Philosophy as a path to transformation: a pragmatist perspective

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Abstract: In the ancient period – Greek and Hellenistic in particular – philosophy was conceived not as a pure intellectual activity geared toward the search for truth, but as a practical exercise of thought that was meant to serve life and aim at self-transformation. The goal was to learn how to conduct a philosophical life and take care of oneself: especially of one’s speeches and actions. It was not so important to be able to expose a true doctrine, but to put into practice the teachings that were given. This perspective lapses as early as the medieval period, but one may wonder if pragmatist attitude does not reanimate some aspects of it: for example, the grafting of practice into theory, the conception of ideas as plans for action, the reference to truth effects, and the like. In this paper I intend to test this hypothesis, especially with reference to the study Peirce has conducted on the process of “self-control” (the ancients would have said “self-government”, autarkeia) as the basis of ethics, understood as a normative science and the foundation of logic.

Keywords: Peirce. Self-control. Self-transformation. Spiritual exercise. Stoics.

In this essay I would like to dwell on a particular topic: what today we would call a meta-philosophical issue. What is the nature of the particular discipline we study? Whom is it addressed to, and what is its purpose? This, as we know, is a fundamental problem, both when we practice philosophy as scholars and when-as students-we have to shield ourselves from the uncomfortable questions asked by friends and relatives: what is philosophy for, what will you do with this kind of knowledge? Philosophy

1 I want to sincerely thank James Liszka for his insightful comments on my paper delivered at the 22nd International Meeting on Pragmatism in November 2023. I have tried to take into account his suggestions in this reworking of my materials.
is different from other disciplines, seemingly useless, a mere intellectual form of entertainment. Plato and Aristotle already posed the problem, and Aristotle conclusively said: philosophy doesn’t “serve” any purpose, it only teaches us to serve no one.2

Philosophy has been formulated in many different ways, but what is striking is that in ancient times it was very different from today. It would seem like there is no Philosophy with a capital P, that is, a universal idea of philosophy, rather – to adopt the interpretive perspective of pragmatism – there are various ways of practicing philosophy, the effects of which are there for all to see.

Here I would like to argue, drawing on some traces of ancient philosophy, that philosophy should not be regarded as abstract speculation, as a pure theory concerning this or that area of knowledge, but, as Seneca said, as “a resource for action” (Seneca, Moral letters to Lucilius II, 20, 2) In Greek and Hellenistic philosophy, and to some extent even within Christianity, philosophy was understood as the art of living, of living well. Happiness, however, was not to be regarded as pleasure, euphoria, an outburst and thus dissipation of forces, but as an expression of self-mastery and surveillance over one’s own doing. A happy life – from phuo, to generate – was thus a “wise” life, a life directed toward knowledge and oriented toward the transformation of self and the world.

Epictetus had already made it clear in his lessons transcribed in the Encheridion (maxim 49): “When then any man says to me, Read Chrysippus to me, I rather blush, when I cannot show my acts like to and consistent with his words” (The Discourses of Epictetus, 1890) Otherwise, what difference would there be between explaining a text by Archilocus and interpreting a Chrysippus fragment? Philosophy, Marcus Aurelius added in his Meditations (I.17,22), should not mean learning how to read certain authors and set them in their chronological context, or performing argumentative and logic exercises and using the propositions of language correctly; rather, philosophy should be an experimental practice that translates logos into everyday gestures and behavior. To embody truth, to make this act of incorporation a tool at the service of life, becomes a commitment to “self-care” (ibidem, I.6), where care indicates not psychological attention to one’s interiority, but a kind of therapy aimed at healing one’s way of knowing, speaking and “commercing” with the world.

Now, the idea of translating knowledge into a life practice, into habitual behaviors that strengthen one’s life conduct, seems to me to have a fully pragmatist quality. Take this quote from Seneca’s Letters to Lucilius: “Philosophy teaches us how to act, not how to speak, and demands that we live by its norms, to ensure that words do not contradict life, and life does not contradict itself” (II.20,2). There is a question that has come down to us from the Greeks (but how much attention have we paid to it?). That question is: what do we do with what we know? What can we do with our knowledge? If knowledge only serves to exercise our brain muscles, then it is something vain.

Certainly, in the Greek and Hellenistic world (and partly, as I said, Christianity), one approached philosophy in order to adopt a different way of life, to effect a transformation of oneself. Pierre Hadot writes: “Philosophy is a way of living […] a way of existing in the world, which must be practiced every moment, which must transform the whole of life” (Hadot, 2002, p. 156. My transl.). In antiquity (but also in the modern age, for Spinoza, Pascal, Montaigne, Sartre, Foucault…), philosophy was a method of spiritual progress which required a radical conversion, a radical transformation of one’s way of being. To achieve this, it was necessary to undergo a process of askesis, of mental gymnastics, of training: one had to know how to progress, to mature, to change one’s outlook and perspective on life. To be a philosopher was to have embarked on a certain itinerary toward sophia, a path that involved the bios of those who engaged in it even before their logos. The decision to do philosophy thus took on the connotations of a true existential choice. Hadot further writes that in the ancients’ perspective philosophy “does not

2 “For speculation of this kind began with a view to recreation and pastime, at a time when practically all the necessities of life were already supplied. Clearly then it is for no extrinsic advantage that we seek this knowledge; for just as we call a man independent who exists for himself and not for another, so we call this the only independent science, since it alone exists for itself” (Aristotle, Metaphysics, I. 2, 982b).
just make one know, it makes one ‘be’ differently”. Man is philo-sophos (a friend of wisdom), never really sophos, and he is a philosopher insofar as he has embarked on a spiritual path, “a movement, a progression, though a never-ending one, toward this transcendent state” (Hadot, 2002, p. 14. My transl.)

Today, as we know, one pursues philosophical studies as one would pursue any other theoretical discipline. One specializes in a theoretical field, conducts detailed studies and analyses, and remains within the boundaries of pure theory. One’s private and professional lives are quite distinct, and as Heidegger said, it is enough for us to have three lines of an author’s biography, because that is not what we are interested in about him: we want to get to his text and thought. Foucault, on the other hand, perhaps referring precisely to Heidegger, wrote that today it is permissible to be an indecent man or woman if one is a great philosopher. We each have our own thoughts about this, but in the perspective, I am proposing here the philosophical attitude cannot be limited to abstract and disembodied speculation: this is an attitude that belongs to the modern and Cartesian age, where knowledge has supplanted life altogether. (Foucault, 2005, Ch.1-4) Yet, it is Nietzsche who has taught us that “life must be the means of knowledge” (Nietzsche, 1974, § 324) and that knowledge must serve life, and not the other way around.

We therefore need to exercise a new “praxis of theory”, as Husserl used to say. Theory emerges from life’s needs, from living doubts, and aims to solve problems that have emerged in the field of practices (including theoretical practices). In the end we should not ask: what is the concept, the idea, the essence? But: what does it do, what effects does it produce? Again, the main philosophical question, in a pragmatist style, should be: What could we make of what we know? Remember that Peirce also says: thought is an action (CP 5:400); therefore, even pure, rigorous, analytical theory is a form of action that arises from definite practical and ethical needs.

Leaving aside the possibility of returning to the exercising of a wise philosophical life in Epicurus’ Garden, there are evidently certain characteristics in philosophical work that have always been the same, yesterday as much as today: open discussions, friendship, a shared passion, aspirations in the educational and political fields (in the broadest sense.) The love of wisdom proceeds through the constant questioning of oneself: of the categories that guide one’s thinking and the references that guide one’s action, ultimately resolving itself in a work of radical transformation of one’s overall view of what is real, true, right, beautiful and good. And that means facing life in a different way, in a non-superstitious way, as Spinoza would say.

One may recall in this regard some key propositions of Foucault’s *The Hermeneutics of the Subject*. In the first lesson we read: “Truth is not granted to the subject by virtue of a mere act of knowledge [...] there can be no truth without a conversion or transformation of the subject” (Foucault 2005, p. 17). Conversion should be understood according to its etymological meaning: to con-vert, to re-vert, to turn one’s gaze, either toward oneself while one is performing a certain operation or toward what one is looking at. To con-vert to the self’s practices, we might say: a kind of action that only philosophy can help us perform. Indeed, the gaze must always be double. Carlo Sini, an important Italian philosopher, writes: “Every discourse is double: it speaks of the ‘thing’ exactly by speaking of you and it speaks of you only by speaking of the ‘thing’ just as it speaks of it” (Sini, 2019, p. 130. My transl.).

One must disentangle oneself, detach oneself from illusions, false opinions, enduring atavistic truths, and must reason about one’s own reasoning. *Melete thanatou* should also be understood in this sense: not, or not only, as a preparation to death, but as learning to die to oneself in order to find oneself reborn through a new form of thought, and thus of life. Foucault speaks of “technologies of the self” (Foucault, 1988), or pragmatics of the self (Foucault, 2010, p. 42), practices of self-constitution of the subject, which are able to shape one’s conduct, to help control and govern oneself, to rejoice in oneself.

That is to say, it is in the relation to self, in the work of self on self, in the work on oneself, in this mode of activity of self on self that philosophy’s reality will actually be demonstrated and attested. Philosophy finds its reality in the practice of philosophy
understood as the set of practices through which the subject has a relationship to itself, elaborates itself, and works on itself. The reality of philosophy is this work of self on self. (Foucault, 2010, p. 242).

I am keen to reiterate that these Foucauldian statements, this particular way of interpreting ancient philosophy, does not refer to an advanced form of psychological introspection, of self-knowledge – or, worse, of self-help. Rather, again, it asks: to what end do I follow the path of inquiry? What is the power and purpose of my knowing? is philosophy able to transform my view of events and hence my practices? Because if it is not, it cannot fulfill its task, which is not to lead us into the presence of truth, but-for example-to make us understand why we have such a deep need to conquer the truth and to grasp what is real in itself. That is why I speak of a conversion of the gaze.

This perspective is completely lacking from Descartes onward: modern scientific knowledge, access to which requires no prior work of con-version, of attention to the self on the subject’s part, entails a view of philosophy not as a choice of life, but as logical coherence and argumentative rigor, exactness and demonstrability. Truth is conceived of as pure adaequatio. The ethopoietic dimension of knowledge (that is, of active construction of ethos, of behavior) is entirely lost. As Foucault again notes, it is instead a matter of “transforming true discourse into a permanent and active principle”. Further on he speaks of the “long process which turns the taught, learned, repeated and assimilated logos into the spontaneous form of the acting subject” (Foucault, 2005, p. 529). There could hardly be a more pragmatist perspective in my view.

At this point I hope to have clarified how according to this particular definition of the discipline of philosophy, which was predominant until the modern age, there is no access to true knowledge without a practice of transformation, of change, of working on one’s own existence – that is, without the comprehension ceasing to be a pure state of mind and becoming an experience. So let us not be confused by the words “convert” or “transfigure”. As Richard Rorty so clearly put it in reference to pragmatist thought, the pragmatists exasperate because they assert that we will never be purified or transfigured, only, hopefully, a little more mature.4

Why, then, can we say that pragmatist thought – as my title suggest – aims to transform the ethos of the self? I will try to clarify only Peirce’s view here, although one can fruitfully advance in the direction traced by James, Rorty and other neopragmatists.

Peirce approached the study of ethics rather late (after the 1890s). He himself says that up to a certain point in his research he did not grasp its relevance. In our perspective, it is worth noting how even in his 1898 paper Philosophy and the Conduct of Life Peirce is still at pains to state that he feels far removed from the way of conceiving of philosophy typical of Greek thought, i.e., that mingling philosophy and practice (EP 2:29). This is a strange statement for a philosopher who twenty years earlier had formulated the principles of the pragmatic maxim in such a way as to highlight that the meaning of any concept must be measured by its practical effects. Indeed, critics are bewildered by this text. There are those who believe that it has an anti-Jamesian function (see for example Atkins, 2016). Certainly, at the time Peirce had few ethical or practical concerns in the strict sense: he was interested in the scientific and speculative research of Aristotle and medieval scholars, rather than in a philosophy such as that of Epictetus, which aimed to treat the ills of the individual soul.

Leaving aside this objectively problematic text, the references to ethics become stronger and stronger in the 1902 Minute Logic (see part of it in CP vol. 1, IV), eventually reaching their culmination in the 1903 Harvard Lectures (especially I and V: CP 5: 14-40; 5.120-150). Here, very

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1 See on this the first four lessons of the Hermeneutique of the Subject by Foucault.
2 See as a comment of this issue (and of the quotation that I take from the exergo of the book): Madelrieux (2022).
significantly, the theme of normative sciences paves the way for the reformulation of the pragmatic maxim. The normative sciences are divided into esthetics, ethics and logic.5 Esthetics seeks what is most admirable in itself regardless of any ulterior reason.6 “Ethics is the study of what ends of action we are deliberately prepared to adopt”, and why we are prepared to act exactly as we do (CP 5.131). Finally, logic is the study of the means of attaining the end of thought. Yet, “It cannot solve that problem until it clearly knows what that end is” (Ibidem) Above all, Peirce argues that logic cannot develop fruitfully except on an ethical basis. And ethics must be based on an esthetics that takes a very clear form for Peirce: it is the search for the summmum bonum, the most attractive ideal. The philosopher writes again: “an ultimate end of action deliberately adopted – that is to say reasonably adopted – must be a state of things that reasonably recommends itself in itself [...] It must be an admirable ideal” (CP 5. 130).

The challenge of pragmatism, then, is to clarify what we are prepared to do insofar as we deliberately choose it, but also insofar as we are freely attracted to it. As I see it, then, there is a double aspect to the formulation of normative sciences: active and passive. Being ready to do, first and foremost, means being dominated by a kalos that seduces and subjugates us, that conquers us through the identification of the feeling it entails, and at the same time it is an ethical domination of our choices, thanks to an ethos made up of reiterated and controlled exercises.

At this stage, I would like not only briefly to follow up on Peirce’s reflection on self-control, but to present the hypothesis that self-control may well be regarded as a translation of Stoic autarky, or the process of the self-constitution of a subjectivity resistant to unconscious habits and mere opinions, which I referred to earlier. Many critics seem to suggest this interpretation. Rachel Herdy, for example, writes: “Peirce is not interested in action per se, which belongs to the domain of Secondness, but rather in the ‘governing’, ‘mediation’ or ‘self-control’ of human action” (Herdy, 2014, p. 12). The idea of reason’s control and of work on oneself is typically Hellenistic, as we have seen.

However, it is clear that, precisely in order to clarify what logical reasoning is, Peirce needs to turn to ethics. “Logic can be of no avail until one knows what it is that one is trying to do, which is precisely what ethics has to determine” (CP 2.120; 198). Reasoning is a form of action, and in that sense, it requires self-control within a range of clearly ethical considerations. With them, the referral to deliberate conduct and the process of self-control is definitely initiated.

Pragmatism is therefore closely intertwined with ethics, understood not as the deliberation of what is right or wrong, but as the study of those ends of action we are deliberately prepared to adopt (CP 5.131). In other words, we have to ask ourselves first and foremost: “What am I prepared deliberately to accept as the statement of what I want to do, what am I to aim at, what am I after? To what is the force of my will to be directed?” (CP 2.198).

In this sense, every logical resolution has an ethical basis: it is the study “of the means of attaining the end of thought. It cannot solve that problem until it clearly knows what that end is. Life can have but one end. It is ethics which defines that end. It is therefore impossible to be thoroughly and rationally logical except upon an ethical basis” (Ibid.). “Logic must depend upon ethics” (CP 2.199).7 This is reasserted in the 1905 text What Pragmatism is, where the distances between pragmatism, or better practicalism, and pragmaticism are established, emphasizing the Kantian roots of the latter term that indicates what is pragmatisch (not praktisch), “what expresses relation to some definite human purpose”. “Now the most

5 For a general and seminal survey of the issue of normative sciences see V. Potter (1966; 1997), followed by Liszka (2022). See also on the issue: Atkins (2016) and Ibri (2022). Ibri writes very effectively: “the idea of self-control mediates the approximation between logic and ethics in Peirce’s philosophy” (Ibri, 2022, p. 279).
6 See on this the very explicative chapter “The aesthetic face of Peirce’s Pragmaticist Epistemology” in Ibri (2022).
7 In the Doctrine of Chances, part of the 1878 Pragmatist series, Peirce wrote about the necessity of a “social theory of logic”, moved by three sentiments: the interest in an indefinite community, the faith that this interest can be supreme and the hope in the unlimited continuance of intellectual activity (CP 2.655.) I can’t approach this theme here but see Fabbrichesi (2024) for wider references.
striking feature of the new theory was its recognition of an inseparable connection between rational cognition and rational purpose” (CP 5.412).

In sum: It seems to me that the pragmatist question can be expressed in the following way: what can you do and what do you want to do (rational purpose) with what you know (rational cognition)? Was the problem different for Socrates, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius? Or indeed for Augustine, Spinoza, Pascal, Sartre, or any other philosopher worthy of the name? Nietzsche wrote: “What exactly is what I do? And what exactly do I want with all this? – this is the problem of truth” (Nietzsche, 1997, § 196). Here is the con-version of the gaze and the possibility of controlling oneself.

But what is the rational purpose Peirce talks about, in terms of an end of action esthetically admirable and ethically pursued, as we saw before? I could answer with Peirce: “the development of concrete reasonableness” (CP 5.3), “of giving a hand toward rendering the world more reasonable” (1.615). Reasonableness, as Ibrī notes (Ibrī, 2022, p. 281), is “a vector of generalization that defines, in itself, an admirable final ideality”. Liszka opens a wide perspective on this: to adhere to reasonableness (concrete reasonableness, i.e. reasonableness embodied in our everyday practices) means “to act in accord with reason as it is manifested in a community of inquiry” (Liszka, 2024, p. 12).1 “Communities are designed in a way that their practices maximize pleasure and comfort, promote prosperity and peace among its members who, all the while, are engaged in a continued search for the highest end” (ibid, p. 12. See also Liszka, 2021, Ch. 7-9). The final end is an on-going process of communitarian inquiry, and, all the while, it is a process in which reasonableness could come to signify many different interpretative gestures. Exactly like truth and reality: all public effects of shared practices of action, verific-action and rationaliz-action (Fabbrichesi, 2023).9

In conclusion, let me briefly touch upon the issue of self-control just a bit more. In order to know what my purpose, my ideal is, I must attain near-perfect self-control, that is, in Peircian terms, I must develop a set of self-controlled habits, and be conscious of their actions, which are only in part instinctive and mechanically habitual. I will rephrase the question in purely pragmatist terms: how can we make sense of our practices (Massecar, 2016; Colapietro, 2022), of our habits, that is, of our very existence (habits as a second nature)? To unravel this question, we must know how to detach ourselves, at least momentarily, from our practices, divest ourselves of our old clothes, gain a habit of detachment (Raposa, 2000). As Foucault said, it is necessary to se-deprendre (Foucault, 1985. Introduction), to critically exercise reason over reason itself, over the knowing that guides us in every moment. It is here that the theme of self-control is wedged in. To best carry out this critical exercise and thus contribute to the growth of concrete reasonableness, we must know what we want and be aware of what we do. We must therefore gain complete self-mastery – as far as this is possible, of course – in order to understand and bring to light what we don’t know we know,10 and to bring self-control to gain satisfaction. “The only moral evil is not to have an ultimate aim” (EP 2.202).

In a heart-breaking letter to Lady Welby, in 1909 (Brent 1993, p. 49), Peirce wrote:

If I had a son, I should instill into him this view of morality (that is that Ethics is the science of the method of bringing Self-Control to bear to gain satisfaction) and force him to see that there is but one thing that raises one individual animal above another, – Self-Mastery; and should teach him that the Will is free only in the sense that, by employing the proper appliances, he can make himself behaving in the way he really desires to behave […] By these teachings, by showing him that a poor dog is more

1 I am very thankful to the author who permits me to read and quote his paper delivered at the 2024 APA Meeting.
2 “Communities are designed in a way that their practices maximize pleasure and comfort, promote prosperity and peace among its members who, all the while, are engaged in a continued search for the highest end” (ibid, p. 12. See also Liszka, 2021, Ch. 7-9).
3 “Communities are designed in a way that their practices maximize pleasure and comfort, promote prosperity and peace among its members who, all the while, are engaged in a continued search for the highest end” (ibid, p. 12. See also Liszka, 2021, Ch. 7-9).
9 Such inferences (indubitable beliefs) are beyond the jurisdiction of criticism. It is the part of psychology to explain their processes as it can; but, as long as they are out of the focal plane of consciousness, they are out of our control, and to call them good or bad were idle. The ordinary business of life is, however, best conducted without too much self-criticism” (CP 7.448).
to be respected than an improvident man, who has not prepared himself beforehand to withstand the day of temptation, I should expect to render him eager to submit to a pretty severe discipline.\(^{11}\)

Many commentators note that Peirce in many passages was echoing Schiller (see Petry, 1992, Liszka, 2021, p. 166-173) and Schiller had employed the metaphor of the marble statue being gradually sculpted: a typical Stoic example about self-control and the ethopoietics of the self. In one of his major texts, a 1907 manuscript on Pragmatism, Peirce writes that interpretative semiosis can be thought as a form of askesis, that is, as a continuous training aimed at the formation of ever new habits of response: “The deliberately formed habit, self-analyzing habit, – self-analyzing because it is formed through the analysis of the exercises that nourished it – is the living definition, the veritable and final logical interpretant”. This may produce a “habit-change”, meaning “a modification of a person’s tendencies toward action, resulting from previous experiences or from previous exertions of his will or acts, or from a complexus of both kinds of cause” (CP 5.476).

As Atkins writes, “the rules become living beliefs through reflection on them and on our ideals” (Atkins, 2016, p. 185). For Peirce too, then, wisdom is a difficult and persistent process of askesis: it is the exercise of control over our own habits. That is the reason why Pragmaticism focuses on deliberate and self-controlled conduct.

Now the theory of Pragmaticism was originally based, as anybody will see who examines the papers of November 1877 and January 1878, upon a study of that experience of the phenomena of self-control which is common to all grown men and women; and it seems evident that to some extent, at least, it must always be so based. For it is to conceptions of deliberate conduct that Pragmaticism would trace the intellectual purport of symbols; and deliberate conduct is self-controlled conduct. (CP 5.422).

Philosophy teaches us to master our own conduct, to disengage ourselves from tenaciously and authoritatively fixed beliefs, to become conscious subjects of what influences and conditions us. Ethics teaches us to control our habits by having a rational ideal in view, and to translate this self-control into a habit-change that will lead us to better actions – more prosperous, prolific actions that engender new truths. The growth of concrete reasonableness, which is the ultimate ideal goal, finds its raison d’être precisely in the happiness of growth, of becoming, of the endless and always incipient postponement of the torch of truth (CP 1.339), interpretant after interpretant, conduct after conduct. As Peirce wrote shortly before his death, always generating new truths, guaranteeing the uberty, not the security of reasoning – this is the only sense in which pragmatism can be understood (EP 2:463-475). It is in this sense that we witness transformation and the conscious formation of new habits – sometimes a successful process, sometimes a fraught one.

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\(^{11}\) Larry Holmes, in a very significant article (Holmes, 1966, p. 113) writes that the theme had a particular fascination on him in his later years, because of his “own lack of moral self-control in his youth”.

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