

## Editorial

*This new **Cognitio** 17(2) is one of the most especial we have published. Not only because it's the first exclusively online number, once we unfortunately don't print the issues anymore, as we have continuously done for 16 years of the Journal's life. Besides that, from the next issue on **Cognitio** will bring the DOI number, another useful tool for an easier location of every one of its articles on the Internet, which is a necessary requirement due to the Journal's characteristic international profile.*

*But the main reason why we call this a especial number is the high quality of its essays. The Journal opens with the original subject of Douglas Anderson's essay. One of the most distinguished Peircean scholars of the world, Anderson argues for an extension of the concept of community to a community of firstness, the phenomenological Peircean category under which the qualities of feelings are fit. Now, in Peirce's system, the category akin to inquiry is thirdness, the locus of logical forms that back up the possibility for a community to constitute itself as a communicative community by possessing the symbolic universe of language, a community capable of establishing a universal agreement of opinions. What, then, would underpin a community of qualities of feeling? Together with Anderson, we invite the reader to meditate upon such a fascinating question.*

*Rogério da Costa also presents the reader with a rare and precious subject: the nexus between Spinoza's and Peirce's thoughts. The author proposes a comparison through the concept of habit, which is present in both philosophers and has been a returning subject in contemporary discussions. This essay opens up an original and important line of inquiry indeed, an invitation to those who enjoy reading these two philosophers seldomly put to dialogue.*

*Thomas Dabay brings an interesting subject to inquirers into logic and epistemology. He reflects upon Fitch's paradox as a way of interpreting Peircean inspired brands of pragmatism, approaching Peirce's epistemic theory of truth, its anti-skeptical fallibilism, its anti-foundationalism and its dependence on epistemic hope.*

*David A. Dilworth cheers **Cognitio** once more with his erudition on the history of modern philosophy. Offering one more study on the relationship between Schelling and Peirce, he now explores the common theoretic ground both thinkers share through the spirit brought by the German philosopher's Philosophie der Natur welded cemented in the letter of Peirce's thought.*

*Considering the still little literature on the relations between Semiotics and Psychoanalysis, this incipient line of research—and for this reason significantly previous to future inquiries—is revived by Paulo Duarte Guimarães Filho's essay. The author makes an inventory of the use of Peirce's conceptions in Psychoanalysis, wherein Lacan's work has a prominent place. But the author also proposes reflexions on the importance of iconic and indexical signs over the dominance of the importance attributed to verbal language, specially for the understanding of the language of babies.*

*In his essay, Risto Hilpinen investigates what Peirce has called "perfect knowledge", a sort of "definitely formed" opinion that could not be impaired by future researches. It's interesting to logicians, specially those interested in Peirce's*

logic, Hilpinen's thesis that the propositions derived from such a perfect knowledge are not vulnerable to a Gettier-type of counterexamples.

Nathan Houser is once more present in the pages of **Cognitio**, with a precious contribution containing a historical approach of the incorporation of Semiotics as discipline of philosophy. With a profound knowledge of the subject, Houser's essay is surely a piece that can become obligatory for all interested in this field of studies.

The very title of Rômulo Martins Pereira's article brings the question to which the author seeks the answer: "Are we capable of being conscious of the initial activity of consciousness? An analysis of transcendental deduction based on Kemp Smith." The author tries to reach such an answer through the analysis of Kemp Smith's account of Kant's transcendental deduction of the categories. According to **Cognitio**'s editorial line of publishing contributions on pragmatism and all the philosophical disciplines that are historically and conceptually related to it, such as Kant's, this essay is among the most interesting ones.

John Stubr begins his essay with the intriguing title "The permanence of change: Empedocles, Dewey, and two kinds of pluralist metaphysics of force." The enthusiast readers of philosophy will not fail to be seduced by it. Empedocles and Dewey are confronted in this article. Under the development of a metaphysical pluralism that goes from being to becoming, Stubr finds a way of reading Empedocles not only as a pre-Socratic but as a pre-pragmatic thinker as well.

Vincent Colapietro, another author who is always welcome in **Cognitio**, contributes an intriguing text on music and human practices, making questions worth of reflection for philosophy of art.

We hope this wide range of subjects is patiently and well enjoyed by the readers of **Cognitio**.

Ivo A. Ibri  
Editor