The Rescue of the legislative’s representative function for the restoration of institutional stability

Abstract

This article analyzes the weakening of the representative function of the Legislative Branch and its effects on institutional balance in democratic constitutionalism. It begins with the problem of the loss of centrality of Parliament in the face of the expanding decision-making power of the Executive and Judiciary branches, especially in contexts marked by the recurrent use of unilateral normative acts, the judicialization of politics, and the displacement of public choices to instances less exposed to representative deliberation. The research adopts a theoretical-critical approach, of a bibliographic and documentary nature, drawing on classic and contemporary authors of constitutional theory and democracy, including Kelsen, Schmitt, Bobbio, Habermas, Waldron, and Gargarella. It argues that the retraction of parliamentary representation compromises democratic legitimacy, weakens the separation of powers, and reduces the institutional capacity for mediating social conflicts. The study demonstrates that the recomposition of the representative function requires the strengthening of deliberative procedures, parliamentary control over executive acts, the improvement of legislative production, and the limitation of judicial substitution in the political arena. It is concluded that the restoration of institutional stability depends on the revaluation of Parliament as a public space for the formation of collective will, without removing constitutional control, but preventing it from replacing the democratic mediation inherent in the legislative process.