

PRAGMATISM AND NATURALISM: AN INEVITABLE CONJUNCTION?

Prof. Dr. DAVID C. LAMBERTH

Abstract: Since the work of John Dewey it has been a common assumption that pragmatism in its most general sense implies a fundamental commitment to naturalism. However, late in his career William James regarded both scientific naturalism and numerous versions of supernaturalism as contrary to what a pragmatic outlook mandates. In this paper, through an exploration of both Dewey and James on the subject of naturalism and supernaturalism, I argue that a thorough-going pragmatic perspective requires moving beyond the overly limited and mutually implicative positions of both naturalism and supernaturalism. In the final sections of the paper, I turn to several contemporary figures – Rorty, Davidson, and McDowell – to assess the significance of this insight in contemporary philosophy.

In the Introduction to his 1993 book, *Philosophical Naturalism*, David Papineau remarked that nearly everybody nowadays wants to be a 'naturalist,' despite the fact that the aspirants differ radically over what the term might mean.¹ Surveying the contemporary revival and developments of pragmatism, or neo-pragmatism as it is often called in the United States, I am inclined to say the same thing. That is, almost everyone who is self-described as a pragmatist (whatever that might mean) also claims to endorse some form of naturalism.²

I want to probe the question of whether pragmatism and naturalism are inherently conjoined by looking at two central figures in the early history of pragmatism, William James and John Dewey. Specifically, I want to compare their positions on the question of naturalism in metaphysics and epistemology, and see whether, and to what extent we should see pragmatism as a species of naturalism. To anticipate, I will conclude that pragmatism is best served when it evades naturalism as well as supernaturalism, and understands itself most fundamentally as a form of radical pluralism.

The relevance of this set of questions may seem, initially, rather obscure. If Papineau and others are right that there is significant agreement within philosophy

David C. Lamberth is Professor at the Faculty of Divinity of Harvard University (USA).

on something called naturalism, agreement bordering on convergence, then perhaps the question is best left aside, or behind.³ I am skeptical, however, that this is the case. As Papineau and Robert Audi both note, while there may be a consensus on the slogan of "naturalism," there is no consensus on its meaning. This is likely due to the fact that the only substantive agreement involved in the endorsement of naturalism is a loose, rather unspecified consensus on what one disavows, rather than any accord on a positive doctrine. Naturalism in such a case usually involves a general disavowal of methodological dualism, as well as a more specific metaphysical denial of any mysterious realm, whether 'mind,' the supernatural, or some other sphere set aside from investigation but ultimately given priority in a thus dualistic philosophical system.

The appearance of naturalism as a positive doctrine yields less concurrence. For some, naturalism primarily implies significant reduction to natural, usually physical, causes and explanations, whether this reduction is exhaustive or partial.⁴ Non-reductive naturalists may vary widely in their metaphysical commitments, as well as in their conception of wherein the "naturalism" really resides. Naturalism often implies an epistemological commitment to empiricism over rationalism, although this is not always exclusively so; in other cases it may more narrowly involve an elevation of and confidence in the scientific method, and its object world of 'nature'. (Both of these may be involved in reductive naturalism as well.) In all of these cases, however, the results of naturalism vary widely based on the particular commitments one makes, and perhaps more explicitly, based on where someone begins their naturalism.⁵

Disagreements over terminology are not always important. Papineau, for his part, contends that the terminological dispute over naturalism is not significant, and that the real issue has to do with "which philosophical doctrines are right, not what to call them."⁶ I suspect, however, that this terminological muddle is not wholly benign, and that the ways in which one construes one's naturalism, or even one's antagonism towards it, are critical.⁷ An in-depth look at James and a slighter shorter look at Dewey on the subject will both illustrate this and begin to lay the ground for understanding some of what is at issue for pragmatists in the naturalism discussion.

JAMES AND THE QUESTION OF NATURALISM

First and foremost, I should begin by saying that James – like Charles Sanders Peirce – does not, in general, understand himself to be a naturalist. On the contrary, in most of his discussions of the subject, James is explicitly opposed to naturalism. This opposition is, however, an interesting one, revealing both what James takes naturalism to involve, and what he sees as its limitations.

His first disclosure in print of his attitude to naturalism occurs in an 1888 review of a book by Edmund Gurney, wherein James writes positively of Gurney's decisive disjunction between the resignation of "dogmatic Naturalism" and the hope provided by "any possible supernaturalism."⁸ Three themes appear here that recur

throughout James's comments on naturalism. First, James (with Gurney) reads scientific naturalism to be dogmatic in its self-restriction to the observable world; by contrast, James and Gurney cast a possible rendition of supernaturalism as truly hypothetical, and thus potentially open to novelty, thus taking the mantle of the scientific spirit for supernaturalism as opposed to naturalism. Secondly, on James's view, the parsimonious dogmatism of naturalism implies the exclusion of personal facts and individual destinies which are not adequately abstract, repeatable, or generalizable. Deriving from this restrictive view of naturalism is James's third repeated point, namely, that this form of naturalism is practically deficient, promoting a pessimistic or resigned attitude, rather than a hopeful or optimistic view of the future.

James's landmark 1892 text, *The Principles of Psychology*, which claims to proceed in a normal, "natural science" fashion, not surprisingly treats naturalism rarely. In his concluding chapter on "Necessary Truths and the Effects of Experience," James does, however, go out of his way to observe that natural science's mode of treating objects by abstracting, breaking them into compositional essences, distorts and loses the "solid plenitude of fact," thus leading us to understand and think about something which is actually different from reality.⁹ This observation connects to and extends the second point I made in relation to the Gurney review, adding the idea that it is not only the dogmatic drive of science to reduction that ignores the plenitude of individual facts, but also the practical (and at this point, seemingly unavoidable) exercise of its method that generates the problems he sees with naturalism.

James elaborates his criticism of naturalism in 1895 in his address "Is Life Worth Living?," published in 1897 in *The Will to Believe*. Here James returns to the second and third themes from the Gurney review, arguing that science's natural order is inadequate due to its inability to formulate a holistic, "harmonious spiritual intent." The natural order of science is "mere weather," James writes (quoting his colleague Chauncey Wright), offering nothing that responds to our intuitive, religious needs.¹⁰ This "ingrained naturalism and materialism of mind," James argues, is no more or less intuitive than is the religious or spiritual demand of humans, to which it is inadequate. Moreover, the religious demand is a practical one, one concerned with issues of conduct, one to which mere naturalism does not respond. So goes James's criticism of the idolatry of science attendant on naturalism, as well as his defense of the right to believe that "the physical order is only a partial order," "not ultimate, but a mere sign or vision, the external staging of a many-storied universe." This latter, spiritual view, James thinks, is the only one that responds adequately to our concrete practical and religious needs, needs which he finds are indelibly "natural" to human beings.¹¹

The theme of the inadequacy of naturalism and the notion of a complementary, quite literally extra- or supra-natural, world beyond the natural recurs in James's writings for the next ten years. Best known among these is James's declaration in the Conclusions of *The Varieties of Religious Experience* to side with supernaturalism against naturalism.¹² Here James again has in mind the partial character of the world that science studies, which naturalism nonetheless declares complete. But, importantly,

James adds a crucial observation that begins to shade his apparently dualistic supernaturalism into a more holistic view. He notes that "the world interpreted religiously is not the materialistic world over again, with an altered expression; it must have, over and above the altered expression, *a natural constitution* different at some point from that which a materialistic world would have. It must be such that different events can be expected in it, different conduct must be required."¹³ In his Postscript James remarks that this conclusion commits him to "piecemeal" or "crass" supernaturalism, in contrast to supernaturalism of a refined or universalistic sort, typified by Royce's "philosophy of the absolute." This latter, which James understands as a new rendition of metaphysically dualistic supernaturalism, both is irrelevant to practice in this life, and concedes too much to science. His position, by contrast, seeks to allow religious feeling, particular experience, and human hope potentially to matter in the world of experience as we know it. Moreover, it requires that we understand science to be limited in how much it could understand at any given time, while at the same time leaving open the possibility that the facts that happen to be beyond science must indeed impact the natural world. This, along with the notion that the divine must be a part of the whole itself, is what James thinks is required pragmatically for supernaturalism to be meaningful.¹⁴

The *Varieties* passages I mentioned mark the beginning of a shift for James in terms of his target, one which is critical for our understanding of his views on naturalism. Where his discussions in the 1880s and 1890s contrasted his own views primarily with naturalism qua reductive materialism, the early 1900s show James equally if not more concerned with absolute idealism – rationalism – as the chief opponent for his views rather than this form of naturalism. So, in *Varieties* James criticizes naturalism, but he also (and in fact, more vociferously) faults absolute idealism, both for leaving naturalism unchecked in its sphere, and for being similarly irrelevant with respect to human value and needs. In 1903 in a review of Henry Sturt's *Personal Idealism*, James also evidences his dual target, remarking that the book seems to mark a way between "Naturalism's desert on the one hand, and the barren summits of the Absolute on the other."¹⁵ James's praise for the book was based on the fact that it seemed to pose a third way, retaining naturalism's concreteness and absolutism's interest in human value.

In 1905, in one of the essays advancing his radical empiricism, James's view of his own opposition swings so far away from materialism toward absolute idealism that James associates his own pragmatism with naturalism itself in contrast to F. H. Bradley's rationalism.¹⁶ What James means by "naturalism" at this point, however, is a quite different view on which truth can only be connected to leading, "successfully or unsuccessfully, into sensible experience again." Here naturalism is fundamentally allied with James's metaphysics of radical empiricism, a non-reductive view whose touchstone is experience, whether so concrete and particular that it cannot be fully captured by thought, or the more mundane variety which natural science can study. "Naturalism" here implies non-transcendental, non-dualistic, concrete experience, much as it does later for Dewey.

This identification of his radical empiricism (or pragmatism as he calls it here) as a form of naturalism is not, however, repeated by James in print or in extant notes and manuscripts. On the contrary, in the notes for his 1905-6 course on Metaphysics, James argues that pure naturalism is “an *ascetic* abstraction . . . when held up as a deity to sacrifice to.”¹⁷ Moreover, in *Pragmatism* James consistently criticizes naturalism in terms of its adequacy, reverting back to associating naturalism with a form of reductive, materialistic science. The progress of science has led to both an enlargement of the universe and a diminution of humanity’s importance, he argues, leading to a vision that is “materialistic and depressing.” Only the tough-minded few are comfortable with that, he argues, implying the need for another view.¹⁸ James elaborates this point about the attitude naturalism generates, connecting it to issues of conduct and indicating another shift in his own understanding of what the competing views are. Naturalism’s orientation to matter, or the physical, leads it only to be concerned with past facts, he observes. Spirit, by contrast, as a principal object, has the benefit of being oriented to the future. James admits in this text that the choice between the spiritual and the natural is an aesthetic preference, deriving from and producing different temperaments, or outlooks, on life.¹⁹ But he also seeks to argue, albeit guardedly, that mere or simple naturalism is not adequate to human needs, interests, or conduct.

The transition away from his fleeting identification with naturalism (and the concomitant thought of making naturalism into a new, pragmatic system), is made wholly explicit in James’s 1909 book *A Pluralistic Universe*. Here in the opening chapter James provides a classification of the types of philosophical thinking, casting the distinction between materialistic and spiritualistic philosophy as the most basic. James dispenses with materialism virtually without argument, judging it wholly inadequate with respect to the facts of life as we experience it. Instead, he associates the chief dilemma as that between what sort of spiritualistic philosophy one endorses. James’s own *Weltanschauung* of radical empiricism is cast as a version of pluralistic pantheism, in contrast to monistic philosophies of the absolute. Shorn of the empirical mind-set, naturalism, which is again wholly associated with materialism, is almost nowhere to be found.²⁰

There is one more critical note to make about James’s move to spiritualistic philosophy in this his final, completed book, and that has to do with his evolving stance concerning supernaturalism. In *Varieties*, James saw the issue as one of a choice between reductive, inhumane naturalism, and supernaturalism. James sided quite clearly with the latter, endorsing a piecemeal form of supernaturalism. Although James reiterates parts of the *Varieties* text word for word in the last chapter of *A Pluralistic Universe*, he is notably silent concerning any alliance between supernaturalism and radical empiricism, the view he seeks to advance. This is so, in my view, because James in 1908 considered his fully developed radical empiricism to obviate the naturalism/supernaturalism dilemma via its radically pluralistic concept of experience. The real philosophical issue in 1908 was one of human value, the understanding of the role of human interests, and human conduct. My judgment is

that James saw "naturalism" as too closely tied, historically and conceptually, to reductive views that ignore the wide range of human feeling, interest, needs, and values. He thus sought ultimately to ignore naturalism, and instead conquer spiritualistic philosophy, with its forward orientation and its sympathetic orientation to the welter of human experience, through his pluralistic metaphysics of experience.²¹ Insofar as we can say that radical empiricism is an expression of James's pragmatism, it would seem that Jamesian pragmatism is quite intentionally not a form of naturalism, even though it is clearly a species of empiricism.²²

NATURALISM IN DEWEY

Like James, John Dewey described the chief opposition in philosophy to be either between spiritualistic and naturalistic philosophies, or alternatively, to be between supernaturalism and naturalism, or to cite one another polarity, to be between rationalism and naturalism.²³ Unlike James, however, once he left his early Hegelian idealism behind, Dewey had no crises of decision in choosing sides in each of these splits. Rather, and perhaps consequently, Dewey was an avowed naturalist throughout the rest of his philosophical career.

Dewey was well aware that the term "naturalism" carried a wide range of meanings.²⁴ In particular, he was cognizant that naturalism up to his time was closely allied with materialism, and thus split from humanism (or the recognition of human value), much as James often presumed and pointed out.²⁵ That said, Dewey made the opposite judgment in comparison to James, seeing "naturalism" as a critical term to be refashioned, and ultimately championed. Doubtless, James would want to remind us that the reasons for such a judgment may be as much temperamental as substantive. I would like to inquire briefly, however, into what Dewey saw in "naturalism."

Perhaps the most helpful exhibition of what Dewey means positively by the term is found in his 1930 article "Individuality in our Day." There, Dewey notes that "a naturalism which perceives that man with his habits, institutions, desires, thoughts, aspirations, ideals, and struggles, is within nature, and integral part of it, has the philosophical foundation and the practical inspiration for effort to employ nature as an ally of human ideals and goods such as no dualism can possibly provide."²⁶ In this statement we see four crucial advantages to naturalism for Dewey. First, with respect to ontology, naturalism is thoroughly monistic. This places human beings within the realm of natural knowledge, and, Dewey thinks, avoids the insoluble metaphysical question of how to understand human beings as of different substance or order (mind, spirit, soul) than the natural/physical order. Related to this virtue is a second advantage of naturalism, also in the form of an evasion. Naturalism, Dewey thinks, evades the epistemological conundrums posed by the putative dualism of mind and matter which have been so central to modern philosophy. Put simply, if naturalism is correct, then the proper means of knowing the world will also pertain directly to knowing human beings, provided that we cast knowing naturalistically. Dewey thus agrees, in a sense, with materialist-naturalists concerning the applicability

of the scientific method, although he has strongly revisionary ideas about what constitutes the model of scientific knowing and proper scientific method.²⁷

Whereas these first two benefits can be seen to pertain to primarily theoretical questions, the second two bear on practical concerns. In the first place, Dewey is deeply concerned with practical motivation, speaking of the “inspiration” necessary to bring human goods about afforded by naturalism, in contrast to any dualistic system. One is reminded here of James’s rejection of absolute idealism’s “moral holiday” in *Pragmatism* (although one should note that James was explicit that, as he conceived it, naturalism offers no motivation whatsoever).²⁸ Although this first practical benefit which Dewey isolates is, principally, subjective, he also appears to have in mind that naturalism has something objective to offer as well. Here, the practical side of Dewey’s naturalism loops back to pick up on the concrete, practical benefit of assuming both of the theoretical advantages just isolated – namely the ontological and methodological monism required by his naturalism. Conjoined with his organistic interpretation of “nature,” practically speaking naturalism implies for Dewey that nature may potentially be an ally to be rallied or employed for human goods.

Out of these four benefits of naturalism, two recur frequently in his writings (often intertwined), providing further insight into why Dewey consistently endorses the position. First, in numerous writings Dewey goes out of his way to highlight the contrast between naturalism and supernaturalism. *A Common Faith*, for example, uses this theme to underscore the limitations that Dewey sees religion (as opposed to “the religious”) to have placed on humankind, identifying both practical and intellectual stultification as the inevitable results of supernaturalism (in stark contrast to James’s assessment).²⁹ In “Anti-Naturalism in Extremis,” Dewey extends this, suggesting in an aside that all forms of philosophical rationalism also derive from supernaturalism, and denouncing the latter in contrast to naturalistic methods.³⁰ This denunciation is, in part, due to supernaturalism’s active ignorance of the practice and achievements of science, the recognition of which is Dewey’s second, frequently-cited advantage to naturalism. Supernaturalism not only ignores science and its achievements, but it actively seeks to discount it. The naturalist, by contrast, is one who “of necessity has respect for the conclusions of natural science.”³¹ Interestingly, the benefits of this orientation are not, according to Dewey, limited to a specifiable domain of the traditionally organized natural sciences. Rather, given Dewey’s conception of the social as within the natural sphere and subject to scientific practice, the benefits of naturalism pertain directly to “democracy” itself, perhaps Dewey’s most inclusive human realm. Dewey thus writes that “Democracy cannot obtain either adequate recognition of its own meaning or coherent practical realization as long as anti-naturalism operates to delay and frustrate the use of methods by which alone understanding of, and consequently ability to guide, social relationships can be obtained.”³² For this reason the pursuit of a thorough-going and self-conscious naturalism, complete with a redefinition of the implicitly supernaturalist philosophical vocabulary, is not simply a terminological preference for Dewey, but rather a pressing practical enterprise.

EVALUATING JAMES AND DEWEY

One could continue at length, particularly with the analysis of Dewey, fruitfully extending and adding nuance to our understanding of his naturalism. But enough is evident at this point to offer some evaluation of James and Dewey together, in order to move towards a contemporary estimation of whether pragmatism should best be seen as necessarily allied with naturalism.

At the outset, it is critical to observe that, methodologically speaking, both James and Dewey advance their respective (apparently opposed) positions based on the pragmatic criterion of attending to the practical effects of ideas as a way of discerning both their meaning and validity. What they differ on, then, is not in being "pragmatists" in a general sense; rather, where they disagree practically is in the interpretation of the facts that condition the meaning and effects of the ideas of naturalism and nature. On James's view, science, naturalism, and the inherently reductive notion of "nature" are not adequate either to capture the nuances of human experience or to motivate human practice. This is particularly true because science, on James's view, is essentially reductive in its conceptualizations and retrospective in its knowing. That is, by the way, what gives science practical power and utility on James's view, but it also proves to be a limitation, depending on the context, question, or issue one is investigating. Dewey, by contrast, understands nature in a far less reductive and more organistic fashion. Additionally, he has high, if not unlimited, hopes for the scope and success of science once practiced according to the method of inquiry guided by intelligence. He thus sees science (naturalism) as potentially up to the task of enlivening all practice, even though it has not yet arrived there. And in direct contrast to James, Dewey sees anti-naturalism to lead to something akin to subjectivism, which, in its "laissez-faire" attitude, appears to lead away from practical, socially ameliorative activity.

James and Dewey have several disagreements here, not the least of which concerns their differing dispositions toward supernaturalism and religion. But more importantly for our purposes, there is a significant disagreement in their understandings and estimations of science as the practical sphere of the naturalist. First and foremost, James is working primarily with a mechanistic model of science, nature, and even the process of conception itself, in contrast to Dewey's more biological, processual, or organistic model. For James this is most evident in his idea that the process of conception is based on the abstraction and isolation of features found in experience, a process of rendering in order to get at basic and law-like structures. James's concern is that this is overly selective, and moreover, selective of only certain aspects of the "blooming, buzzing confusion" that is reality. Dewey, by contrast, sees science as able to work around this, and thus assumes that all aspects of experience can be dealt with in one way or another through generally scientific methods. No doubt Dewey is closer to contemporary thinking in estimating the radical plurality of useful, "scientific" methods; however, James's reservation that some aspects of (individual or particular) experience may not easily (if ever) yield

to being captured, studied, or repeated scientifically also has contemporary warrant.

This difference of opinion concerning the prospects for scientific study is actually at the heart of the disagreement between James and Dewey. In part, the disagreement can accurately be chalked up to one of temperament or dispositional difference, with Dewey being more optimistic vis à vis science than the tough-minded, skeptical James, and James being more tender-minded than Dewey in relation to religion and the tragic aspects of human experience (e.g., the possibilities of fully realizing the good and eradicating suffering or evil).³³ But the issue is not simply one of philosophical disposition. Rather, it comes down to certain more basic judgements about rationality and reality as well.

Dewey rightly has a more expansive notion of the nature and possibilities of the sciences, as well as the remaining potential for an organistic or biological model for inquiry itself. Having said that, however, it is also critical to note that Dewey tends strongly in his thinking toward monism, regarding both the constitution of nature and, more importantly, the conceptualization of scientific method, or rationality itself. James, by contrast, tends more frequently to radical pluralism. This comes out in James in two crucial places. First, in his article presenting his controversial thesis of “pure experience,” James goes out of his way to note that, although we use the term “experience” as a metaphysical substantive, there is “no *general* stuff of which experience at large is made. [Rather,] there are as many stuffs as there are ‘natures’ in the things experienced.”³⁴ What he means to indicate here is that, in proposing the fiction of pure experience, he is not adumbrating a substantive view in the traditional form. Thus James does not write of “experience philosophy” but rather of radical empiricism. “Empiricism” in this usage draws attention to experience, but not in a substantive fashion. Dewey’s naturalism, by contrast, gives way to the age old tendency of substance-metaphysics, even though he explicitly seeks to avoid such mystification through his disavowal of rationalism and other “supernaturalist” legacies, and his own focus on experience.³⁵

The second arena in which James’s radical pluralism comes out is concerned not with ontology but rather with our conception of rationality. In an often overlooked but deeply significant passage of *A Pluralistic Universe*, James observes that there is, at bottom, a radical plurality in human rationality: “... rationality has at least four dimensions, intellectual, aesthetical, moral, and practical; and to find a world rational to the maximal degree *in all these respects simultaneously* is no easy matter ... the problem, accordingly, seems at first sight to resolve itself into that of getting a conception which will yield the largest *balance* of rationality.”³⁶ What is interesting about this passage is not the utilitarian-inspired calculus suggested at its close, but rather the assumption undergirding it that there is, and in fact can be, no obvious or universal resolution to our conflicting rationalities, no *Überrationalität* within which all will be resolved. The balance of rationality James seeks, although implied as a rational calculus, ultimately involves aesthetic choices, balances, and tolerances. A radical pluralism, James thinks, is thus necessitated in our practices, a pluralism which is only partially theoretical, or scientific. Where Dewey is content to allow

the method of inquiry, the scientific method, to extend over all of human affairs, James is, by contrast, wary that in so doing we will obfuscate, and even compromise, the other springs of rationality that are fundamental to our being human. James's radical pluralism of rationality, then, suggests that we should be deeply concerned about whether a monism of method ultimately implies a reduction rather than an expansion of humanism (or what Dewey would call democracy).

Dewey and James agree in their usage that experience – taken not as a substantive but as a functional, processive matrix – is the *real* locus and impetus for knowing and practice, whether philosophical, scientific, moral or aesthetic. (I would underscore that it is “experience” and not nature that really does the work for both of them.)³⁷ Moreover, they concur on the necessity of conceiving of this range of endeavors in simultaneously practical and social ways. Dewey is doubtless a better guide than James in understanding both the complexity and concreteness of the sociality of experience, as well as the organistic character of inquiry and investigation. Although Dewey is, in many respects, much more instructive to our present on all of these points, it is James who eventually signals (albeit obliquely) that naturalism, regardless of how it is construed, is itself still entangled in the logic of substantive rather than pragmatic metaphysics. While we need not side with spiritualistic philosophy as did James, those interested in the prospects of pragmatism would do well to focus, as both James and Dewey did in practice, on the radical plurality of experience taken as a collective, including the plurality of rationalities therein. We would do well, likewise, to move beyond the language of either supernaturalism or naturalism, spiritualism or materialism, or physicalism, for that matter. The effect will be, I expect, not merely terminological, but rather quite concrete and practical, leading us into recesses of individual and social experiences that have been obscured and ignored through our continued and exclusive concern over the questions suggested by this too-long-standing natural/supernatural antipathy. With such a step we may, in fact, cross the threshold into the new era for philosophy that both James and Dewey heralded, but which has yet to be realized.

NOTES

1. Papineau, David. *Philosophical Naturalism*. Cambridge: Blackwell, 1993, p. 1. See also Audi, Robert. “Philosophical Naturalism at the Turn of the Century,” *Journal of Philosophical Research* 25 (2000), 27-45.
2. Richard Rorty is the most prominent example here, but the application of the idea is widespread.
3. This putative agreement depends on taking a rather restricted view of philosophy. The generalization probably holds in many analytic departments, but there are numerous philosophers interested in religion still disavowing naturalism in a variety of ways (e.g. Plantinga, Swinburne, Wolterstorff).
4. Papineau's physicalism fits in here.
5. Audi makes this point nicely, concurring generally on any formalization of agreement on naturalism, 40.

6. Papineau, 1.
7. John McDowell, in his new introduction to *Mind and World*, appears to share a similar insight, one we can see in his taking the approach of philosophical 'anxieties' attendant upon empiricism. See *Mind and World*. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1996, xi-xxii. (The relevance of this comparison will become clear below.)
8. James, William. "Tertium Quid." Ed. Edmund Gurney. *Essays, Comments, and Reviews* Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1987, p. 413.
9. James, William. *The Principles of Psychology*. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1981-83, p. 1231.
10. James, William. *The Will to Believe*. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1979, p. 49.
11. James, William. *Will to Believe*. p. 49, 50, 52.
12. James, William. *Varieties of Religious Experience*. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1985, p. 384.
13. James, *Varieties*, p. 408.
14. James developed these ideas in more detail the summer *Varieties* appeared in a series of two lectures at Harvard Divinity School. See James, William. "Summer School of Theology Lectures on 'Intellect and Feeling in Religion,'" *Manuscript Lectures*. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1988, p. 88 ff.
15. James, William. "Personal Idealism." Ed. Henry Sturt. *Essays, Comments, and Reviews*. p. 540-1.
16. James, William. "The Thing and Its Relations." *Essays in Radical Empiricism*. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1976, p. 49.
17. James, William. "Notes for Philosophy 9: Metaphysics (1905-1906)." *Manuscript Lectures*, p. 370.
18. James, William. *Pragmatism*. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1975, p. 15.
19. James, William. *Pragmatism*. p. 50, 49, 53, 55.
20. James, William. *A Pluralistic Universe*. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1977, p. 14-22. See also p. 138 for a summary view on naturalism as materialism. For a detailed discussion of this analysis, see Lamberth, David C. *William James and the Metaphysics of Experience*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1999, p. 151-162.
21. For a detailed analysis of James's metaphysics of radical empiricism, see Lamberth, chapters 1 and 4.
22. I have argued that we are better off understanding James's pragmatism as a part of his overall view of radical empiricism, in line with his comments in *The Meaning of Truth* rather than those of *Pragmatism*. See Lamberth, p. 207-8.
23. See, for example, Dewey, John. "Experience, Knowledge, and Value: a Rejoinder." *Later Works*. Carbondale: Southern Illinois UP, 1988. V. 14, p. 64.
24. Dewey, John. "Individuality in our Day," *Later Works*. Carbondale: Southern Illinois UP, 1988. V. 5, p. 14.
25. See, for example, Dewey, John. *Reconstruction in Philosophy*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1948, p. 173-4.
26. Dewey, John. "Individuality in our Day." p. 114.
27. Dewey's conception of the method of inquiry (or intelligence), and of the necessity of infusing science with a consciousness of value render his approach to the scientific method remarkable and prescient of later thought. See, e.g., *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, p. 173, and *A Common Faith*. New Haven: Yale UP, 1934, p. 79.
28. See James, William. *Pragmatism*. p. 41-3.
29. Dewey, John. *A Common Faith*. p. 78f.

30. Dewey, John. "Anti-Naturalism in Extremis." Ed. Larry Hickman and Thomas Alexander. *The Essential Dewey*. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1998. Vol. 1, p. 163.
31. Dewey, John. "Anti-Naturalism in Extremis." p. 163.
32. Dewey, John. "Anti-Naturalism in Extremis." p. 163-4.
33. Note, however, that optimistic and tough-minded are not aligned in James's "idealized" list, as the tough-minded person is "ideally" pessimistic. James, of course, sees himself and most others as an amalgam of these attitudes. I am suggesting simply that Dewey and James are amalgamated differently. See James, William. *Pragmatism*. p. 13.
34. James, William. "Does Consciousness Exist?" *Essays in Radical Empiricism*. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1976, p. 14.
35. There is a parallel form of slippage in many contemporary philosophers who seek to avoid such reduction as well. One interesting example is John McDowell's *Mind and World*. McDowell, somewhat like James, has an overly narrow and mechanistic Enlightenment understanding of science as the realm of law. But he, like Dewey, needlessly exports the limits of the language of nature into the separate "realm of reasons" that he takes to have to do with the human, and the mind. I suspect that for McDowell, as for Dewey, an over-reaction to supernaturalism and its limitations in philosophy guides this instantiation of nature, which ultimately limits the possibilities of his proposal.
36. James, William. *A Pluralistic Universe*. p. 55.
37. Interestingly, the same can be said of McDowell, for whom "experience" does all the work, although he fronts naturalism and nature as carrying the freight. See *Mind and World*.