application that should be made of pragmatism of any stripe is to define words. (Draft, undated, late June or later 1905)

From what you say about me, I infer that you have never read any philosophical or logical paper of mine unless perhaps this last one [*What Pragmatism Is*]. (Draft, 23 May 1905)

Schiller: Dear Mr Peirce. I fear that my unfortunate misapprehension as to the relation of James's account of pragmatism to your authentic doctrine (which I was first enabled to realize by your first letter), must have rendered my art.

[However,] James and I both agree that if there are real alternatives anywhere, the whole course of things might have been different, and so that the acceptance of human freedom carries with it the assertion of an indefinite 'plasticity' of the 'real'. (5 or 6 June 1905)

Peirce: As to the plasticity of the real, I am, on one side, entirely with you. [...] The power of self-control is certainly not a power over what one is doing at the very instant the operation of self-control is commenced. It consists (to mention only the leading constituents), first, in comparing one's past deeds with standards, second, in rational deliberation concerning how one will act in the future, in itself a highly complicated operation, third, in the formation of a resolve, fourth, in the creation, on the basis of the resolve, of a strong determination, or modification of habit.

[Therefore,] the most important and far-reaching difference is in regard to scholastic realism. (Draft, undated, late June or later 1905; CP 8.319-320)

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