The reemergence of Schiller in Peirce’s reminiscences of the Æsthetic Letters: a critical addendum to D. Dilworth’s Account of the provenance of Peirce’s Categories in Schiller

O ressurgimento de Schiller nas recordações das cartas estéticas de Peirce: um adendo crítico à explicação de D. Dilworth sobre a procedência das categorias de Peirce em Schiller

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Abstract: The determination of the depth and scope of the influence Schiller’s Æsthetic Letters exerted on Peirce’s philosophizing has proved a demanding interpretive task. Both the understanding of its necessity and the awareness of its difficulties have only gradually emerged in the work of generations of scholars. The aim of this paper is to sketch the present hermeneutic situation concerning the “Schiller-Peirce-affair” (Section I) and to perform the subtask of interpreting a group of passages that has hitherto not received the philological attention and accuracy it deserves: Peirce’s reminiscences (1902-1913) of his juvenile study of the Letters. As these constitute our only warrant for the assumption that Schiller’s thought – besides acting as a gateway to Kant around 1855, – had any import for Peirce, the reminiscences are documented as completely as possible (Section II), in order to situate Schiller’s reemergence in Peirce’s thought in the context of the theoretical challenges Peirce is facing in view of the coenoscopic redesign of the philosophical sciences carried out between 1900 and 1903 (Section III). This architectonic contextualization of the reminiscences matches the results of our analysis of the juvenilia obtained in a twin-paper: The categoriological core of the Letters, around which Schiller builds a three-level logic of psychic processes, acted as the catalyst for Peirce’s analysis of the shortcomings of Kant’s categoriology and thus informed his conception (intension) and use (extensive application to object-realms) of the categories as purely formal – truly universal, strictly ordered, essentially modal – constituents of phenomenality, normativity and historical processuality, i.e. as the constitutive elements and architectonic dimensions of the semeiosis of an intelligence, which is capable of learning from experience.

Resumo: A determinação da profundidade e âmbito da influência que as Cartas estéticas de Schiller exerceu sobre a filosofia de Peirce revelou-se como uma desafiadora tarefa interpretativa. Tanto o entendimento de sua necessidade quanto a consciência de suas dificuldades apenas surgiram gradativamente na obra de gerações de estudiosos. O objetivo deste trabalho é delinear a situação hermenêutica atual em relação à “questão-Schiller-Peirce” (Seção I) e executar a sub-tarefa de interpretar um grupo de passagens que, até agora, não receberam a atenção e o rigor filológico que merecem: as recordações de Peirce (1902-1913) de seu estudo juvenil das Cartas. Como constituem nossa única garantia da premissa de que o pensamento de Schiller – além de servir como acesso a Kant, em torno de 1855 – teve algum significado para Peirce, as recordações são documentadas o mais plenamente possível (Seção II), a fim de situar o ressurgimento de Schiller no pensamento de Peirce no contexto dos desafios teóricos enfrentados por Peirce, em vista da reconcepção coenoscópica das ciências filosóficas que ocorreram entre 1900 e 1903 (Seção III). Esta contextualização arquitetônica das recordações corresponde aos resultados de nossa análise da juventúnia obtida em um trabalho conjunto. A essência categoriológica das Cartas, em torno da qual Schiller constrói uma lógica tripartida de processos psíquicos, agiu como um catalizador para a análise de Peirce das deficiências da categoriologia de Kant e, assim, fundamentou sua concepção (conotação) e uso (aplicação extensa ao objeto-dominios) das categorias como constituintes meramente formais – verdadeiramente universais, estritamente ordenados, essencialmente modais – de fenomenalidade, normatividade e processualidade histórica, i.e., como os elementos constitutivos e dimensões arquitetônicas da sentose de uma inteligência, capaz de aprender através da experiência.


1 Introduction

The fundamental problem in analyzing and assessing the influence of Friedrich von Schiller’s On the Æsthetic Education of Man in a Series of Letters on Peirce’s mature philosophy originates in a gap of 50 years: the Æsthetic Letters act as Peirce’s initiation to philosophy around 1855, but are only mentioned again in a few reminiscences dating from the last and most productive decade of Peirce’s career. A philologically accurate and methodologically sound analysis of the depth and scope of Schiller’s influence on Peirce’s mature thought thus requires the following steps: (i) a preliminary analysis of those passages that could support the hypothesis of a protracted influence and might, therefore, also indicate its systematic vectors. If such an analysis were to give significant positive results, it would moreover (ii) become unavoidable to explore those juvenilia that document Peirce’s early reception of Schiller, in order to (iii) attempt to identify those ideas apprehended in youth that can render intelligible the reemergence of Schiller in Peirce’s thought at a determinate juncture of his later development.
The present paper focusses on the first step: We begin with a sketch of the hermeneutic situation that has resulted from scholarly work devoted to the understanding of the ‘Schiller-Peirce-affair’ in the last 50 years (Section I), in order to bring into view the necessity of tackling the task of compiling and interpreting Peirce’s reminiscences of his juvenile study of the *Æsthetic Letters* (Section II). Finally, we contextualize Schiller’s reemergence in Peirce’s thought on the backdrop of the emergence of determinate theoretical challenges Peirce is facing during the redesign of his architectonic of coenoscoptic sciences, which gains momentum around 1900 and finds its first consolidated form in the *Harvard Lectures* and *Lowell Lectures* of 1903 (Section III).

2 The hermeneutic situation

“Why not examine Schiller?” – it is more than half a century ago that Max Fisch scribbled this question in his copy of Murray Murphey’s *The Development of Peirce’s Philosophy*. His marginal intervention occurs on page 36, where Murphey inquires into the origin of the three early pronominal categories and sees “no alternative but to regard the I, It and Thou as the Peircean equivalents of Kant’s classes of transcendental ideas.” The indirect proof Murphey gives in support of his thesis leans on the biographical information that “the only philosopher he [Peirce] is known to have studied by that time [1857] is Kant.” – It must have been Murphey’s footnote to this sentence with its revealing use of the adverb ‘only’ that prompted Fisch’s marginal intervention concerning the advisability of studying Schiller: “The only other philosopher he [Peirce] is known to have read at this time”, Murphey explains, “is Schiller, and he had read only the *Aesthetische Briefe.*” Only a book on æsthetics. There is an enthymeme here, concealed in the adverb ‘only’. Its suppressed major premise might be spelled out as follows: “Fundamental concepts of cognition play no role in theories of philosophizing poets.” Max Fisch clearly saw that this premise is far from self-evident: Why not examine Schiller!

Two decades later, in his *Introduction* to the first volume of the *Writings of Charles S. Peirce* (W1), Fisch’s private marginal memo to examine Schiller eventually became public and central. There, in the section entitled “I, IT and THOU”, he eventually revealed the pedigree of the pronominal categories by identifying Schiller’s theory of drives as the mother and a bunch of other abstract notions – including the stages of Hegelian dialectic, Kant’s *ratio divisionis* for the trichotomization of the categorico-logical material and the concept of linguistic categories as potential fathers. The *Introduction* to W1 – but also Thomas Sebeok’s *Play of Musement* – succeeded in invigorating interest in a text which probably had been as much a “turgid product of German Romanticism” to Murphey in 1961 as it had been to

1 MURPHEY, 1961, p. 36. Fisch’s copy is in the *Max Fisch Library* of the *Peirce Edition Project*, Indianapolis.
2 Idem n. 27, *our italics*.
3 Cf. CPR, § 11, especially B 109-112.
4 Cf. W 1: xxvii f.
The reemergence of Schiller in Peirce’s reminiscences of the Æsthetic Letters: a critical addendum to D. Dilworth’s Account of the provenance of Peirce’s Categories in Schiller

Goudge in 1950. Thus, in the wake of Fisch’s rehabilitation of Schiller’s Æsthetic Letters, Peirce-Scholars have been mainly exploring three conceptual pathways that lead from the reflections of the German poet, historian and dramatist to the thought of the American scientist, philosopher and logician, namely (i) the impact the Æsthetic Letters have had on the formation of the (early) Peircean theory of categories; (ii) the provenance of the concept of musement from the intellectual soil of the notion of a Spieltrieb; finally, (iii) the architectonic revamping of central Schillerian claims concerning the normative structure of rationality that is taken to be reflected in Peirce’s conception of a dependence of logic – qua “Normative Semeiotic” (CP 2.111, 1902) – on pure ethics and esthetics, thus architectonically mirroring the axiological dependence of norms of logical and ethical goodness on the praxeological acknowledgment of an esthetic ideal.

Sure enough, few scholars only would side with Jeffrey Barnouw, who, in two papers of paradigmatic transatlantic scholarship invited us to consider Schiller as a thinker, who – in addition to fundamentally shaping Peirce’s notion of esthetics and the axiological hierarchy it grounds – also shaped his pragmatistic outlook as a whole. Most commentators would rather be inclined to follow André De Tienne’s Solomonic verdict, who is certainly justified in pointing out the quantitative scarcity of textual evidence and the elusive nature of Peirce’s references to Schiller: “One would be mistaken to overrate the importance of Schiller’s influence on Peirce, but one would no less be wrong to neglect it.” (DE TIENNE, 1996, p. 33. Our translation).

Now, whether the account David Dilworth recently gave in this journal commits the very mistake of overrating the importance Schiller had for Peirce or not, – his erudite analysis in “Intellectual Gravity and Elective Attractions: The Provenance of Peirce’s Categories in Friedrich von Schiller” is (with the partial exception of BARNOUW, 1988 and 1994) the first paper published in English that to our knowledge ever took on the duty to provide its readers with two essential hermeneutic elements that had been neglected due to what Dilworth labels as “narrow-gauge partisan methodologies [that] are not likely to do justice […] to the full range of Peirce’s system” (DILWORTH, 2014, p. 39). Firstly, Peirce-Scholars have generally shied away from the systematic task of penetrating the

7  For reflections of this rehabilitation in scholarly work see e.g. the acknowledgement of Schiller’s importance for Peirce in Hookway, 1985, p. 4, who writes that Peirce was “deeply influenced by reading Schiller and Kant while an undergraduate”, and Anderson, 1995, p. 4, who claims that “the aesthetic dimension of Schiller’s work came to play a central role in Peirce’s thinking late in his life”.
argumentative structure, methodology and unity of the *Æsthetic Letters*.\textsuperscript{13} Secondly, Peirce-Scholars have lacked the historical interest to deal with the complex relations that, on the one hand, connect the production of the *Æsthetic Letters* to Kant’s *Transzendentalphilosopie* and Fichte’s *Wissenschaftslebre*, and to the reception of German Idealism in Emerson and the sects of American *Transcendentalism* on the other. In this perspective, thus, Dilworth’s contribution finally offers the rich historical tableau that was virtually absent from the debate on Schiller’s influence on Peirce and, moreover, provides us with a rich analysis of the contents of the *Æsthetic Letters* in terms of their factual (or at least probable) impact on the mature Peirce.

Dilworth’s achievements notwithstanding, however, there are substantial addenda and fundamental specifications to be made to his account of the provenance of Peirce’s categories in Schiller. My criticisms are mainly three: Firstly, as Peirce’s mature reminiscences to his early reading of the *Æsthetic Letters* constitute our only means to corroborate claims that there really is a demonstrable Schillerian influence on Peirce’s mature triadic conception of coenoscopic philosophy\textsuperscript{14} (i.e. on his writings from 1902-1913), it constitutes no sound philological procedure to use bits and pieces of these reminiscences without properly specifying their provenance and without reflecting on the argumentative context they are taken from.\textsuperscript{15}

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\textsuperscript{13} As BARNOUW, 1988, p. 611, hypothesizes, this is so „because no one knows (as Peirce did in 1855 or at least 1857) how to read […] it. “For Barnouw’s insightful interpretation of the *Æsthetic Letters*, cf. *ibid.*, p. 615-627.

\textsuperscript{14} It is worth reminding the reader of two facts in this context, namely that (i.) the Peircean conception of philosophy had been implicitly coenoscopic (cf. e.g. MS 13:1-2, 1895; NEM 4:267, 1895; NEM 4:ix-x, 1897) long before 1902 (when it became explicitly conesoscopic in the *Minute Logic*) and (ii.) that the Peircean architectonic articulation of coenosity in the *Minute Logic* is not yet triadic, which it only truly becomes in the *Harvard Lectures* and *Lowell Lectures of 1903*; on the last point, cf. ATKINS (2006), whose explanation of the lateness of the ‘triadic turn’ Peirce’s conception of coenoscopy took, however, is not convincing, because the task of classification is not primarily the task of a science of review (*ibid.*, p. 496), but a central task of Speculative Rhetoric, thus of Normative Semeiotic, cf. CP 1.204 and PARÉ, 1989, pp. 346 ff. Nonetheless Atkin’s paper – without knowing to do so – points in the direction in which Schiller became important again for Peirce in 1902: as a model of a dynamic architectonic unity of philosophy based on the theory of categories and their iterated applicability to themselves, which, by the way, Schiller adopts in *AEM*, XXIV-XXV.

\textsuperscript{15} To give only one particularly striking example, DILWORTH, 2014, p. 40, 58, and 66, refers to the – somewhat mutilated Peircean phrase – ‘categories in disguise’ in quotation-marks without ever referring to the source and date of this quotation (which is MS 310:3-5, 1903) or reflecting on the context and purpose of its use. The reader will find the full passage quoted above in the fifth reminiscense (*R5*), in which Peirce speaks of the *Æsthetic Letters* as “one of these books in which the three categories, in an almost unrecognizable disguise, played a great part”. This is an eminently important passage, the unreflected compression of which into an inaccurate quotation naturally leads to imprecise interpretive claims: Even if, in the following quotation, we replace the words “contained his earliest articulation” with ‘contained the earliest articulation’, it is simply not true, that – as DILWORTH, 2014, p. 66 claims – “Peirce wrote that Schiller’s *Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man* contained his earliest articulation of his three categories ‘in disguise’.”
3 Peirce’s Reminiscences of the Æsthetic Letters

In his last decade, Peirce, in lectures, unpublished manuscripts and letters, sporadically reflects on his early study of Schiller’s Æsthetic Letters. In comparison to the amount of references given to Kant or Hegel, the references to Schiller are admittedly scarce. But so are his references to Henry James sen., who – according to a statement which is as concise as it is balanced (cf. EP 2:460 n., 1909) – profoundly stimulated Peirce’s thought on ethics and religious metaphysics. Thus, although there is probably less than a dozen of passages, in which Peirce refers to Schiller after 1860, this, in itself, gives no justification to abort an examination of Schiller’s influence on – or: stimulation of – Peirce’s mature thought.

Scarcity of means, however, recommends efficient usage. It is, therefore, necessary to take a patient and careful look at what Peirce actually says about

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16 Cf. TOPA, 2012, p. 195-218, where I sketch the facets of the distinction of two types of categories in the juvenilia, which might be differentiated along the lines of the mature distinction between “Universal Categories” and “series of categories consisting of phases of evolution” (CP 5.38; cf. 5.121, 1903; 1.561-3, 1905).

17 Such a demonstration should use the minimal Kantian sense of the term ‘category’ qua necessary conceptual condition of the unity of the synthesis of sensuous manifolds as its necessary criterium for the categoriality of concepts, which thus requires these to be such that “by these alone can it [the understanding] understand something in the manifold of intuition, i.e., think an object for it” (CPR, A 80/B 106).

18 I fail to find an answer in DILWORTH, 2014, concerning the crucial question how drives can be categories. Our answer to this question will be presented in a paper forthcoming in this journal and completing the account offered here.

19 As indicated above, a major criticism that ought to be directed to most earlier attempts to deal with Schiller’s influence on Peirce is the lack of attention paid to these reminiscences. This lack is particularly problematic in DILWORTH 2014, who first rightly, though excessively vaguely, claims that “a force of intellectual gravity brought him [Peirce] back to Schiller as his system peaked in its later phase“ (p. 40), but then, claiming that the mature Peirce was “consciously and unconsciously absorbing Schiller” (idem), goes far beyond what any non-psychoanalytic interpretive kind of work based on textual evidence and philological standards could ever warrant. In order to understand why, when and in which contexts Schiller reemerges in Peirce’s thought, we are obliged to study the reminiscences and their respective contexts. These constitute the primary warrant for claims concerning a Schillerian influence on Peirce’s mature thought.
Schiller when he refers to him after 1902; and it is necessary to understand why he says what he says, i.e. in which mode (anecdotal, illustrative, historically or systematically contextualizing, exemplificatory etc.) these statements are connected to the general subject-matter dealt with and, moreover, how exactly it is pertinent to the narrower argumentative context we find the reference situated in. This section, therefore, is reserved to a most probably incomplete chronological compilation and brief contextualizing analysis of the respective passages.

(R1) Autobiographical Fragment (after 1880, MS 1606:1-2)

The first passage comes from an undated autobiographical manuscript. Although the passage is embedded in a purely narrative context, the rhetoric function of the autobiographical reference to Schiller is clearly to give evidence of an early interest in the “study of the human mind”, which is put in contrast to the study of natural sciences.

Although I was not a precocious child, at the age of 8, I took up of my own accord the study of chemistry, to which the following year I added Natural philosophy, so that by the time I went to college, I was already a fairly expert analyst. Somewhat later I became exceedingly fascinated with Lavater’s Physiognomy, in which I half believed. But further than that I took no particular interest in the human mind before I reached puberty. Nor did I, then, read about it, although I wrote a little treatise of my own entitled The Dynamics of Persuasion. The first philosophical book which attracted my attention was Whately’s Logic, with which, as a schoolboy, I was delighted. At sixteen I entered college. I think we studied Jouffroy’s Ethics the first year. It was a very interesting book. But a great part of my time that year was taken up by a most painstaking study of Schiller’s Aesthetische Briefe. It produced so powerful an impression on me, that I am unable to this day to disabuse myself of it. I then took up Kant’s Critic of the Pure Reason which chiefly occupied my mind for three years […].

(R2) Minute Logic, II, 2: “Why Study Logic?” (CP 2.197 = MS 428:118, May 1902)

The next passage comes from the second part of the second chapter (“Prelogical Notions”) of the Minute Logic. The main subject matter of the text is the thematization of those notions, theories and sciences that are architectonically prior to Logic. The narrower argumentative function of what is certainly more than a mere anecdotal autobiographic reference to Schiller, which superficially functions as a fig-leave on the bareness of Peirce’s lack of aesthetic expertise, is the problem of determining the nature of the dependence of Logic on Ethics and Esthetics, i.e. “the logic of the normative sciences”, as we hear Peirce label the problem:

We shall next take up the logic of the normative sciences, of which logic itself is only the third, being preceded by Esthetics and Ethics. It is now forty-seven years ago that I undertook to expound Schiller’s Aesthetische Briefe to my dear friend, Horatio Paine. We spent every afternoon for long months upon it, picking the matter
to pieces as well as we boys knew how to do. In those days, I read various works on esthetics; but on the whole, I must confess that, like most logicians, I have pondered that subject far too little. The books do seem so feeble. That affords one excuse. And then esthetics and logic seem, at first blush, to belong to different universes. It is only very recently that I have become persuaded that that seeming is illusory, and that, on the contrary, logic needs the help of esthetics. The matter is not yet very clear to me; so unless some great light should fall upon me before I reach that chapter, it will be a short one filled with doubts and queries mainly.

(R3) First Draft of the Harvard Lecture on the Normative Sciences (MS 310:3-5, 1903)

The main subject matter of this passage is the determination of the conception, division and subject matter of the Normative Sciences. The argumentative function of the autobiographical reference to Schiller (which, on the surface, again functions as a fig-leave) seems to be the problem of an architectonic movement from Phenomenology to Esthetics (being the first of the three Normative Sciences) which is itself categorial in nature, i.e. a first movement to the appearance of the categories in their secondness as dichotomic conceptions of value.20

Ideas so fundamental as I hold these [three categories] to be must have been uralt when the Neantherthal [sic!] man was a child. They must be traceable in the minds of the inferior animals. Much more must they have permeated human thought since Pherecydes. No, all that I have done is to give an exposition of them which, I hope, puts them in a clearer light than that of Hegel. The first year of my own serious study of philosophy, in 1856, forty-seven years ago was devoted to esthetics. My good angel must have prompted me to take up first that branch of philosophy which ought immediately to follow the study of the categories, and to study it in a German book which though it was too old to be sensibly influenced by Hegel was nevertheless one of these books in which the three categories, in an almost unrecognizable disguise, played a great part. It was Schiller's Ästhetische Briefe, – a very good book for an infant philosopher. After that I passed to logic and to the analytic part of the Critic of the Pure Reason and I am sorry I confess that I have entirely neglected esthetics; so that, though I am now obliged to say a few words about it, I am constrained to preface them with the acknowledgment of my incompetence.

(R4) Harvard Lecture on the Normative Sciences (CP 5.132 = EP 2:201, 1903)

The following passage comes from the final version of the Harvard Lecture on the Normative Sciences. We add it to our list, although Peirce replaces the reference to Schiller by a more generic one, because it indicates that Peirce is conceiving of Schiller as a “philosophical artist” and, moreover, gives a definition of esthetical

goodness that – in accordance with the mathematical exigencies\textsuperscript{21} of the methodology of the normative sciences – is \textit{deduced} from the categories and thus offers a partial\textsuperscript{22} solution for the problem we saw emerging in \textit{R3}.

So, then, incompetent as I am to it, I find the task imposed upon me of defining the esthetically good – a work which so many \textit{philosophical artists} have made as many attempts at performing. In the light of the doctrine of categories I should say that an object, to be esthetically good, must have a multitude of parts so related to one another as to impart a positive simple immediate quality to their totality; and whatever does this is, in so far, esthetically good, no matter what the particular quality of the total may be. If that quality be such as to nauseate us, to scare us, or otherwise to disturb us to the point of throwing us out of the mood of esthetic enjoyment, out of the mood of simply contemplating the embodiment of the quality – just, for example, as the Alps affected the people of old times, when the state of civilization was such that an impression of great power was inseparably associated with lively apprehension and terror – then the object remains none the less esthetically good, although people in our condition are incapacitated from a calm esthetic contemplation of it.

\textbf{(R5) “Consequences of Pragmaticism” (MS 290:35-37 = CP 5.402 n.3, 1906)}

This comes from the drafts for the Monist-Articles of 1905-6. The main subject matter of the paper is Pragmaticism as a philosophical position. The narrower argumentative function of this deeply appreciative reference to Schiller is the role the esthetic ideal (the object of which is the \textit{summum bonum}) plays as a developing regulating motivational attractor of self-control in the horizon of which man’s self-understanding unfolds, i.e. the understanding of the purpose of his thoughts, feelings, experiences and actions, both on the timescale of individual live-spans and on that of historical communities and humanity as a whole. This reference thus relates to a different, i.e. a metaphysical strand of Schiller’s thought and establishes a connection between the cultural function of the sense of beauty and its aesthetic education on the one hand and Schiller’s metaphysics of history as the medium of an infinite expression of human nature on the other hand.\textsuperscript{23} We are thus dealing with the problem of a \textit{non-relativistic understanding of the necessary developmental historicity of the summum bonum}.

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{21} Cf. e.g. CP 4.240 (1902), MS 75:161 (1902), MS 1339:017 (c. 1903), EP 2:378 (1905).
  \item \textsuperscript{22} This solution is only partial because an account of the movement from pure phenomenality to normativity is impossible without taking into consideration what Peirce, at the beginning of the “Harvard Lecture on the Normative Sciences”, labels as “peculiar appreciations, to which nothing at all in the phenomena, in themselves, corresponds” (CP 5.126). The expression ‘peculiar appreciations’ is a literal translation of what WUNDT, \textit{Ethik}, (1886), p. 3, refers to as „das Moment einer besonderen Werthschätzung” (\textit{the momentum of a peculiar appreciation}) as constituting the distinctive feature of the „Gegenstände der Normwissenschaften (\textit{objects of the normative sciences}).
  \item \textsuperscript{23} Cf. especially AEM, XI.7-8.
\end{itemize}
No doubt, Pragmaticism makes thought ultimately apply to action exclusively – to conceived action. But between admitting that and either saying that it makes thought, in the sense of the purport of symbols, to consist in acts, or saying that the true ultimate purpose of thinking is action, there is much the same difference as there is between saying that the artist-painter's living art is applied to dabbing paint upon canvas, and saying that that art-life consists in dabbing paint, or that its ultimate aim is dabbing paint. Pragmaticism makes thinking to consist in the living inferential metaboly of symbols whose purport lies in conditional general resolutions to act. As for the ultimate purpose of thought, which must be the purpose of everything, it is beyond human comprehension; but according to the stage of approach which my thought has made to it – with aid from many persons, among whom I may mention Royce (in his World and Individual), Schiller (in his Riddles of the Sphinx) as well, by the way, as the famous poet (in his Aesthetische Briefer), Henry James the elder (in his Substance and Shadow and in his conversations), together with Swedenborg himself – it is by the indefinite replication of self-control upon self-control that the vir is begotten, and by action, through thought, he grows an esthetic ideal, not for the behoof of his own poor noodle merely, but as the share which God permits him to have in the work of creation. This ideal by modifying the rules of self-control modifies action, and so experience too, – both the man's own and that of others, and this centrifugal movement thus rebounds in a new centripetal movement, and so on; and the whole is a bit of what has been going on, we may presume, for a time in comparison with which the sum of the geological ages is as the surface of an electron in comparison with those of a planet. So far as it goes, this seems to me a legitimate outcome of pragmaticism.

(R6) From a Letter to Lady Welby (SS:77, 1908)

This passage comes from a letter to Lady Welby, which, according to the peculiar dynamics of the Welby-Peirce correspondence touches upon a number of oftentimes only loosely connected subject matters.

As to the word «play», the first book of philosophy I ever read (except Whately's Logic, which I devoured at the age of 12 or 13,) was Schiller's Aesthetische Briefe, where he has so much to say about the Spiel-Trieb; and it made so much impression upon me as to have thoroughly soaked my notion of “play,” to this day.

(R7) “Studies in Meaning. The Import of Thought: An Essay in Two Chapters” (MS 619:7-9, 1909):

The following passage comes from a hitherto unpublished introduction to a collection of papers on pragmatism Peirce was projecting in spring 1909. The main
subject matter of the paper is a pragmatic theory of meaning. The function of this essentially autobiographic reference to Schiller is particularly difficult to decipher, but it might be seen as aiming at a contraposition of two modes of reflection, one discursive and semantically loaden, the other diagrammatical and mathematically abstract. If so, this is the first time we see a Peircean articulation of what separates him from Friedrich Schiller.

When I got to be a Freshman in college, the fact that we were seated in the classrooms in alphabetical order brought me into intimacy with a noble-hearted, sterling characterized young gentlemen, Horatio Paine, almost the only real companion I have ever had, in the sense of not only being interested in the ideas that interested me but also disposed to think along the very paths of thought that I myself pursued. He and I occupied almost all our leisure together in reading and discussing Schiller’s *Aesthetische Briefe*, which being the first philosophical work I ever read made an indelible impression on me. I may here mention that I am naturally deficient in aptitude for language. When a new bit of slang comes into vogue, I am about the last person who discovers what it means and when I come to do so, it is by requesting somebody to explain it to me. [...] I do not think I ever reflect in words: I employ visual diagrams, firstly, because this way of thinking is my natural language of self-communion, and secondly, because I am convinced that it is the best system for the purpose. [...] My “Existential Graphs” have a remarkable likeness to my thoughts about any topic of philosophy. Schiller’s letters naturally awakened Horatio’s and my curiosity about Kant; and we began the study of that great work and of the Prolegomena. 25

(R8) “A Sketch of Logical Critic” (MS 675: 043-045, 1911)

This passage comes from a hitherto unpublished portion of an essay Peirce intended to contribute to a *Festschrift* for Lady Welby. 26 The main subject matter of the paper is the theory of reasoning. The narrower argumentative function of the openly polemical reference to Schiller is the exposition of the normative sciences in general and the difference in their conceptions of esthetics in particular.

How ought these three studies [the normative sciences esthetics, ethics and logic; AT] to be pursued? I foresee that it will be no easy task to reply to that question with the perfect impersonality and scientific *sang-froid* that propriety demands. Yet I ought to say how the first two sciences should prepare the way for the third. This third is the science of concluding the truth; but this it can only do in so far as it way has been premised by the fullest statements of the antecedent truth. It has been fifty-five years since I read the only book on esthetics in general, the only one professing to cover the whole subject that I ever read. It was the work of the poet Schiller; and its theory was that beauty is the expression of the *Spiel-trieb*. I am willing enough to admit the truth of all the great poet said of that kind of beauty that is a matter

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of play, whether idle play or busy play. I am, no doubt, with my plodding spirit, incapable of understanding literary people. They appear to me to avoid all feeling that burns in one’s heart as a violation of good taste. I should have been glad if Schiller, with his fondness of allegory, – provided it was frigid enough, – had, for once used that means, or any other, for considering what it can be that is fit to excite the admiration, devotion, and passionate research of an immortal soul. I wish he had imagined a fairy godmother to have said to her godson: “I will grant you a single wish and only that one. It shall be [a] definite one, a conceivable one; and if it is such, no matter what it may be, it shall be granted. Now take a year to think it over. At the end of a year, I will return, and if you are not yet prepared to say what will delight and fully satisfy you though all other desires be frustrated, then I will give you another year to consider it, and so on from year to year for a certain number of years. How many I had better not divulge.” If Schiller had then gone on to narrate how the young man, scared and sobered by the tones in which the fairy intimated that no other wish than the one he asked would ever be granted, set himself to consider what would suffice to fill his life with joy he would have produced a work on a subject which I should confess was worthy to engage the study that should occupy the first, the initial place in the trio of normative sciences. But it would not be ›Spiel‹ nor “Spieltrieb” that the young man would be considering. It would still be Beauty; beauty, however, of the kind that fills the soul brim-full.

(R9) “An Essay toward Reasoning in Security and Uberty” (MS 683:17-19, 1913)

The last passage comes from one of several hitherto unpublished drafts of the last essay on the theory of reasoning Peirce composed.27 The argumentative function of this polemical reference to Schiller is the exposition of the normative sciences in general and esthetics in particular. Peirce openly states that Schiller’s artistic productions do not appeal to his taste:28

The principal mental sciences, living, or in ovo, seem to me to be Esthetics, Ethics, Logic, and Psychology. Of esthetics I must confess myself utterly ignorant, the only book I ever read on the subject having [also] been the first on any of those subjects, I ever read, except Whately’s Logic. It was Schiller’s Aesthetische Briefe, which made a deep impression upon me. I confess that few of Schiller’s own productions overwhelm me with a sense of their beauty; but I think that, owing to effects of habituation, too much theory, and other accidental causes, in great parts of the

27 Cf. MSS 680-685.

28 The fact that Schiller’s dramas and poems seem to have almost no æsthetic impact on Peirce is (ibid.) explained by referring to cultural and racial differences, which are taken to be the results of processes of habituation in the course of which taste develops as a special kind of sensitivity, which implicitly creates a numbness towards other qualities of feeling. Nonetheless, Peirce reflects, there is no need to take the differences in æsthetic appreciation between Schiller and himself as indications of the existence of radically different general ideas of beauty. Peirce thus claims that even opposed different tastes can still be conceived of as only highlighting compatible aspects of a shared more general idea of the beautiful.
country, German’s feelings have become, generally, blunted to certain elements, so that a difference in the appreciation of particular kinds of work does not at all prove that the idea of beauty in general is so essentially different in the two minds that the analysis of its nature in one need be false for the other. But it must be confessed that there is very little of the artist in my make-up: and I detest my own style quite as much as the reader is likely to do; for when I write I am so occupied with trying to get what I think exactly conveyed that I can attend to nothing else. As to Ethics, the discussions that were an indispensable [sic] preliminary to any scientific investigation of its proper problems seem to me to have begun with Hobbes and to have been carried on in an admirable spirit to this day, the principal suggestions following upon one another as rapidly as was consistent with the proper mental digestion of their reasonings at the time when they first broached. The discussion, mostly English (in a broad sense), may be taken as beginning with Sir Edward Herbert, who became Baron Herbert of Cherbury.

4 Architectonic contextualization of Peirce’s reminiscences

Three kinds of indications can be derived from the information our compilation provides: Firstly, we can derive indications that confirm our understanding of the historical context and the dynamics of Peirce’s reception of Schiller. Secondly, we

29 A look at those indications falling under the first rubric amply confirm what we know from the juvenilia: Peirce, after having read Whately’s Logic as a schoolboy, upon entering Harvard College in 1855 at the age of sixteen, “[r]ead Schiller’s Ästhetic Letters and began the study of Kant” (W 1:2; cf. R1, 2, 3, 7, 8, 9). The intellectual experience Peirce describes is characterized as producing a rich (R6) “powerful” (R1), “indelible” (R7), “deep impression” (R9), which probably did not only “soak” Peirce’s conception of play (R6), but exerted a pervasive influence on an adolescent’s evolving habits of conceptual differentiation, and is thus characterized as something difficult to “disabuse” oneself of (R1). The Ästhetic Letters, after all, are not a mere treatise on æsthetics, but rather enshrine the theory of the beautiful they offer as a pivotal element of a comprehensive outlook on human reality, in which the nature of man’s relation to the physical, socio-political and historical world is shown to be rooted in and shaped by a universal elementary psychic structure of drives (Triebe) which constitutes the nature and determines the development of the human being’s relatedness to both itself and its fellows and to the physical world and the Divine. The Ästhetic Letters, thus, offer what Peirce later will sometimes call a “Weltanschauung” (CP 8.158, 1900; 2.61, 2.118, 1902; 5.13n., 5.61, 1903) or “outline system of metaphysics” (CP 8.158, 1900), i.e. a comprehensive theory of how the various components of reality form a unity. Embracing such comprehensive contents, Schiller’s work is “a very good book for an infant philosopher” (R3), i.e. useful for someone who is trying to build his own conceptual schemes. Two dialogic streams of communication seem to be intimately entwined with the philosophical nature of the experience of reading Schiller’s Letters: On the one hand the social experience of intensive symphilosophizing with the “dear friend” Horatio Paine (R2, 7), on the other hand the disclosure of historico-systematic horizons that lead to the study of Schiller’s main point of reference: Kant’s critical idealism (R1, 3). It should be noted that both the social and the historical dimension of Peirce’s first immersion in philosophical thought are pervaded by the deepest acknowledgment of the value of cooperation and tradition as the two modes in which men can achieve something that transcends their individuality, be of use for others and deliver to posterity “the message
can derive indications that invite us to critically revisit a rather simplistic and static view of the mature Peirce’s appreciation of Schiller’s works and ideas: towards the end of his life, Peirce seems to become quite critical of Schiller’s understanding of beauty and the understanding of the *summum bonum* implied therein. The systematically

with which an age is charged” (CP 1.176, 1894). There is an ethos Peirce shared with his “real companion” Paine and which is communicated in the reminiscences: “We spent every afternoon for long months upon it, picking the matter to pieces as well as we boys knew how to do” (R2). To philosophize architectonically, thus, Peirce illustrates here, means to philosophize so as to properly reflect the historical responsibility of philosophy. But to properly reflect this responsibility in our philosophizing we are obliged to erotematically approach what is “beyond human comprehension”, i.e. the “ultimate purpose of thought”, which to envisage requires “aid from many persons”, who in their agreement will at least indicate a trajectory for my approach (R5).

The main factors to account for this shift in Peirce’s appreciation of Schiller’s conception of the beautiful/admireable seem to be two: On the one hand, this shift is indicative of an ongoing development in Peirce’s conception of the Normative Sciences, the historical and cultural function of which as “the greatest need of our age” (CP 8.239, 1904) starts to be reflected with great vigour in texts written after Dewey’s publication of the *Studies in Logical Theory* (1903), which Peirce severely criticized both privately (CP 8.243 ff.) and publicly (CP 8.188 ff.) in 1904. Thus in 1905 Peirce writes: “As I was saying, a modern recognition of evolution must distinguish the Critical Common-sensist from the old school. Modern science, with its microscopes and telescopes, with its chemistry and electricity, and with its entirely new appliances of life, has put us into quite another world; almost as much so as if it had transported our race to another planet. Some of the old beliefs have no application except in extended senses, and in such extended senses they are sometimes dubitable and subject to just criticism. It is above all the normative sciences, esthetics, ethics, and logic, that men are in dire need of having severely criticized, in their relation to the new world created by science. Unfortunately, this need is as unconscious as it is great. The evils are in some superficial way recognized; but it never occurs to anybody that the study of esthetics, ethics, and logic can be seriously important, because these sciences are conceived by all, but their deepest students, in the old way” (*CP* 5.513, our italics). In addition to the distantiation from Schiller’s ‘old school approach’ to the historical development of classic ideals, which results from Peirce’s antipathy towards a classical humanistic misunderstandings of his conception of the Normative Sciences, this shift is also indicative of an anti-German sentiment Peirce harbours and openly pronounces time and again, especially since 1893. This sentiment implies the urge to impart adequate habits of sentiment and thought on others, both in philosophical publications and private communications: “There is too much German influence in this country, in every way. Their subjectivism is detestable & antipragmatical” (*SS*:12), Peirce writes in December 1903 to Welby. Both elements – the politico-racial concerning the German *Weltanschauung* and the evolutionary-cultural concerning the proper conception of the Normative Sciences – taken together should warn us to conceive of Peirce as a figure that is much interested in the ramifications of the intellectual history Schiller is part of as a poet and dramatist. Especially *R9*, upon closer examination, turns out to functionalize a clearly marked racism, in order to fraternize with the English readers Peirce is flirting with: In sharp contrast to the literary culture of Germany with its overrefined æsthetics we find the “mostly English (in a broad sense)” culture of discussing the indispensable preliminaries “to any scientific investigation of its [Ethics] proper problems”, originating in Hobbes and Herbert of Cherbury. Whereas Schiller appears as a pale figure for whose descent and life Peirce lacks any interest,
most interesting elements of the reminiscences in our categoriological context, however, are certainly those that allow to derive a more specific understanding of the rationale of Schiller’s reemergence in Peirce’s thought around 1902.

Still, in none of these reminiscences (R2-5) do we find anything like a substantial argumentative necessity to refer to Schiller. The impression is rather that the reference to Schiller, generically speaking, functions like the index of a diagram that represents the elements and outlines of an intricate configuration of theoretical problems. The heuretic sciences that are involved in these problems are: aesthetics (R2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9) the theory of categories (R 3, 4), ethics (R5, 9) and logic (R2, 7). But more than individual disciplines it is their relation that is thematic in Peirce’s references to Schiller: there is the insight that “logic needs the help of esthetics” and is admitted to need more reflection in 1902, which clearly indicates that the nature of the dependence of Logic on Esthetics is problematic (R2); there is the architectonic movement from Phenomenology to Esthetics that needs to be motivated and justified (R3); there is the categoriological definition of the esthetically good from the purely phenomenal point of view of the theory of categories (R4); there is the complex relation obtaining between the ethical phenomenon of self-control, experience, and the esthetic ideal, which is both (logically) foundational for and (genetically) dependent on the operation of self-control (R5).

The phrase “the logic of the normative sciences” (R2) is certainly the most concise to capture the rationale for the reemergence of Schiller in Peirce’s thought in 1902. The years 1900-1903 are the years in which Peirce is radically transforming his understanding of philosophy and its systematic articulation. Whether this transformation is based on genuine new insights, on a process of clarifying and relating elements already present in his thought, or on a mixture of both, is a question for a full monograph we surely cannot settle here. That notwithstanding, the following architectonic shifts ought to be analytically distinguished: Firstly, there is the emergence of Phenomenology: Whereas Mathematics and Philosophy, dichotomically subdivided into Logic and Metaphysics, had for many years been the most abstract disciplines for Peirce, upon which the others were principle-dependent, around 1899 we see Peirce for the first time conceive of a discipline, called “High Philosophy”, which is said to be “more general” than the two main branches of philosophy and “bring to light certain truths applicable alike to logic and to

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Herbert of Cherbury’s vita is introduced in a footnote that is two pages long and presents him as “an important philosopher” (MS 683:21) with a background as a leading diplomat. At this point, thus, a racist opposition between the Germanic overspecialization in feeling and the English (in a broad way) specialization in action becomes visible. Herbert of Cherbury plays the part of the English man of action who is praised for “recognizing that all truth depends on ‘Natural Instinct’” (MS 683:21), whereas Schiller with his playfully overrefined – thus: insincere – conception of beauty is the prototype of the Germanic man of feeling. It is, thus, no surprise to see Peirce pay attention to Herbert Cherbury’s brother George, even if referring to him is completely out of context: “He [Herbert of Cherbury] was born in Montgomery Castle, and was the eldest brother of the devout poet George Herbert, every one of whose pieces embodies some original and striking thought of which the intense sincerity is brought home to us all the more by the extreme oddity of the metaphors, some of which would border on the comical but for their powerful earnestness” (MS 683:20, our italics).
metaphysics”, which concern the elementary structural components of experience that Peirce refers to as “Kainopythagorean Categories” (CP 7.526-28; MS 141). Secondly, in 1902 (cf. CP 1.239), we see the explicit terminological determination and architectonic stratification of a conception of philosophy that can be called “coenoscopic”, because it infers all its truths from common experience (cf. CP 1.183, 1903). Thirdly, there is the integration of the Normative Sciences into Peirce’s architectonic of philosophical sciences. This integration starts with accepting “the science of morals” as a third discipline besides Logic and Metaphysics in April 1901 (MS 872) and finds its first attempts at a full systematic exposition in the Minute Logic, in the process of writing which, Peirce moves from a position that conceives of logic as a normative and ethics as “pre-normative” science in late 1901 (MSS 432-34; cf. CP 1.575-584) to a position that is more inclined to also include esthetics (MS 428; cf. CP 2.197, May 1902). It is only in the Harvard Lectures of 1903 that Peirce eventually introduces Esthetics, Ethics and Logic as a categoriologically ordered sequence of three normative sciences that is itself part of a triad of categoriologically ordered philosophic sciences (Phenomenology, Normative Science, Metaphysics). Thus, fourthly, we have to reckon with the problem of finding the true internal articulation of Normative Science.

Now, it is precisely in the context of these four architectonic shifts and problems that Schiller reemerges in Peirce’s thought. And the reason why the Æsthetic Letters reemerge in Peirce’s thought in this period is that they present a coherent model of how to conceive of a philosophy that is thoroughly based on common experience and on a theory of categories of such a kind, that these do not only function as (b.) fundamental concepts of sensuous cognition, but do, moreover, (c.) have an application as essential normative motive forces qua categoriologically ordered elements of man’s relatedness to the world and (d.) an application as moments of the evolutionary-historic process, and which thus, due to the breadth of their applications, ought to be (a.) rooted in purely formal coenoscopic concepts that enter as their constituents into all possible quasi-mental telic processes, i.e. into all processes of semeiosis. Peirce is clearly articulating this in R3 when he says that the Æsthetic Letters were “one of these books in which the three categories, in an almost unrecognizable disguise, played a great part”. In a twin-paper that is designed as a complement to the present one, we shall learn to identify these categorial disguises, look underneath them, study the parts the categories actually play and try to eventually understand the plot they are part of.”

References


31 Peirce had already been working with and reflecting on a proto-coenoscopic understanding of philosophy for many years (cf. e.g. W 1:167-173, 1865; MS 380:2, 1873; EP 2:11, 1895; CP 3.428, 1896).
32 Cf. AEM, I,4 and XVIII,4n.


The reemergence of Schiller in Peirce’s reminiscences of the Ästhetic Letters: a critical addendum to D. Dilworth’s Account of the provenance of Peirce’s Categories in Schiller

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