

The semiotic resilient mind: conflictual and agapic relationship between logical and emotional interpretants¹

A mente semiótica resiliente: relação conflituosa e agápica entre os interpretantes lógicos e emocionais

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Abstract: By resilient mind I mean the mind's capacity to deal with the hardness of otherness, which demands a continuous effort to allow the development of habits of conduct. The predicate of resilience comes from the mind's ability to self-correct when such habits lose their mediative efficiency, therefore requiring the reconstruction of new cognitive mediations as habits of action. In this article, I propose to reflect on the set of semiotic *interpretants* proposed by Peirce with the aim of exploring their habitual facet in regard to the conflict between emotional and logical interpretants, where the predominance of the former to the detriment of the latter can generate acute situations of psychological suffering by blocking access to representations that otherwise might break the brute force of otherness.

Keywords: Beliefs. Habits. Kinds of interpretants. Mind. Peirce. Resilience.

Resumo: Por mente resiliente, quero dizer a capacidade da mente de lidar com a dureza da alteridade, que exige um esforço contínuo para permitir o desenvolvimento de hábitos de conduta. O predicado da resiliência vem da capacidade da mente de se autocorrigir, quando esses hábitos perdem sua eficiência mediadora, exigindo, portanto, a reconstrução de novas mediações cognitivas como hábitos de ação. Neste artigo, proponho refletir sobre o conjunto de interpretantes semióticos proposto por Peirce com o objetivo de explorar sua faceta habitual com respeito ao conflito entre interpretantes emocionais e lógicos, onde a predominância do primeiro em detrimento do segundo pode gerar situações agudas de sofrimento psicológico bloqueando o acesso a representações que, de outra forma, poderiam romper a força bruta da alteridade.

Palavras-chave: Crenças. Hábitos. Mente. Peirce. Resiliência. Tipos de interpretantes.

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1 Choosing an entrance in the Peircean edifice

Peirce's philosophy is perhaps the last to exhibit a system, in other words, he conceived an *almost* complete philosophical edifice, consisting of doctrines that range from a refined phenomenology, notwithstanding its apparent simplicity, to a sophisticated realist ontology, in fine scholastic style. I say here *almost*, since he wrote practically nothing about Art, concentrating his focus in Esthetics on the predicate of *Admirability*, itself committed to the ends of Semiotics and Ethics. I have reflected on a possible philosophy of art that could be extracted from his philosophical system,² and it can be said to bring new and original ideas to this area of knowledge.³

I proposed a reconstruction of this system in Ibri (2017),⁴ during which I perceived this edifice that, in my opinion, offers many entrances, although it should be recognized that everything starts with a *being in the world*, in which a necessarily cognitive mind must strive to comprehend the ocean of signs about which and with which it needs to dialogue for its very survival. From this viewpoint, it seems legitimate to say that *vital matters*, as they are called by Peirce, provide an environment more immediately phenomenological where representing the conduct of the *other* as otherness in general allows our cognitive capacity to develop in a more consistent way.

Here, the concept of mind is at once introduced as being also a teleological figure, that is, committed to the construction of mediations in order to maintain itself *viable in its environment*—in spite of having at its disposal all our human culture with its myriad collection of mediations in the service of our survival. As much as this collection may alleviate some basic problems of life, others inexorably take their place: we continue to be thrust into a *Kronos* that is not the fruit of our imagination⁵ and which imposes on us the irreversibility of the past and a future that our fallible rationality seeks to foretell.

In this *Kronos*, we are subjected to bear an ego that, many times, one's whole lifetime is insufficient to fully understand. Moreover, we must deal with other egos that we judge to know, but that all too frequently contradict our expectations. We must also not forget the facts, proverbially brute, in Peirce's words, to which I have reserved the predicate of *insolent*, since they invade our lives without being invited. They exemplify, with the randomness and indifference that characterizes them, the phenomenological accidentality that sustains one of the facets of Peirce's category of firstness, providing, at the same time, an experience that is typical of the second

2 I worked on this topic in IBRI, 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2016.

3 See also INNIS, 2013.

4 This is a late version in English of a work originally written in Portuguese and published in 1992.

5 I have proposed a distinction between *Kronos* and *Kairos*, as objective and subjective forms of time. See, for example, IBRI, 2016a.

category—in which the most immediate mark of what we call *reality* is situated. This whole frame, in my opinion, already requires that the mind, in its broader conception as I will put forth subsequently, must be resilient.

Let us return to that philosophical edifice of many entry doors, and here, as I have already mentioned, I choose the concept of mind as a possible entrance. For Peirce, *mind* is something that possesses the basic capacity of generalizing, i.e., of extracting from experience those elements that are noteworthy, detectable through their permanence and redundancy, and which, by phenomenically presenting themselves in this way, point towards a possible rule that would explain them and moreover, towards a rule that *produces* such facts, according to a realism that will be considered in the sequence of this essay. That facts could be generated by some form of logical rule independently of their possible representation already seems to suggest an ontology of universals. Let us put aside for now this apparently complex, but nonetheless essential step in Peirce's philosophy—his realism, which is in fact quite distinct from how contemporarily the question is considered.⁶

There is a passage in the work of Peirce that W. James considered one of his most brilliant ideas, confessing this opinion in a letter to his friend. It is a question about the origin of the laws of Nature. By likening the idea of law to that of habit, affirming that nature is endowed with habits that appear in redundant replicas, the question of the origin of laws becomes the question about how Nature acquired such habits, observing the fact that this ability to acquire habits is typical and observable in the human mind. This line of reasoning leads to the conclusion that there is in Nature a principle that is of a mental nature, since it can be characterized precisely by its ability to generalize, taking here the concept of habit as a result of a generalization. In this argument, two Peircean doctrines are outlined, i.e., Evolutionism and his Objective Idealism, of which I will speak in brief. Let us consider Peirce's own words on this question of the origin of laws:

What kind of an explanation can there be then? I answer, we may still hope for an evolutionary explanation. We may suppose that the laws of nature are results of an evolutionary process. (CP 7.512) [Further:] But if the laws of nature are the results of evolution, this evolutionary process must be supposed to be still in progress. For it cannot be complete as long as the constants of the laws have reached no ultimate possible limit. But if the laws of nature are still in process of evolution from a state of things in the indefinitely distant past in which there were no laws, it must be that events are not even now absolutely regulated by law (CP 7.514).

There are many noteworthy consequences in this line of argumentation, of both epistemological and ontological nature. Epistemologically, the notion that laws are products of an evolutionary process makes one suppose them to still be in

6 Contemporarily, there is an opposition of realism versus idealism, in the form of the recognition of the world exterior to the mind and interior to it, while in its scholastic origin, the question was drawn between realism versus nominalism, that is, in the recognition of the reality of universals instead of their admission exclusively within the bounds of language.

formation, making room for the principle of Chance to act in Nature. While the latter falls under the first category, laws fall under the third category. Both these principles are active in the facticity characteristic of the second category, where each thing is defined by its particular, individual and determined nature.

Here, in this evolutionary saga, an important epistemological doctrine that Peirce calls *Fallibilism* is forged. Once more, we give him the floor:

All positive reasoning is of the nature of judging the proportion of something in a whole collection by the proportion found in a sample. Accordingly, there are three things to which we can never hope to attain by reasoning, namely, absolute certainty, absolute exactitude, absolute universality. (CP 1.141) [Further:] In those sciences of measurement which are the least subject to error—metrology, geodesy, and metrical astronomy—no man of self-respect ever now states his result, without affixing to it its probable error; and if this practice is not followed in other sciences it is because in those the probable errors are too vast to be estimated. [And...] infallibility in scientific matters seems to me irresistibly comical [...] (CP 1.9).

To rid oneself of the myth of certainty so sought after through the centuries of the history of philosophy is not a trivial endeavor. This dismissal does not mean renouncing certainty because of an epistemological incompetence, but rather, it means an ontological conviction that to hold onto certainty as a cognitive goal is equivalent to seeking a semiotic illusion, namely, the conception of interpretant signs that ignores the very nature of their object. This staunch abandonment of the certainty of our positive representations will have epistemological consequences that require us to deal with probabilistic models as being genuinely adequate for their objects. More than this, the idea of deviation from theoretical expectations should be incorporated into the normality of factual observation, and a still more acute consequence will be the permanent specter of possible error, which will bring about the *tense* necessity of a continued observation of the represented object, of constant semiotic dialogue with it, giving *it* the last word about itself, its properties, its conduct, and so forth.

This characteristic of Fallibilism results in an evident ethical hue: the otherness of an object cannot be substituted by any descriptive judgment of theories, discourses, or language, reinforcing a clear position on semiotic truth, that is, that truth is nourished by permanent dialogue with its object and that by operating in this way, is able to maintain *adherence* to it,⁷ uncovering the future path of the facts and, in light of these, making it possible for the mind that represents them to make choices about its own conduct.

In Peirce's philosophy, it is possible to ascertain a theoretical effort that orbits around the concept of connaturality between that which is human and that which is natural. It is important to bear in mind that Phenomenology is the first of the philosophical sciences, as Peirce proposes in his classification of the sciences in the

7 I call here *adherence* the harmonic correspondence between theoretic prediction and the course of facts.

mature phase of his thought, in such a way that that the universe of human experience becomes the ground from whence the normative sciences are raised up, among which is also Semiotics, and a theory about reality, his Ontology. This hierarchy of origin that he proposes does not fall into an anthropocentric philosophy that supposes the human universe to be the foundational and molding instance of reality. On the contrary, the categories of experience that are proposed in Phenomenology will also give the general form of the concept of reality, as principles that act effectively in it, drawing a symmetry between *ways of appearing*—Phenomenology, with *ways of being*—Ontology. This categorial symmetry is associated with the idea of connaturality, allowing it to be understood as pertaining to the common nature between sign and object in Semiotics.

The theoretical consequence of this reflection on the origin of laws turns out to be one of the pillars that sustains the doctrine, often times misunderstood⁸ by scholars of the Peircean opus, namely, Objective Idealism. If the laws of nature are indeed acquired habits, observable even in that which we call inorganic *matter*, then the dichotomy between the nature of mind and matter disappears, breaking with a very old dualism and proposing an ideality of all that constitutes that which we call reality.⁹

Objective idealism is what will justify a flux of signs in an environment of connaturality, averting that the instance of human subjectivity be considered the origin of all ideality,¹⁰ as if it were possible to lend this predicate to the rest of the objects in the world, configuring the most common and most frequent incarnation of a nominalism that tacitly perpetuates the duality of the genesis between mind and matter.

2 The connatural realism of the internal and external worlds

Peirce's Objective Idealism is not an operational theory, in the sense of containing in itself a rule that produces facts, or that organizes or diversifies them. This operativity of the modes in which semiotic objects will phenomenically appear will be subsumed in the three Peircean categories. Idealism, as Peirce conceives it, is nothing more than a *backdrop*, a platform of continuous connaturality that will legitimize the extensive use of a vocabulary traditionally applied only to universal subjectivity to all semiotic objects, whether they be human or natural.¹¹

Thus, feeling, internal and external worlds, logical possibility, generalization,

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- 8 One of the reasons for this misunderstanding comes from the non-recognition of the origin of this doctrine in Schelling and from the reduction of idealism to a foundational subjectivity in opposition to a realism of the admission of things external to the mind. This contemporary approach has almost no relation to the question of realism-idealism that we address in this essay.
- 9 On the role of habit in Peirce's pragmatism, see also IBRI, 2017a.
- 10 Therefore, due care must be taken in addressing the subject of human subjectivity within Peirce's philosophy. For the reader interested in delving deeper into this subject, see COLAPIETRO, 1989.
- 11 On this instigating theme of Peircean thought, see also HOUSER, 2014.

habits, interpretation, etc. are terms that Idealism will allow to be used in the realm of the realism of Peirce's philosophy, so much so that one can affirm his system to be a realism-idealism, however strange this may sound to the ears of other philosophies, notably, those who propose an anthropocentrism whose consequent tacit nominalism remains dogmatically connected to ontologically dualist schools of philosophy.

It seems legitimate to say that philosophical dogmatisms arise from the proposal of phenomenologically non-observable geneses of the world and its representations, or, by simply ignoring the question, discrediting it as non-philosophical. This appears to happen within philosophies that do not possess the resources to produce an answer, and that navigate uncritically in some form of *Ptolemaic* anthropocentrism.

Peirce's Objective Idealism is already in genesis within his Cosmology, the exposition of which does not fit in this brief essay, but which at least, allows for it to be taken that the genesis of the universe happens logically with the passage of the *possible to the necessary*, using terms analogous to Aristotelian modal logic, in a saga that conjectures on the origin of the categories, of firstness to thirdness—and in this category, the emergence of Kronos still in the realm of pure ideality, much earlier than the advent of matter.

In any case, if we wish to conceptualize *habit* beyond a strictly human domain, as Peirce in fact does, then Objective Idealism should be considered and with it, its genesis, namely, Cosmology, in its genetic aspect—as a cosmogenesis.

In reality, always in the light of Fallibilism, Peirce's ontological hypotheses provide a good number of new entryways within his edifice, none of them, as someone who studies Peirce can affirm, being dogmatic. On the contrary, in my opinion, they suggest a good deal of heuristic consequences, some of which he himself did not foresee or write about.

Two of Peirce's affirmations that we borrow from his Cosmology already encourage the practice of a new and extensive philosophical vocabulary, now legitimized by the entrance into his edifice through Objective Idealism.

Let us first hear this passage: "Every attempt to understand anything—every research—supposes, or at least *hopes* that the very objects of study themselves are subject to a logic more or less identical with that which we employ" (CP 6.189).

To presume a logic in the object similar to that which we employ in the signs gives rise here explicitly to Peirce's hypothesis of realism-idealism, a thirdness that it not confined only to human thought, but that also encompasses real objects. On the other hand, the ideality of logical forms also forges a symmetry between sign and object, ensuring the representational character of the interpretants in their saga of seeking adherence to reality.

Peirce's Cosmogenesis presupposes that the origin of the universe was once an absolutely potential *Nothing*.¹² In fact, any other hypothesis would imply an origin that was either dogmatic or that succumbed to incognoscibility. Let us now observe Peirce's articulation on the logical principle of possibility, or potentiality,

12 The affinity declared by Peirce in regard to Schelling's work suggests that this concept of *Nothing* in his cosmology is associated with the notion of the *Absolute* of the German author. On Peirce's Schellingian inspiration, see also DILWORTH, 2016.

noteworthy for its consequences:

I say that nothing “necessarily” resulted from the Nothing of boundless freedom. That is, nothing according to deductive logic. But such is not the logic of freedom or possibility. The logic of freedom, or potentiality, is that it shall annul itself. For if it does not annul itself, it remains a completely idle and do-nothing potentiality; *and a completely idle potentiality is annulled by its complete idleness* (CP 6.219, my italics).

There is indeed much to reflect about this origin. Firstly, it is pure ideality and could be described in an apparently paradoxical manner: *possible is that, which in order to be possible, must no longer be possible*. It is, in my opinion, an absolutely remarkable heuristic principle. It implies the necessary transition of vague to definite, of general to particular, with possible intermediate stages of a progressive decrease of generality. Here, there is a foreshadowing of the duality between *continuous* and *discreet*, characteristic of the theory of mathematical continuity that inspires Peirce’s ontological theory of Synechism. From here, it is possible to extract the very essence of the categories, and one could say further still, from this principle, extract the very core of pragmatism.¹³ It is from here that I now wish to advance this series of suggestions that, in the space reserved for this essay, cannot undergo complete theoretical development, but can nonetheless be formulated.¹⁴ Perhaps, we can take another passage from Peirce’s cosmology which will provide us with a lead to follow up on these suggestions. Let us consider the apparently surprising affirmation:

The distinction between the inner and the outer worlds antedates Time [...] The inner world that I mean is something very primitive. The original quality in itself with its immediate unity belonged to that inner world, a world of possibilities [...] The accidental reaction awoke it into a consciousness of duality, of struggle and therefore of antagonism between an inner and an outer. Thus, the inner world was first, and its unity comes from that firstness. The outer world as second [...]. [and finally:] That is why I make bold to go the human mind to learn the nature of a great cosmical element. (NEM 4.142)

It becomes evident, in this passage, that the retro-announced new vocabulary that is bid for by Peirce’s realism-idealism, is shown here in a radical way. How strange it seems to claim the existence of an *interior world* that antecedes the *exterior world* in a cosmic sense, without any human instance! What boldness, to suppose the predicate of interiority as pertaining to a reality independent of us and, moreover, far anteceding our very existence! And to seek in the human mind something of a cosmic nature! Yes, it is in this very way that Peirce’s philosophy

13 On the origins and importance of pragmatism, see FABBRICHESI, 2008; and HOUSER, 2003.

14 IBRI, 2017, Chap. 5, the reader may find an extensive exposition of Peirce’s cosmology.

structures itself as a system within an environment of connaturality of the ideality that colors and permeates everything.

Peirce propounds to seek within the human mind the experimental foundation for a proper and more ample conception of mind, namely, one founded on the capacity to generalize, forming habits of conduct, and that within the environment of connatural reality constitutes itself into what is usually called laws.

The idea that the internal world cannot be reduced to the strictly human realm is extremely fertile in the understanding of an epistemology of universals or of real continuities. The question, crucial to realism, could be formulated as follows: how is it possible to know that which is not given directly through the senses? And here, one can add the question that is associated with the former, that is, of the logical relationships between exteriority and interiority, now advanced ontologically.

Let us consider this passage: “But even from the human mind we only collect external information about habit. Our knowledge of its inner nature must come to us from logic. For habit is generalization” (NEM 4.142).

In fact, only the category of secondness definitively exhibits objects in their individual, particular character. It possesses that property of subsuming everything that is exterior to the mind, and hence, becomes endowed with the most evident otherness. Peircean realism, nonetheless, enjoins that reality is not only constituted by objects according to their secondness, but that the real is co-valently comprised of the other two categories as well, namely, firstness and thirdness, that encompass logical possibility and necessity, in this order. Both these two categories, it may be said, comprise everything that is of a general or continuous nature and thus, realism differs from nominalism in recognizing them as important components of that which is called reality. In this way, habits can only be known by the manner in which they are manifest through facts in the form of the conduct that exists through their influence.

In this way, firstness and thirdness are of an interior nature, while secondness is of an exterior nature. In a general manner then, it is reaffirmed that interior objects are only knowable by the way they appear exteriorly. Secondness is the category where beings show themselves publicly to every and any mind, while the other two categories are knowable only through inference based on the way in which they condition this exterior manifestation. This seems to be the greatest difficulty of philosophies in adopting realism as their ontological axis, since possibility and necessity, the essence of firstness and thirdness in this order, are accessible only indirectly, while the objects in their defined and individual existence are available to direct cognition.

Nonetheless, in the line of Peirce's philosophy, the rupture in mind-matter dualism and the genetic estrangement between man and nature both explode in admitting that the *internal world* is not confined only to the human mind, and that the extension of the concept of mind to all real beings capable of acquiring habits endows them with an interiority which encompasses the first and third categories. It seems legitimate to propose a distinction between interiority, a more general term that designates continuous universals of the possible and necessary, and subjectivity, that denotes the exclusively human interior world.

3 Knowing habits: prospecting the future

The broader concept of mind held by Objective Idealism is based on the universal phenomenon of the acquisition of habits, likening the notion of habit to that of law. However, ultimately, one could ask: why do beings in general tend to acquire habits? What function do these habits perform? The natural answer to these questions is that habits serve as guides for conduct in the face of factic otherness. Thus, they constitute *mediations*, although arguably, not always genuine *representations* of their objects.¹⁵ At this point, let us anticipate what will be the object of more detailed reflection in a sequel of this essay. I take to be genuine representations those mediations that are able to foresee the future conduct of the object, associated, in this way, with the *logical* role of habits. In this vein, such habits are, semiotically, logical interpretants. These are necessarily continuous in time, given their predictive function, having in general been conceived by means of a generalizing temporal observation of the object's conduct.

Nonetheless, it should be noted that there are also habits of *feeling* that constitute emotional interpretants which in turn, when predominating over logical interpretants, rising above them and distancing themselves from the latter,¹⁶ result in a relation of secondness with their object whose conduct they cannot predict, given their character of immediacy, unconnected to time. Notwithstanding this characteristic, emotional interpretants that act autonomously in the secondness of experience perform the role of references for conduct, however, with no predictive power.

Peirce coined the term *degenerate* to designate a type of sign truncation that does not reach thirdness, remaining in the second category. A degenerate sign of the second category cannot be predictive because it does not enter the temporality of thirdness, and thus, the conduct that results from it is purely reactive. For this reason, it does not have the virtue of suggesting novel habits, i.e., it does not constitute a learning process of the mind. Here, evidently, I am seeking to be faithful to the Peircean concept of learning as a process of changing habits.

As the result of generalizations, and therefore of an inductive process, habits can nonetheless be of different natures since they can arise from different types of induction, as classified by Peirce. I will summarize them briefly as follows. Statistical Induction (CP 7.120, 1903), is configured by defined theoretical probabilistic models. This type of induction applies to the method of inquiry advocated by Peirce himself, preceded by the logical steps of Abduction and Deduction. The second class of induction he calls Qualitative Induction (CP 2.759, 1905), in my opinion, applicable in experimental situations where the enquirer is identifying resembling cases, with base on former knowledge. I suppose moreover that it is possible to reason that these constitute perceptive judgments based on habits, as can be seen exemplarily in the formulation of medical diagnostics. However, for the scope of this essay, it is my interest to examine the concept of Crude Induction (CP 2.757, 1905), which is

15 See IBRI, 2012.

16 It will be shown that this is a case of disassociation of these two types of interpretants, although it is possible in a genuine representation of thirdness, an efficient association of both.

mainly characterized as always resulting in universal propositions, in the belief that the predicates of an object in the past will not be altered in the future. I highlight this type of induction since, in my opinion, it is typical of cases in which there is a prevalence of emotional interpretants, leaving no space for logical ones. The latter, to their merit, are marked by a commitment to some form of epistemological fallibilism, which makes them assume the form of propositions of a conjectural nature. One could say that logical interpretants are associated with statistical induction and their conjectural nature is given by the form of a proposition that affirms predicates with varying degrees of probability of occurrence. This conjectural nature I also imagine can be admitted as well in qualitative inductions, as long as they avoid universal propositions, resisting the assumption of a rigid conservation of past characteristics of the object in the future, as happens in crude induction.

In the light of Peircean realism, *to know* is to seek to represent the habits of the investigated object. There is, however, an increase in the presence of the spontaneity of the first category in the spectrum of Peirce's Objective Idealism. This can be observed starting from the habits of matter, recognized as an aged mind that has reached an *almost* definite state of equilibrium and therefore, virtually closed off to change till arriving at more unstable, lively minds, as is the human mind. While it can be affirmed that the geology of crystals is not a simple science, the complexity and difficulty of its enquiry cannot be compared, for instance, to that of psychoanalysis. This latter science deals with objects not only permeated by the emotionality of qualities of feeling; it must also be investigated based on the patient's account, without direct phenomenological access to the conveyed facticity, even though one can make use of a semiotic reading of the many indicial signs that accompany such an account.¹⁷

Everything that is desired by the *just* act of knowing is to outline the probable future conduct of an object. Conversely, it may be said that an object with no habits does not allow itself to be known.

4 The water and the fishing net

I will permit myself to use here a metaphor that I believe will help to think about the difference between logical and emotional interpretants. It is the image on the one hand of water and on the other, of the fishing net. Water suggests the idea of a continuum without form, of which even the finite portions are not distinct from the continuous whole of the fluid to which they belong. The idea of a part referring immediately to a whole is reminiscent of crude induction.

On the other hand, the fishing net has a form, designed to sweep up a few determined objects, in this case, fish of some type, allowing others that are possibly not the objective, to pass through. The net selects a few elements from this universe through a prior plan, given by its previously projected configuration. This consequent selection of intentionally foreseen individuals is reminiscent, I suppose, of statistic induction, which generalizes based on a sample, and therefore is able to be predictive. While statistic induction generalizes based on a theory that is taken to be modifiable in case facts appear to contradict it, crude induction cannot do

17 On this point, consult the analysis of GUIMARÃES FILHO, 2017.

the same. It does not possess a *theory* that plays the role of a rule of reflection on an eventual presence of surprising elements of experience that could suggest its revision or even resetting its parameters.

Crude induction, as a formless liquid, always tends to operate in an immediate manner, referring the part to the whole, with no criteria of distinction. Therefore, what sustains its always universal propositions is merely a repetition through apparent similarity of facts or a factual state to which it refers. Universal generalizations by mere analogy end up mobilizing only indexical-icons without elevating them to a genuinely symbolic state; in other words, they never leave their phenomenological environment of secondness to become elevated to the third category where the otherness of the fact can be understood in the light of a theory.

Many judgments of a merely emotional backdrop are produced in this way and this is not simply a logical problem. They end up creating a conflict between the minds that seek to guide themselves by what is sayable, aware of the fallibility of what is said, and the minds that refuse to navigate through any degree of uncertainty, since they are immersed in the necessity of universal statements.

5 In conclusion: the resilient mind

Once more, I invoke Objective Idealism, from whence in this essay I entered into Peirce's philosophical edifice, as the doctrine that justifies the connaturality of the genesis of continua both of qualities of feeling, under firstness, and of logical structure under thirdness. In a vocabulary of common sense, one could say simply, in the restricted realm of human faculties, connaturality between *feeling* and *reason*. In truth, this common genesis is given in the author's cosmology, where from one continuum without form, of mere possibilities, arise continua with form, of *quasi*-necessity.

Here, it is possible to draw a type of cosmic lesson that suggests this connaturality and that the disjunction of possibility and logical necessity constitutes a misconception that can only create a duality that is, because groundless, unjust. Many examples could be listed of the joint work of emotional and logical interpretants. To name one especially, Peirce's whole heuristic theory of abduction, in which he suggests that we conceive of the birth of new logical mediations, new theories in science, through a type of intelligent sensitivity, or, in other words, a sensitive intelligence, also present in his exemplary concepts of perceptive judgments, insights of thirdness. No less, is the defense that he makes of the almost unusual presence of an *instinctive* faculty of evolutionary origin in the human mind.¹⁸

Although Peirce did not concentrate, in the realm of artistic creation, on the direction of the joint work between the emotional and the logical, that could be called *agapic*, as I suggest in the title of this essay, in my opinion, it is licit to say that an idea of esthetic nature becomes a work of art through the knowledge of some theory that guides its conception. I also propose that a distinction be drawn between *sensitivity* and *emotionality*, in which the former translates the interactive

18 In order to deepen this theme, see ANDERSON, 1987 and, in a different perspective and brilliant approach, see DILWORTH, 2015.

work between feeling and logical form and the latter is confined to the immediate unity of its own nature.

Let us return to the theme of the dissention between emotional and logical interpretants. While the emotional does not have a rule for the formation of its judgments, except to universalize predicates and identify objects in the light of an apparent similarity between them, the logical does have in itself some relevant criteria that distinguishes in its objects the characteristics that can be interpreted in light of this criteria. Pure emotionality acts, therefore, as an interpretant confined to the second category, unable to overcome the duality that characterizes it. Mediations based on these interpretants lead consequently to energetic interpretants that do not take into consideration the conduct of the minds with whom they interact. From this form of human relation there stems inevitable conflicts because of the impossibility of considering alterity fairly, the *other*, as psychoanalysts are wont to say, is submitted to the universalizing immediacy of emotional signs that draw exclusively on habits of feeling.¹⁹

How much suffering *tenacious* minds, to use the term from Peirce's theory of beliefs, bring to their surroundings, requiring an almost superhuman *resilience*²⁰ of those who cohabit with them. It is not for nothing that Peirce calls otherness "brute". In face of it, we possess the resource of cognitive mediations, and they can represent the conduct of otherness, diluting its brutality by making it thinkable within Kronos. However, when the genetic brutality of otherness, called as such for ignoring what we would like for it to be or what we could imagine it could be, remains in this phenomenologically existential state before our mind, conflictual relations inexorably confined to secondness are at hand.

Let us think, rather, that the agapic labor between emotional and logical interpretants, endowing the mind with sensitivity and not mere emotionality, will require a special resilience, defined by a flexibility that it must exhibit in order to recognize its own errors before that which always has the last word—the facts. But through this, the mind will be immersed in that which will renew its vital strength and actualize its most genuine nature, namely, its saga of growth and continuous learning.

I believe that the resilient mind, put constantly in motion by the harshness of the secondness where it is destined to exist, is entitled to moments of deserved rest, where the agapic constitution of our sensibility can enjoy what it has created for itself: the highest human art of music, of fine arts, of poetry, and what Nature has to offer from its most refined art to our contemplation.

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19 On the influence of Peirce's semiotics on psychoanalytic thinking, see GUIMARÃES FILHO, 2016.

20 No wonder the concept of Resilience has been the subject of studies in several areas of the Human Sciences. See, for example, NORRIS, TRACY, and GALEA, 2009; and SOUTHWICK; CHARNEY, 2018.

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