Peirce’s Schelling-fashion shaped critique of Hegel
A crítica Schellenguiana de Peirce a Hegel

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Abstract: Peirce’s transformation of Kant’s faculty psychology and the heuristic power of the reflective judgment, set within his declared Schelling-fashion objective idealism, informed his career-long exposé of Hegel’s a priori method of fixing belief as a paradigm of internal logical anancasm. Peirce’s critique of Hegel remains as illuminative and relevant in the contemporary marketplace of ideas.


Resumo: A transformação de Peirce da psicologia racional de Kant e o poder heurístico do julgamento reflexivo, estabelecido dentro do seu declarado idealismo objetivo Schellingiano, fundamentou sua exposição, ao longo de sua carreira, do método a priori de Hegel da fixação da crença como paradigma do anancasmo lógico interno. A crítica de Peirce a Hegel permanece iluminadora e relevante no ambiente contemporâneo das ideias.


Introduction
A previous paper elaborates on the need of establishing a non-scholastic methodology to appreciate the trans-Atlantic resources in post-Kantian Idealism that Peirce digested and transformed in the course of developing his career-text. The motive of this endeavor is to place Peirce in the broader history of philosophy, and further, for adjudicating his place in the history of philosophy. Peirce bids fair to have evolved into a first-tier philosopher. Indeed, that is the real excitement in studying his philosophical achievement. Moreover, it was his own

assessment of his mature architectonic of the Three Categories, which he regarded as transcending in comprehensive scope the categories of such major authors as Aristotle, Kant, and Hegel.\(^2\)

Peirce acknowledged a first trans-Atlantic philosophical influence acquired though his reading of Friedrich von Schiller’s *Aesthetic Letters*. That influence remained as an undercurrent in Peirce’s articulation of his “First” category of Qualitative Feeling, as well as of his classification of Esthetics as the first of the Normative Sciences, of Musement in his ‘Neglected Argument,’ and of ‘Uberty’ involving the ampliative power of Abduction among the valid forms of reasoning. The present paper pursues other trans-Atlantic influences, namely his own considered association of aspects of his mature philosophy with those of Kant and Schelling, as well as his way of drawing a fine line of interface between his categorical architectonic and that of Hegel.\(^3\)

With respect to the latter, Peirce’s carefully worded declaration of his “Schelling-fashioned” idealism-realism inevitably interacted with, and in the final analysis, diverged from, Hegel’s absolute idealism, in their fundamental sense-making respects. In itself, the value of Peirce’s reading of Hegel as an almost contemporary 19th-century understanding of the German philosopher cannot be underestimated. Peirce’s text will be seen as endorsing Schelling’s interpretation of Hegel. This “Schellingian” estimation of Hegel’s system and its various conceptual elaborations carried over into the American philosophical context (impacting William James, among others). Thus Peirce’s reading of Hegel served then—and I think now—to clarify Schelling’s own way of parsing his differences from Hegel. And it constitutes a contribution to the history of philosophy that is still relevant in contemporary philosophical, sociological, and literary circles. For it is fair to say that certain kinds of “praxis-theory” influences traceable to Hegel’s legacy are cropping up in the pedagogical missions of the Philosophy, Social Sciences, and Humanities departments of today’s academy. Not only “Critical Theory” varieties of thought as exemplified by promotion of such authors as Marcuse, Adorno, Benjamin and others, some academics specialize in a narrow-gauge canon of “Continental

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\(^2\) Peirce compared his achievement in logic as “in the same rank” with those of Aristotle, Duns Scotus, and Leibniz (Brent, 1993, p. 324). *The Essential Peirce* broadens the list of major influences Peirce digested in the history of philosophy (citing Aristotle and Kant, Plato, Scotus, and Berkeley, along with such others as Leibniz, Hegel, and Compte), while noting his absorption of contemporary scientific, mathematical, and logical influences, and his relations with fellow-pragmatists, chiefly William James but including Josiah Royce, as well as the philosopher and editor Paul Carus, and the English semiotician Victoria Lady Welby. (EP 2:xviii).

\(^3\) Kaag (ibid, 2014) lucidly documents the phases of Peirce’s transformation of Kant’s concept of the reflective judgment into his theory of the primacy of abduction and musement. The recent work of Ibi, Dilworth, and Guardiano, among others, have added considerations of the further historical mediations between Kant and Peirce realized in the career-texts of Schelling and Emerson. Ivo Ibi has pioneered the recent promoting an understanding of Peirce’s relation to Schelling; his approach has its precedent in the still recommendable studies of Joseph Esposito (1977, 1980) which, in stressing Peirce’s background in Schelling, contrasts, for example, with Carl Hausman’s excellent study, *Charles S. Peirce’s Evolutionary Cosmology*, 1993.
thought” that broadly reflects strains of postmodernist Hegelianism, Marxism, and neo-Marxist criticism.

Peirce lamented the takeover of the universities by the “Humanists” in his day, and, in his special line of logical expertise, he especially viewed certain kinds of “critical logicians” with a jaundiced eye. Presciently anticipating the will-to-believe character of our leftwing university culture, he penned the following remark on “Hegelism,” a remark which shades off from an initial mockery of theological “seminaries” to a reference to the “seminarist Hegel” himself:

The critical logicians have been much affiliated to the theological seminaries. About the thinking that goes on in laboratories they have known nothing. Now the seminarists and religionists generally have at all times and places set their faces against the idea of continuous growth. That disposition of intellect is the most catholic element of religion. Religious truth having been once defined is never to be altered in the least particular; and theology being held as queen of the sciences, the religionists have bitterly fought by fire and tortures all great advances in the true sciences; and if there be no continuous growth in men’s ideas where else in the world should it be looked for? Thence, we find this folk setting up hard lines of demarcation, or great gulfs, contrary to all observation, between good men and bad, between the wise and foolish, between the spirit and the flesh, between all the different kinds of objects, between one quantity and the next. So shut up are they in this conception that when the seminarist Hegel discovered that the universe is everywhere permeated with continuous growth (for that, and nothing else, is the ‘Secret of Hegel’) it was supposed to be an entirely new idea, a century and a half after the differential calculus had been in working order. (CP 1.40, c. 1892).

It will be seen that Peirce’s full point, subtly expressed here, is that, while the “seminarist Hegel” broke down the old oppositions by introducing his phenomenology of continuous growth, he encased them in another kind of a priori logical form and will-to-believe. Mutatis mutandis, and by a stretch of the historical imagination, the theological “seminaries” of Peirce’s day appear to have morphed in some instances into the current practice of university “seminars”—ideological think-tanks that are ringing changes on Hegelian and Marxist dialectics and insinuating them as background premises of philosophical, sociological, and literary criticism. Attendance at almost any academic conference today will serve to witness this point.

Historical perspective may again serve us here. Schelling’s critique of Hegel in his Berlin Lectures in 1842-43 provided food for Peirce’s (and our own) consideration, in view of the energetic reaction against Schelling’s lectures from the political left at that time. Unlike Kierkegaard, who applauded Schelling’s lectures featuring divine and human freedom, another attendee, Friedrich Engels, railed against them while speaking explicitly for the Young Hegelians of the time. The Young Hegelians believed that the critique of religion was already accomplished by Hegel’s apotheosis of Absolute Philosophical Knowing; for them, Hegel’s subordination of
religion to rationality underwrote what was to become the centerpiece of their own grubby faith, based on Marx’s critique of religion as the very “precondition of all criticism.” We may presume that Peirce, who insisted on religious sentiment as a presupposition of science, was conversant with this controversy between the Hegelians and Schellingians a generation later. It had already been transmitted to Emerson by his Transcendentalist colleagues who, like Kierkegaard and Engels, attended Schelling’s 1842-43 lectures in Berlin. In declaring himself “a Schellingian, of some stripe,” Peirce took his stance on the issues then, and he did so in a comprehensive discussion of categorical architectonics that is still relevant for our contemporary philosophical scene today.

1 Peirce, “a Schellingian, of some stripe”

Let us begin with an overview. In his metaphysical period Peirce fused aspects of Kant’s, Schiller’s, and Schelling’s legacies into his “objective idealism.” There is a significant historical background to this. Schelling’s “protean” profusion of Idealistic and Romantic themes were transmitted through Coleridge and others to Emerson. Emerson read John Weiss’ notes of Schelling’s Berlin Lectures and had a complete set of his work in German. Before the age of 30, Peirce read Schelling in Thomas Davidson’s translations of Schelling’s 1799 First Outline of a System of the Philosophy of Nature as well as the ‘Introduction’ to his 1800 System of Transcendental Idealism. Peirce seems first to have associated Schelling with Hegel, but then, learning to adjudicate their differences, kept them apart while endorsing Schelling’s form of objective idealism.

In his ‘A Guess at the Riddle’ of 1887-88 Peirce already inscribed a Schellingian sense of “matter” in the sense that “The genuine second suffers and yet resists, like dead matter, whose existence consists in its inertia.” This was an aspect

5 Schiller’s concept of Beauty as the fullest realization of the harmony of unconscious nature and conscious spirit—that is, of determinism and freedom and their “indifference” (principle of synthetic identity)—became variously inscribed in Schelling’s writings on Naturphilosophie (1897-99), his System of Transcendental Idealism (1800), his Philosophy of Art (1803-04), his Essay on the Essence of Human Freedom (1808), and his later-phase The Ages of the World (1914-15) and Grounding of Positive Philosophy (Berlin Lectures, 1842-43). The theme has its clear provenance in Kant’s third Critique; most notably in his concept of the “genius,” through whom “Nature gives the rule to art.” Cf. KAAG, 2014, p. 25-56.
7 ESPOSITO, 1977, p. 201.
8 While rooted in earlier phases of his mercurial early career, Schelling’s public rejection of Hegel’s “critical” (immanently discursive a priori) or “negative” philosophy dates from 1834 and gained further momentum in his Berlin Lectures of the 1840s. Cf. MATTHEWS, 2007, p. 8ff.
9 EP 1:249.
of Schelling’s *Naturphilosophie*’s full conception of “matter,” which postulated “nature” not as something inertially hide-bound with habit, but rather as vitally active. Subsequently, in ‘The Architecture of Theories’ (1891), Peirce famously speculated that “the only intelligible theory of the universe” is one in which mind and matter are to be conceived synechistically, that is, as symmetrically affine aspects of an open-ended evolutionary process. He went on in ‘The Law of Mind’ (1892) to assert that “[…] *tychism* must give birth to an evolutionary cosmology, in which all the regularities of nature and of mind are regarded as products of growth, and to a Schelling-fashioned idealism which holds matter to be a mere specialized and partially deadened mind.” In that same paragraph Peirce went on to speak of the influence of Emerson and Hedge disseminating Transcendentalist ideas “that were caught from Schelling, Plotinus, Boehm, and the monstrous mysticisms of the East.”

The following year, 1893, in “A Rejoinder to Dr. Carus,” while referring to his five metaphysical essays published in *The Monist* journal, Peirce wrote:

> In the first of this series […] I carefully recorded my opposition to all philosophies which deny the reality of the Absolute, and asserted that ‘the one intelligible theory of the universe is that of objective idealism,’ that matter is effete mind. This is as much as to say that I am a Schellingian, of some stripe; so that, on the whole I do not think Dr. Carus has made a very happy hit in likening me to Hume, to whose whole method and style of philosophizing I have always been perhaps too intensely averse.

The significance of Peirce’s self-appellation as “a Schellingian, of some stripe” is that it occurs in controversy with his editor and philosophical interlocutor Paul Carus, a religious monist and necessitarian, who accused Peirce of being “David

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11 CP 6.102; EP 1:312-13. It is important to note that Peirce’s charming prose here subtends a very positive recognition of these influences. Peirce was an astutely accurate reader of the history of philosophy. He began the mature phase of his metaphysical speculation with “A Guess at the Riddle” (1887-88), a writing that took its point of departure from Emerson’s popular poem, “The Sphinx” (1841). He was acquainted with Emerson through his father Benjamin Peirce and any number of other contacts, and was one of the co-participants in a Harvard lecture series of 1870-71 during which Emerson’s delivered his course on “The Natural History of Intellect.” For Emerson in the background of Peirce, see Dilworth (2009 and 2010). For Peirce’s “one intelligible theory of the universe,” see Guardiano (2011). Regarding the Sphinx reference in “A Guess at the Riddle,” the editors of the *Writings: A Chronological Edition* find dubious the claim connecting it to Emerson’s poem. They say that there is “no convincing evidence” that Peirce intended to associate the title with Emerson (W 6:438-9). This opinion is debatable, since we have passages in other writings where Peirce directly quotes lines from Emerson’s poem.

12 CP 6.605.
Hume Redivivus.” In reply to Carus’s “onslaught” against Peirce’s Tychism, Peirce’s ‘Rejoinder to Dr. Carus’ characterized Carus as “a nominalist tinged with realistic opinions” (CP 6.593) whose “thoroughgoing necessitarianism” suppresses the spontaneity of nature. That Peirce’s rejoinder makes no other reference to Schelling in this lengthy rejoinder stands out as his carefully considered self-appellation for the knowledgeable Carus to digest. Rejecting reductive nominalistic theories tout court and accounting for necessitarian theories as degenerate forms of what he called his “socialistic, or as I prefer to term it, agapastic ontology” (CP 6.610), Peirce’s Monist essays keyed his Lamarkian interpretation of evolution to his categories of Tychism and Agapism. This conception of agapistic spontaneity had its provenance in the writings of Schelling, too, as well as to Swedenborg and Henry James Sr.

The next year, 1894, Peirce reiterated his elective affinity with Schelling in a letter to William James:

My views were probably influenced by Schelling—by all stages of Schelling, but especially by the *Philosophie der Natur*. I consider Schelling as enormous; and one thing I admire about him is his freedom from the trammels of system, and his holding

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13 In “Evolutionary Love” Peirce refers to Paul Carus in the context of extolling the years from 1846 to the appearance of Darwin’s *Origin of Species* in 1859 as “the most productive period of equal length in the entire history of science until now,” writing “The idea that chance begets order, which is one of the corner-stones of modern physics (although Dr. Carus considers it ‘the weakest point in Mr. Peirce’s system,’) was at that time put in its clearest light” (EP 1:358). EP 1:388, fn. 9, and EP 2:518, fn. 18, references Carus’s “Mr. Charles S. Peirce’s Onslaught on the Doctrine of Necessity,” *The Monist* 2 (1892): 576 in which Carus titled the first section of his paper “David Hume Redivivus” (p. 561-65). In “Philosophy and the Conduct of Life” of 1898 Peirce refers to Carus’s employment of the “energetic phrase” *ktema eis aei* (‘possession for all time’) for what is properly and usually called *belief*, saying it “has no place in science at all. […] Pure science has nothing to do with *action*” (EP 2:33). In “The First Rule of Logic” of the same year, Peirce refers to Dr. Carus as “an eminent religious teacher” who is horrified at Peirce’s fallibilistic conception of truth. He refers to Carus’s article “The Founder of Tychism, His Methods, Philosophy, and Criticisms: In Reply to Mr. Charles S. Peirce,” *The Monist* 3 (July 1893): p. 571-622 (cited in EP 2:509 fn. 32.) In “On the Logic of Drawing History from Ancient Documents, Especially from Testimonies” (1901), Peirce wrote on the Tychism issue: “What, then, is that element of a phenomenon that renders it surprising, in the sense that an explanation for it is demanded? *Par excellence*, it is irregularity, says Dr. Paul Carus, in substance.” [EP 2:512, fn. 20, here referencing Carus’s “The Idea of Necessity, Its Basis and Scope,” *The Monist* 3 (Oct. 1892), p. 68-96, especially p. 86 in the section “Necessity and Chance.”] To the contrary, Peirce contends that “irregularity does not prompt us to ask for an explanation.” “Mere irregularity,” he continues, “where no definite regularity is expected, creates no surprise nor excites any curiosity. Why should I, when irregularity is the overwhelmingly preponderant rule of experience, and regularity only the strange exception” (EP 2:88).

14 EP 1:361. We see the reverse side of this as early as Peirce’s 1871 “Fraser’s *The Works of George Berkeley*,” where he convicts the hypotheses of Darwin (among others) “as extending the operation of simple mechanical principles, which belong to nominalism.”

himself uncommitted to any previous utterance. In that, he is like a scientific man. If you were to call my philosophy Schellingian transformed in the light of modern physics, I should not take it hard.”

Again, we note that Peirce writes about Schelling here in carefully measured, as well as obliquely self-referent, words.

A decade later, in his ‘Seven Systems of Metaphysics’ (1903), Peirce speculated on how to classify previous metaphysicians in terms of their partial anticipation of his Three Categories—of Firstness (qualitative potentiality), Secondness (actual existence, brute, reactive facticity), and Thirdness (generality, continuity, evolutionary esse in futuro). He says that the only type that features all Three Categories is one that “embraces Kantism,—Reid’s philosophy and the Platonic philosophy of which Aristotelianism is a special development.” He continues: “The doctrine of Aristotle is distinguished from substantially all modern philosophy by its recognition of at least two grades of being. That is, besides actual reactive existence, Aristotle recognizes a germinal being, an esse in potentia, or I like to call it an esse in futuro; thus in places of his text Aristotle “has glimpses of a distinction between energeia and entelecheia.” What is significant here is that Peirce originally inserted “except perhaps Schelling & mine” after “all modern philosophy”; he then crossed out the insertion, and added instead the word “substantially” earlier in the sentence.

In these and other articulations Peirce argued that, together with the standard nominalistic interpretation of Darwinian evolution, most if not all the forms of modern philosophy—and this included Leibniz, Hume, Kant, Hegel, and such contemporaries as Royce, James, and even Dewey!—are based predominantly on a concept of energeia without entelecheia, that is, of actual reactive being, which he called existence or Secondness, without proper attention to the two co-valent, indecomposable categories of qualitative essence and potential being he called Firstness and Thirdness, respectively. All Three Categories compresently inform Peirce’s asymptotic hyperbolic worldview whose open-ended features corresponded to Schelling’s “progressive” or “metaphysical empiricism.” At the same time, via “remembering” Schiller, Peirce established the ideal of Esthetic Normativity as the Final Interpretant of symbolic metaboly (semiotic interchanges) of nature and human intelligence in this metaphysical “universe perfused with signs.”

2 Hegel’s a priori method of fixing belief

After Hegel’s death in 1830 his powerful influence in the philosophical centers of Europe naturally crossed the Atlantic, mediated for example by the Transcendentalist Club initiated by Emerson and Hedge, and through the St. Louis School of

Hegelianism led by W. T. Harris and Henry Brokmeyer. Paul Carus, monist and necessitarian, in addition to writing scores of books and hundreds of articles, edited over one hundred issues of *The Monist* and over seven hundred issues of the *Open Court*. He published essays of Peirce, James, Royce, and Dewey, as well as of others including Ernst Mach, Bertrand Russell, and D. T. Suzuki. He promoted Peirce more than anyone at the time, also becoming an important interlocutor, as noted above, in charging Peirce with being a Humean, a criticism that provoked Peirce’s declaration that he was rather “a Schellingian, of some stripe.” Peirce, like James, also seriously engaged their brilliant contemporary Josiah Royce. Not to pursue these historical leads here, other than to remark on the complex *Zeitgeist* of mid- and late-19th-century American philosophy in which Peirce seriously reflected upon Hegel’s philosophy in the midst of developing his own system. His clarification of Hegel’s principles remains very relevant in view of the range of interpretations of Hegel’s text encountered today in contemporary philosophical, social-scientific, and literary circles.

Did Peirce get Hegel right? My argument here will be that he developed categorical resources with which to illumine Hegel’s in fine distinction from his own and, in so doing, transparently adjudicated the sense-making character of Hegel’s text.

It should be noted that Peirce’s consideration of Hegel in fact stretches through his entire career-text. His adjudication of Hegel’s sense-making assumptions surfaces in his early essay, ‘Some Consequences of Four Incapacities’ (1868), where, in rejection of the last of these incapacities, namely, “that the absolutely incognizable is absolutely inconceivable,” Peirce was concerned generally to endorse “an anti-Cartesian idealism” which he said “breaking forth […] in every direction.” In this context, he cites Berkeley and Hume as “empiricists” and Fichte and Hegel as “noologists” representative of other kinds of idealists who contest the premise that the very realities of “things in themselves” cannot be known. Peirce, with the problematic not only of Cartesian idealism but also of Kant’s dichotomy of phenomenon and noumenon in mind, is here expressing his general affinity with these camps of both “empiricists” and “noologists” in rejecting cognitively inaccessible metaphysical entities (EP 1:51; CP 5.264-317). His pointed reference to “the noologists Fichte and Hegel” is conspicuous in this regard. He appears to have deliberately omitted Schelling, whose early career rang changes on Fichte’s idealism while patently denouncing Kant’s dichotomy of appearance and reality by a robust principle of absolute identity or “indifference,” from the obvious list of contemporary post-Kantian German idealists whose systems contested Kant’s *Ding-an-sich*.  

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20  Susan Haack (2014) has written lucidly on this topic in terms of Peirce’s front and center methodic maxim Do Not Block the Way of Inquiry. In this paper I submit below that, in addition to Haack’s textual exegesis, there remains the looming historical relationship that Peirce’s methodic maxim, itself a variation on his “keystone” principle of synechism, has a clear provenance in Kant’s published Introduction, sections II through VII, of his *Critique of the Power of Judgment* (1790).

21  Peirce read Schelling earlier, as per footnote 4 above.
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Peirce, while—throughout his career—positively identifying with Hegel’s and other “noologies” in rejecting Kant’s thing-in-itself, nine years later inscribed a different and more negative kind of animadversion of Hegel in ‘The Fixation of Belief’ (1877). There he contrasts the fallible, inter-generational scientific method he champions with both Cartesian and Hegelian methods of fixing belief by systems of a priori reasoning. As for Hegel—Peirce comments ironically here,—his a priori system of nature “represents tolerably the science of his day,” but that “one may be sure that whatever scientific investigation has been put out of doubt will presently received a priori demonstration on the part of the metaphysicians” (EP 1:121, 255-56; CP 5.358-87). In this regard of classifying Hegel as an a priori metaphysician, Peirce laid the seeds of characterizing Hegel’s philosophy as a form of logical determinism of the internal anancastic type. We will further explore the point that the precedent for that characterization can be found in Schelling’s Berlin Lectures (1842-43) which develops the contrast between “Negative Philosophy,” as paradigmatically exemplified in the systematic Apriorism of Hegel, and the “Positive Philosophy” of Schelling’s own “progressive” or “metaphysical empiricism.” In the scientifically rich Zeitgeist of the later 19th-century, it was arguably Peirce who, in career and thought, emerged as the “metaphysical empiricist” par excellence, and he did so by synthesizing aspects of Kant and Schelling each of whom contributed certain resources to the lineaments of his un-Hegelian “logic of inquiry.”

In his 1885 review of Royce in ‘An American Plato,’ Peirce re-characterized Hegel’s “method of fixing belief” as consisting of dialectical progression of immanent phases of a priori reasoning. The culminating Hegelian logic, he says, illustrates the “capital error” of ignoring the “Outward Clash” of the actual world in its ubiquitous outcroppings of radically contingent, non-dicible, brutal facticity. His assertion that “the Hegelians” fatally overlook the facts of action and reaction in the development of thought (EP 1:233; CP 8.39-54) precedes his formal announcement, so to speak, of his doctrine of the Three Categories in his “Guess at the Riddle” of 1887-88, where Hegel’s immanently discursive “labor of the negative” lacks the full force of inductive, indexical, and “molitional” consciousness and thus of a robust sense of Secondness. Here he writes:

When Hegel tells me that thought has three stages, that of naïve acceptance, that of reaction and criticism, and that of rational conviction, in a general sense, I agree to it […] But […] the idea that the mere reaction of assent and doubt, the mere play of thought, the heat-lightning of the brain, is going to settle anything in this real world to which we appertain,—such an idea only shows again how the Hegelians overlook the facts of volitional action and reaction in the development of thought. I find myself in a world of forces which act upon me, and it is they and not the logical transformations of my thought which determine what I shall ultimately believe (EP 1:237).

As we will see, this too set the precedent for Peirce’s later classification, in his “Seven Systems of Metaphysics” of 1903, of Hegel’s system as a procrustean system of “pure Thirdness.”
In ‘A Guess’ (1887-88) Peirce went on to characterize Hegel’s *a priori* logic as “only a feeble application of principles of mathematical calculus to philosophy”; but the root of their difference is again that, in contrast with his (Peirce’s) own categorical Tritism, Hegel’s method overlooks Secondness, “a real world of real action and reactions” (EP 1:255-56; CP 1.355-68). ‘A Guess’ announces his neo-Aristotelian project, outlining his system of the Three Categories that is to be so comprehensive as to be “a new birth of time,” accomplishing a complete re-organization of the branches of philosophy and science (EP 1:245-246). In that pivotal context Peirce refers to the “Hegel-Schelling mansion” in modern philosophy which, coming after the demolitions and repairs to traditional Aristotelian philosophy made by Descartes, Hobbes, Kant and others, is “still standing on its own ground,” but “with such oversights in its construction, that although brand new, is already pronounced uninhabitable” (EP 1:247; CP 1.1-2). What is significant for our interest here is that, as Peirce went on, he came to disassociate Schelling from Hegel, endorsing the former “in all phases” of his thought—with particular predilection for his *Philosophie der Natur*—while continuing to reject Hegel whose *a priori* system had been characterized by Schelling as lacking an authentic philosophy of nature.\footnote{22 Cf. Peirce’s 1894 Letter to William James, referenced above in footnote 14. In ‘A Guess at the Riddle’ Peirce wrote that his triadic method “differs in toto” from Hegel’s. This turns out to have been an overstatement, as we will see. Max Fisch, *Peirce, Semiotic and Pragmatism*, “Hegel and Peirce,” 261 ff. suggests closely aligning Hegel and Peirce. Fisch’s article, however, is not a full accounting of Peirce’s references to Hegel.}

Peirce’s 1867 “New List” had contained the seeds of a categorical and semiotic transformation of fundamental principles. The seeds began to blossom in ‘A Guess’ (1887-88), and then in ‘The Architecture of Theories’ (1891) where Peirce reprised Kant’s own metaphor, conspicuously employed in the closing section of the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781), of an architect building a great structure by gathering all the requisite materials. The thrust of this passage is to the effect that Peirce was already considering his Tritism as an *inhabitable* replacement of the “Hegel-Schelling mansion.” The same effort was to accomplish an architectonic overhaul of the categories of Aristotle, Kant, and Hegel. But unlike William James, he did not reject these trajectories of Kant and post-Kantian idealism *in toto*, but rather sought to employ the building materials of “modern philosophy,” combining empiricist and noologist features alike, in his new construction that would be “a new birth of time.”

### 3 Peirce’s Categorial Transformation of Kant’s Transcendentalism

Thus it is crucial to observe that Peirce did not reject Kant *in toto*; rather, he devoured Kant from his early days, and in due course incorporated key features of Kant’s three *Critiques* into his own formulation of his Three Categories. The key features of Kant’s critical period consisted of his architectonic resolution of the faculties of experience into the three faculties of Cognition, Desiring, and Enjoyment, and thereby into the three domains of the theoretical, moral, and aesthetic/teleological forms of judgment, each with its own irreducible *a priori*. The first and the second of these domains have special “apodictive,” or constitutively “determinative,” forms of judgment with regard to the objective concepts of nature and of freedom, respectively;
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the third is a “problematic” or “reflecting” power of judgment having a “subjective only” regulative status with its own synthetic *a priori* form of *sensus communis*. Kant’s third *Critique* brilliantly maintains the distinction between determinative and regulative forms of judgment to the very end; and it can be surmised that Peirce recognized Kant’s extension of the regulative power of aesthetic and teleological judgment beyond the constitutive function of the cognitive and moral domains of his first two *Critiques*. At any rate, Peirce gathered in this new Kantian material in building the basic lineaments of his Fallibilism.

Peirce’s ‘A Guess’ synoptically places Kant’s “determinative” and “reflective-regulative” forms of transcendental consciousness within a subsection intended to be a complete chapter in a planned book, “The Triad in Psychology” (EP 1:257-262). The thrust of this significant subsection is Peirce’s acknowledgement that the Three Categories, which must “have their origin in the nature of the mind,” have a clear provenance in “the Kantian form of inference” which, Peirce adds, “I do not know that modern studies have done anything to discredit.” While it is true that “we no longer regard such a psychological explanation of a conception to be as final as Kant thought,” the ideas of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness are due to “congenital tendencies of the mind,” and “So far there is nothing in my argument to distinguish it from that of many a Kantian. The noticeable thing is that I do not stop here, but seek to put the conclusion to the test by an independent examination of the facts of psychology.”

Peirce pointedly acknowledges that “the three departments of the mind that have been generally recognized since Kant are Feeling, Knowing, and Willing.” In a fuller analysis, which space does not allow here, we can appreciate that Peirce rethought Kant’s faculty psychology into the logical, ontological, and semiotic forms of his own philosophy. He in effect reconfigured the order of Kant’s three *Critiques*, prioritizing the third *Critique*’s “reflecting judgment” of aesthetic *feeling* as the *first* of the Categories of his Tritism—while relegating Kant’s “taste”-saturated “feelings” of aesthetic pleasure and displeasure to the status of “secondary phenomena” in the domain of Kant’s determinative judgments of the understanding. ‘A Guess’ then abducts the implications of Kant’s reflecting *a priori* of the aesthetic judgment in Peirce’s doctrine of Firstness heuristically applied to scientific and cosmogonic domains of inquiry. As well, his logical revision of Kant’s psychological aesthetics reemerges as the primacy of Abduction functioning as the “heuretic” (truth-discovering) edge of connatural imagination among the three forms of valid inference, and in the formulations of Tychism in the world’s ubiquitous “variescences” at the cosmological level. Following Schelling again—who was himself powerfully influenced by Goethe—Peirce revised Kant’s critical restriction of teleological judgment as “regulative only” for the inquiring subject into the Thirdness terms of his semiosis of the isomorphic affinity of cosmogonic mind and nature.

Peirce’s ground-breaking ‘A Guess’ thus reconfigures Kant’s *psychological* forms of transcendental *a priori* consciousness into their *logical* forms based on his categorical Tritism. In another crucial respect ‘A Guess’ shows a clear appropriation of Kant’s formulation of the “reflecting judgment” as the “formal power” of the

mind’s “regulative” penetration into “the lawfulness of the contingent” in the inquiring mind’s presupposition as to the “systematicity of nature.” Peirce’s gradual elaboration of his doctrine of abduction as the leading edge of scientific discovery also has its clear provenance here. Kant elaborated this heuristic Kraft (“power,” also translated in terms of “guideline,” and “guiding thread”) of the mind’s prospective confrontation “with the particular to which the universal must be found” in the opening pages of his *Critique of the Power of Judgment’s* (published Introduction, sections II-VII).

Peirce’s version is as follows: “Indeterminacy affords us nothing to ask a question about; *haecceity* is the *ultima ratio*, the brutal fact that will not be questioned. But every fact of a general and orderly nature calls for an explanation; and logic forbids us to assume in regard to any given fact of that sort that it is of its own nature absolutely inexplicable. This is what Kant calls a regulative principle, that is to say, an intellectual hope. The sole immediate purpose of thinking is to render things intelligible; and to think and yet in that very act to think a thing unintelligible is a self-stultification.” Peirce goes on to introduce a metaphor of a man blowing his own brains out rather than face a redoubtable enemy: “Despair is insanity. True there may be facts that will never get explained; but that any given fact is of the number, is what experience can never give us reason to think; far less can it show that any fact is of its own nature unintelligible. We must therefore be guided by the principle of hope, and consequently we must reject every philosophy or general conception of the universe which could ever lead to the conclusion that any given general fact is an ultimate one” (EP 1:275).

Peirce’s articulation here patently dovetails with Kant’s, who unlike the playbooks of our more contemporary postmoderns promoting concepts of the incomprehensibility of the world by any model of rationality, rather postulated a deep connection between aesthetics and teleology in their common support of morality. Kant pushed forward to articulate their affinity in the difficult language of a *supersensible ground,* a ground in terms of which the very function of

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25 Cf. Guyer (2000): “the first form of the reflecting judgment that Kant considers […] is judgment about the systematicity of the body of our scientific concepts and laws itself” (in Sections IV through VII of the published Introduction). […] (xxiv). “As Kant puts it in the first [unpublished] draft of the introduction, the *a priori* principle of reflecting judgment is simply that “Nature specifies its general laws into empirical ones, in accordance with the form of a logical system, in behalf of the power of judgment.” This principle “confirms our authorization to seek for the systematicity in our concepts and laws, or is what the published Introduction calls a principle of ‘heautonomy’ of judgment, a law prescribed not so much to nature as to judgment itself” (Guyer xxv).

26 In Kant’s words: “Although there is an incalculable gulf between the domain of the concept of nature, as the sensible, and the domain of the concept of freedom, as the supersensible. […] Just as if there were so many different worlds […] yet the latter *should* have an influence on the former […] and nature must consequently also be able to be conceived in such a way that the lawfulness of its form is at least in agreement with the possibility of the ends that are to be realized in it in accordance with the laws of freedom. — Thus there must be a ground of the *unity* of the supersensible that grounds nature with that which the concept of freedom contains practically […] [and] makes possible the transition from the manner of thinking in accordance with the principles of the one to that in accordance with the principles of the other” (ibid, 63).
“reflection” is that of “inquiring” in the later abductory sense evolved by Peirce. The transcendental power of judgment functions as a law of “purposive” affinity: “[…] for reflection on the law is directed by nature, and nature is not directed by the conditions in terms of which we attempt to develop a concept of it that in this regard is entirely contingent.”

It therefore becomes significant to note that Kant’s references to what he calls “maxims of judgment” as “pronouncements of metaphysical wisdom” also become the stock in trade of Peirce’s advocacy of the “logic of inquiry” qua prospective principle of synechism at the basis of abduction.

Kant’s text here also adumbrates Peirce’s assertion that the incognizable is no principle of explanation. Peirce’s version simply reverses Kant’s way of putting it. Moreover, we can go so far as seeing here the seedbed of Peirce’s regulative principle of the hope of synechistic discovery as substantiating his later formulation of the summum bonum, namely, the Esthetic Ideal of Concrete Reasonableness. At the heart of that Esthetic Ideal functions Peirce’s sense of the Admirable per se which also has a Kantian provenance. And Peirce drew

27 On the convertibility of the “problematic” (pragmatic) or “reflecting” = inquiring judgment, consider Kant’s words: “The reflecting power of judgment […] can only give itself such a transcendental principle as a law. […] for reflection on the law of nature is directed by nature, and nature is not directed by the conditions in terms of which we attempt to develop a concept of it that is in this regard entirely contingent” (ibid., 67).

28 In Kant’s words: “[…] maxims which are laid down a priori as the basis of research into nature. […] i.e. of nature as determined by a manifold of particular laws.” “They are to be found often enough in the course of this science, but only scattered about, as pronouncement of metaphysical wisdom, on the occasion of various rules whose necessity cannot be demonstrated from concepts. “Nature takes the shortest way” (lex parsimoniae); ‘it makes no leaps, either in the sequence of its changes or in the juxtaposition of specifically different forms’ (lex continui in natura); ‘the great multiplicity of its empirical laws is nevertheless unity under a few principles” (principia praeter necessitatem non sunt multiplicanda); and so forth (ibid. p. 69, 71-72; cf. CPR A652/B680 ff.). Kant indicated that these maxims overlap. It is crucial to observe that they appear repeatedly in Peirce’s text under the headings of Ockham’s Razor, his theory of continuous quantification, his trichotomic semiotics which critiques dyadic ontologies and hermeneutics, and, in general, his various methodological pronouncement of the principle of synechism, “the keystone of the arch” of his “completely developed system.”

29 In Kant’s words: “[…] the law of the specification of nature […] assumes it in behalf of an order of nature cognizable for our understanding. […] into a suitability for human understanding in its necessary business of finding the universal for the particular that is offered to it by perception and then further connection in the unity of the principle for all that is different…” (ibid., p. 72).

30 In Kant’s words: “The correspondence of nature in the multiplicity of its particular laws with our need to find universality of principles for it […] is indispensable for the needs of our understanding, and hence as a purposiveness through which nature agrees with our aim, but only as directed to cognition” (ibid., p. 73).

31 In Kant’s words: “The attainment of every end is combined with the feeling of pleasure […] and in this case the feeling of pleasure is also determined through a ground that is a priori and valid for everyone […] without the concept of purposiveness in this case having the least regard to the faculty of desire…” (ibid., p. 73). Such a discovery of the “unifiability of two or more empirically heterogeneous laws of nature” […] is a
out the corresponding ethical priority of Kant’s philosophy in his concept of agapasm in ‘Evolutionary Love.’

It is in such words, which deeply draw upon the formal function of Kant’s reflecting-regulative judgment, that Peirce expressed the fallibilistic foundation of his methodic maxim, Do Not Block the Way of Inquiry. Peirce’s lifelong interest in theorizing the logic of inquiry, itself a variation on his “keystone” principle of synechism, as expressed in his later formulations of agapasm, pragmaticism, the normative principle of “concrete reasonableness” (“a Reasonableness that creates,” MS 310), and sense of “uberty” (the “gravidly rich” purposive suggestiveness of the world) that trumps “secure” pragmatic reasoning, is implicated here in nuce. Kant was with him all the way.

In final analysis, Peirce rejected Kant’s absolutely incognizable and inexplicable thing-in-itself while positively absorbing his three irreducible a priori and setting his

“very noticeable pleasure, often indeed of admiration, even of one that does not cease (although one is already sufficiently familiar with its object) […] but it must certainly have been there in its time, and only because the most common experience would not be possible [without it]. […] has it gradually become mixed up with mere cognition and is no longer especially noticed. — It thus requires study to make us attentive to the purposiveness of nature for our understanding in our judging of it. […] and if we succeed in this. […] pleasure will be felt.” Contrariwise, if this were not possible, this would “thoroughly displease us,” because it would contradict the principle of the subjective-purposive specification of nature,” such that “[…] we would rather listen if another gives us hope [my emphasis] that the more we become acquainted with what is inner-unknown to us. […] the simpler and more perspicuous would we find it in the apparent heterogeneity of its empirical laws the farther our experience progressed. For it is a command of our power of judgment to proceed in accordance with the principle of the suitability of nature to our faculty of cognition as far as it reaches…” (p. 74). [My emphases.] Returning here to the big historical picture, we see in Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment the provenance of the theme of the “suitability,” i.e. “purposive” connaturality or affinity of mind and nature, found in Schelling, in Emerson’s sense of “consanguinity with nature,” Peirce’s senses of Instinct, Abduction and Uberty, and James’ and Dewey’s sense of radical experience enjoying a “congeniality” with the universe.

32 See ‘The Doctrine of Chances’ (1878): “It may seem strange that I should put forward three sentiments, namely, interest in an indefinite community, recognition of the possibility of this interest being made supreme, and hope in the unlimited continuance of intellectual activity, as indispensable requirements of logic. Yet when we consider that logic depends on a mere struggle to escape doubt, which, as it terminates in action, must begin in emotion, and that, furthermore, the only cause of our planting ourselves on reason is that the other methods of escaping doubt fail on account of the social impulse, why should we wonder to find social sentiment presupposed in reasoning? […] It interests me to notice that these three sentiments seem to be pretty much the same as that famous trio of Charity, Faith, and Hope, which in the estimation of St. Paul are the finest and greatest of spiritual gifts” (EP 1:150). In this earlier passage Peirce’s emphasis is on the presupposition of Charity as to an “interest in an indefinite community,” while assigning Faith and Hope as “supports and accessories of it.” The present citation from ‘A Guess’ is, rather, more directly drawn from Kant’s sense of the function of the reflecting judgment as an intellectual hope qua regulative principle with regard to the formal systematicity of nature that subsumes Peirce’s maxim Do Not Block the Way of Inquiry.
regulative and normative formulations of the “reflecting” power of judgment in an open-ended (asymptotic and hyperbolic) semiotics and ontology. Subtended by his insistence on the primacy of abductive discovery among the valid forms of inference, he re-situated Kant’s heuristic maxim of reflective inquiry as to the “lawfulness of the contingent” in a “universe perfused with signs” in endlessly possible expansions of sign-transference. Peirce’s pragmatic maxim and pragmaticism are solidly embedded here. The synergistic relation of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness accomplishes this transformation of Kant’s categories. As we shall further remark, Peirce’s originality here is that he resets Kant’s reflective judgment within Schelling’s objective idealism.

And what of Hegel’s self-enclosed system of “Absolute Knowing” in his *Phenomenology of Mind*, the brilliant conclusion of Hegel’s *a priori* dialectics that informs all of his later works? Commentators may be prone to mistake Peirce’s “dream” vision of the *summum bonum* of “Concrete Reasonableness” (MS 310) with Hegel’s “Concrete Universal.” Peirce’s is an exercise in pure phenomenology—it is not Hegel’s actualized absolutization of *Human Reason* (*contra* Peirce’s *cosmic Reasonableness*) as per Hegel’s regarding rational mediation as the final court of appeal for the theory of knowledge and source of definitive reflection upon the equation of the Real and the Rational. Rather, Peirce’s pure phenomenology of, so to speak, the Firstness of Thirdness; as envisioned in the Esthetic *ideal* of Concrete Reasonableness, it is an “unanalyzable impression.”

Peirce’s mature reflections on Hegel’s *Anancasm*

After ‘A Guess at the Riddle,’ Peirce’s key *Monist* metaphysical essays of 1891-93 carry a conspicuous undertow of mature reflections on Hegel’s “three stages of thinking” in interface with his Three Categories. Most noteworthy of course, beginning with ‘The Architecture of Theories’ (1891), Peirce openly declared his considered commitment to a “Schelling-fashioned objective idealism” which he regarded as “the one intelligible theory of the universe.” “Schelling-fashioned” here carries the clear connotation of cutting Hegel out of the equation. In this weighty context he repeated the dismissive point he made in ‘A Guess’ to the effect that “Most of what is true in Hegel is a darkling glimmer of a conception which the mathematicians had long before made pretty clear, and which recent researches have still further illustrated.” The passage goes on to describe the trivalent interplay of the Three Categories, and ends with speculation about a “cosmogonic philosophy”: “like some of the most ancient and some of the most recent it would be a Cosmogonic Philosophy,” one that postulates “a generalizing tendency out of a chaos of impersonalised feeling”
Prima facie, “some of the more recent” theories would appear to include an allusion to Schelling’s Naturphilosophie and even to his 1808 Essay on the Essence of Human Freedom, the spirit if not the letter of which Peirce also explicitly references in his ensuing Monist essay “The Law of Mind” of 1892.

Prior to ‘The Law of Mind,’ Peirce’s ‘The Doctrine of Necessity Examined,’ published in The Monist of 1892, declared the mechanistic hypothesis a brilliant “postulate” of 17th-century physics, but whose claim to universality of law must yield to the more comprehensive Tychism of his evolutionary cosmology—“to chance in the form of a spontaneity that is to some degree regular” (EP 1:310-11; CP 6.35-65, 6.588-618). As we have seen above, ‘The Doctrine of Necessity Examined’ of The Monist, volume 2, of 1892, has its companion piece in ‘Reply to the Necessitarians: rejoinder to Dr. Carus’ that appeared in The Monist, volume 3, of 1893. In this context Peirce makes a transition from discussing Carus’s necessitarianism to Hegel’s. He observes that Hegel’s “objective logic” goes to the extreme of postulating a spontaneity that is “certain,” instead of just a “chance way.” Peirce continues:

I make use of chance chiefly to make room for a principle of generalization, or tendency to form habits which I hold have produced all regularities. The mechanical philosophy leaves the whole specification of the world utterly unaccounted for, which is pretty nearly as to boldly attribute it to chance. (EP 1:310).

He adds the qualification that Hegel’s view, though “as much opposed to the necessitarian scheme of existence as my own theory is,” accounts for spontaneity in the wrong way, that is, “in a certain and not a chance way.” Hegel’s idealism need not be necessitarian/mechanistic, Peirce further opines; he “leaves that open as a possibility, for the present.” However, shortly thereafter in ‘Evolutionary Love’ (1893), he resolves that problematic line of inquiry, featuring Hegel’s philosophy as a paradigmatic case of mechanistic necessitarianism qua internal logical anancasm.

The pivotal ‘The Law of Mind’ essay, also appearing in volume 2 of The Monist for 1892, further develops his “keystone” concept of synechism applied to mental experience, according to which “ideas tend to spread and affect other ideas, while losing in intensity but gaining in generality.” From this “One Law of Mind” follows Peirce’s insistence on his principle of objective continuity, i.e. generality in nature—and as Houser and Kloesel remark in their introductory synopsis, “the doctrines of logical realism, objective idealism, and tychism follow” as well (EP 1:312). Kant’s “reflective principle” reappears here as the regulative principle of hope in the systematicity of nature, that is, as the heuristic guideline of discoverable continuity, or of inexhaustible complexification of naturally and historically embodied sign-transferences. The biopragmaticistic maxim, Do Not Blocking the Way of Inquiry, so-to-speak mirrors the Objective Way of inquiring Nature Naturing in general. Accordingly, Peirce inaugurates this key metaphysical essay with another statement of his evolutionary cosmology, “in which all the regularities of nature and of mind are regarded as products of growth, and to a Schelling-fashioned idealism which holds matter to be more specialized and partially deadened mind.” As already noted, he continues by mentioning the influence of Concord transcendentalism as represented by Emerson and Hedge, and of ideas that they have caught “from Schelling, and
Peirce’s Schelling-fashiooned critique of Hegel

Schelling from Plotinus, from Boehm, or from God knows what minds stricken with the monstrous mysticism of the East”—influences, however, modified by his training in mathematical and physical investigations.

It can be noted that Peirce’s expressions of “matter” as “partially deadened mind,” or “feeble mind,” are virtually verbatim phrases out of Schelling.\(^34\) Concepts of the “indifference,” symmetry, isomorphism, affinity, connaturality, and “purposive” as well as “harmonious” interpermeations of imaginative mind and nature—these are mutually translating concepts—are in fact some of the essential threads of Schelling’s writings as well as of the trans-Atlantic transmission of his doctrine, via Coleridge among others, to Emerson.\(^35\) Peirce, with his background in mathematics, logic, and the burgeoning 19\(^{th}\)-century sciences, was in a position to amplify Schelling’s objective idealism via his principle of synechism.

In his ensuing 1893 ‘Evolutionary Love’ essay, Peirce continued to weave the several threads of ‘The Doctrine of Necessity Examined’ and ‘The Law of Mind,’ now even more explicitly asserting that, in contrast to his Schelling-fashioned sense of evolutionary synergy \(\text{in futuro}\), “the Hegelian philosophy is such an anancasticism.” “The whole movement of it is that of a vast engine, impelled by \(\text{a vis a tergo}\).” “Yet, after all, living freedom is practically excluded by its method”; it is “a Keely motor,”—and, harkening back to his \(\text{papier mâché} \) metaphor about building an uninhabitable house in the opening pages of ‘The Architecture of Theories’—it is “a pasteboard model of a philosophy that in reality does not exist” (EP 1:363; CP 6.287-317). Peirce goes on to say that if Tychism could be reintroduced into Hegel’s system, “and make that the support of a vital freedom which is the breath of the spirit of love, we may be able to produce that genuine agapasticism, at which Hegel was aiming.” The ensuing reflections of the same essay, however, conclude that the Hegelian dialectical method imposes an \(\text{internal logical anancasm}\) on “the history of the development of thought, of all history, of all development” (EP 1:368)—a necessitarian doctrine which gives no scope for free choice, and a necessitarian doctrine that is defeated

\(^34\) An almost \(\text{verbatim precedent}\) is found in Schelling’s \textit{System of Transcendental Idealism} (1800): “Matter is indeed nothing else but mind viewed in an equilibrium of its activities. There is no need to demonstrate at length how, by means of this elimination of all dualism, or all real opposition between mind and matter, whereby the latter is regarded merely as mind in a condition of dullness, or the former, conversely, as matter merely in becoming, a term is set to a host of bewildering enquiries concerning the relationship of the two.” Peirce inscribed Schelling’s doctrine in various contexts of his speculations that matter is effete mind, or mind hide-bound by habit (CP 2.228); the one intelligible theory of the universe is that of objective idealism, that matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming physical laws (CP 6.25); all mind partakes more or less of the nature of matter; hence it is a mistake to conceive of the psychical and physical aspects of matter as absolutely distinct (CP 6.265); from the outside, considering its relation of action and reaction with other things, it is matter. […] From the inside, looking at its immediate character as feeling, it appears as consciousness (CP 6.268). See also CP 1.81, 2.754, 6.104, 6.201, 7.364, and 7.570.

\(^35\) In the course of his career Peirce increasingly formulated the relation between evolution and abductive instinct. Cf. for example, CP 1.81, 2.754, also 5.172-73. He could not have missed seeing that the same relation appears front and center in the writings of Emerson: see Dilworth (2009, 2010).
by his logic of relatives (EP 1:368). “Internal anancasm, or logical groping, which advances upon a predestined line without being able to foresee whither it is be carried nor to steer its course,” is Hegel's retrospective and nominalistic rule of the development of philosophy. Peirce comments here that “This involves a positive, clearly demonstrable error [...] it supposes that logic is sufficient of itself to determine what conclusions follow from given premises. [...] thus supposes that from given premises, only one conclusion can logically be drawn, and that there is no scope for free choice” (ibid). Peirce copies Schelling here.

Returning to the terms of Peirce’s positive appropriation of Kant’s legacy concerning the “regulative” as distinguished from the “determinative” power of judgment, Hegel’s absolute idealism imposes a dialectic of the apodictic or determinative logical judgment on the nature of things, whereas Peirce’s agapasm finds purchase in the “would be” power of fallibilistic scientific method as well as in free personal conduct set within his Tritistic metaphysics. The compresent dimensions of tychasm and agapasm involve implications of esse in futuro that are not genuinely available in Hegel’s retrospective-nominalistic system of the evolution of Geist. In contrast with Hegel’s absolute idealism, Peirce’s objective idealism-realism constitutes a semiotic ontology, postulating that synthetic discoveries and harmonies are possible by the natural affinity of the interpermeating “purposiveness” of mind and nature, instead of by Darwinian accretions of chance contingency or by internal logical groping. In this real universe “perfused with signs,” which is to say pregnant with iconic possibilities of relations returnable to an initial “Platonic World,” Peirce postulates a sympathetic and “divining” empathy as the forward edge of agapastic evolution

[...] which adopts certain mental tendencies, not altogether heedlessly, as in tychasm, nor quite blindly by the mere force of circumstance or of logic, as in anancasm, but by an immediate attraction for the idea itself, whose nature is divined before the mind possesses it, by the power of sympathy, that is, by virtue of the continuity of mind. (CP 6.307, EP 1:364).

Now jumping ahead another five years to 1898, the textual record has Peirce, in his Emerson-titled essay ‘Philosophy and the Conduct of Life,’ referring to “the Hegelian arrogance” that “all metaphysics is necessarily idle, subjective, and illogical stuff.” (EP 2:37; CP 6.616-48). This too can be returned to Hegel’s nominalism. The

36 Peirce’s agapism also parallels Schelling’s speculations in such works as On the Essence of Human Freedom, The Ages of the World and The Grounding of a Positive Philosophy in conceiving the divine existential freedom as taking the form of a creative eros, a longing or willing of God’s spiritual personality. Schelling highlighted the absence of personal freedom in Hegel’s system as well.

37 In ‘Pragmatic and Pragmatism’ in Baldwin’s Dictionary Peirce writes that “Nominalism up to that of Hegel, looks at reality retrospectively. What all modern philosophy does is to deny that there is any esse in futuro” (CP 8.292). Hegel’s absolutization of Reason itself reduces generality to mere facticity (Secondness). Peirce considered Schelling’s and his own philosophy to preserve the distinction between energeia and entelecheia involved in the genuine sense of Thirdness as esse in futuro.
Peirce’s Schelling-fashioned critique of Hegel

nominalist, Peirce wrote elsewhere, lacks a robust sense of objective generality (Thirdness). Balancing that negative judgment, in ‘The First Rule of Logic’ of the same year he discusses the difference between “the will to believe” and “the will to learn.” Promoting the heuristic power of the latter for its own sake, Peirce remarks that every science makes use of the self-correcting property of Reason, which Hegel made so much of, though properly it belongs to induction, not deduction (EP 2:44; CP 5.574-89, 7.135-40). The self-correcting property of Reason re-inscribes Peirce’s Fallibilism in the cooperative scientific community whose progressive methods are hypothetical and inductive (whereas the deductive method in the strict sense is restricted to corollarial mathematics.) By contrast, Hegel’s logic incorporates concepts of nature and history in its peculiar form of internal anancastic deductionism.

Peirce addresses the deductive logic of Hegel’s absolute idealism in the same year of 1898. In “The Logic of Events,” he theorizes on “The Origin of the Universe” from an initial condition in which the whole universe was non-existent, and therefore a state of absolute nothing, or “pure zero” (CP 6.214 ff.). Such a “pure zero” is not to be confused with the nothing of negation which imports Secondness. “The nothing of negation is the nothing of death, which comes second to, or after, everything.” This “pure zero” is, rather, “the nothing of not having been born. There is no individual thing, no compulsion, outward or inward, no law.” It is the state “where freedom was boundless, nothing in particular necessarily resulted” (CP 6.217-18). Precisely in this cosmogenic context Peirce asserts that in this proposition “lies the prime difference between my objective logic and that of Hegel.” Hegel says: if there is any sense in philosophy at all, the whole universe and every feature of it, however minute, is rational, and was constrained to be as it is by the logic of events, so that there is no principle of action in the universe but reason. Peirce replies: “this line of thought, though it begins rightly, is not exact. A logical slip is committed; and the conclusion reached is manifestly at variance with observation. It is true that the whole universe and every feature of it must be regarded as rational, that is as brought about by the logic of events. But it does not follow that it is constrained to be as it is by the logic of events; for the logic of evolution and of life need not be supposed to be of the wooden kind that absolutely constrains a given conclusion. The logic may be that of the inductive or hypothetic inference. […] The effect of this error of Hegel is that he is forced to deny [the] fundamental character of two elements of experience which cannot result from deductive logic” (CP 6.218).

38 J. N. Findlay, in his Foreword to A. V. Miller’s translation, Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit (1977), makes the case for a possible plurality of dialectical ascensions through nature and history, not restricted to Hegel’s actual performance, to Absolute Spirit, in terms of “three conceptual moments of universality, specificity, and singularity.” I think, however, that this suggestion only reinforces Peirce’s insight into the character of Hegel’s nominalism that is dialectically superimposed “fact-free” on real nature and history. Findlay ends his remarks with a concession to the “obscurities, inconsequences, and dysteleologies in our world which demoralize, rather than stimulate, spiritual effort,” adding “we shall not, however, consider these contemporary depressants, which Hegel, as German Romantic, could not have envisaged.” (MILLER, 1977, xv). Along this line, one might consider an interpretation of a fundamental tension in Hegel’s thought as articulated by Benedetto Croce and others, who write that the dualism between nature and spirit, or “unconscious and conscious logicity,” is never overcome within Hegel’s thought. A similar approach to
This observation reprises Peirce’s critical rejection of Hegelian method already adumbrated in his 1885 review of Royce, ‘An American Plato.’ We can also note that Peirce’s critique of Hegel’s deductive logic here has a Schellingian provenance, especially in the latter’s characterization of Hegel’s as a paradigm case of the Apriorism of “Negative Philosophy”; and it furnishes a textual antecedent to his consignment of Hegel to a procrustean metaphysics of pure Thirdness in ‘The Seven System of Metaphysics’ (1903).39

In the 1903 lecture now entitled ‘The Maxim of Pragmatism,’ Peirce repeats that Hegel’s phenomenology of spirit is nominalistic. This is because Hegel “restrict[s] himself to what actually forces itself on the mind,” thus ignoring “the distinction between essence and existence and so gave it the nominalistic and […] pragmatoidal character in which the world of the Hegelian errors have their origin” (EP 2:143-44; CP 5.14-40). Hegel’s impure phenomenology is nominalistic and pragmatoidal in the sense of restricting itself to conceptual analysis and dialectical classification of abstract experience as the phases of a one and only “concrete universal,”—which in fact is only the most abstract universal of a purely a priori system,—whereas Peirce’s pure phenomenology formulates three irreducible dimensions of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness of consciousness and then proceeds to apply them within an architectonic system of cosmogonic ideal-realism.

Here Peirce goes on to find “two sets” of categories in Hegel. Hegel’s three general categories that power his dialectical logic (which “he does not call categories” but “stages of thinking”) are acceptable to Peirce (who adopts the three); but Hegel is said to be all wrong on a “second series of categories consisting of phases of

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39 The passage goes on to say: “I say that nothing necessarily resulted from the Nothing of boundless freedom. That is, nothing according to deductive logic. But such is not the logic of freedom or possibility. The logic of freedom, or potentiality, is that it shall annul itself. For if it does not annul itself, it remains a completely idle and do-nothing potentiality; and a completely idle potentiality is annulled by its complete idleness” (CP 6.219). These considerations were central to Schelling, e.g., in *Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom* (1809) and *The Ages of the World* (1915). Let us note again that Peirce cited influences on his ideas not only from Schelling, but also from Emerson and his Transcendentalist colleague, Frederic Hedge, and also from Plotinus, Boehme, and the mysticism of the East. Arguably Peirce’s Platonism of “the Platonic World” is Plotinian, “of some stripe.” For a lucid treatment of Peirce’s doctrine of “the Platonic World,” see Guardiano, *Transcendentalist Aesthetics in Emerson, Peirce, and the 19th-century American School of Landscape Painting*, Schelling’s articulation of the “Positive” and “Negative” philosophies and of his “Metaphysical Empiricism” occupy the final chapters of *The Grounding of Positive Philosophy: The Berlin Lectures*, trans. Bruce Matthews (2007).
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evolution.” Peirce says he can’t make sense of those; and in this regard he says that he received no influence from Hegel (EP 2:143-44, 149; CP 5.14-40). Once again, at the heart of this difference is Schelling’s later-phase distinction between “Negative” and “Positive” philosophy, or of “Abstract Essence” and “Existence” (in Schelling’s terminology). Hegel turns out to be a hide-bound Abstractionist-Essentialist, producing a culminating paradigm of the “Negative Philosophy.” For his part, Schelling ultimately postulated the need of an inclusively disjunctive (not categorical) synthesis of the Negative and the Positive philosophies; arguably Peirce accomplished the same accommodation in his synoptic systematization of the triadic dimensionalities of phenomenological and metaphysical/cosmological experience. That is why his “objective idealism” is a realistic or objective idealism powered by the Esthetic ideal of “Concrete Reasonableness.”

Several other essays appearing in 1903 have explicit references to Hegel, and can be cited to confirm this reading of Peirce’s continued accurate parsing of the Hegelian system. In an originally untitled lecture ‘The Maxim of Pragmatism,’ he charged that Hegel “clubfooted” phenomenology:

[…] phenomenology, which does not depend upon any positive science, nevertheless must, if it is to be properly grounded, be made to depend upon the Conditional or Hypothetical Science of Pure Mathematics. […] A phenomenology which does not reckon with pure mathematics, a science come to years of discretion when Hegel wrote, will be the same pitiful clubfooted affair that Hegel produced” (EP 2:144).

In ‘On Phenomenology’ of the same series of lectures Peirce returns to the issue he had previously raised with respect to Royce, observing that the Hegelian philosophy is a species of the will-to-believe, oriented toward practical philosophy as a guide toward religious belief. Like all modern philosophies that are built on Ockham’s razor, such an orientation is nominalistic. Indeed, “And there is no form of modern philosophy of which this is more essentially true than the philosophy of Hegel. But it is not modern philosophers only who are nominalists. The nominalistic Weltanschauung has become incorporated into what I will venture to call the very flesh and blood of the average modern mind.” Peirce goes on to cite Leibniz as another example of “the modern nominalist, par excellence.” (EP 2:155-57; CP 5.41-56, 59-65).

In his 1903 essay, ‘The Categories Defended,’ Peirce proceeded to take the huge speculative step of applying his Three Categories to all possible systems of metaphysics. Hegel’s metaphysics, he judged, is “pure Thirdness,” by virtue of—*per impossibile*—sublating the first two categories of Firstness and Secondness (EP 2:164; CP 5.66-81, 88-92). “That Thirdness is the one and sole category is substantially the idea of Hegel, who reduces the Absolute to One; three absolutes would be to him a ludicrous contradiction *in adjeceto*, and therefore Firstness and Secondness must be *aufgegeben*.” Peirce crucially comments: “But it is not true. They are in no way refuted or refutable […] what is required for the idea of a genuine Thirdness is an independent solid Secondness and not a Secondness that is a mere corollary of an unfounded and inconceivable Thirdness; and a similar remark may be made in reference to Firstness” (ibid. 177).
Continuing in a similar vein in the 1903 ‘The Seven Systems of Metaphysics,’ Peirce observes that Hegel’s doctrine of Wesen in his Science of Logic attempts to work out a distinction between “existence” and “essence” a la Aristotle but ends up agreeing “with all other modern philosophers in recognizing no other mode of being than being in actu.” It lacks the haecceitas of Scotistic realism. Hegel’s metaphysics is a pure immanently self-reflective Wesenlehre. This just after the retracted footnote in which Peirce associates himself with Schelling’s kind of Aristotelianism that involves all three categories, and in which Peirce calls himself an Aristotelian of the scholastic wing, approaching Scotism, but going much further in the direction of Scotistic realism (EP 2:180; CP 5.77n, 93-111, 114-18, 1.314-16, 5.119, 111-13, 57-58).

Yet in another 1903 essay, ‘Sundry Logical Conceptions,’ Peirce makes the previous point about Hegel featuring “three categories” considering the extent to which in his Phenomenology he rings the changes on his “three stages of thought” (EP 2:267; CP 2.274-77, 283-84, 292-94, 309-31). He recognizes the same point in his 1907 article ‘Pragmatism’ where he says that his own (Peirce’s) three categories are of the “family stock” of Hegel’s three “stages of thought.” But Hegel’s trichotomy, Peirce observes, “is commonplace,” e.g. can be found in Kant and others, whereas Peirce’s Three Categories are not: they are rescued from the one-sidedness of allowing one category to supersede the other two. He ends by saying “there may by profound analyses under the brambles of self-deception in Hegel,” but he finds it “unprofitable to go there.” (EP 2:428; CP 5.111-13, 464-66, 1.560-62, 5.467-96).

A paper written for The Monist of April 1905 (the paper was composed in the summer of 1904) witnesses Peirce repeating this fundamental point, and again in the context of distinguishing his position from Hegel’s absolute idealism. It says that “the truth is that pragmaticism is closely allied to the Hegelian absolute idealism, from which, however, it is sundered by its vigorous denial that the third category (which Hegel degrades to a mere stage of thinking) suffices to make the world, or is even so much as self-sufficient.” Here again we see Peirce’s allegiance with Schelling’s critique of Hegel’s “Negative philosophy” as an immanent system of retrospective a priori thinking. This passage also aligns with his classification of Hegel’s metaphysics of “pure Thought” in his ‘Seven Systems of Metaphysics’ of 1903. And again, while Peirce recognizes Hegel’s triune dialectic as “an ally,” “a great vindicator,” of his own categories—“Had Hegel, instead of regarding the first two stages with his smile of contempt, held on to them as independent or distinct elements of the triune Reality”—he adds that the “external trappings” of Hegel’s doctrine are “only here and there of much significance.” Peirce concludes this passage by saying that pragmatism “belongs essentially to the triadic class of philosophical doctrines,” and “is much more essentially so than Hegelianism is.” (EP 2:345).

**Conclusion**

In fine, Peirce, necessarily employing the heuristic of his own categories, judged that Hegel’s philosophy constituted an a priori anancastic system, that is, a species of necessitarian logical determinism (CP 6.305), whose self-enclosed “concrete universal”
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is nominalistic—\textsuperscript{40}—and an anthropocentrism disguised as a theodicy to boot—\textsuperscript{41}—such that “objective nature” for Hegel is only a “stage” in the saga of humanity’s spiritual realization in which “freedom of the Spirit” is the final result of the Absolute’s self-conscious “reflection,” but not, as in Schelling’s “Positive Philosophy,” the \textit{actus prius} of empirical-metaphysical origination. In one respect Peirce’s thought particularly converges with Schelling’s “Positive Philosophy” in charging that Hegel’s system has the “fatal disease” of ignoring the “Outward Clash” of existential Secondness in the absence of which embodied Thought as genuine Thirdness in the universe has no real meaning. More comprehensively, he charges that Hegel obliterates the real “variescences” of Firstness and Secondness, so that in effect it is a lopsided \textit{papier-mâché} system of pure Thirdness—that is, of merely immanent conceptual apriority (again exactly paralleling what Schelling charged against Hegel).\textsuperscript{43}

Crucial for the immanently self-reflective system of Hegel’s \textit{Phenomenology} and \textit{Logic} is that it resolves the differentiations of natural and historical phases in ever higher sublimations of self-conscious Spirit (\textit{Geist}) culminating in its absolute \textit{Idee}, the most “concrete Universal” (i.e., most abstract universal).\textsuperscript{44} To Peirce, in effect, Hegel’s \textit{vis a tergo} system only has a “catch-up” sense of freedom, whereas a Schillerian and Schellingian postulation of freedom is rather the “first” principle of Peirce’s own realistic phenomenology, cosmogony, and semiotics. Hegel’s self-enclosing dialectical logic goes so far to postulate the \textit{end of history}, \textit{philosophy}, and \textit{art} as having already been essentially, i.e. immanently, completed by his “concrete Universal.”\textsuperscript{45} (Marxist thought rings changes on this paradigm, retaining the necessitarian feature of the Hegelian dialectic.)

\textsuperscript{40} Hegel’s concept of world history—resulting no less than in the “end” of world history—reduces the generality of it to an individual fact. In “Pragmatic and Pragmatism” for Baldwin’s \textit{Dictionary}, Peirce wrote that “Nominalism up to Hegel, looks at reality retrospectively. What all modern philosophy does is to deny that there is any \textit{esse in futuro}” (CP 8.292). Hegel’s concept of the complete self-actualization of Reason (CP 8.590 ff.) itself reduces generality to an absolute facticity, which for Peirce is Secondness.

\textsuperscript{41} I am indebted to private correspondence with Ivo A. Ibri for this characterization of Hegel’s “disguised theodicy.”

\textsuperscript{42} CP 8.268, 8.41.

\textsuperscript{43} CP 5.436, EP 2:180. Peirce refers to this as “pragmatoidal” or degenerate Thirdness.

\textsuperscript{44} In Schelling’s criticism, the Negative Philosophy functions as a pure apriorism, subsuming the actual eventualities of nature and history in its transcendental net, but having no capacity to think forward. Schelling argued for the “progressive empiricism”—or “metaphysical empiricism”—of reality anchored in the \textit{actus prius} of the divine creative reality. Peirce’s “uberous” asymptotic hyperbolic cosmology renders the same metaphysical worldview. Wm. James, in \textit{Some Problems of Philosophy}, captured the essence of this (melioristic) worldview in writing that “we live forwards while understanding backward.” James cites Kierkegaard who in fact attended and applauded Schelling’s anti-Hegel Berlin Lectures on the difference between the Negative and Positive philosophies. The content of these lectures had already been transmitted to Emerson by his Transcendentalist colleagues in the 1840s.

To the contrary, Peirce’s Fallibilism levels a direct hit against Hegel’s “temperamental” rationalism as a method of fixing belief. Crucial for Peirce is that all three of his categories function connaturally and indecomposably in nature and history as symbolic “sign-potencies,” thereby accounting for (his and Schelling’s) irreducible differences between “essence” and “existence,” as well as accounting for his (Peirce’s) charge that Hegel’s cosmico-metaphysical type (“Hegelianism of all shades”) is that of a “pure Thirdness,” i.e. putting Firstness and Secondness under erasure, and thus lacking a genuine sense of open-ended agapistic generality by virtue of the normative lure of “the admirable per se” (the “Firstness of Thirdness” as inexhaustible ideal of the harmonization of necessity and freedom in “concrete reasonableness”). Peirce’s Pragmaticism rang variations on this same critique of Hegel, and other “absolute idealists.” (A critique that remains extremely relevant in today’s philosophical arena considering the extent to which Hegelian/ Marxist dialectics are motivating a gamut of philosophical, sociological, and literary hermeneutics.)

To close this briefest overview, let me reemphasize the international and inter-generational heuretic character of Peirce’s sense of architectonic project to which he contributed in his own career-text. His synoptic-mindedness eludes narrow scholastic classification. While reaching back to Plato, Aristotle, the Medieval and early modern European philosophers, he synthesized contemporary currents of mathematics, logic, and positive science together with leading ideas of 19th century Enlightenment thought. In the latter respect, he carried on the ideas of Kant, Schiller, Schelling, and Emerson in his own theoretical register, while astutely positioning itself in relation to Hegel. I suggest that sorting out the various strands of these latter influences is indispensably requisite to appreciate the rich suggestiveness and manifold inner latticing of Peirce’s first-tier contribution to the history of philosophy and his continued relevance to many of the key issues and debates in contemporary philosophy.

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46 ‘Seven Systems of Metaphysics’ (1903) EP 2:180; to the same effect, in ‘The Categories Defended’ (also 1903), Peirce observes that “the doctrine of Hegel” […] regards the Third as the only true one. […] In the Hegelian system the other two [categories] are only introduced in order to be aufgegeben. All the categories of Hegel’s list from Pure Being up appear to me very manifestly to involve Thirdness, although he does not appear to recognize it, so immersed is he in this category” (EP 2:164).

47 Schelling’s speculations concerning the pre-rational volitional Divine Nature in *The Essence of Human Freedom* and his later elaboration of the unvordenkliche and ueberschwengliche Divine Creation as actus prius in his “Positive Philosophy” (which critiques Hegel’s “Negative” or purely a priori philosophy) are deeply embedded in Peirce’s mature metaphysics. Further embedded in these concepts we have Peirce’s formulation of the “pure potency” of the “Platonic Ideas” of “the Platonic World” as a “first” component of cosmogony. Cosmogony, cosmology, and metaphysics are, to Peirce, the same inquiry.


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