Peirce’s Objective Idealism: A Reply to T.L. Short’s ‘What was Peirce’s Objective Idealism?’

O Idealismo Objetivo de Peirce: Uma Réplica a ‘O que foi o Idealismo Objetivo de Peirce?’ de T.L. Short

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Abstract: Peirce gradually evolved a set of foundational categories he himself characterized as a completely developed system. The article pinpoints essential, intertranslatable features of this system which in mid-career Peirce referred to as his Schelling-fashioned objective idealism. In reply to a recent article by T. L. Short, it contends that Schelling’s influence was not confined to the years of the Monist metaphysical essays, but continued on in the amplifications and ramifications of Peirce’s later articulations. Peirce’s continuously unfolding system is shown to run counter to Short’s article which features William James’ psychologism as antidote to Peirce’s foundational categories. The polemical nature of Short’s article distracts from Peirce’s own considered reflections on James’s position.


Resumo: Peirce gradualmente desenvolveu um conjunto de categorias fundacionais que ele próprio caracteriza como um sistema completamente desenvolvido. O artigo destaca aspectos essenciais, intertraduzíveis de seu sistema que, nos meados da carreira, Peirce se refere como seu idealismo objetivo do tipo shellinguiano. Em resposta ao recente artigo de T.L. Short, afirma-se que a influência de Schelling não foi confinada aos anos dos ensaios metafísicos da Monist, mas permanece nas amplificações e ramificações das articulações posteriores de Peirce. O contínuo desenvolvimento do sistema peirciano é mostrado em contraposição ao artigo de Short, que apresenta o psicologismo de William James como antidoto às categorias fundacionais de Peirce. A natureza polêmica do artigo de Short desvia a atenção das próprias reflexões ponderadas de Peirce sobre a posição jamesiana.

1. Reciprocally Interpretant Signs in Peirce’s Completely Developed System

In a November 25, 1902 letter to William James, Peirce wrote: “I seem to myself to be the sole depository at present of the completely developed system, which all hangs together and cannot receive proper presentation in fragments.” He went on, in just a few more strokes of his pen, to convey to James that his completely developed system is based on his “three categories, which in their psychological aspect, appears as Feeling, Reaction, and Thought”, which in turn subtend his “three normative sciences”, and that “the true nature of pragmatism cannot be understood without them”. Arguably this latter remark was a friendly jibe at James, considering his ensuing remark that his version of pragmatism [namely, Pragmaticism] doesn’t take Reaction (his second category) as the be-all, “but it takes the end-all as the be-all, and the End is something that gives sanction to action”. “The End” involves Thought proper as Thirdness as well as the significations of his three normative sciences in his overall conception of philosophy. Continuing this sotto voce interface with James’ version of pragmatism, Peirce says that his own view requires a rejection of “a nominalistic view of Thought as if it were something that a man had in his [individual] consciousness”. “Consciousness”, Peirce observes, may mean any one of the three categories; but if it is to mean Thought “it is more without us than within. It is we that are in it, rather than it in any of us”. And he finally added: “This then leads to synechism, which is the keystone of the arch” (CP 8.255-257).

What is remarkable about this letter is that it is a concise condensation of his “completely developed system”. Instead of an epistle of merely desultory remarks, Peirce produced an iconic hologram, so to speak, of his synechistic philosophy for James’ jaundiced eye. Peirce was now in his early sixties, in full possession of his mature philosophical powers. His friendly jibing at James continued in his contemporary 1903 Harvard Lectures, as for example in the originally untitled first lecture, ‘The Maxim of Pragmatism’, in which he complained that “the new pragmatists” were “lively but not deep” (EP 2: 134). And it culminated in Peirce’s considered way of parsing his differences from James, F. C. S. Schiller, and other “new pragmatists” in the last years of his career, as we shall see below (section three of this paper).

The textual signs are that we should take a synechistic approach to Peirce’s own writings. Like that of any great author, his thought organically blossomed into its own distinctive form. Beginning at least in mid-career with ‘A Guess at the Riddle’ (1887-88), Peirce famously sowed the seeds of a multi-layered architecture of

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2 CP volume 8, chapter five, pp. 186 ff. is a gold mine for Peirce’s remarks on the difference between his “completely developed system” (8.255) and James’ psychologism and doctrine of pure experience (CP 8.256-58, 260-61, 279. 301). At CP 8.263, 286, 287, 292 Peirce complains of the blind spot on James’ mental retina with regard to his system; see also Joseph Brent’s biographical discussion of James’s reaction to Peirce’s 1903 Harvard Lectures (BRENT, 1993, p. 291, 327-28). Further notice of Peirce’s ambivalent relation to James will appear below.
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He reaped a vintage harvest from these seeds, producing a grand cru theoretical accomplishment of the highest caliber in the history of philosophy. Peirce’s 1902 letter to James can be read as a miniature synthesis of the essentials of that career-text in which he systematically developed foundational categories to rival, if not surpass, the categories of such first-tier theorists in the history of philosophy as Aristotle, Kant, and Hegel (EP 2: 148). These categories, consisting of his trichotomic of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness, trace back to his youthful (“genius in nuce”) endeavors to replace Kant’s categories. His mature phases of speculation continued this labor, gradually amplifying his categories in phenomenological, normative, and metaphysical trajectories that were further designed to clarify the logical prerequisites of the hard and soft sciences. In retrospect, we can recognize it as a first-tier project and accomplishment in the history of philosophy.

There are numerous ways to approach the legacy of this achievement. For schematic purposes here I will suggest that Peirce came to develop his bottom line of philosophical speculation in three interlacing strands of articulation: (1) his curiously labeled “Schelling-fashioned objective idealism” according to which matter is “effete” or “partially deadened mind”, pointedly explicated in terms of the universe’s habit-taking tendencies – such that in his over-all worldview “Reality is an affair of Thirdness” (EP 2: 197); (2) his co-implicative insistence on a shared metaphysical DNA, as it were – that is, an evolution-based instinctive affinity between objective nature and the human mind – which accounts, also in Schelling-fashion, for how the discovering work of abductive and inductive inferences arise and generate the processes of inquiry (and thus how, contra Kant, productive propositions of science and art are possible), in the first place; and (3) his equally huge claim as to the “energizing reasonableless” of Ideas in nature that subtends, in interpermeating patterns of efficient and final causation, the plastic, progressive, agapistic, productions of human intelligence. Peirce also traded these concepts in the currency of Scholastic Realism, the reverse side of which coin was his ubiquitous rejection of Nominalism.

As he went on, Peirce gradually developed this complex of essential thoughts. He came to articulate how Pragmatism (or in his later preferred word, Pragmaticism) was based on the three categories; and he set that within his theory of universal semiosis, namely that “the Universe is a vast representamen, a great symbol of God’s purpose, working out its conclusions in living realities” (EP 2: 193; cf. 254-55, 343-44).

In one of the most powerful of his later-phase writings, ‘The Neglected Argument for the Reality of God’ of 1908, Peirce reformulated his “three universes” with respect to “the hypothesis of God’s Reality” in the Pure Play of Musement.

When we do
the work of connecting the dots, we seem to come away with an appreciation that Peirce did in fact achieve a “completely developed system” —and one that takes its place among the greatest theories in the history of philosophy. Such was his own sense of his potential accomplishment in ‘A Guess at the Riddle’ in 1887 (when he referred to himself as the modern Aristotle).

While other formulations of Peirce's bottom line (foundational) tenets are surely possible, let me here propose the aforementioned interlaced strands of Peirce's thought as heuristics to access his “completely developed system”. It is crucial to see that they are intertranslatable patterns of conceptualization, illustrative of his brilliant power of high-level “vague” generalization and, as well, enacting his own doctrine of signification by an open-ended series of interpretant-signs.

Peirce's interrelated themes of the instinctive affinity (connaturality) of the mind and nature and thus of the energizing of Ideas as final causes in the nature of things are easily construed as variants of the first strand, his objective idealism, namely, his theory of the Reality of Thought in the universe. The reciprocity of this complex of concepts accounts, among other things, for why Peirce in his later career was keen to position his three Normative Sciences between his Phaneroscopy and Metaphysics.

Peirce opined, just before he died, that it was not the security of pragmatic reasoning, but the uberty of pursuit of the Beautiful, the Good, and of Abstract Thought that raised humanity above animality. This was consistent with his opinion penned in ‘New Elements’ (1904), “The words justice and truth, amid a world that habitually neglects these things and utterly derides the words, are nevertheless among the greatest powers the world contains” (EP 2: 308). In numerous passages to the same effect he affirmed such a focused system of pragmatistic realism-idealism replete with Platonic, Aristotelian, and Leibnizian nuances. He reprised and reconfigured these nuances by the objective perspective of his scientific mind-set. His concept of abduction, the principal venue for his theory of the instinctive and progressive powers of the human mind in nature, became, if anything, even more pronounced as he settled into his most mature reflections – as witnessed for example in his 1908 piece, ‘The Neglected Argument’.

To appreciate these ramifying interpretant-signs of Peirce’s worldview, a fuller analysis should parse the array of German Idealisms that Peirce appropriated as he another extraordinary passage on the Creative Process in MS 310.

6 Here I should like to acknowledge my debt to Nicholas Guardiano’s incisive paper, ‘Peirce’s Metaphysics of Objective Idealism’, which was the William James Prize paper presented at the APA Eastern Division meeting in Boston, December 29, 2010.


8 In ‘What Pragmatism Is’ (1905), Peirce repeats his point that human purposes are physically efficient. “For truths, on the average, have a greater tendency to get believed than falsities have”. Accordingly, “[...] the ideas of ‘justice’ and ‘truth’ are, notwithstanding the iniquity of the world, the mightiest of the forces that move it. Generality is, indeed, an indispensable ingredient of reality; for mere individual existent or actuality without any regularity whatever is a nullity. Chaos is pure nothing” (EP 2: 343).

hit his stride as an original philosopher. Such an array is now available for our own comparative analysis – an array including Kant's critical idealism, Fichte's subjective idealism, Schelling's objective idealism, Hegel's absolute idealism, Husserl's transcendental idealism. Such a fuller historical analysis – not entered into here – will confirm that Peirce embraced a “Schelling-fashioned objective idealism”, amplifying it according to his own concerns as a physicist, mathematician, and logician, but at any rate following Schelling in critiquing the “negative philosophy” versions of immanent, transcendental reflectivity in Kant, Fichte, and Hegel. Peirce’s critique, we shall see, also extends to Husserl’s phenomenology and to the psychologistic versions of philosophy in his day and our own.

2. T. L. Short’s Version of Peirce’s Objective Idealism

My concern in this paper, however, will be to offer a collegial reply to T. L. Short’s recent *Cognitio* article, “What Was Peirce’s Objective Idealism?” Short’s agenda consists of limiting Schelling’s influence to the years 1891-93. It proceeds to the further, more drastic, step of rejecting the ascription of a genuine objective idealism to Peirce’s philosophy. He does this by way of – as I understand it – first arguing that Peirce’s objective idealism is paradoxically tantamount to a form of materialism, but then providing his own version of a phenomenalistic idealism associated with the tenets of William James’ philosophy at the expense of Peirce’s position.

Short’s Abstract gives a foretaste of his contrarian thesis by reducing Peirce’s objective idealism to the terms of James’ version of a subjective idealism. Peirce’s error, he says, “consists in the identification of the subjective or introspectable with the objective or observable, taking William James’ descriptions of the ‘stream of thought’, contrary to James’ intention, ontologically”. But we will see that in fact this was a psychologistic position, sometimes with explicit reference to James, which Peirce ubiquitously critiqued (and it will be noted that Short’s article in due course acknowledges that James did ontologize his “stream of thought” in his later doctrine of “pure experience”).

Let me identify these issues as a way of re-featuring Peirce’s “Schelling-fashioned objective idealism” and its correlatable variants of the connaturality of mind and nature, nature’s energizing reasonableness, his doctrine of universal semeiosis, and his later-phase pragmaticism. For this purpose I will refer to Short’s article in the sequence of its eight sections.

10 See especially Bruce Matthews (2007 and 2011). Schelling’s reputation as a major thinker has had to survive Hegel’s way of subordinating it to his own. It was Schelling’s manufactured speculations that clarified the differing idealisms of Kant, Fichte, Hegel, and his own. And Peirce embraced Schelling.

11 In passing we might note that William James frequently took aim at the German Idealisms (as well as Royce’s Hegelianism and F. H. Bradley’s Berkeleyan-Buddhistic variant) in his writings. But James did not parse the varieties of Idealism under discussion; he rather treated them all under a common monistic rubric of “All-form”, or “bloc universe”, and does not seem to have appreciated the differences involved in Peirce’s considered advocacy of Schelling’s objective idealism.
In this first section Short works toward a “suggestion” that Peirce did not persist in calling himself an objective idealist after 1893 or 1894, and “in the light of that possibility” it proposes to explicate Peirce’s objective idealism confined to the five Monist articles of 1891-93 alone. He then offers a promissory note “to conclude by briefly citing some evidence that it was later abandoned”— though I think that Short in the end, having reduced Peirce to James’ psychologism, does not make good on this promise.

First, Short correctly indicates that Peirce outgrew his 1887-88 remark on the “uninhabitable Schelling-Hegel mansion”. Peirce reversed his estimate of Schelling in his 1890s series of strong affirmations of allegiance to Schelling’s objective idealism, while increasingly establishing his distance from Hegel. His criticism of Hegel’s “ananchastic” dialectic in fact hewed close to Schelling’s career-long (and increasingly explicit) portrayal of Hegel’s “negative philosophy” of immanent transcendental reflectivity. Peirce followed Schelling in contending that Hegel’s dialectical logic was not existential and open-ended, but only a vis a tergo within its closed system of “the Real is Rational, and the Rational is the Real.”

Moreover, Peirce’s interest in Schelling was not just confined to 1891-93. Before the age of 30, Peirce had read Schelling in Thomas Davidson’s translations of Schelling’s 1799 First Outline of a System of the Philosophy of Nature and the ‘Introduction’ to his 1800 System of Transcendental Idealism. He says he was particularly influenced by Schelling’s Naturphilosophie. He must have been slowly digesting Schelling’s ideas while developing his own rejection of mechanism for an indeterministic, vitalistic model that blossomed forth in the Monist essays; and the textual evidence confirms that this was not confined to the years of his Monist articles of 1891-93.

Thus after his obliquely autobiographical letter to James in 1894, in which Peirce, over against Hegel’s putdown of Schelling’s “Protean” stream of writings, endorsed “all phases of Schelling’s career” for its “freedom from the trammels of system” and thus resembling “a scientific man”, a decade later, in his fourth Harvard Lecture, ‘Seven Systems of Metaphysics’ of 1903, he still remarkably identified his metaphysics of the three categories with Schelling. There, as Peirce speculates on how to classify previous metaphysicians in terms of their partial or full anticipation of his three categories of Firstness (spontaneity as qualitative potentiality), Secondness (brute otherness, resistant facticity), and Thirdness (thought, real generality, continuity, and evolution), he says that the only type that features all three categories is one that “embraces Kantism, – Reid’s philosophy and the Platonic philosophy of which Aristotelianism is a special development”. He continues: “The doctrine of Aristotle is distinguished from substantially all modern philosophy by its recognition of at least two grades of being. That is, besides actual reactive existence, Aristotle recognizes a germinal being, an esse in potentia or as I like to call it an esse in futuro. Thus in places Aristotle “has glimpses of a distinction between energeia and entelecheia”, although Aristotle’s general tendency is to conflate formal, efficient, and final causes and thus limiting, by “hindsighting,” entelecheia to energeia.

13 ESPOSITO, 1977, p. 201.
14 See ‘New Elements’, 1904: “Aristotle gropes for a conception of perfection, or entelechy, which he never succeeds in making clear. We may adopt the word to mean the very fact,
What is significant here is that Peirce originally inserted “except perhaps Schelling & mine” after “all modern philosophy”; he then crossed out the insertion, and added instead the word “substantially” earlier in the sentence (Harvard Lectures, 1903, CP 5.79, EP 2: 180 and 522 n4). In effect, Peirce here re-acknowledged his affinity with Schelling's own robust sense of esse in futuro (which Schelling articulated in his “progressive [metaphysical] empiricism” from the early phases of his Naturphilosophie to his later “positive philosophy” against Kant's and Hegel’s “negative philosophy”).

Short’s article presents no evidence that Peirce had not digested Schelling's objective idealism into his own thought and maintained it until the end of his life. Peirce often fussed over his earlier tenets, revising them as he went along. In this case there is no such revision. Rather, when Peirce, in his third Harvard Lecture, associated his position exclusively with that of Schelling’s among the modern theories, he re-implicated his doctrines of “the law of mind” and of agapastic evolution in the objective nature of things. He postulated his three categories as “metaphysico-cosmical” categories in the third and again in the fifth Harvard Lecture, ‘The Three Normative Sciences’, while saying that “To be a nominalist consists in the undeveloped state in one's mind of the apprehension of Thirdness as Thirdness. The remedy for it consists in allowing ideas of human life to play a greater part in one's philosophy. Metaphysics is the science of Reality. Reality consists in regularity. Real regularity is active law. Active law is efficient reasonableness, or in other words is truly reasonable reasonableness. Reasonableness is Thirdness as Thirdness” (EP 2: 197). The provenance of this attitude of allowing the organic ideas of human life to energize one’s philosophy of the objective nature of things is also conspicuously found in Schelling’s youthful reconfigurations of Kant and Fichte (the precedent is found in Goethe and other German writers as well).

It is hard to conclude that Peirce’s mature philosophy was anything less than a continuous amplification of his Schelling-fashioned objective idealism. He reformulated that doctrine, for example, in his ‘On Science and Natural Classes’ (1902) where, against the range of nominalists from Ockham down to Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, and the Mills (EP 2: 70-72), he championed the Scholastic theories of objective generalities in nature and the mind’s metaphysical affinity with nature that is, the ideal sign which should be quite perfect, and so identical, – in such identity as a sign may have – with the very matter denoted united with the very form signified by it. The entelechy of the Universe of being, then, the Universe qua fact, will be that Universe in its aspect as a sign, the ‘Truth,’ of being. The ‘Truth,’ the fact that is not abstracted but complete, is the ultimate interpretant of every sign.” (EP 2: 304). Despite Aristotle's tendency to conflate energeia and entelecheta, Peirce hews close to Aristotle, as for example in ‘The Basis of Pragmaticism in the Normative Sciences’, where he says that Aristotle “brought to light the supremacy of the element of Growth,” and therefore furnished “the Aristotelian key” to cenoscopity and uberosity (EP 2: 373-74). As for his “Kantism”, Peirce elsewhere indicated how his early “pure Kantism” was forced by steps into Pragmaticism by involving the rejection of Kant's thing-in-itself and accepting Scholastic Realism's implication concerning “real vagues” and “real possibilities” (EP 2: 353-54). The entire gamut of respects in which Peirce adapts Aristotle (via Schelling) will require a separate study.

16 See especially Bruce Matthews (2007), 'Introduction', 1-84.
that subtends scientific and artistic discovery. It is precisely this capacity of the mind to “prognosticate”, “divine”, and to “generate” potential being in futuro that Peirce underscores as shipwrecking the nominalist position. The very essence of Thought (in the Universe) consists in “mediating”, that is, on “bringing about the actualization of qualities”. Indeed, that is his Pragmaticism in a nutshell. And here it should be noted that, as Peirce goes on to describe – once again in Schellingian fashion – the life of energizing reasonableness in science as a living thing, he also rejects what he calls “the Greek sense of episteme” as a complete body of definitions, or “systematized knowledge” (EP 2: 129-30), in such wise as to reject the Aristotelian tendency to tie down final cause to formal cause (here too he followed Schelling, who articulated a similar critique of the formalism of Spinoza’s definitional system).

In another contemporary piece, ‘The Maxim of Pragmatism’ (1903), after gently satirizing James and others for their lively but superficial adoption of his term pragmatism (EP 2: 134), Peirce produced another condensation of “the true nature of pragmatism” in writing that while pragmatism is hard to define, it is “a sort of instinctive attraction for living facts” (EP 2: 158). Living, not lively, facts (and thus another hologrammatic definition of pragmatism based on his three categories).

In this same regard Peirce also developed a persistent theme of his later Pragmaticism that symbols influence events. He drew the contrast between “objects of reaction” and “objects of representation”, the latter signifying symbolic representations of esse in futuro (EP 2: 182). “In the history of mind’s development, and in nature”, he says elsewhere, “the very being of the General, or Reason, consists in governing individual events”. It “consists” in “embodiment, that is, in manifestation. The creation of the universe […] is going on today and never will be done, is the very development of Reason”. The ideal of human conduct will accordingly be “to execute our little function in the operation of creation by giving a hand toward rendering the world more reasonable whenever, as the slang is, it is ‘up to us’ to do so” (EP 2: 254-55). Thirdness consists in bringing about secondness (EP 2: 267). Directly linking back to the “objective idealist” characterization of his Monist essays of 1891-93, he therefore says here in 1903 that “Thought is habit, determining the suchness of existence” (EP 2: 269). Thought acts not by efficient energy, but by furnishing laws – that is, by furnishing replicas or interpretant signs (EP 2: 271). And thus again, in 1904, “representations have the power to cause real facts”, and “there can be no reality which has not the life of a symbol” (EP 2: 308, 316).

As for Peirce’s declared objective idealism, Short’s article waffles the issue of “matter is extinct mind” of the 1889-91 Century Dictionary entry. Peirce more precisely rendered it as “specialised and partially deadened mind” in “The Law of Mind” of 1892, which Short’s article glosses as “decayed mind”. The precedent for Peirce’s “partially deadened mind”, “matter as effete mind”, and “mind hide-bound by habits” can be traced to numerous pronouncements of Schelling, not only in his Naturphilosophie of 1797-99 but even in his System of Transcendental Idealism of 1800. For example, the ‘Introduction’ to the latter work (which Peirce read back in 1879) contains the following sentences:

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17 See above Peirce’s comments on James’ lively but not deep rendition of pragmatism.
Matter is indeed nothing else but mind viewed in an equilibrium of its activities. There is no need to demonstrate at length how, by means of this elimination of all dualism, or all real opposition between mind and matter, whereby the latter is regarded merely as mind in a condition of dullness, or the former, conversely, as matter merely in becoming, a term is set to a host of bewildering enquiries concerning the relationship of the two.\textsuperscript{18}

These words of Schelling are obviously an exact forerunner of Peirce’s doctrine: his “effete mind” is simply Schelling’s “mind in a condition of dullness”. As the aforecited paper by Nicholas Guardiano points out, that “matter” is “partially deadened mind” can also be found in Emerson, as for example in his very late Harvard lecture, ‘The Natural History of Intellect.’\textsuperscript{19} The reverse side of the same doctrine is the mediating activity of mind in the universe, as we have seen above.

Here and in what follows, Short’s article does not provide Peirce’s full doctrine in which nature’s “inveterate habit becoming physical laws” is the reverse side of “growth as increasing complexity” in an evolutionary \textit{kosmos-noetos}.\textsuperscript{20} These two sides of “enfolding and unfolding” (Leibniz), “systolic and diastolic” (Goethe, Schelling), or “arrested and progressive” (Emerson) aspects of living nature, become the two complementary aspects of mechanistic and teleological – alternatively, of efficient and final – causation in Peirce’s stochastic sense of evolutionary nature comprised of both “effete” or “partially deadened” and “living”, or “accommodating” habit-formations. Peirce’s considered judgment as to these “outside” and “inside” dimensions of “matter” was that this is “the one intelligible theory of the universe” (CP 2.228).\textsuperscript{21} These metaphysical resolutions informed his later-phase pragmaticistic and semeiotic formulations as well.

My point here is that not only did Peirce not outgrow this theory, he continued to provide further interpretant-signs of it in a range of issues of his realism-idealism for the next two decades of his still blossoming philosophical career – as for example in his persistent critique of nominalism as falling short of his sense of the energizing reasonableness in the nature of things, his increasing interest in articulating the guiding aims of his three normative sciences, and in his sophisticated semeiotic reformulations of pragmaticism.\textsuperscript{22}

\textsuperscript{19} A synopsis of Emerson’s ‘The Natural History of Intellect’ (1870-71) appears in Dilworth (2010). Peirce, still a young man, shared the lecture platform with Emerson and several others in this Harvard lecture series. On Peirce’s relation to Emerson, see also Felicia E. Kruse (2010).
\textsuperscript{20} Cf. the full title of IBRI, 1992.
\textsuperscript{21} “All mind partakes more or less of the nature of matter; hence it is a mistake to conceive of the psychical and physical aspects of matter as absolutely distinct” (CP 6.265). “From the outside, considering its relation of action and reaction with other things, it is matter […]. From the inside, looking at its immediate character as feeling, it appears as consciousness” (CP 6.268; see also 6.104, 6.201, 7.364, 7.570).
\textsuperscript{22} An instructive variant on all this is his linking Pierre Gassendi’s Epicurean concept of “mechanistic evolutionary law” with the nominalism of the Ockhamists – which Peirce undermines via a citation from Ralph Cudworth’s 1845 \textit{The True Intellectual System of the Universe} (EP 2: 73, and 511, fn. 8 and 9). Peirce adumbrated this in his discussion of three
2. I have said above that a fuller analysis of the issues would need to parse the various kinds of idealism in the modern history of philosophy – from Berkeley’s through Husserl’s, and with particularly emphasis on the nuances of the doctrine achieved by Kant and the next generation of his 19th-century German followers. One could add to the list the senses of F. H. Bradley’s “absolute sentience”, Bergson’s “elan vital”, and Whitehead’s “prehensile feeling” constitutive of the “occasions of experience”. James’ unique doctrine of the “each forms” of “pure experience” also becomes relevant to the discussion, as we will see shortly. But it is fair to say that the later texts of Bradley, Bergson, James, and Whitehead only retail the more theoretically sophisticated, wholesale versions of their German predecessors, among which Schelling’s is the most instructive in that in his “Protean” career (so admired by Peirce) he forged the essential differences between himself, Kant, Fichte, and Hegel at a ground theoretical level.

Now, in that regard, Short, although not concerned with an historical account, admirably begins section 2 of his article with a succinct analysis of the Urform of subjective idealism that is associated with Fichte. He cites Peirce (EP 1: 91) in characterizing subjective idealism as based on the principle of immanent self-consciousness, such that the mind is a “container”, the contents of which are immediately known, while the world outside is known only by inference. But the inferential character of the outside world ultimately falls prey to the same principle of immediately immanent reflexivity, leaving the subjective “ego” as constructive source of the external world.

Such a Fichtean paradigm in fact became the points of departure for the youthful idealisms of Schelling and Hegel. Subsequently, the latter two outgrew Fichte in formulating their mature objective and absolute idealisms, respectively. Schelling recorded his gradual emancipation from Fichte’s subjective idealism in his Naturphilosophie writings of 1787-89 and his System of Transcendental Idealism of 1800. Peirce, we saw, studied both of these writings in 1879.

Then, by re-citing Peirce’s EP 1: 91, Short goes on, again admirably, to describe how objective idealism, in contrast with subjective idealism, does not deny the existence of the external world. It strives rather to theorize a principle of identity to account for the affinity in our knowledge of the inner and outer worlds (Peirce reprised Schelling’s principle of identity in his principle of synechism).

Short adds, however, that in that respect objective idealism is “like” both materialism and Cartesian dualism in bridging the inner and outer worlds in knowledge. But Cartesian dualism plainly does not fill the bill here. Rather, it is objective idealism,
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such as Peirce's which construes matter as effete mind, that has much in common with materialism. Materialism also identifies “minds” with special organizations of “matter”, i.e., in Short's words, of “decayed mind”, such that – as he also concludes at the end of section 3 – there is nothing that would distinguish objective idealism from a “non-Newtonian non-deterministic materialism” except perhaps a perverse choice of words. Since mind and matter are co-implicative in Peirce's synecchistic account, Short argues, Peirce's “law of mind” ought to be regarded as “paradoxical”.

Needless to say, this interpretive strategy ambiguates Peirce's precise phenomenological and metaphysical reflections. Peirce's many articulations of the impossibility of materialism to account for the “mental” aspects of spontaneous variety (firstness) and evolutionary growth (thirdness) are subverted by this paradoxical wordplay that materialism and objective idealism “have much in common”. Okay, but they may have even more not in common, and a final analysis has to account for both the resemblances and the differences. As well, mention of the Cartesian dualism of mind and matter raises a key issue in that the paradigm of materialism is classically based on a metaphysical substrate –atoms and the void, the flux of energy, string theory, or the equivalent – that requires the rendition of spirit or consciousness as an supervenient flaneur. We see this epiphenomenal doctrine in Heraclitus and Democritus, for example, in their respective dicta that “Nature likes to hide”. Rather than the co-implicative identity and affinity of mind and nature theorized in objective idealism, the materialistic hypothesis denigrates consciousness to a decidedly lower status in its own kind of lopsided metaphysical monism-cum-epistemological dualism.

Short's rendition of “extinct” or “decayed” mind can be further remarked here. His rendition, noted above, can be thought to lose the sense of qualitative vitality that remains present in Peirce's concept of matter as “dull” (not dense) or partially-deadened (not entirely dead). And his analysis is handicapped for being ahistorical. Entirely relevant is the tradition of the creative vitalism of nature as natura naturans that Peirce inherited from the Romantic and Idealist, explicitly anti-Newtonian, traditions carried on by Goethe, Schelling, Coleridge, Emerson and others (while having deeper roots in the mystical traditions, and in Spinoza and Leibniz). Peirce rang the changes on this vitalistic concept by his own unique power of theoretical generalization (fortified as this power was by his mathematical, logical, and scientific expertise).

Apart from this extremely relevant historical consideration, Short's conflation of idealism and materialism fudges the precision with which Peirce formulated his trichotomic doctrine of the categories. The latter topic Short only takes up in the next section. To adumbrate that doctrine here, the issue for Peirce is how “decayed matter” can intelligibly be construed as “organizing” consciousness, not to mention engendering our experience of the world's infinite variety and degrees of complexity? The brute material facts and events collide, push and pull, but do not organize. Organization bespeaks teleological functions of nature and consciousness which Peirce's third category of synthetic habit-formation precisely focuses. Absent this third aspect of our connatural experience of the organic and noetic vitality of nature – ever a “coincidence of freedom and necessity”, in Schelling's language –the materialistic
hypothesis is exposed as lacking real explanatory power.\textsuperscript{24} For Peirce, each of the “three universes” is essential in an adequate theory.

Hologrammatically speaking, Peirce’s 1903 classification of the “heuretic” (truth-seeking) sciences enacts this same full doctrine. It both illustrates an epistemic principle of noetic organization in the domains of objective human inquiry and points to corresponding vital nodes in nature and consciousness which the research sciences discover in the idiosopic, metaphysical, logical, ethical, esthetic, and phenomenological spheres. All this, too, is part of Peirce’s sense of objective idealism as “the one intelligible theory of the universe”.

3. Section 3 of Short’s article introduces Peirce’s three categories but elides Peirce’s insistence on their \textit{compresence} in all perceptual judgments. The thrust of his analysis is rather to argue monologically that “feeling is basic” – and (somewhat ingenuously?) he even inquires whether Peirce knew what he was saying! Goodbye trichotomic.

Pursuant of this agenda, Short tendentiously \textit{conflates} Peirce’s three irreducible but compresent categories by a strategy of translating “Feeling” into a Jamesian doctrine of \textit{introspected psychic content}, while again complaining that Peirce’s “law of mind” is “paradoxical” in that it must be known by introspection but applies objectively, such that, “by looking within our own minds, we grasp the fundamental law of the universe”. For his part, Peirce rejected this monological (Fichtean) conflation. Indeed, as he proclaimed in ‘One, Two, Three: Kantian Categories’ of 1886, ‘A Guess at the Riddle’ of 1887, and ‘Trichotomic’ of 1888, he believed he was making a quantum leap in the history of philosophy in articulating \textit{three} foundational phenomenological-cum-metaphysical categories (EP 1: 242-84), and with a degree of comprehensive generality surpassing the categories of Aristotle, Kant, and Hegel (EP 1: xxx, 45-46, EP 2: 148). Cosmological adumbrations of that trichotomic are traceable in early writings, as for example in ‘The Order of Nature’ of 1878 and ‘Design and Chance’ of 1884 (EP 1: 170 ff., 215 ff.). And of course Peirce’s \textit{Monist} papers and those that followed generated brilliant variations on the same categorical trichotomy.

For only one relevant application here, Peirce’s rejection of the monological reducibility of his “three universes” to the single category of Feeling appears in ‘What Makes a Reasoning Sound?’, the first of his Lowell lectures of 1903. There Peirce inscribes a long argument leveled against “the malady that has broken out in science”, namely the idea in vogue that rationality rests on “a feeling of logicality”. With respect to both logical and moral reasoning, he argues that this \textit{psychologistic} and nominalistic malady that reduces truth and goodness to subjective satisfaction consists in a conflation of the categories of Secondness, or efficient agency, and Thirdness, or general mental formulation, compounded by the further “blunder” of reducing both of these two to the Firstness of “Feeling.”\textsuperscript{25}

\textsuperscript{24} “The materialistic doctrine seems to me quite as repugnant to scientific logic as to common sense; since it requires us to suppose that a certain kind of mechanism will feel, which would be a hypothesis absolutely irreducible to reason – an ultimate, inexplicable regularity; while the only possible justification of any theory is that it should make things clear and reasonable” (EP 1: 292).

Short, however, goes on to prefer the terms of a Jamesian “free floating” phenomenalist of Feeling in lieu of the multidimensionality of Peirce’s account. In that regard let us note Peirce’s later speculations concerning the possibility of classification of all possible systems of metaphysics by the metric of the three categories. He provided schemes of the same in ‘The Categories Defended’ (the Third Harvard Lecture), and in ‘The Seven Systems of Metaphysics’ (the Fourth Harvard Lecture) of 1903. “Type I” Peirce classifies as based on such a reductive principle of Feeling. He says that this “simplest” of possible metaphysical systems is one for which “We ought therefore to admire and extol the efforts of Condillac and the Associationists to explain everything by means of the qualities of feeling.” (EP 2: 164). He subsequently refers to this “Type I” as marking the parameters of “Nihilism, so-called, and Idealistic Sensualism” (EP 2: 180). Peirce does not further elaborate this monological paradigm of Feeling, though it tantalizingly coincides with some passages in James, to say nothing of F. H. Bradley and centuries of East Asian Buddhism. But at any rate, “Type I” does not measure up to the categorical demands of Peirce own “metaphysico-cosmical” framework comprised of Types I, II, and III combined, which he says “embraces Kantism – Reid’s philosophy and the Platonic philosophy of which Aristotelianism is a special development”, and to which, as we saw above, he appended his own relation to Schelling (EP 2: 180).

A further application of the impossibility of this reduction to the single metaphysical variable of Feeling occurs, however, when Short goes on to refer Peirce’s theory of cosmogonic habit-formation to “matters of chance”. This in effect features what Peirce elsewhere called a nominalistic-mechanistic presupposition of “tachastic”-type Darwinian evolution we have just seen rejected in his remarks on Pierre Gassendi and Chauncey Wright. Peirce’s refutatory critique of this coupling of nominalistic and mechanistic presuppositions of interpreting Darwinian evolution traces at least as far back as his 1871 paper ‘Fraser’s The Works of George Berkeley’ (EP 1: 104; cf. 289, 357-59).

Short proceeds to say that “apart from its implicit appeal to introspection”, there is nothing to distinguish Peirce’s objective idealism from some kind of “non-Newtonian, non-deterministic materialism” – since “all things, including individual minds, are composed of the same stuff,” namely “matter” or “feeling”. The phrase “non-deterministic materialism” is not helpful here; indeed, it appears to be, in Schopenhauer’s word, a wooden-iron. If Short means it seriously, he ought to develop it. Will it be a version of hylozoism Peirce espoused in ‘The Architecture of Theories’?

We should note that Peirce himself recognized a kind of “non-Newtonian, non-deterministic materialism” in Epicurus’ departure from Democritus’ doctrine in making the atoms “swerve”, in effect investing them with “feeling” so as to “decline” from strict mechanical necessity, as required by his ethics of detached pleasure. But as we have just seen in Peirce’s remarks on Pierre Gassendi’s revival of Epicureanism in the Renaissance, Peirce developed the point that the Epicurean system is still

26 The modern Japanese philosopher Nishida Kitaro (1870-1945), reformulating Japan’s heritages of Mahayana Buddhism and Shinto, speaks of his country’s “metaphysical culture” as one of “pure feeling”. Nishida originally drew his basic concept of “pure experience” from William James.
only a monologically tychastic one, metaphysically speaking a cosmical “crap-shoot” which – however true to life in certain respects (of Firstness and Secondness) – in effect lacks a valid sense of organicity and teleological progression in the nature of things (including human consciousness). Once again, the concept of “organizing (or self-organizing) matter” turns out to be no adequate principle of explanation. Organization bespeaks thirdness. Objective idealism’s “one intelligible theory of the universe” combines real and ideal aspects by a principle of organic, synthetic identity unavailable in the Epicurean paradigm or any equivalent of it.

Short’s version of the “same stuff” of “matter/feeling” is taken from James’ doctrine of “pure experience” in his *Essays in Radical Empiricism* of 1904 (a publication contemporary with the Peircean materials we have been reviewing). But from the ‘Stream of Thought’ chapter of *Principles of Psychology* of 1890 to his later doctrine of “pure experience” of 1904, it was James who was the subjective idealist, arguably writing within an attenuated Fichtean paradigm.27 Nor does the article concern itself with the apparent inconsistencies in James’ doctrine of “pure experience”, which he alternatively calls “the one stuff out of which the universe is made” (a neutral monistic stuff adumbrated in writings of E. Mach), “the stream of sensation”, and “the instant field of the present,” among other apparently inconsistent appellations.

Also relevant here are Peirce’s many pronouncements of objective idealism that the universe’s noetic energy is not centered in individual brains, and indeed that individual minds do not produce the energizing reasonableness in the nature of things. He wrote that it is “a perfectly intelligible opinion that ideas are not all mere creations of this or that mind, but on the contrary have a power of finding or creating their vehicles, and having found them, of conferring upon them the ability to transform the face of the earth” (the sentence reprises, in essence, Schelling’s stance against Fichte). In reference to such *ideas* that represent the *esse in futuro* in the productive nature of things (especially marked by the plasticity of human intelligence), Peirce then declares, “It so happens that I myself believe in the eternal life of the ideas Truth and Right”. But every idea “has in some measure [...] the power to work out physical and psychical results. They have life, generative life”. And this is a matter of “experiential fact”: its evidence “stares us all in the face every hour of the day” (EP 2: 123). These pronouncements (also reminiscent of Emerson) went far beyond James’ own penchant to locate experience and reality in the “each forms” of personal action, to say nothing of the reduction of their ideal contents to a monadology of matter-cum-feeling.

Implications of Peirce’s objective idealism at work here are spelled out in any number of affine passages. For example, when he says that “all law is the result of

27 In his ‘Seven Systems of Metaphysics’, Peirce interestingly distinguishes the “moderate nominalists” such as Ockham, Hobbes, Locke, the two Mills, from “the Berkeleyans,” even though elsewhere he recognizes Berkeley as an arch-nominalist. The “moderate nominalists” predominantly blend the first two categories [I, II], while the Berkeleyans are grounded in the categories I and III. While speculative, I am inclined to think that Peirce viewed James as a “Berkeleyan” for his predominant sense-making in terms of the temperamental character of subjective feelings and thoughts in his “stream of thought” and “pure experience” concepts. James’ facts are “soft facts” in contrast to the “hard facts” of Peirce’s category of Secondness. His essays on the “strenuous life” and “energies of men” are basically hortatory, placed within a pluralistic account of the “each forms” of pure experience.
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evolution” (CP 6.91). Or again: “The evolutionary process is, therefore, not a mere
evolution of the existing universe, but rather a process by which the very Platonic
forms themselves have become or are becoming developed” (CP 6.194). Or again, in
more explicit Schellingian fashion: “We must search for this generalizing tendency in
such departments of nature where we find plasticity and evolution still at work. The
most plastic of all things is the human mind, and next after that come the organic
world, the world of protoplasm. Now the generalizing tendency is the great law of
mind, the law of association, the law of habit-taking” (CP 7.515).

This section of Short’s paper ends, argumentatively, with Peirce’s 1868-69 dictum
that “We have no power of introspection, but all knowledge of the internal world is
derived by hypothetical reasoning from our knowledge of external facts” – a statement
that is supposed to reinforce the “paradox” of Peirce’s account in which Feeling is
required (by Short) to play the double (Fichtean) role of introspection and external
reference. But it should be clear that Peirce’s early dictum, the first statement of four
epistemological incapacities he insisted upon, is, in light of the foregoing, easily alig-
ned with Peirce’s doctrine of the three irreducible and compresent phenomenological
categories in perceptual judgments and thus also in the various corollarial strands of
objective idealism we are reviewing here.

4. Still obscuring Peirce’s three-dimensional categories, section 4 of Short’s article goes
on to characterize “pure Feeling which forms the warp and woof of consciousness, or
in Kant’s phrase its matter” as a doctrine that “suggests a substantival conception of
feeling”. “Substantival” is a word the article repeats in several places to reinsinuate
the Jamesian “stuff of the universe” neutral monism, but unexpectedly Short here
claims that it is “plain though unstated throughout [Peirce’s] Monist series”. In this
context Short egregiously suggests that Peirce was resuscitating Locke’s theory that
“a general idea is a composite of particular ideas” – “as if our idea of triangularity
were a composite image of all triangles. Such a composite would be a terrible mess,
a mere smudge, and couldn’t represent anything”. The textual evidence, to the con-
trary, is that Peirce explicitly rejected the “moderate nominalism” of Locke and the
other British empiricists, as for example in his early ‘Fraser’s The Works of George
Berkeley’ of 1871 where he gives an account of his Scholastic Realism comprised of
the two marks of haecceity or Secondness and generality or Thirdness (EP 1: 83 ff.),
as well as in his restatement of his Aristotelian and Scholastic realism in ‘On Science
and Natural Classes’ of 1902, and again in his ‘Seven Systems of Metaphysics’ of 1903.

Short’s ensuing discussion of “the gain and loss” of the “intensity” or “vivacity”
of ideas also requires a more precise parsing of the three categories than his article
indicates (to Peirce, intensity and vivacity, like pleasure and pain, are marks of the
secondness of psychological description). The same precision is required for the next
citation of Peirce’s sense of general ideas as the “far more, living realities than the
feelings themselves out of which they are concreted” (the latter passage illustrates
Thirdness very exactly!). Short’s Jamesian-sided polemic again fudges Peirce’s fine-
tuned analyses of nominalistic sensationalism and representationalism in Locke, Hume,
Kant, Hegel, and many other modern philosophers, including James. The paper seems
remarkably unaware of Peirce’s critiques of psychologism and nominalism, and in
fact falls prey to them at almost every turn of its own articulations.
5. Short’s agonistic approach to Peirce reappears in this section which argues that a formerly cited passage (EP 1: 330) “appears deliberately to have been rejecting two of his earlier doctrines, Scholastic realism and [...] pragmatism”. In the case of neither does the paper go beyond a disingenuous misreading of Peirce’s words, and rather again reveals an inability to deal with the flexible compresence of the three categories.

And as indicated above, as part of this larger agenda, Short cuts Peirce’s career-text into chronologically discontinuous tenets, thus isolating Peirce’s objective idealism to the years 1891-1893, instead of applying Peirce’s own criteria of organic growth and complexification to his own continuously developing philosophical career. Here we might reflect on the passage in ‘The Law of Mind’ where Peirce fashioned an Aristotelian doctrine of habit-forming personality as a “developmental teleology” (EP 1: 330-31). This suggests another template with which to measure his own career-text, namely its synechistic, generative teleology that amplified and ramified his core doctrine of objective idealism in the later phases of his career.

Indeed, Short’s initial approach to finding discontinuous tenets in Peirce’s gradually unfolding (and blossoming) career-text might be thought to have its provenance in Kant’s “regressive method”, employed in his first Critique’s first and second cosmological antinomies, which factor quantities and qualities in terms of mathematical parts. In such a computational form of abstract analysis, one is free to periodize Peirce’s text into discrete units (scholars do this all the time. Schelling’s career-text is a notorious target of the practice). As we have seen, however, Peirce does not endorse this method, declaring it singularly inappropriate for the discussion of the cognizability of nature’s spontaneous qualities of firstness and organic processes of thirdness. With regard to the latter, he ubiquitously rejects that dissecting rubric of categorization in favor of an organic, developmental method, conjugating the formal and material aspects of the phanerons together, the logical operation of which consists of an organic reciprocity of parts and whole productive of the mind’s realistic prognostications of esse in futuro (here too Peirce followed Schelling’s reconstruction of Kant in this foundational respect of prioritizing the synthetically dynamic over the statically mathematical sets in Kant’s categories of the understanding). It is but a short step to applying the same holistic approach to the genuine productions of all human intelligence, including those of philosophical texts such as his own.

Peirce, we saw, considered Kant’s transcendental categories as a set of particular categories not up to the level of generality of his own phaneroscopy (EP 2: 148). Like any first-rate author, he enacts (performs) his foundational categories in the articulations, amplifications, and ramifications of his own career-text. Thus, as articulated in ‘Science and Natural Classes” (1902), Peirce arguably conceived of his own career-text and that of the life of the heuretic sciences in the same vein (EP 2: 130). In that respect his later-phase writings represent the living process of enacting his “completed developed system”.

6. This section of Short’s paper introduces the possibility of mutual influence of Peirce’s doctrine and James’s Principles of Psychology. Okay, but as such it is at best speculative given the wider range of materials with which both authors were working.

However, much to the point, a footnote of Short’s article indicates that Peirce wrote a “markedly critical review” of James’ Principles of Psychology for the Nation.
in 1891! Surely Short’s article, for his reader’s sake, might have gone into that at length. And soon the matter becomes even more problematic. James’s *Principles* are described as “phenomenological” in the sense of ascribing “no underlying substance” to the “free-floating” stream of thought. Peirce, on the other hand, is said to have “made the bold move” of turning feelings into “substances”. In contrast, James’ “stream of thought” is indicated to be introspectively “personal” – “the corollary of his introspective method” and what is introspected by one person is not available to observation of others” – which again seems to take us back to the Fichtean paradigm of subjective idealism (and indeed the paper should have mentioned that James’ other four characteristics of the “stream of thought” in the *Principles* are also immanently subjective, with no convincing trace of objective transcendence). However, in its fn. 5 the article goes on disapprovingly to indicate that “in James’ later writings, the appearance of influence is reversed […] [James] appears to have followed Peirce in ontologizing the contents of phenomenological description”. Subsequently, it says, James wrote enthusiastically about Peirce’s *Monist* series, though primarily to compare Peirce to Bergson, whereas Peirce, for his part, “rejected the comparison in the most strenuous terms.”

There is much to unpack here, but the upshot of this section seems to be that Short has pulled the rug out from under his own advocacy of James’s so-called “free-floating” phenomenology, turning it into a position affine with Peirce’s disapproved “substantial” objective idealism. It does appear to be the case that James, in his later career, made a passage to a kind of transcendentalism, thus beginning his own long postponed work on metaphysics. This would seem to bankrupt the entire paper’s polemic, unless Short desires to maintain the bottom line of James’s subjectively introspected contents of psychological consciousness (which Peirce for his part subsumed within the category of secondness conflated with firstness), even after James moved on.

7. This section begins by asking, “How can these bold moves be justified?” (a question that now applies to James as well as to Peirce). It goes on to miss Peirce’s whole theory of active habit-formation articulated as “accommodation” and “selective assimilation” in organic patterns of protoplasm (subtending speciation, nutritional, reproductive, and other mental processes), which Peirce pointedly articulated in ‘Man’s Glassy Essence’ of 1892 – that is, as the physiological *breaking up* of old habits with the concommitant psychological *reviving of consciousness*. Here Peirce again speculates on the vectorial dynamics of his evolutionary cosmology, involving the inner and outer, teleological and mechanistic, aspects of habit-formation in the synechistic progress from molecular protoplasm to the higher stages of freedom in the plasticity of the genetic codes and of individual animal and human intelligence (in this way he subsumed the aforementioned Epicurean tychastic into his own agapastic account).

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28 In addition to James’ *Essays in Radical Empiricism* (1904) and *A Pluralistic Universe* (1909), see *Some Problems of Philosophy: A Beginning of an Introduction to Philosophy* (1911); the latter work was greatly admired by Whitehead who incorporated some of James’s ideas into his composition of the subjective-superjective character of ontological occasions in *Process and Reality*.

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Short's representation, therefore, that objective idealism “probably” cannot simultaneously explain the evolution of the laws of nature and the aggregation of molecules problematizes exactly what Peirce sought to do in ‘Man’s Glassy Essence’ and many related writings! In an ensuing section 10 of his article, he upgrades this to “Peirce’s difficulty accounting by one principle both for universal law and for heterogeneous organization”. On the contrary, for Peirce this was no difficulty – indeed it was the very heart of his theory! We have seen that Peirce in fact carried forward the doctrine of Nature’s identity and metamorphoses – that is, “productivity” in terms of the twins principles of organic community and differential appropriation – with attendant critique of mechanistic evolution – perspectives that were very prominent in the writings of Schelling and Emerson, among others – in the various generalizations of metaphysical Synechism in his later phase.29

8. This section continues the discussion of the “inverse relation of habitualness and consciousness”. It rightly cites EP 1: 349 which is a basic Peircean text on the (Schelling-fashioned) “whirlpools” or “eddies” of nature’s habit-formations which, viewed from the outside, appear as matter, and viewed from the inside, as consciousness. As Peirce goes on to say, “These views are combined when we remember that mechanical laws are nothing but acquired [but now arrested] habits [...]”, as distinguished from the front edge of teleological “accommodation” qua selective assimilation of the potentialities of environments. The “outward aspect” is the aspect of “effete” or “partially deadened mind,” a tenet Peirce directly imported from Schelling into his intertranslatable theory of objective idealism, of the instinctive affinity of mind and nature, and of the evolution of general ideas in the objective nature of things.

Short of course is free to develop a positive alternative to Peirce’s system. It would be in the spirit of Peirce’s philosophy to welcome and cherish his endeavor. Be that as it may. But as a bottom line, Short’s article plays fast and loose with Peirce’s own text. It does not adequately represents Peirce’s “completely developed system” of “Schelling-fashioned objective idealism”, as well as the amplification and ramification of that doctrine in the objective energizing of Ideas in the selectively assimilating ad complexifying nature of things and in the connatural productions of intelligence (in the sciences and arts) – systematically keyed to his three phenomenological and three normative categories. Peirce set his later-phase formulations of semeiosis and pragmaticism on that same foundational basis. Instead, to the end, Short’s article rather proposes its Jamesian “free-floating” phenomenalist psychology, while attempting to reduce Peirce’s philosophy to a “substantival doctrine of feeling” infected with a paradoxical “dichotomy between observation and introspection”. As a further twist, it concludes with the words, “In denying that consciousness is essential to mind, Peirce rejected not only James’ psychology but also his own objective idealism”. Its “lame duck” advocacy of James’ subjective psychologism (“lame duck”

29 For one of the most powerful of such articulations towards the end of his career see his rejection of the “Darwinians” in ‘The Neglected Argument for the Reality of God’, EP 2: 438-39.
after James anthologized “pure experience” in his later career) becomes the vehicle of this interpretation, despite Peirce’ critical interfaces with James in various venues.³⁰

3. Peirce’s Logical Realism-Idealism and James’ Psychologism
Because it enlists James’s psychologism in overtly polemical fashion, Short’s article distracts us away from a significant aspect of the Peirce-James relationship. It is that Peirce, the ever serious exact parser of philosophical words and foundational concepts – his incisive readings of the gamut of prominent authors in the history of philosophy has yet to be fully appreciated – found his logical realism-idealism willy-nilly locked in a career-long interface with James. Crucially for this paper, it should be recognized that Peirce deeply pondered his friend and intellectual interlocutor James’ writings, arguably achieving the par excellence critical reading of James’ career-text. No one has ever been in a better position, and more intellectually equipped, to do so. And Peirce, toward the end of his life, actually did so.

In ‘What Pragmatism Is’ of 1904 Peirce famously entered friendly but ambivalent remarks on “the famed psychologist” James, “the humanist” Ferdinand C. S. Schiller, and other “kidnappers” of his original formulation of pragmatism, taking the drastic step of renaming his doctrine Pragmaticism (EP 2: 334-35). We can surmise that all his further writings on Pragmaticism can be read as energized by Peirce’s parsing his precise distance from their “popularizations”. This came to a head on several occasions. Thus, for example, in the first variant of his multi-layered ‘Pragmatism’ of 1907, he places F. C. S. Schiller’s “beautiful Humanism” as a version of pragmatism intermediate between James’ and his own. As for James, he judges that James’ accounts of pragmatic conduct largely dovetail (becoming “evanescent in practice”) with his own, though with “no slight theoretical divergence” “on important questions of philosophy, especially as regards the infinite and the absolute”. “My pragmatism”, he says there, “having nothing to do with qualities of feeling, permits me to hold that the predication of such a quality is just what it seems, and has nothing to do with anything else” (EP 2: 401). Such monistic qualities of feeling, however, differ from intellectual concepts, which are ‘the would-acts’ of habitual behavior, and [contra James] no agglomeration of actual happenings can every completely fill up the meaning of a ‘would be’”. “It is that proposition” Peirce takes “to be the kernel of [his own] pragmatism” (EP 2: 402).

In another variant of this same 1907 piece, he re-formulates his relation to James more problematically: “But though I seldom am able to attach a very distinct signification to any statement by Professor James, least of all in philosophy, yet I have sufficiently studied the, to me, very difficult dialect of this thought to be satisfied that a minute analysis of a formal definition is not the right way to ascertainment what he

³⁰ See footnote 2 above. The long personal and intellectual relation between Peirce and James going back at least to the founding of the Metaphysical Club in 1871 suggests a project of determining the degree to which each addressed the public writings of the other. Though I can not enter into that project here, the record should indicate that James more explicitly drew from Peirce, “popularizing” his ideas beyond Peirce’s considered intentions. Peirce’s ubiquitous subordination of psychology to logic and metaphysics can be read as having James, among others, in mind.

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means”. He goes on ironically to say: “I can only say that by processes I cannot comprehend he arrives at much the same practical conclusions that I should” (EP 2: 421).

The next year in 1908, in ‘The Neglected Argument for the Reality of God’, Peirce took up his relation to Schiller and James once again. Indeed, it is of interest that he took the occasion of its final paragraph (of the Additament) “to express my personal sentiments about their tenets”. He goes about this in reprising his core doctrine of expressing the Truth in the form of future conditionals. If Truth consists in satisfaction, “it cannot be any actual satisfaction”, but must be the satisfaction which “would ultimately be found if the inquiry were pushed to its ultimate and indefeasible issue”. This, he continues, “is a very different position from that of Mr. Schiller and the pragmatists of today”. Continuing, then, to parse their differences, Peirce disavows their tendency to minimize “strict logic” and “exact thought”. At the same time he finds a common ground in their “clear discernment of some fundamental truths”, such as their denial of necessitarianism, their rejection of any “consciousness” different from visceral or other external sensation, their acknowledgment that there are “Real habits […] as Real generals”, and their ways of “interpreting all hypostatic abstractions in terms of what they would or might (not actually will) come to in the concrete”. So far so good; but Peirce ends the entire essay on a reverse tack, saying their popularizing versions of pragmatism are “infected” with “the seeds of death” in such notions as that of “the unreality of all ideas of infinity and that of the mutability of truth, and in such confusions of thought as that of active willing (willing to control thought, to doubt, and to weigh reasons) with willing not to exert the will (willing to believe).” (EP 2: 450).

The last mentioned clearly targets James’ Will to Believe of 1897, in effect reprising Peirce’s distinction between the “will to believe” and “the will to learn” elaborated in his fourth Cambridge Conference lecture, ‘The First Rule of Logic’, of 1898 (EP 2: 47-48); the allusion to the mutability of truth targets James’ position in various instantiations, as for example in his lecture ‘What Pragmatism Is’ of his Pragmatism (as indicated by the editors of EP 2 in their footnote 23 on p. 551). In 1911, ‘A Sketch of Logical Critics’, Peirce added Schiller back into the mix, saying that he invented the word “pragmaticism” after “James and Schiller made the word [pragmatism] imply ‘the will to believe’, the mutability of truth, the soundness of Zeno’s refutation of motion, and pluralism generally” (EP 2: 457).

In such fashion Peirce performed the function of making crystal-clear for future generations just how the legacy of his own Pragmaticism should be interpreted over against James’ (and Schiller’s) popularizing versions.31 As well, his rejection of their doctrines of the mutability of truth and will to believe become heuristics that trace back through all the phases of his career-text. After the production of his three categories in “A Guess at the Riddle” of 1887-88, he amplified the Urform of his thought in a brilliant display of synecdochic interpretants. The Urform of these trajectories surfaced as his “Schelling-fashioned objective idealism” (also indebted to Emerson

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31 I am happy to cite the pro-Jamesian work of two of my own colleagues here: Harvey Cormier’s monograph, The Truth is What Matters: William James, Pragmatism, and the Seeds of Death, 2001, and Megan Craig’s Levinas and James: Toward a Pragmatic Phenomenology, 2010. Both of these works contribute interpretations to the range of issues raised by Short’s article.
and the Transcendentalist tradition), issued forth in “the one law of mind” and “evolutionary agapism”, ramified in the interrelated motif of the energizing reasonableness of Thought in the Universe, as well as in the various later-phase modulations of his Scholastic Realism, semiotics, and Pragmaticism. His “completely developed system, which all hangs together and cannot receive any proper presentation in fragments”, unfolded as such a conspicuous internal latticing.

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