The Categories in disguise: a categoriological specification of D. Dilworth’s account of the provenance of Peirce’s Categories in Schiller

As categorias sob disfarce: uma especificação categorialógica da consideração de D. Dilworth da proveniência das categorias de Peirce em Schiller

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Abstract: A methodologically sound analysis of the depth and scope of Schiller’s influence on Peirce’s mature thought requires three steps: (i) a preliminary analysis of the passages that could support the hypothesis of a protracted influence and thus might also indicate its systematic vectors. In case such an analysis was to give positive results, it would (ii) become necessary to explore those *juvenilia* that document Peirce’s early reception of Schiller, in order to (iii) attempt to identify those ideas that render intelligible the reemergence of Schiller in Peirce’s thought after 1900. Based on the results that our preliminary architectonic contextualization of Peirce’s reminiscences of his juvenile study of the *Æsthetic Letters* yielded in a twin-paper, the present paper focusses on the second and third step. We thus aim to show that the threefold appearance Schiller’s categories make in “an almost unrecognizable disguise”—as *moments of logical determination*, as individual and collective *mental states of socialized minds* shaped by the relations of elementary psychic drives, and as *stages of historical processes*—first acted as the catalyst for Peirce’s early understanding of the shortcomings of Kant’s categoriology, and was consequently ‘fated’ to later reemerge in view of determinate architectonic challenges Peirce found himself confronted with while working on the coenoscopic redesign of the philosophical sciences in the years from 1900 to 1903. The influence Schiller exerted on Peirce, therefore, originates in his prefiguration of Peirce’s conception of categoriality and the coherence of architectonic uses it enables, especially as a means for the prescissive stratification of the—phenomenal, normative and metaphysico-entelechial—components of common experience and the modes of rationality embodied therein.

Resumo: Uma análise metodologicamente correta da profundidade e escopo da influência de Schiller sobre o pensamento maduro de Peirce requer três passos: (i) uma análise preliminar das passagens que poderiam sustentar a hipótese de uma influência prolongada e, assim, poderá também indicar seus vetores sistemáticos. No caso de tal análise dar resultados positivos, tornar-se-ia (ii) necessário explorar as juventudes que documentam a recepção inicial de Peirce de Schiller, para (iii) tentar identificar aquelas ideias que tornam inteligibilidade à re-emergência de Schiller no pensamento de Peirce após 1900. Com base nos resultados que nossa contextualização arquitetônica preliminar das reminiscências de Peirce de seu estudo juvenil das Cartas Estéticas resultaram em um artigo duplo. O presente artigo foca nos segundo e terceiro passos. Logo, nosso propósito é mostrar que a tripla apariência das categorias de Schiller fazem em seu disfarce—ora como momentos de determinação lógica, ora como estados mentais coletivo e individual de mentes socializadas moldadas pelas relações de unidades psíquicas elementares, e ora como estágios de processos históricos—primeiro agindo como o catalizador para o entendimento inicial de Peirce das deficiências da categoriológia de Kant e, consequentemente, foi ‘fadado’ à re-emergência posterior em consideração a determinar desafios arquitetônicos que Peirce encontrou-se confrontado enquanto trabalhava no redesenho da cenoscoopia das ciências filosóficas nos anos de 1900 a 1903. A influência de Schiller exercida sobre Peirce, portanto, origina em sua prefiguração do conceito de Peirce de categorialidade e a coerência dos usos arquitetônicos que ela permite, em especial, como um meio para a estratificação prescissiva dos componentes—fenomenal, normativa e metafísico-entelequial—da experiência comum e os modos de racionalidade ali incorporadas.


“It is Schiller who must be given great credit for breaking through the Kantian subjectivity and abstraction of thinking and for venturing on an attempt to get beyond this by intellectually grasping the unity and reconciliation as the truth and by actualizing them in artistic production. For Schiller in his aesthetic writings has not merely taken good note of art and its interest, without any regard for its relation to philosophy proper, but he has also compared his interest in the beauty of art with philosophical principles, and only by starting from them and with their aid did he penetrate into the deeper nature and concept of the beautiful.”

HEGEL
1 Introduction

At first blush, most of Peirce’s reminiscences to his juvenile study of Friedrich Schiller’s _Æsthetic Letters_ merely seem to offer excuses to dwell on aesthetics without proper professional credentials.¹ But as our preparatory analysis of these reminiscences in a twin-paper has demonstrated,² especially Peirce’s references to Schiller in the years 1902 and 1903 ought to be read as the indices of a diagram that represents the elements and outlines of an intricate configuration of theoretical problems, Peirce found himself confronted with while working on the coenoscopic redesign of the architectonic of philosophical sciences in the years from 1900 to 1903. These reminiscences, therefore, do not merely refer us to a cherished juvenile intellectual experience, but most of all to a model of the grounding of the articulation of philosophy in a categoriological stratification of common experience.

To substantiate this claim, let me invite you to compare what Schiller—_en passant_ grounding the _ratio divisionis_ of the trichotomization of the Kantian material categories in a transcendental theory of faculties—has to say about common experience in Letter XVIII of the _Æsthetic Letters_ to what Peirce writes in the _Lowell Syllabus_ of 1903:

> Nature (sense and intuition) always unites, Intellect always divides; but Reason unites once more. Before he begins to philosophize, therefore, man is nearer to truth than the philosopher, who has not yet completed his investigation. Hence we can, without any further examination, declare a philosophical argument to be false if, in its results, it has the general feeling against it; but with equal justice we may consider it suspect if, in its form and method, it has this general feeling on its side.³

And,

> Philosophical inquiry consists, by the definition given above, of reflection upon the knowledge that all men, so to say, already possess; and in point of fact the beginner in the study of philosophy is already possessed of knowledge far greater in weight than all that science can ever teach him. This is Common Sense; and one of the most solid principles of common sense is that when we begin any serious undertaking we ought to do [so] deliberately. Now this deliberation consists in making out as well as we can what the upshot of our efforts is likely to be. I propose to show that Pragmatism is nothing but deliberation so conceived.⁴

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¹ Cf. CP 2.197, 1902; MS 310:3-5, CP 5.132 = EP 2:201, 1903; MS 675:045-045, 1911; MS 683:17-19, 1913.
² Cf. TOPA, 2017.
³ AEM, XVIII, 4.
⁴ MS 478:0142, 1903.
Note that to conceive of everyday processes of deliberation as the model for a pragmatic form of philosophizing, is nothing but an attempt to bring the methodology of philosophy into harmonious accordance with its foundations in the non-specialized common sense both Schiller and Peirce are referring to. It is to find a way of building theories that is not “suspect” as Schiller calls it, although it has “general feeling on its side.” To conceive of a pragmatic philosophy, thus, seems a way of perfecting Schiller’s conception of it.

In a draft of the fifth of the *Harvard Lectures* on the Normative Sciences we can find a particularly rich Peircean gesture towards Schiller, in which the historic and systematic importance of the *Letters* is indicated. Moving from a look back on the preceding fourth lecture, which had dealt with the categories, Peirce now emphasizes the externality of the origin and historical character of the process, in which these ideas become apprehended in increasing degrees of conceptual clarity and sketches a brief evolutionary phenomenology of the categories, in which his original encounter with these ideas in the *Æsthetic Letters* becomes part of the phylogenetic—or, if you prefer: common-sensical—manifestation of the categories in the history of living organisms (from the “inferior animals” to Hegel and Peirce’s thought in the spring of 1903). What is thus attempted ‘in the name of Schiller’ is a transition from Phenomenology to Esthetics (and thus to the other Normative Sciences) which is itself of a categoriological nature: if the phenomenal categories are operative in nature, then they must have their first conceptual reflection as dichotomous conceptions of value. As a matter of fact, this seems to be the first time the hierarchy of the coenoscopic sciences is itself conceived as categoriological in nature and thus ordered accordingly. This does also explain, why Peirce can claim that the study of esthetics “ought immediately to follow the study of the categories” (our italics):

I trust, ladies and gentlemen, that I have not conveyed the idea that the three categories about which I have been discoursing are a discovery of mine. If they were, that circumstance would be an almost conclusive proof of the falsity of the list. Ideas so fundamental as I hold these to be must have been uralt, when the Neantherthal man was a child. They must be traceable in the mind of the inferior animals. Much more must they have permeated human thought since Pherecydes. No, all that I have done is to give an exposition of them which, I hope, puts them in a clearer light than that of Hegel. The first year of my own serious study of philosophy in 1856, forty-seven years ago was devoted to esthetics. My good angel must have prompted me to take up first that branch of philosophy which ought immediately to follow the study of the categories, and to study it in a German book, which, though it was too old to be sensibly influenced by Hegel, was nevertheless one of these books in which the three categories, in an almost unrecognizable disguise, played a great part. It was Schiller’s *Ästhetische Briefe*,—a very good book for an infant philosopher. After that I passed to Logic and the analytic part of the Critic of the Pure Reason and I am sorry to
confess that I have entirely neglected esthetics; so that, though I am now obliged to say a few words about it, I am constrained to preface them with the acknowledgment of my incompetence.\(^5\)

A few days later then, in MS 311 and in the final version of the lecture on “The Three Normative Sciences” (MS 312), Peirce will for the first time flesh out a thoroughly categoriologically grounded ordering of Coenoscopy and the Normative Sciences, which factually corresponds to a complete categoriological stratification of common experience as the subject matter of a coenoscopic philosophy.\(^6\)

Peirce’s ‘architectonic anecdote’ prompts us to improve our understanding of the nexus of Phenomenology, Esthetics and the other Normative Sciences by ourselves studying the \textit{Æsthetic Letters} and dutifully paying attention to how “the three categories, in an almost unrecognizable disguise, played a great part” therein. What is this disguise? Which are the parts played? And: is there a plot? In order to show how the Peircean conception of categoriality and its architectonic role is prefigured in Schiller’s threefold use of categories—(i) as moments of logical determination in sensuous cognition, (ii) as individual and collective \textit{mental states of socialized minds} shaped by the relations of elementary psychic drives, i.e. as essential \textit{normative} motive forces qua formal elements of a sensuous-rational being’s relatedness to the world, and (iii) as metaphysical \textit{stages of the historical process as an infinite expression},—we will first take a detailed look at Peirce’s juvenile study of the \textit{Æsthetic Letters} in the broader context of his early reception of Kant, which is clearly shaped by the preceding study of Schiller (Section 2). We then inquire into the specific role ascribed to the categories of modality in Schiller, Kant, and Peirce (Section 2.1) and provide a concise outline of the argumentation of the \textit{Æsthetic Letters} (2.2) Finally, we will unveil the categories of Schiller’s logic of psychic—i.e. of necessarily embodied mental processes\(^7\)—by providing detailed textual support for our interpretation of Schiller’s logic of psychic processes as making a threefold categorial use of his famous psychic drives (Section 3).\(^8\)

\section*{2 Peirce’s early study of the Æsthetic Letters}

The few texts\(^9\) documenting Peirce’s early study of Schiller indicate that the

\(^5\) MS 310: 3-5.  
\(^6\) Cf. EP 2:196-207.  
\(^7\) Cf. AEM, XXIII.4.  
\(^8\) A fundamental question Dilworth, 2014, does not answer is: In which sense are the three Schillerian \textit{drives}—the Formtrieb, Stofftrieb and Spieltrieb—\textit{categories}? How can \textit{drives} be categories at all? This becomes only intelligible if we see how the purely formal (i.e. \textit{mental}) characteristics of the categories of modality act as mediators between a transcendental theory of faculty-psychology of Kantian descent and a theory of categories with strong praxeological Fichtean tendencies.  
\(^9\) Cf. W 1: xxvii, 2, 4, 6, 10-16, 534; KETNER, 1998, p. 147-149, offers replicas of three diagrams drawn in 1857 which reflect Peirce’s reading of Schiller and the application of his theory to (i) an analytical psychology of self-controlled volition in pragmatic perspective, (ii) rhetoric and (iii) philosophy. The third of these diagrams is the one we
pronominal categories I, THOU and IT are derived from Schiller’s impulses of form, play and matter.\textsuperscript{10} The intellectual horizon, into which Peirce integrated these ideas, is nowhere as comprehensively represented as in this diagram, hand-drawn in 1857.\textsuperscript{11}

![Diagram of Faculty Impulse and The Soul]

Some remarks on the context of production may serve an introductory purpose: The two published college essays that document Peirce’s reception of Schiller reflect a discourse in which art is seen as a means of moral self-perfecting. Accordingly, in \textit{The Sense of Beauty}, which defends Schiller against a misinterpretation,\textsuperscript{12} Peirce emphasizes the “perfect freedom” that constitutes the core of the aesthetic state as the \textit{result} of a harmony between the drives for form and matter. The power of beauty thus lies in its capacity to distance us from ourselves and regain a sense of our “infinite determinableness”, or potentials of growth: “sleep, like beauty, puts us in a state of ability to do our duty.”\textsuperscript{13}

In Raphael and Michel Angelo, Peirce correlates “I” with “Intellect”, “THOU” with “Heart” and “IT” with the “Sense”. These “elements of the soul” compose the “inward nature” as an irreducibly triadic capacity to perform basic acts.\textsuperscript{14} No intellect

\textsuperscript{10} Cf. FISCH, 1982, p. xxvii f., and W 1:10-12. In \textit{The Sense of Beauty}, Peirce follows the invitation of his instructor to use his own language and explicitly identifies his categories with Schiller’s drives at the margins of the text (cf. W 1:534); cf. also DE TIEENNE, 1996, p. 38.

\textsuperscript{11} W 1:4; KETNER, 1998, p. 149, offers a replica of the original drawing.

\textsuperscript{12} The full title reads \textit{The Sense of Beauty never fathered the Performance of a single Act of Duty} and synthesizes John Ruskin’s understanding of Schiller’s position. In \textit{Modern Painters}, v. 2, Part III, Section 1, Ch. XV, §9, Ruskin had written: “It has been said by Schiller, in his letters on aesthetic culture, that the sense of beauty never fathered the performance of a single duty.”

\textsuperscript{13} W 1:12.

\textsuperscript{14} In this sense Peirce writes: “The heart is that which loves; which flies toward a fellow being, as such. The sensibilities do not do this, neither do they conceive; hence they are a distinct element of the soul” (W 1:15).
could conceive, no heart love, no sense feel anything if these were not correlated in a primordial communicative constellation, whence their specific determinateness and the possibility of expression arises. Peirce’s “soul” lives in and as expression.

Let us consider the diagram as a triptych which installs the ideal of “Beauty” at the center of its symmetries. The third column registers the pronouns I, THOU and IT. To conceive of them as impulses creates a link to Schiller’s theory of drives; to conceive of them as faculties refers us to Kant.

The reference to Kant, however, is obvious in the right section of the diagram, where his material categories—by which alone can we “understand something in the manifold, i.e., think an object for it”—are registered.15 Without repeating what has already been pointed out about the generative scheme of intercategorial synthesis represented here, the fundamental idea is clear: Kant’s three material categories correlated to the THOU are supposed to emerge from a “reciprocal action”16 between sensuous and formal drive.

“The there is no other way of making sensuous man rational except by first making him aesthetic”.18 Focusing on the middle section, we see how this main thesis of the Letters is represented in the vertical hierarchy of the ideals “Truth”, “Beauty” and “Goodness”, which, on their left, are correlated with the drives—the “only moving forces in the sensible world”, as Schiller calls them—and with their intrinsic forms of ‘erotic’ striving on their right.19

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15 CPR, A 80/B 106.
16 For Schiller’s concept of Wechselwirkung (reciprocal action), cf. AEM, XIV.1-4.
17 DE TIENNE, 1996, p. 51ff., has noted that the disposition given to Kant’s categories reflects a remark added to the second edition of the First Critique, according to which a combination of the second and first category of each triad produces its third member (cf. CPR, B 110 f.) In this sense, Peirce’s diagram registers the resulting third category in the middle position correlated to the THOU as emerging from the combination of the category correlated with the I with the category of the IT of each group. Thus, the unity of plurality gives totality, the negation of reality gives limitation and the permanence of community causality. Note that the correlation between I-impulse and permanence, i.e. Kant’s transcendental scheme of substance (cf. CPR, A 144/B 183), is imperative in the context of Schiller’s theory of (persisting) “Person” and (everchanging) “Condition” (cf. AEM XI). Note also that Kant’s description of the generation of the third category does not reflect that the operation of synthesis required cannot be commutative, as the plurality of unity does not give us totality etc. Only the relation brought about by prescience will be able to establish a strict ordering-relation among categorial concepts; cf. EP 1:3 (1867): “Prescience is not a reciprocal process”.
18 AEM, XXIII.2.
19 As a reflection from 1856 confirms, in which Peirce, in accordance with Phaedrus, 245c-d, defines the soul as “that which can move” (W1:6; cf. W1:61), there is an allusion to the Platonic theory of eros and the ladder of love here (cf. Symposium, 204d - 212c), which is grounded in the underlying presence of the classical greek model of psychic striving for eudaimonia. The corresponding metaxy-anthropology, in which human existence is primarily understood as an in-between-being, does also reverberate considerably in Schiller’s outlook on man as a being between animal and God, cf. AEM, XI.7: “A disposition to the divine man does indubitably carry within him, in his Personality; the way to the divine (if we can call a way that which never leads to the goal) is opened up
Clearly, this diagram contains more than a theory of categories in nuce. It rather represents a “general map of philosophy”, circumscribing a theoretical vantage-point, from which the essential ideas, the relations among them and their architectonic organization can be envisioned. This is very much what Kant does with his table of a priori law-giving faculties in their systematic unity, closing the Introduction to the Third Critique.

Besides the indication that Peirce’s diagram offers an attempt to colligate Kantian and Schillerian elements in one theoretical outlook, something else deserves attention: Reading the diagram from left to right, the main parts of the triptych anticipate the three divisions of Coenoscopy: Phenomenology, Normative Science with its “peculiar appreciations”, and Metaphysics. In both orders of reading the concept of “Beauty” proves to be central.

2.1 The categories in disguise: the absence of the categories of modality

But on which grounds can we relate Peirce’s later universal categories to the Schillerian drives? How can we connect the left section of the triptych with the first division of Coenoscopy? First of all, let us notice an absence. Despite all its care for correlations, the diagram contains no categories of modality. Why? Did Peirce, who

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The faculties of the mind</th>
<th>Faculty of cognition</th>
<th>A priori principles</th>
<th>Application to</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Faculty of cognition</td>
<td>Understanding</td>
<td>Lawfulness</td>
<td>Nature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feeling of pleasure and displeasure</td>
<td>Power of judgment</td>
<td>Purposiveness</td>
<td>Art</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faculty of desire</td>
<td>Reason</td>
<td>Final End</td>
<td>Freedom</td>
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21 CPJ, Introduction § IX:

22 EP 2:199.
23 BARNOUW, 1988, and DILWORTH, 2014, have already shown with great care to which extent Peirce’s understanding of the role of aesthetics as a normative science has been shaped by Schiller; the final chapter in ZIEMKOWSKI, 2008, p. 155-201, entitled “An Esthetic Theory of Self-Control”, offers a detailed analysis of Peirce’s concept of a purely aesthetic stage of self-control which is also essential for the first recognition of the summum bonum. LEFEVBRE, 2007 offers a rich interpretation of Peirce’s normative aesthetics in the light of its relevance for the philosophy of art and contends that it is “possible […] to see Peirce’s late views on esthetics as a normative science as having been ‘prepared’ by his reading of Schiller’s Aesthetische Briefe” (p. 341, n.5). An account of the traditions and theoreticians that mainly shaped Peirce’s conception of aesthetics—including, among others, Leibniz and Schiller—is given by BARNOUW, 1994. ERNY, 2005, p. 255-259, and DILWORTH, 2014, establish a fertile connection between Schiller’s aesthetic state of active determinability and Peirce’s concept of agape which is interpreted as a generalization of the unconstrained, though purposive power of unification, operative in the aesthetic state.
in the same year distinguished reality from the “modality of the conception”, forget them? Or is there a deeper rationale for registering all Kantian categories, except the modalities, in the right section of the table?

In fact, two such reasons are given by Kant himself. The first is connected to the particular topical structure of the categories of modality, which do not stand in disjunctive relations to each other, as the categories of all other triads do, but in

24 W 1:18; the text alluded to, entitled A Scientific Book of Synonyms, is a telling indication of Peirce’s early interest in the specific nature of modality, which, at this stage, in 1857, is still very much Kantian in outlook and terminology. It should immediately be added that there is no diagram or text, in which Peirce, between 1859 and 1864, deals with the categories, that does not contain modalities. Published (cf. W 1:93f.) and unpublished texts, such as Of the Stages of the Category of Modality or Chance (MS 921: 00044-47, May 22nd, 1859; cf. also MS 921:00090 f.) rather show that the Kantian categories of modality raised a number of intricate problems for Peirce and constituted one of the main drivers of his development towards a system with eight triads. As Of the Stages of the Category of Modality or Chance and other texts produced in late May 1859 show, Peirce distinguishes physical, logical and metaphysical modalities, which, in the beginning, are squeezed into the Kantian scheme with four categories. With the subsequent developmental stage, beginning in June 1859, we find all diagrams and tables of categories to be conceiving of the categories of dependence as kinds of necessity—logical, physical, absolute (cf. W 1: 38, 48, 54, 550)—which, in turn, are themselves derived from and composed of other categories that express the more formal components of the modalities, such as their being “Successive Stages of Degree” (cf. W 1:38, 530) or “forms of fact” (W 1:92), expressed in “Time” as a “Formal Intuition of Expression” (W 1:39, 530) or kind of “abstract revelation” (W 1:47) in the three modi or worlds of the I, IT or Thou (cf. the “three Celestial Worlds” of Modus of the IT, W 1:47).

25 The theory of categories contained in our diagram is different from the topical structures Peirce will design between 1859 and 1864, which consist of eight triads and do not integrate the universal pronominal categories, but rather develop subsystems, notably of the categories of the IT (cf. W 1:49, 113; MS 923:23). Doubtless our diagram belongs to the earliest stage of Peirce’s theorizing on the categories, since The Diagram of the IT (W 1:530) and the Letter Draft, Peirce to Pliny Earle Chase (W 1:115f.) represent the first (June 1859) and last (April 1864) evidence for Peirce’s commitment to this theoretical framework. Unpublished manuscripts clearly show that Peirce switched from a classical Kantian scheme composed of four triads to the scheme with eight triads offered by the Diagram of the IT in June 1859; cf. in particular the text New Names and Symbols for Kant’s Categories (MS 921:42f.), which was written May 21st, 1859 and still operates within the Kantian scheme with four triads. The reasons for the change of scheme are pointed out in a fragment from 1898 (CP 1.563) and are connected to the problem of integrating different types of modality and to the question in which sense the categories of a second triad can be constructed as modes of a category belonging to a previous triad, which have the ratio of their trichotomization in a third triad. In this sense, Peirce writes, the categories of quality for example are “so many relations of inherence, which is a category of relation”, but are trichotomized in accordance to the categories of modality: “[…] the answer I gave was that negation was merely possible inherence, quality in degree a contingent inherence, and intrinsic attribution a necessary inherence” (CP 1.563). The early text SPQR, which should probably be dated May 1859 struggles with exactly this specific problem (cf. W 1:94) the cyclical structure of the Diagram of the IT then solves. DE TIENNE, 1996, p. 57 f., is also arguing to reassess the date of its composition.
relations of supposition. The second reason is connected to the semantics of the modalities. As Kant states in §9 of the first Critique, “the modality of judgements is a quite special function,” since it “contributes nothing to the content of the judgment.”\(^{26}\) The modality rather concerns “the value of the copula in relation to thinking in general.”\(^{27}\) As grades of integration of propositional content into the mind the functions of modality are “moments of thinking in general.” As such moments they are not real predicates. They are categories of another kind.\(^{28}\)

Considering the clarifications given in the Postulates of Empirical Thinking, we can say that the modalities are the product of a reflection which determines the content of a representation in relation to the subjective origin of its determinateness;\(^{29}\) while taking into account §76 of the Third Critique, we can eventually say that the modalities as moments of thinking in general are purely subjective moments of every process of cognition and thus, for Kant, exclusively grounded in the nature and structure of our faculties, which are those of a sensuous rational being.

The modal character of the drives is essential for Schiller’s aesthetics and his drive-theoretical reconstruction of Kant’s theory of reason.\(^{30}\) As he writes in Letter XV, the material drive in cognition is “concerned with the actuality”, whereas the formal drive is concerned “with the necessity of things”.\(^{31}\) This modal character of the drives introduced in the Letters XI and XII flows from the dialectic of person and condition in man and the two “fundamental laws of his sensuo-rational nature”, which challenge him to materialize all his potentialities of form and formalize all material of experience.\(^{32}\) Note how the modal character of the drives functions as their definienis and is linked to the mixed nature of man’s faculties:

Towards the accomplishment of this twofold task—of giving actuality to the necessity within, and subjecting to the law of necessity the actuality without—we are impelled by two opposing forces […]. The first of these, which I call the sensuous drive, proceeds from the physical existence of man, or his sensuous nature. […] The second […], which we may call the formal drive, proceeds from the absolute existence of man, or from his rational nature […].\(^{33}\)

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26 CPR, A 74/B 100, \textit{our italics}.
27 \textit{Ibid}.
28 CPR, A 599/B 628.
29 The Postulates of Empirical Thinking clarify that the principles of modality are not “objective-synthetic” since the predicates of modality do not “in the least augment the concept of which they are asserted,” but are “subjectively-synthetic”. Subjectively-synthetic in the sense that they “add to the concept of a thing, […] the cognitive power whence it arises and has its seat” (CPR, A 233/B 286f.).
30 ENGFER, 1981, p. 36ff., convincingly locates this reconstruction in the broader historical context of a drive-theoretical re-interpretation of Kant, a line of reception that starts with Reinhold and has its most prominent figure in Fichte; cf. also BEISER, 2005, p. 139n.
31 AEM, XV.5.
32 AEM, XI.9.
33 AEM XII.1 (\textit{our italics}).
The modal character of the play-drive, finally, is as complex as one would expect. Schiller’s justification of his terminological choice, however, suffices to confirm our claim that the modal character of the drives is essential for their meaning. ‘Play’, Schiller explains, designates everything which is “neither subjectively nor objectively contingent, and yet imposes no kind of constraint either from within or from without.”

There are strong grounds to legitimize the separation of the formal modalities from the “material categories”, as the mature Peirce himself calls them. Following §76 of the Third Critique we might say that the modalities reflect the mark of our finitude in the representational form of our faculties. In Peirce’s early theorizing this formality will find its most abstract expression in the vision of I, Thou and It as “three worlds completely unrelated except in identity of substance”, hence as modes of one divine substance expressing itself in mind and matter. Peirce will return to the metaphysics of modality only later in his career; but the idea that “the purest conceptions […] of Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness” are those of “modes of being” corresponding to elements of representation, is, in nuce, Schillerian.

2.2 A concise outline of the methodology and argumentation of the Æsthetic Letters

In order to analyze how the Æsthetic Letters shaped Peirce’s concept of categoriality, an outline of their structure will be useful. Their aim is to show that the aesthetic needs to be acknowledged as the foundational layer of normativity since “it is only

34 AEM, XV.5; whoever is forced to play, is engaged in an activity which is no longer an end to itself, while, on the other hand, we are not free to force the play, i.e. to disregard its rules, as long as we play seriously. Peirce paraphrases this definition of ‘play’ in The Sense of Beauty; when he writes that ‘play’ is that, “which is neither internally nor externally constrained” (W 1:11). This is the definition Peirce refers Lady Welby to (cf. SS:77).

35 Cf. SS:189: “Alongside of these, however, which may be called material categories, there are formal categories corresponding to his [Hegel’s] three grades of thought. These are much more important as all classifications according to structure are than classifications according to material.”

36 W 1:83.

37 MORGAN, 1979, and PIETARINEN, 2006, offer accounts of the Peircean logical views on the modalities, their development and contribution to formal possible-worlds semantics with the diagrammatic logic of the Existential Graphs in their GAMMA part. As Pietarinen puts it, the main development is certainly one which led Peirce from a “one-world pragmatism to ‘many-world’ pragmatistic and scholastic realism” (p. 347).

CP. 1.530; cf. CP 1.23: “My view is that there are three modes of being. I hold that we can directly observe them in elements of whatever is at any time before the mind in any way. They are the being of positive qualitative possibility, the being of actual fact, and the being of law that will govern facts in the future.” HAUSMANN, 1993, p. 127-139, offers a careful description of what he distinguishes as Peirce’s “metaphysical framework for describing the categories” (p. 138) from other—chemical, logical, psychological—vocabularies of their phenomenological thematization. In this framework we are dealing with the most formal-categorial aspects of Peirce’s synecistic metaphysics of modality. Cf. Peirce’s distinction between various types of subjective and objective modalities and their relation to time, accounting for a realistic-pragmaticistic interpretation of the pragmatic maxim in the final paragraphs of Issues of Pragmaticism, EP 2:354-359.

38 CP 1.530; cf. also 6.341f.; CP 1.23.
through Beauty that man makes his way to freedom.”

Schiller thus turns to a drive-theoretical deduction of the “concept of reason of beauty” as the ideal of the “reciprocal action of two opposed drives” from the dialectic of “Person” and “Condition”, or: “the self and its determining attributes.”

Note that at this point, the “reciprocal action”, which is supposed to bring about “living form” as the aesthetic schematism of the object of the play-drive, is deduced as a demand of reason for the sake of a highest self-expression of humanity.

It is the sheer promise that art might induce a balanced interplay between our sensual and rational forces in an aesthetic experience, which would thus restore the totality of a humanity “mutilated” by modern culture, and provide man with a “complete intuition of his human nature” (Letters XI-XV).

Consequently, we have to distinguish a regulative discourse about “beauty as idea” from a discourse on “beauty in experience.”

For the latter, we “descend from the region of Ideas on to the stage of reality” in order to develop a logic of psychic processes, that accounts for the actualization of the play-drive. This logic revolves around the concept of determination and explores the laws of transition between states.

Thus, while the normative second part demonstrates that beauty is a regulative condition of humanity, the phenomenological third part shows how the play-drive and its aesthetic state become manifest.

Finally, the rules of psychic processes are applied to the evolution of humanity, schematized in a metaphysics of freedom which, with its theory of stages of reasonableness, clarifies the main thesis in the idea of aesthetic culture.

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39 AEM, II.5; cf. AEM, XXIII.2 and AEM, XXIII.6.
40 AEM, X.7.
41 AEM, XVI.1.
42 AEM, X1.2.
43 AEM, XVII.1; cf. AEM, X.6-7.
44 This demand has clear-cut implications for the modal character of the play-drive: “Reason, on transcendental grounds, makes the following demand: Let there be a bond of union between the form-drive and the material drive; that is to say, let there be a play-drive, since only the union of reality with form, contingency with necessity, passivity with freedom, makes the concept of human nature complete.” (AEM, XV.4, our italics).
45 Cf. AEM, XIV.3.
46 AEM, VI.14; cf. AEM, VI.6: “It was civilization itself which inflicted this wound upon modern man.”
47 AEM, XIV.2 and VI.15.
48 AEM, XVI.1.
49 AEM, XVII.2
50 AEM, XVII.2.
51 Cf. Peirce’s outline of Schiller’s argumentation in The Sense of Beauty, W 1:11.
(XXIV-XXVII). Thus, appearing in their firstness, secondness and thirdness, the fundamental psychic drives play their part as logical moments of determination in acts of sensuous cognition, as essential normative motive forces qua formal elements of sensuous-rational beings’ relatedness to the world in individual and collective mental states, and as stages of historical processes.

3. Unveiling the categories of Schiller’s logic of psychic processes: categories as (logical) moments of determination, (normative) motive forces and (metaphysical) stages of an infinite expression

In a footnote to Letter XXV, Schiller writes:

From the moment man sees an object, he is no longer in a merely physical state; and as long as he continues to see objects, he will not entirely have escaped from that physical stage; for only inasmuch as he has physical sensations is he able to see at all. In a general way, then, those three moments that I mentioned at the beginning of the twenty-fourth Letter may well be considered as [ii] three different epochs, if we are thinking either of the development of mankind as a whole, or of [iii] the whole development of a single individual; but [i] they are also to be distinguished in each single act of perception, and are, in a word, the necessary conditions of all knowledge which comes to us through the senses.

To call certain conceptual moments the “necessary conditions of all knowledge which comes to us through the senses” is to conceive of them as concepts by which alone we can “understand something in the manifold of intuition, i.e. think an object for it”. Schiller is referring to universal conditions of intelligibility, to categories. These differ from Kant’s in one important respect: they are to be distinguished “in each single act of perception”, which means, that they are truly universal, while the actualization of a Kantian category potentially excludes the use of the two other categories of its triad. It is Schiller’s criterium of categoriality that lives on

52 The main thesis being “that there is no other way of making sensuous man rational except by first making him aesthetic.” Letter XXIII systematically introduces the concept of “ästhetische Kultur” (AEM, XXIII.8) and thus mediates between the preceding logic (particularly Letters XIX-XXI with XXII as a digression, which applies the logic to fine art) and the following application to the historical process of cultivation (Letters XXIV-XXVII).


54 Cf. AEM, XX.4 n. and XXI.1-3.

55 Cf, AEM, XI-XV.

56 Cf. AEM, XXIV.1 ff.

57 AEM, XXV.1 n., additions in brackets mine.

58 CPR, A 80/B 106.

59 Cf. CPR A 64/B 89 for Kant’s criteria of categoriality. Of course, in a hypothetical or
in Peirce’s theorizing, initiating a decade of work to reconcile Schiller's triad with Kant's methodology of a deduction from logical forms.\(^{60}\)

But, what are these pervasive “moments” described in the footnote as categories of the expression of reasonableness in the media of perception, self-development, and history? Schiller refers to the beginning of Letter XXIV. Here the logic of psychic processes is projected into the realm of the historical actualization of freedom, generating “three different moments or stages of development through which both the individual and the species as a whole must pass, inevitably and in definite order, if they are to complete the full cycle of their destiny”.\(^{61}\) These necessary stages of the actualization of our “predisposition to a possible infinite expression”\(^{62}\) are the physical, aesthetic and moral state in which man “suffers the dominion of nature” (is reduced to feeling), then “emancipates himself from this dominion” (reacts), and, finally, “acquires mastery over it in the moral state” (exerts mental self-control).\(^{63}\) On this level of application the categories are envisioned to be operative in the historical world and are, thus, regarded in their thirdness as “efficient reasonableness.”\(^{64}\)

Schiller’s legitimation to speak of a “definite order”, one through which all processes of expression “inevitably” have to pass, is given in his logic of psychic process and grounded in the dialectic of the “ultimate concepts” Person and Condition.\(^{65}\) Its main task\(^{66}\) is to comprehend, how Beauty can arise as a “state midway between matter and form, passivity and activity”, unifying the “opposite conditions of feeling and thinking”\(^{67}\) in a synthesis consisting of two “operations” through which both conditions are to “disappear in a third”.\(^{68}\)

disjunctive judgment (which, in turn, could again be composed of different categorial, hypothetical or disjunctive judgments), more than one category of quantity and quality might be actualized. Moreover, all modalities might be included.

60 Cf. W 1:302; CP 1.563; Thus we might say that the theorem, which identifies the function of a categorial conception with the reduction “of the manifold of sensuous impressions to unity”, is Kantian, while the one, which defines “the validity of a conception” to consist in “the impossibility of reducing the content of consciousness to unity without the introduction of it” (CP 1.545), is Schillerian; cf. CP 5.43 (our italics): “But in Kant we have Unity, Plurality, Totality not all present at once; Reality, Negation and Limitation not all present at once[...]. On the other hand, Kant’s four greater categories, Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Modality, form what I should recognize as Kant’s Universal Categories.”

61 AEM, XXIV.1.
62 Cf. particularly AEM, XI.7-8.
63 Ibid.
64 EP 2:197.
65 AEM, XI.1; it is obvious that person and condition as well as the corresponding drives for form and matter are Schiller’s teleological dramatization of Kant’s axiom of the “two stems of human cognition (...), namely sensibility and understanding”, cf. CPR, A 15/B 29.
66 Note that this task is qualified as focusing on “the point on which the whole question of beauty must eventually turn” (AEM, XVIII.3).
67 AEM, XVIII.2-3.
68 AEM, XVIII.3-4; these operations are connection (Verknüpfung) and cancellation (Aufhebung), taking place as moments of the reciprocal action, within which the two
In the Letters XIX-XXII, Schiller develops the rules of these “operations” within a logic of determination that defines sensation and thought as the two forms of determination of our state. “When man is sensible of the present,” he writes, “the whole infinitude of his possible determinations is confined to this single mode of his being.” This is feeling, corresponding to the logical moment of passive determination and to the physical state, wherein the field of psyche is limited by something else. When, on the other hand, the field of psyche is limited by itself, the determination is active and constitutes thought, corresponding to the logico-moral state. Moreover, two modes of determinability are distinguished: “mere indetermination,” which is brought out by lack of sensory stimulus or by abstract thought, and “active determinability,” which corresponds to the aesthetic state. Consequently, the moments characterized as “the necessary conditions” of all empirical knowledge are moments of determination and elementary aspects of perceptive acts. A functional order obtains among them, since passive determination is possible without active determinability, but not vice versa. “As long as he continues to see objects”, Schiller writes, man “will not entirely have escaped from that physical stage”. But, in which sense then is the logico-moral state non-prescindable from the aesthetic state?

According to Schiller, it is impossible to immediately “exchange passivity for autonomy”; to move from a passive to an active determination, we must be “free of all determination whatsoever, and pass through a state of pure determinability.” Thus he conceives of Kant’s aesthetic judgment of reflection as a necessary condition of the determinative one: “Our psyche passes, then, from sensation to thought via a middle disposition in which sense and reason are both active at the same

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69 AEM, XII.2.

70 In reference to AEM, XX.4 and XXI.3 we might say: Omnes determinatio est negatio in reference to the omnitudo realitatis.

71 AEM, XX.2, also referred to as “sheer absence of determination” in Letters XX and XXI.

72 AEM, XX.4.

73 AEM, XXV.1 n., additions in brackets mine.

74 Concerning the concept and operation of prescission, cf. CP 1.549 and EP 2.270.

75 AEM, XX.3; cf. Peirce’s initial move to set the stage for the introduction of the category of firstness in the first draft of the Harvard Lecture II (MS 304), published in PAP:140: “Let us try to get into an unsophisticated state so that we can perceive what is present to us. Let me read you a bit of poetry just to rinse your thoughts. XXXXX.” This poetic mood approaches the state in which what is present appears as it is present.”

76 Cf. CPJ, §9; here and elsewhere Kant speaks of the specific harmony obtaining in the “free play” between the understanding and imagination in the aesthetic judgment as a “proportionierte Stimmung, die wir zu allem Erkenntnisse fordern”, hence of something, which constitutes “the subjective formal condition of a judgement in general” (§35, emphasis mine).
time.” It is, therefore, impossible to prescind active determination from “active determinability” or the rational from the aesthetic state. A strict order obtains among Schiller’s categories and thus “gives rise to a concept of gradation among those conceptions which are universal”.

This order is a consequence of the “priority of the sensuous drive” in the human condition, which “provides the clue to the whole history of human freedom.” It is the evidence of our finite being as living symbols, that “form is never made manifest except in some material” and “the Absolute manifests itself only through the medium of limitation.” Thus, if we turn once more to the context of Schiller’s footnote quoted at the beginning of this subsection, we find it positioned at that specific juncture within his account of stages, where, in the aesthetic stage, “a transition to the world of spirit” has been completed. Moreover, we see within this transition in which the physical stimulus (first correlate) is apprehended as an object (second) by reflecting its intelligible being within a continuum of forms (third correlate), how

77 AEM, XX.4; cf. CPJ, Introduction, IV.
78 Ibid.; the reverse relation does not obtain, since in the aesthetic state — as reflective — the physical and rational “determining forces” are aufgehen.
79 CP 1.546.
80 AEM, XX.2.
81 AEM, XX.2 and XII.3.
82 It should be noted that Schiller in his account of stages in Letter XXIV is exclusively moving through different stages of the physical condition (cf. AEM, XXIV.8: “these deviations are nevertheless all attendant upon his physical condition since in all of them the life-impulse plays the master over the form-impulse”). Hence, in XXIV.2-8 he is dealing only with intermediary stages between the physical and the aesthetic condition, that ought to be described as “manifold aberrations from the ideal that man is meant to achieve” (AEM, XXIX.8). These intermediary stages are formally conceptualized by a recursive iteration of the categories, which results in: a.) the ideal “state of brute nature” (AEM, XXIV.3) corresponding to what might be called the physicality of the physical state (cf. AEM, XXIV.2-4); b.) the stage of “unlimited longing” (AEM, XXIV.5) corresponding to what might be called the aestheticity of the physical state (cf. AEM, XXIV.5-); finally c.) the stage of the rationality of the physical state, in which man’s “inquiring intellect” cannot be appeased by “evoking any ultimate and inward cause” and thus “manages at least to silence it with the notion of no-cause”, hence by seeking an arbitrary (religious) ground outside of itself, instead of realizing its own autonomy. These passages had a strong influence on Hegel’s Phenomenology of the Spirit and reverberate in Peirce’s sequence of different methods of fixing belief, in the sense that the logic of a continuous telic process is interpreted as an iteration of categorial moments. Accordingly, the sketch of the history of sciences that Peirce gives at the beginning of Fixation of Belief is structured as a movement through ‘degenerated’ forms of the method of science in its a.) tenacious stage (Roger Bacon), b.) authoritarian stage (Francis Bacon), c.) aesthetic stage (Kepler), and finally d.) in its genuine stage with Lavoisier. For an account of the roots of Peirce’s philosophy of history in the tradition of German Idealism, cf. ToPA, 2016.
83 AEM, XXV.4; from XXV.1-3 Schiller gives a dense metaphorical description of the transition with its three categorial moments, which spells out the thesis that “Contemplation (or reflection) is the first liberal relation which man establishes with the universe around him.” (AEM, XXV.2).
Schiller’s categories function as moments of semiosis as moments of a process that integrates the physical determination into a state transcending the encapsulation of sensuous immediateness and thus, “since thought”, for Schiller, “needs a body, and form can only be realized in some material”, might be called a sign.

References


84 Defined as the irreducibly triadic “cooperation of three subjects such as a sign, its object and its interpretant” in EP 2:411.

85 AEM, XXIII.4.


