



# COGNITIO

Revista de Filosofia  
Centro de Estudos de Pragmatismo

São Paulo, v. 27, n. 1, p. 1-10, jan.-dez. 2026  
e-ISSN: 2316-5278

 <https://doi.org/10.23925/2316-5278.2026v27i1:e76727>

## Reflection on the possibility of an epistemic dimension in ethics and democracy

*Reflexão sobre a possibilidade de uma dimensão epistêmica na ética e na democracia*

**José Luiz Zanette\***  
zanetteinho@gmail.com

**Abstract:** This paper examines the possibility of an epistemic dimension in ethics and democracy, taking as its point of departure Jürgen Habermas's question concerning the epistemic status of democratic procedures in contemporary societies marked by communicative distortions. In a context increasingly shaped by digital media and the proliferation of narratives immune to moral and normative testing, the integration between discourse and action becomes a decisive philosophical demand. Drawing on the pragmatist tradition, particularly the philosophies of Charles S. Peirce, John Dewey, and others, the study argues that ethics and democracy are normative domains grounded in experience and inferential practices, rather than in metaphysical or purely procedural foundations. By recovering Peirce's conception of normative sciences and his doctrine of synechism, the paper challenges the modern dichotomies between fact and value, cognition and normativity. It is argued that the rational acceptability of actions within a community, understood as a fallibilist and non-coercive process, could sustain the epistemic dimension of moral and democratic norms. In this sense, the epistemic character of democracy is not derived from substantive truths but from the rational continuity of practices oriented toward mutual recognition and the coercion of better arguments.

**Keywords:** Democracy. Epistemic dimension. Ethics. Normativity, Pragmatism. Synechism.

**Recebido em:** 10/02/2026.

**Aprovado em:** 21/05/2026.

**Publicado em:** 08/07/2026.

**Resumo:** Este artigo examina a possibilidade de uma dimensão epistêmica na ética e na democracia, tomando como ponto de partida a questão formulada por Jürgen Habermas acerca do estatuto epistêmico dos procedimentos democráticos em sociedades contemporâneas marcadas por distorções comunicativas. Em um contexto cada vez mais moldado pelas mídias digitais e pela proliferação de narrativas imunes ao escrutínio moral e normativo, a integração entre discurso e ação torna-se uma exigência filosófica decisiva. Com base na tradição pragmatista, particularmente nas filosofias de Charles S. Peirce, John Dewey e outros autores, o estudo sustenta que a ética e a democracia são domínios normativos fundamentados na experiência e em práticas inferenciais, e não em fundamentos metafísicos ou meramente procedimentais. Ao recuperar a concepção peirceana das ciências normativas e sua doutrina do sinequismo, o artigo questiona as dicotomias modernas entre fato e valor, cognição e normatividade. Argumenta-se que a aceitabilidade racional das ações no âmbito de uma comunidade, compreendida como um processo falibilista e não coercitivo, pode sustentar a dimensão epistêmica das normas morais e democráticas. Nesse sentido, o caráter epistêmico da democracia não deriva de verdades substantivas, mas da continuidade racional de práticas orientadas pelo reconhecimento mútuo e pela força coercitiva dos melhores argumentos.

**Palavras-chave:** Democracia. Dimensão epistêmica. Ética. Normatividade. Pragmatismo. Sinequismo.



Artigo está licenciado sob forma de uma licença  
Creative Commons Atribuição 4.0 Internacional.

\* Pontifícia Universidade Católica  
de São Paulo - Centro de Estudos  
de Pragmatismo.

## 1 Introduction

In this study, I address a question raised by Habermas (2006, p. 411-426), which anticipates what we may now call the age of *fake news*: narratives that are not subject to tests of moral-normative correctness, yet seek, through their unlimited proliferation, to claim precisely such a status. These methods recall those employed by twentieth-century authoritarian regimes — Fascism, Nazism, and Stalinism among others — vividly portrayed in George Orwell's novel *1984*.

The title of Habermas's article, *Does Democracy Still Enjoy an Epistemic Dimension?*, which points, first, to the absence, within the political public sphere—mediated by a particular kind of communication—of well-defined contents suitable for deliberation. Today, even considering the rich variety of models that may be evaluated as democratic, in the sense reiterated by John Dewey, democracy requires, first and foremost, a *way of life* that entails the rejection of privilege and the defense of individual rights against oppressive states. It is possible to perceive some progress in delimiting the kinds of content that may be deliberated within the public sphere.

Our reflection therefore proceeds with elements of Habermas's own philosophy, as influenced by Peirce's, both of which constitute the ground upon which one may think the epistemic dimension of the empirical-pragmatic aspects that permeate this discussion today — aiming to satisfy the demand for the formation of a plurality of opinions, as well as to provide non-arbitrary standards for identifying the causes of communicative pathologies.

In this reflective approach, ethics and democracy are considered *normative fields par excellence*, guided by the foundations of Pragmatism. Thinkers such as Peirce, Dewey, and Habermas, among others, sought to reconcile the ancient dichotomy between knowledge and value, fact and norm, distancing themselves from the old dogmatic metaphysics. The result was an intertwining of deontology, cognition, possible ends, and minimal procedural standards ensuring the participation of those affected by normative effects.

## 2 A brief note on ethics in the history of philosophy: the emergence as ethics as thought and metaphysics

For the purpose established here, I refer to Heidegger's work (Heidegger, 2002) on Heraclitus (Heidegger, 2002, p. 218), in which he analyzes the fragments of the pre-Socratic philosopher and relates them to contemporary philosophy. Based on his reading of a fragment concerning ethics, Heidegger states that, through one of Heraclitus's terms, *ethics* signifies “the man's abiding, the dwelling, the ‘habitation’ of human amidst the totality of *ens* [...] the way in which man comports himself toward *ens* and thereby maintains and allows himself to be held”.<sup>1</sup> It follows, according to Heidegger, that in contrast to physics, which thinks *ens* in their totality, ethics focuses on a specific *ens* — man. Yet man is not considered as a mere part of beings in their totality, separated from the others.

It should be noticed that in Heidegger's vocabulary, *ens* designates everything that is — everything that possesses existence — from material things to simple abstractions. In his philosophy, he delves deeply into the question of *Being*, which makes *ens* possible. This, however, will not be the focus of the present study, but rather his investigations into the emerge of ethics as metaphysics. In his analysis of another fragment concerning man and totality — despite the fact that in Heraclitus's philosophy man is not distinguished from other *ens* — Heidegger asserts:

Thought here in its broad and essential sense, ethics seeks to understand how man abides, holds himself within himself, and is contained in this dwelling [...] Ethics

<sup>1</sup> Such a view is similar to that found in Peirce's philosophy, particularly in his doctrine of Objective Idealism.

concerns human beings, not as one object among others [...] In a certain way, man stands within the midst of the totality of *ens* without being himself the center or foundation of that totality[...] Physics and ethics are both modes of understanding the totality of *ens*". (Heidegger, 2002, p. 225-228).

Thus, in Heidegger's interpretation, as a knowledge of the comportment of human attitudes, ethics is the most comprehensive form of knowledge, including logic. (Heidegger, 2002, p. 234)

Accordingly for Heidegger, it is up to ethics to discuss the modes of human behavior, "all derived from the unity of man's posture in the sense of a way of abiding amidst *ens*". Consequently, in his view about Heraclitus, logic is a branch of ethics — the branch dealing with enunciative behavior — lacking, however, the universal character proper to ethics and physics. (Heidegger, 2002, p. 238) Although Heidegger recognizes this trait of totality in the original thought, he notes that

the three titles — logic, physics, ethics — constitute the tripartition, the paradigmatic division of philosophy since Plato. This tripartition, in the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle, enabled thought to become metaphysics. Neither Plato nor Aristotle knew or used the term *metaphysics* [...] If, at bottom, physics is meta-physics, and if ethics — obtained correspondingly and by division in relation to physics — also thinks *ens* in their totality in an equally universal way, albeit from another perspective, then ethics too thinks metaphysically. (Heidegger, 2002, p. 246).

Thus, through Heidegger's development of this line of thought, one can discern the emerge of the metaphysical character of ethics within ancient Greek philosophy. In Plato, as Pegoraro (2006) observes, we encounter an *ethics of transcendence*, whereby "morality, in order to be a science of the Good, must be grounded upon *a priori* pure, concepts: the Ideas, especially the Idea of Justice and of the Good" (Pegoraro, 2006, p. 24).

With Aristotle the *ethics of immanence*, which cannot dispense with social order and peace within the *polis* if one is to live well:

[...] implies the practice of personal ethics (the exercise of moral virtues) and social coexistence according to justice under the guidance of a just and equitable legislator. In this way, the aim of ethics and politics is fulfilled: the happiness of the body politic and of the citizen. (Pegoraro, 2006, p. 58)

This latter condition would later inspire Benjamin Constant's famous distinction between the freedom of the ancients and the freedom of the moderns.

If, for Heraclitus, ethics is an essential part of man — not something acquired externally but, at most, something potentially dormant within him as an innate condition, already inscribed in the human soul as part of his nature — then for Aristotle there is no preexistent potency for the future externalization of virtuous acts. Rather, we become just by performing just actions; ethical character is acquired through *habits*, shaping one's mode of being through practice.

In the Christian era, with Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, we find what may be termed the *verticalization of ethics*. With Augustine, there is a loss of confidence in human reason and freedom, both of which become subordinated to faith. If, as Pegoraro suggests, Augustine may be seen as a phenomenologist (Pegoraro, 2006, p. 76), then in his phenomenology appearances are required to be subsumed under the concept of divine creation — that is, to be "saved" under the light of a dogmatic *a priori*.

Without evident alteration in metaphysical structure, in the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, as Pegoraro explains,

ethics and politics in Thomas simultaneously presuppose reason as their basis and faith as their transcendent crowning. Ethics and politics are charged with creating norms of human conduct grounded in the understanding of man's structure as a rational and political animal by nature. Faith confirms and supports the content of ethical reason, which seeks justice because human beings live in a universe conceived according to a divine plan. (Pegoraro, 2006, p. 98).

Thus, it remains for human beings, in a rational yet detached posture, to contemplate the divine work established within Aristotle's teleology of potentiality and act.

With Kant, the *ethics of subjectivity* replaces one metaphysics with another; but in Kant's case, there arises the hope that a rationally grounded ethics might be possible. Returning to Pegoraro, we find his observation that Kant's philosophy "liberated ethics from the theological tutelage of nearly a millennium. God no longer dictates ethical norms but only the principles of faith. Kant also freed ethics from the Greek philosophy, which derived moral postulates from the metaphysical nature of man" (Pegoraro, 2006, p.98), as well as from the traditional natural and biological laws governing human sensibility and instinct, through his new *transcendental logic*.

Pegoraro, also in his timeline on the evolution of ethics, states about Kant that "Kant marks the beginning of most subsequent ethics. From Kant onward, ethics becomes normative: the ethics of moral law replaces the ethics of virtue" (Pegoraro, 2006, p.117).

The claim that Kantian ethics would have replaced virtue ethics arises from a frequent contemporary approach according to which virtue ethics is opposed to Kant's deontological ethics. This issue cannot be underestimated, since it would imply that the application of the balance between rights and duties — within the public sphere of rational action, understood as a self-regulated association, would operate without any grounding in the concept of virtue.

In his late work on moral and political philosophy, *The Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant deals with, in the section spanning pages 405 to 417 (Kant, 2006), the question of what constitutes a duty of virtue, specifically with the ethical virtues that human beings must develop and fulfill. Equipped with this logical framework and grounded in the principle of universal consciousness, Kant states: "The supreme principle of the doctrine of virtue is: 'Act according to a maxim of ends, the having of which can be for everyone a universal law.'" (Kant, 2006, p. 407). With this principle he articulates a strictly procedural framework - a form of formal pragmatics - that encompasses a conception of virtue grounded in the equality of rights to act.

His philosophy — often characterized as a philosophy of the subject — in which there is a universal subject of knowledge, likewise, aims at a universal subject of ethics, conceived in a rational and deterministic manner, without recourse to evolutionism or fallibilism, and implying an ontological reference to a single objective world.

Within this framework, Kant asserts: "The supreme principle of juridical doctrine is analytical, and the principle of virtue doctrine is synthetic". (Kant, 2006, p. 409). Here, regarding the principle of the juridical doctrine, it is subsumed that the actors within the juridical world are not required to consider laws as integrated within the totality of intersubjective relations. Being analytic, it dispenses with further deliberation — an assertion that is today called into question, insofar as it diverges from a strict predominance of grammaticalism without integration into pragmatic consequences to people involved in these.

According to Kant:

On the contrary, the principle of the doctrine of virtue goes beyond the concept of external freedom and, in accordance with universal laws, unites it with an end that is posited as a duty. This principle is therefore synthetic. The possibility of this principle is contained in its deduction. (Kant, 2002, p. 409).

He further adds that human beings cannot be used merely as means, since the human being is a duty to himself, the human being in general as an end; virtue, therefore, consists in the control of impulses that contravene duty, as recognized through rational access that allows for its ascertainment.

Questions raised by Kant remain forcefully present in ethics. Within contemporary philosophy, envisioning a moral world to be constructed in a shared manner — through an inclusive and self-determining social projection — Habermas refers to what he calls, in a translation of the Kantian realm of ends, the condition according to which an individual can be free only if all others are equally free. In this sense, the end of an individual may be given as an end applicable to all, understood as a form of formal pragmatics intended to replace an ontological reference to an objective world. (Habermas, 2004, p. 66)

Thus, it may be asserted that Kant's moral philosophy was not constructed in order to replace the doctrine of virtues, but rather was founded upon deontology, presenting itself as something more stable and rational than the mere contingencies of history. Accordingly, rather than saying that Kant's moral philosophy replaced a doctrine of virtue, it is more adequate to say that encompasses it — albeit as a doctrine grounded in his most fundamental principle, namely that of rational autonomy.<sup>2</sup>

Returning to the brief historical outline of ethics, it noticed that Heidegger maintains — and here one may agree — that Nevertheless, consistent with its dyadic logic, determinism, and nominalism inherent in a transcendental-logical perspective, Kant's ethics adds nothing new to the ancient tripartition. In a lengthy passage, and *apud* Heidegger, he not only follows it but also affirms its full validity:

Kant still employs the aforementioned tripartition of philosophy. The preface to the 1785 *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* begins with these words: “The old Greek philosophy was divided into three sciences: Physics, Ethics, and Logic. This division accords with the nature of things, and nothing needs correction in it, except only to add the principle on which it is based, so that, on the one hand, we may be assured of its completeness and, on the other, we may be able to determine precisely the necessary subdivisions”. (Heidegger, 2002, p. 240-241).

Kant incorporates the *principle of contradiction*, formulated as “No thing can receive a predicate that contradicts it”, and designates man's behavior toward *ens* and toward their totality by the term *morals*, subordinated to the *moral law*. Thus, he names ethics — the doctrine of morals — the *metaphysics of morals*.

The step taken by Kant remains decisive, and although he sought to confer the same status upon moral and natural laws, he reaffirmed within himself the modern tradition of opposing *knowledge and value, fact and norm*.

Only with Peirce do these separations become idle — as will be seen later — and become clearer within the domain of thought after the so-called *linguistic turn*, which introduced new approaches to theories of meaning and knowledge.

### 3 The philosophy of Peirce, the new role of language, and the end of the quarrel between facts and values

Charles S. Peirce, in 1867, in his essay *A New List of Categories*, (EP 1.1.) did a critical reconstruction of the *Critique of Pure Reason* and carries out a semiotic transformation of Kantian transcendental philosophy through a trivalent dimension of the interpretation of signs. Within pragmatism, this

<sup>2</sup> I am deeply grateful to Professor Vincent Colapietro for his insightful suggestions concerning the Kantian question of the doctrine of virtues, offered during the 2025 International Meeting of the Center for Pragmatism Studies (PUC-SP).

establishes an interrelation between the theory of meaning and semiotics. In this way, space was opened for a transition from the critique of consciousness to the critique of language, without thereby reducing ontological problems to the factual description of language — as has occurred in several branches of philosophy.

It was Peirce who discovered the “sign-man” and who also promoted the integration between discourse and action without transcendence, creating a new world for philosophical reflection. As Apel has shown (Apel, 1984), Peirce dissolved the interminable quarrels between reason and understanding, and between the explicable and the explained. Originating from the phenomenological category of the experience of *firstness*, the relation between perceptual judgments — also a feeling of the world — renders equivalent the insights of the world and hermeneutic understanding, now always situated within the world of experience and open to causal explanation. Perceptual judgments cannot be false or true, since they still contain a hypothetical element; therefore, they are fallible and subject to future testing.

Nevertheless, if meaning is lost it is not sustained by the logical-semiotic “chain” that follows; explanation can then occur only within the field of reasonableness. Inferences and forms of reasoning develop solely within the domain of meaning or reasonableness — within *reasonable reasonableness*.

In this sense, grounded in experience and in *reasonable reasonableness*, Peirce expands the concept of the object. In *Reflections on Real and Unreal Objects* [undated] (MS 966), Peirce affirms that an object is anything that can be thought or spoken of—that is, the “epistemic” includes not only knowledge but everything that can be thought. Clearly, this ends the strict distinction between facts and values, and likewise between the object of ethics and those of other special sciences.

The “epistemic” path applies equally to mental judgments and to external signs (Peirce, CP 5.569), which allows thoughts, emotions, actions, and physical effects to be broadly signified. (Peirce, CP. 8.191) Nature, being rational, is therefore intelligible; this implies that its processes are also to be understood as processes of thought (Peirce, CP 3.422). Such breadth leads to an integration between discourse and action.

This integration in Peirce is easily observed in his mature philosophy — the *pragmatism* — in which the three normative sciences, Aesthetics, Ethics, and Logic, the theoretical disciplines of the “ought,” correspond to his three categories phenomenological of experience, which, in their psychological aspect, appear as feeling, reaction, and thought. Without these interrelations, the true nature of Pragmatism cannot be understood. Through this interaction, Peirce claims that, contrary to his earlier view, reaction should not be regarded as the whole but as the end that results from the third category of experience. An end directed toward action, that is, indicating a predisposition to act.

However, consciousness may signify any of the three categories; yet, in the case of thought, it is we who are *in* consciousness.<sup>3</sup> Thus, the logical interpretant is referred to *synechism*, or continuity, which is the “key of the arch” for a theory of justice into the pragmatism, since the regularity or permanence of action must result in the rational acceptability of those involved in the consequences of action.

Nevertheless, Peirce did not advance sufficiently in his analysis of the types of action that occur within and around the public sphere — a task later developed through Habermas’s teaching on types of action (Zanette, 2023).

## 4 Types of action according to Habermas’s philosophy

Habermas, in his philosophy, maintains a rational treatment of the world. His point of departure is *communicative rationality*, which results from the very interaction between discourse and action.

<sup>3</sup> Consciousness may signify any of the three categories. However, insofar as it signifies thought, it is more we who are within it than it is within any of us. We are in it, rather than it being in any one of us.

It functions as a kind of filter for reflexive, strategic, and epistemic rationalities. Although these forms of rationality interact continuously, there is a convergence toward communicative rationality. From this framework derives the distinction among three types of action: *strategic*, *instrumental*, and *communicative*.

Instrumental action, within the scope of its own rationality, operates in the solution of technical tasks and in the construction of efficient means. Epistemic action, for Habermas, is wrapped by knowledge, leading him to describe himself as a realist in epistemic matters but a constructivist in moral questions — a division that, as will be seen later, becomes idle considering Peirce's *Synechism*.

For the purpose of this discussion, strategic actions are of particular importance. These are mostly characterized by the agent's calculation of success in relation to others, influencing the decisions of other actors and aiming at the recognition of a correctness of the action from the normative point of view — thus contributing to the consolidation of understanding-oriented action. After his initial insights into the theory of communicative action, Habermas further developed his reflections on forms of social action and consolidated his thought through the identification of the *pathologies* of strategic action (Habermas, 1996).

Communicative action, in this framework, is divided into *understanding-oriented action* and *consensual action*, the latter of which subdivides into *action* and *discourse*. Strategic action, in turn, is divided into *Evident (open)* action, in which the means for achieving argumentative success are clear to all participants, and *Latent (covert)* action, which operates through indirect and manipulative means — resulting in *distorted communication* and thus precluding the possibility of normative moral correctness.

The distinction between Evident and Latent strategic actions, within the interweaving of the aforementioned rationalities, is primarily guided by epistemic rationality — even though this occurs within a *fallibilist epistemology* that follows from an *indeterminist ontology*.

Such a direction is entirely consistent with Habermas's general orientation. In his critique of Rawls (Habermas, 1995, p. 109-131), he points out that for a proper procedural model, Rawls should not have adopted an *anticognitive vocabulary*, since only *cognitive meaning*, endowed with the deontological character of the procedure, can lead to the compulsion of the better argument, capable of withstanding the coercions arising from the diversity of virtualized doctrines. Keeping all these questions apart creates a problematic environment. For Habermas, there is no way to separate the public use of reason from some degree of objectivity, the space of moral convictions and the locus in which the force of the better argument can truly reside.

## 5 Final considerations

In the introduction to this study, reflecting on the public political sphere in relation to the operators of digital media — including those responsible for generating *fake news* — whether in open-content formats or in content produced for instrumental purposes, one can consider that the demand for integration between discourse and action is already underway. Perhaps not at the desired pace, given the complexity of the issues involved, but it is proceeding within certain limits regarding the consequences for human dignity, the suffering of those offended, and the possible distortion in the constitution of norms and values. The counterfactual dimension of debates, encompassing broad thematic approaches throughout the public sphere, is already directed toward deliberative institutions that establish compulsory norms for individuals and is indeed already implicated in an epistemic dimension.

The question of which guiding principles define an ideal of justice seems to find its vectors in Peirce's philosophy. In his mature thought, Peirce concludes that normative philosophy possesses an inferential structure and can be treated as a rational inquiry into the ultimate ends of action. These ends, constituted through inference, are *logical interpretants* that stand as candidates — under the form of

*final interpretants of action*, whose regularity — within the continuum of time, the domain of *Synechism*, which Peirce describes as the “key of the arch” leading toward the philosophical ideal of justice (CP 8). Actions are not imposed by coercion but through the rational acceptability of those involved, in the prediction of their consequences for the community.

In this way, the moral-normative correction of voluntary and self-controlled actions assumes, within the continuum, a certain resemblance to natural laws, as turn themselves available into reality. Such actions thereby qualify as components of reality and are independent of linguistic naming. Within *Synechism*, the real thirdness of natural laws and the normative correctness of noncoercive human behavior, together, compose the objective world — a world imagined as more or less the same for all — which is in the domain of an epistemic dimension.

## References

- APEL, Karl Otto. *Understanding and Explanation: A Transcendental-Pragmatic Perspective*. 1. ed. The MIT Press Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England. 1984.
- APEL, Karl. *Charles S. Peirce: From Pragmatism to Pragmaticism*. New York: Humanities Press International Inc., 1995.
- APEL, Karl. *Transformação da Filosofia I: Filosofia Analítica, Semiótica, Hermenêutica*. 1. ed. São Paulo: Edições Loyola, 2000.
- APEL, Karl. *Transformação da Filosofia II: O a priori da comunidade de comunicação*. 1. ed. São Paulo: Edições Loyola, 2000.
- HABERMAS, Jürgen. *Racionalidade e Comunicação*. Lisboa: Edições 70, 1996.
- HABERMAS, Jürgen. *Reconciliation Through the Public Use of Reason: Remarks on John Rawls's Political Liberalism*. *The Journal of Philosophy*, v. 92, n. 3, p. 109-131, mar. 1995. <https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil199592335>.
- HABERMAS, Jürgen. *Teoria de la Acción Comunicativa I: Racionalidad de la Acción y Racionalización Social*. 3. ed. Madrid: Taurus Humanidades, 2001.
- HABERMAS, Jürgen. *Teoria de la Acción Comunicativa II: Crítica de la Razón Funcionalista*. 3. ed. Madrid: Taurus Humanidades, 2001a.
- HABERMAS, Jürgen. *Teoria de la Acción Comunicativa: Complementos y Estudios Previos*. 4. ed. Madrid: Cátedra, 2001b.
- HABERMAS, Jürgen. *A Ética da Discussão e a Questão da Verdade*. 1. ed. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2004.
- HABERMAS, Jürgen. *Does Democracy Still Enjoy an Epistemic Dimension?* *Communication Theory*, v. 16, p. 411-426, 2006. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2885.2006.00280.x>.
- HEIDEGGER, Martin. *Heráclito: A origem do pensamento ocidental. Lógica*. A doutrina heraclítica do Lógos. 3. ed. Rio de Janeiro: Relume Dumará, 2002.
- KANT, Immanuel. *Metafísica Dei Costumi*. Texto tedesco a fronte. (German and Italian) 1ª Edizione. Milano: Bompiani, 2006.
- PEIRCE, Charles Sanders. *Reflections on Real and Unreal Objects*. [Undated] MS 966.
- PEIRCE, C. S. *The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*. Electronic edition reproducing Vols. I-VI ed. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1931-1935), Vols. VII-VIII ed. Arthur W. Burks (same publisher, 1958). Mentioned CP.

PEIRCE, C. S. *Writings of Charles S. Peirce – Chronological Edition*. V. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, Indiana University Press – Peirce Edition Project.

PEIRCE, C. S. *The Essential Peirce* – Selected Philosophical Writings. Indiana University Press. Volumes 1 e 2. 1992 e 1998. Mentioned as EP. 1 or 2.

PEIRCE, Charles S. *The New Elements of Mathematics. Vol. IV: Mathematical Philosophy*. Edited by Carolyn Eisele. The Hague; Paris: Mouton & Co B.V. Publishers, 1976. NEM 4.

PEGORARO, Olinto. *A Ética dos maiores mestres através da história*. 1. ed. Petrópolis: Editora Vozes, 2006.

ZANETTE, J. L. *Relation of normative sciences and the predisposition to act in Peirce's philosophy*. *Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia, Centro de Estudos de Pragmatismo, São Paulo*, v. 24, n. 1, p. 1-7, jan./dez. 2023. <https://doi.org/10.23925/2316-5278.2023v24i1:e63651>.



# COGNITIO

Revista de Filosofia  
Centro de Estudos de Pragmatismo

São Paulo, v. 27, n. 1, p. 1-10, jan.-dez. 2026  
e-ISSN: 2316-5278

 <https://doi.org/10.23925/2316-5278.2026v27i1:e76727>