

**FREGE'S PHILOSOPHY OF MIND?
THE CONCEPTION OF SUBJECTIVITY IN
FREGE**

MARIO ARIEL GONZÁLEZ PORTA

PUC-SP – Brazil – Bolsista CNPq – nível 2

mariopor@pucsp.br

ABSTRACT:

Frege's decisive and well-known critique of psychologism does not exclude, but rather presupposes, a certain peculiar conception of subjectivity.

KEYWORDS:

FREGE. PSYCHOLOGISM. PLATONISM. PHILOSOPHY OF MIND

1. INTRODUCTION

In what follows I intend to make it plausible that Frege has a certain conception of subjectivity and indicate its main features. This obviously implies the controversial and provocative thesis that there is a conception of subjectivity in Frege, which is totally in opposition to the consensus that Frege has no interest in this subject.

I will base my thesis on three types of arguments that, in the end, are interrelated, namely:

- a. consideration of texts that have been either overlooked or neglected in some of their aspects;
- b. attention to the reciprocal relationship of these texts, which, when so considered, show a coherent whole (something that is lost sight of considering them as mere isolated curiosities);
- c. and, finally, placement of these texts in their historical-philosophical context, by appealing to comparison with other authors.

2. AN INTERESTING TEXT ABOUT THE RELATIONSHIP TO IDEATE (*VORSTELLEN*)¹ - THINK / JUDGE (*DENKEN / URTEILEN*)

I would like to start from a text that is well known and has already been analyzed on what we could call the main point of view.

¹ I use *idea* to translate *Vorstellung*, and to *ideate* or *ideating* or *ideation* to translate *Vorstellen*. (See the note of the translator in the Oxford edition of Frege's *The Basic Laws of Arithmetic* (2016, p. XXIII-XXIV). I have quoted all the texts in the corresponding English translation and placed the original German version in the note when it is the case. In the case of no corresponding English translation, Camila Bozzo made the translation. All italics are mine.

Physiological psychology provides us with the most striking case of this slide into idealism because its realistic point of departure stands in such sharp contrast to it. We start out with nerve fibers and ganglion cells and make assumptions about impulses and how they are transmitted, and we seek in this way to make ideation more intelligible, since we can't help regarding processes in the ganglion cells and nerve fibers as more intelligible than the process of ideation. As befits a science worthy of the name, we do not hesitate to take it for granted, *when we proceed like this, that ganglion cells and nerve fibers are objective and real*. This will probably work perfectly well so long as we confine ourselves to ideation. But we do not stop there: we move on to thinking and judgement as well, and *at this point what began as realism suddenly turns into an extreme form of idealism; in this way realism itself cuts off the branch on which it is sitting*. (FREGE, 1979d, p. 144)².

Obviously, Frege is referring to physiological psychology that, contradictorily, intends to establish idealistic consequences on a realistic basis and it is likely that the criticism is directed to Wundt. Now, without denying that in this passage the main point is the one indicated, I would like to draw attention to another aspect, where I emphasize:

Physiological psychology provides us with the most striking case of this slide into idealism because its realistic point of departure stands in such sharp contrast to it. We start out with nerve fibers and ganglion cells and make assumptions about impulses and how they are transmitted, and we seek in this way to make ideation more intelligible, since we can't help regarding processes in the ganglion cells and nerve fibers as more intelligible than the process of ideation. As befits a science worthy of the name, we do not hesitate to take it for granted, *when we proceed like this, that ganglion cells and nerve fibers are objective and real*. *This will probably work perfectly well so long as we confine ourselves to ideation. But we do not stop there: we move on to thinking*

² „Am Auffallendste ist das Einmünden in Idealismus bei der physiologischen Psychologie, weil es mit ihrem realistischen Ausgangspunkt in so scharfem Gegensatz steht. Man geht aus von Nervenfasern, Ganglienzellen, macht Annahme über Erregungen und deren Fortleitung und sucht damit das Vorstellen dem Verständnis näher zu bringen, indem man unwillkürlich die Vorgänge in den Ganglienzellen und Nervenfasern für verständlicher hält, als das Vorstellen. Wie es sich für eine brave Naturwissenschaft ziemt, *setzt man hier bei unbesehen die Ganglienzellen und Nervenfasern als objektiv und wirklich voraus*. Dies mag solange gehen, als man sich auf das Vorstellen beschränkt. Aber dabei bleibt es nicht: man geht auch auf das Denken und Urteilen über, und *da schlägt nun plötzlich der anfängliche Realismus in extremen Idealismus um, und damit sägt diese Theorie selber, den Ast ab, auf dem sie sitzt*.“ (FREGE, (1897) 1990, p. 62)

and judgement as well, and at this point what began as realism suddenly turns into an extreme form of idealism; in this way realism itself cuts off the branch on which it is sitting. (FREGE, 1979d, p. 144)³

Clearly Frege is here distinguishing between to ideate, on the one hand, and thinking and judging, on the other and giving them a different treatment with respect to a certain issue indicated by the “this”. Frege concedes *en passant*, that, in principle, a neurophysiological reduction of psychic phenomena can be admitted as far as ideas are concerned; he denies, however, that such a reduction is acceptable with regards to thinking and judging.

The effective path of the Fregean text is complex and has several aspects, and it is not desirable to submit it to a thorough analysis right now. For this reason, we will focus on the thesis we have indicated and only observe that it is linked to others, namely:

- a. that founding a certain form of idealism in physiology is not contradictory in the case of ideas, but it is in the case of thinking and judging;
- b. that what is true or false cannot be real events, since truth is not a property of them;
- c. that the object of ideating, the idea, is real-immanent in consciousness;
- d. that the object of ideating, as real-immanent in consciousness, can be explained by its neurophysiological conditions or reduced to these;

³ „Am Auffallendste ist die Einmünden in Idealismus bei der physiologischen Psychologie, weil es mit ihrem realistischen Ausgangspunkte in so scharfem Gegensatz steht. Man geht aus von Nervenfasern, Ganglienzellen, macht Annahme über Erregungen und deren Fortleitung und sucht damit das Vorstellen dem Verständnis näher zu bringen, indem man unwillkürlich die Vorgänge in den Ganglienzellen un Nervenfassern für verständlicher hält, als das Vorstellen. Wie es sich für eine brave Naturwissenschaft ziemt, setzt man hier bei unbesehen die Ganglienzellen und Nervenfässern als objektiv und wirklich voraus. *Dies mag solange gehen, als man sich auf das Vorstellen beschränkt. Aber dabei bleibt es nicht: man geht auch auf das Denken und Urteilen über*, und da schlägt nun plötzlich der anfängliche Realismus in extremen Idealismus um, und damit sägt diese Theorie selber, den Ast ab, auf dem sie sitzt.“ (FREGE, (1897) 1990, p. 62)

e. and that, for that reason, such an object has a purely phenomenal-subjective character and

f. that, therefore, if all our knowledge were reduced to ideas, any bridge to the objective would be broken;

g. that thinking and judging are not ideas or allowed to reduce to ideas;

h. that thinking and judging cannot be reduced to physiological mechanisms;

i. that if thinking and judging were reduced to ideas and, consequently, to neurophysiological events, the truth would ultimately become a property of real events.

Implicit in all this argumentation is that thinking is the capture of thoughts (*Gedanken*) and that, therefore, the object of thinking, unlike that of ideating, is not a real-immanent object in consciousness and that, consequently, he can be rightly considered the true bearer of truth.

3. ONE MORE TEXT ABOUT IDEAS

The above is not the only text in which Frege says something substantial with respect to ideas. In fact, there are other texts in which Frege explicitly states that ideas are what is subject to the laws of the association and others, moreover, where he generalizes this idea to make it clear that the laws of association are only a case of laws governing ideas, but that together with them can also be found the laws of fusion (*Verschmelzung*).

An idea in the subjective sense is what is governed by the psychological laws of association. (FREGE, 1980, p. 37)⁴

⁴ "Die Vorstellung im subjektiven Sinne ist das, worauf sich die psychologischen Assoziationsgesetze beziehen [...]" (FREGE, 1884, p. 41-42)

And hence a vacillation afflicts the use of the word “idea”, so that sometimes it seems to refer to something which belongs to the mental life of the individual and which, in accordance with the psychological laws, amalgamates with other ideas, associates with them; while at other times, to something that confronts everyone in the same way, so that no bearer of ideas is either mentioned or even presupposed. These two uses are incompatible; for the former, associations, amalgamations merely occur within the individual bearer of ideas and merely occur at something that is as private to the bearer of ideas as his joy or pain. (FREGE, 2016, p. XVIII)⁵

Associate ideas or run them together as we may, we shall still finish up with an idea and never with something that could be true. (FREGE, 1979d, p. 131)⁶

That Frege distinguishes between association and fusion, shows that he has a certain non-trivial knowledge of the psychology of his time, because the notion of fusion is characteristic of German psychology from Herbart, and there was a discussion about the relations between association and fusion which Wundt echoes. But, if this is interesting enough in itself, it is not what we should concentrate our attention on now, but rather the fact that, given the above, we can say that ideas are those psychic phenomena that are subject to the laws of nature (*Naturgesetze*).

If ideas are that mode of psychism subject to the laws of nature, then it is not vain to link this thesis to the previous thesis according to which ideas, ultimately, can be explained by neurophysiological phenomena. Actually, both theses not only do not contradict and are consistent with each other, but in a certain sense they complement each other.

⁵ „Und daher kommt ein Schwanken in den Gebrauch des Wortes ‘Vorstellung’, indem es bald etwas zu bedeuten scheint, was dem Seelenleben des Einzelnen angehört und nach psychologischen Gesetzen mit anderen Vorstellungen verschmilzt, sich mit ihnen assoziiert, bald etwas Allen gleicherweise Gegenüberstehendes, bei dem ein Vorstellender weder genannt noch auch nur vorausgesetzt wird. Diese beiden Gebrauchsweisen sind unvereinbar; denn jene Associationen, Verschmelzungen gehen nur im einzelнем Vorstellenden vor sich und gehen nur an etwas vor sich, was diesem Vorstellenden ganz so eigentümlich zugehört, wie seine Freude oder sein Schmerz es tut“. (FREGE, 1893, p. XVIII)

⁶ “Wie man auch assoziieren oder verschmelzen mag, man wird immer nur wieder eine Vorstellung erhalten, aber nie etwas, was wahr sein könnte.” (FREGE, (1897) 1990, p. 43)

Moreover, if ideas are psychic phenomena subject to the laws of nature and, eventually, ultimately explainable by their neurophysiological conditions, then it is not risky to think that ideas cannot be in any intelligible sense “free”, and that if there are free phenomena in the psyche, this can only happen because they are not ideas.

4. AN INTERESTING TEXT ABOUT THE RELATION IDEA - DECISION
(*ENTSCHLUSS*)

Now, in a curious text that has been overlooked or erroneously interpreted up until now, Frege tells us that decisions are not ideas:

Even an unphilosophical man soon finds it necessary to recognize an inner world distinct from the outer world, a world of sense-impressions, of creations of his imagination, of sensations, of feelings and moods, a world of inclinations, wishes and decisions. For brevity's sake I want to use the word “idea” to cover all these occurrences, *except decisions*. (FREGE, 1991, p. 360)⁷

Notice that Frege makes an enumeration that is not random, but follows a principle, which refers to the classic tripartite theory of faculties:

<i>Vorstellen</i> (to ideate)	<i>Sinneseindrücke</i> (sense impressions) <i>Schöpfungen der Einbildungskraft</i> (creations of the imagination) <i>Empfindungen</i> (sensations)
<i>Fühlen</i> (to feel)	<i>Gefühle</i> (feelings)

⁷ „Auch der unphilosophische Mensch sieht sich bald genötigt, eine von der Aussenwelt verschiedene Innenwelt anzuerkennen, eine Welt der Sinneseindrücke, der Schöpfungen seiner Einbildungskraft, der Empfindungen, der Gefühle und Stimmungen, eine Welt der Neigungen, Wünsche und Entschlüsse. Um einen kurzen Ausdruck zu haben, will ich dies *mit Ausnahme der Entschlüsse* unter dem Worte “Vorstellung” zusammenfassen.“ (FREGE, (1918) 1966, p. 39)

	<i>Stimmungen</i> (moods)
<i>Wollen</i> (to want)	<i>Neigungen</i> (inclinations/tendencies) <i>Wünsche</i> (desires) <i>Entschlüsse</i> (decisions)

However, there is a decisive difference with this theory in the conception of *wanting*, because, as trends and desires are considered ideas, the decision is not.

If decisions are not ideas, the question that is imposed is obviously: why? Given the above, it is thought that the answer is that decisions are not ideas because they are not subject to the natural laws of psychism and, eventually, are not neurophysiologically explainable; that is: *Entschlüsse* are free.

5. THE CONJUNCTION OF BOTH TEXTS

That thinking and judging are not ideas or reduced to a combination of ideas (*Vorstellungsverbindungen*), is something repeated by Frege in innumerable texts and already implicitly contained in the famous thesis that thinking is apprehension of thoughts (*Fassen von Gedanken*)⁸. Now, if taking into account the above, we link the results obtained from the analysis of the two previous texts, let us observe that obviously there is a parallel between what Frege says about the relationship of ideating with thinking and judging, and what Frege says about the relationship of ideating with deciding. Given the above, it does not

⁸ Note that in the text quoted about decisions, although we are told that decisions are not ideas, it is striking that, in it, neither thinking nor judging are mentioned. In reality, the follow-up of the tripartite theory of the faculties would have required placing thinking among the modes of ideation not less than placing judgment among the modes of wanting.

seem exaggerated to transfer what he says in one case to what he says in the other.

1. If thinking and judging are not reducible to neurophysiological conditions, neither is deciding.
2. If deciding is not ideating because it is not subject to the mechanical laws of psyche, neither thinking nor judging are.

If there is a parallel in what Frege says regarding the relationship ideate, think-judge and with respect to the relationship ideate - decide, we can deepen this parallel to the extent that we study differently the relationship of these elements to each other, that is, between:

- a. think-judge
- b. judge-decide
- c. think-decide

The think-judge relationship is very simple: we can think without judging, but we cannot judge without thinking, because what is judged is what is thought. If to think is to capture thoughts, to judge is to attribute a value of truth to a thought.

From the above another, less obvious and more much more interesting, relationship is clear, namely, the relationship of judging when deciding (see GABRIEL, 2003, p. 24). Frege defines judging in several ways, sometimes as attribution of a truth value, sometimes also, however, as an election (*Wahl*).

To make a judgement is to make a choice between opposite thoughts.
(FREGE, 1979c, p. 198)⁹

⁹ "Man kann sagen, dass das Urteilen die Wahl zwischen Entgegengesetzten ist." (FREGE, (1906c) 1990, p. 201)

To make a judgement is to make a choice between opposite thoughts. Accepting one of them and rejecting the other is one act. (FREGE, 1979b, p. 198)¹⁰

Consequently, we can comfortably infer that this election implies a decision. If the above is correct, then a path is opened to better understand the Fregean motivation to establish his thesis that deciding is not a way of ideating. Certainly, as we saw, this implies that the decision is free. Now, beyond the interest that this thesis may have from the point of view of an eventual ethic, a topic with which Frege certainly has not been occupied, it cannot be overlooked that the thesis that decisions are free acts is absolutely relevant to the Fregean theory of judgment, because if our judgments were always causally determined, then, a serious threat to the possibility of objectivity would certainly be established.

More complex and also more interesting is the relationship between thinking and deciding, which goes through judging. Interestingly, the important treatment dedicated to it, has not been correctly contextualized and, for this reason, has resulted in a very strange interpretation by Currie (1984, p. 234-236, 244) according to which thoughts act or have causal efficacy (*wirken*)¹¹. In any

¹⁰ "Das Urteil ist die Wahl zwischen entgegengesetzten Gedanken. Die Anerkennung des einen und die Verwerfung des andern ist eine Tat." (FREGE, (1906b) 1969, p. 214).

¹¹ The point of Frege's text is not the thesis that *Gedanken wirken*, but how they do it, or better, *how they don't*.

To say: "The laws of gravitation, of inertia, of the parallelogram of forces cause the earth to move as it does move", might make it look as if these laws, so to speak took the earth by the ears and kept it on the path they prescribe. Such a use of the words "affect", "cause", would be misleading. On the other hand, it is all right to say that the sun and planets act on one another in accordance with the laws of gravitation. (FREGE, 1979d, p. 137)

Wenn man sagt: "Die Gesetze der Gravitation, der Trägheit, des Parallelograms der Kräfte bewirken, dass die Erde sich so bewegt, wie sie sich bewegt, so könnte das den Anschein erwecken, als ob jene Naturgesetze die Erde sozusagen beim Ohre nähmen und zu pflichtmässigen Wandel anhielten. Ein solcher Gebrauche der Wörter "wirken", "bewirken" wäre irreleitend. Dagegen kann man wohl sagen, dass die Sonne und die Planeten nach dem Gravitationsgesetze aufeinander wirken. (FREGE, (1897) 1990, p. 52)

Since laws (*Gesetze*) are the paradigmatic example of thoughts (*Gedanken*), what Frege is saying here is clearly that thoughts do not act causally (*wirken*) in a literal sense. If it were understood in a literal sense, it would fall into a mythology.

If we were to disregard this we should easily slip into a kind of mythology. (FREGE, 1979d, p. 137)

case, the central point that we are interested in underlining now is that deciding involves thinking (and judging), because it is a decision about a thought. Frege says it explicitly:

How does a thought act? By being grasped and taken to be true. This is a process in the inner world of a thinker which may have further consequences in this inner world, and which may also encroach on the sphere of the will and make itself noticeable in the outer world as well. If, for example, I grasp the thought we express by the theorem of Pythagoras, the consequence may be that I recognize it to be true, and further that I apply it in making a *decision*, which brings about the acceleration of masses. This is how our actions are usually *led up to by acts of thinking and judging*. (FREGE, 1991, p. 371)¹²

Note that, perhaps for purely grammatical reasons, instead of "*Entschlüsse*" Frege uses the expression "*Beschlüsse*" in this text. Leaving aside this small difference, stylistic and non-substantial, the idea expressed is the same as in the previous text. In an even clearer way, and in this case explicitly using the term decision (*Entschluss*), Frege already expressed in the *Logic* of 1897: "If we wish to speak of a thought as being actual, we can do so only in the sense that the knowledge that a man has of e.g. a law of nature has an influence on the decisions he makes, which in their turn may affect the course of history." (FREGE, 1979d, p. 138)¹³

Wenn man das nicht beachten wollte, wurde man leicht in eine Art von Mythologie verfallen. (FREGE, (1897) 1990, p. 52)

This thesis acquires all its meaning in the controversial context of Lotze's critique of finalism and, in particular, in the role played in some German idealists by the "Idea" in the realization of the purpose.

¹² „Wie wirkt ein Gedanke? Dadurch, dass er gefasst und für wahr gehalten wird. Das ist ein Vorgang in der Innenwelt eines Denkenden, der weitere Folgen in der Innenwelt haben kann, die, auf das Gebiet des Willens übergreifend, sich auch in der Aussenwelt bemerkbar machen. Wenn ich z.B. den Gedanken fasse, den wir im pythagoreischen Lehrsatz aussprechen, so kann die Folge sein, dass ich ihn als wahr anerkenne, und weiter, dass ich ihn anwende, einen *Beschluss* fassend, der Beschleunigung von Massen bewirkt. So werden unsere Taten gewöhnlich durch *Denken und Urteilen vorbereitet*. Und so können Gedanken auf Massenbewegungen mittelbar Einfluss haben.“ (FREGE, (1918) 1986, p. 53)

¹³ "Wenn man von einer Wirklichkeit des Gedankens sprechen will, so kann dies nur in dem Sinne geschehen, dass die Kenntnis, die jemand, z.B. von einem Naturgesetz hat, auf seine

Now, if one can say that decisions, in a certain sense, are “caused” by knowledge, care must be taken to specify what is being understood, in this case, by “causation.” “Cause” does not mean here in any way being “determined” by natural laws, but means being “motivated” by a knowledge. Frege is thus differentiating two types of causation (*wirken*) essentially heterogeneous, one natural-causal and one “intentional”. More specifically, there is an absolute difference in the effect of a stone that falls on my head and my decision to change place since I know what will happen if the stone falls on my head. It is not the fact that the stone will fall on my head, but my knowledge about it, that “motivates” my action. Facts or events causally determine other facts or events; a knowledge about a fact or event “motivates” a decision making¹⁴.

Actually, the Fregean affirmation that decisions are not subject to the laws of the association (and, with it, to mechanical-natural determinism) and the Fregean affirmation that decisions are actually motivated by a knowledge, are only the two sides of the same coin, that is, the negative and positive formulation of the same fundamental conception.

Entschlüsse einwirkt, die dann wieder Massenbewegungen zur Folge haben können.” (FREGE, (1897) 1990, p. 53)

¹⁴ We have introduced the notion of “motivation”, typically Husserlian, to refer to a mode of causality that goes through the intervention of intentional states. Frege certainly does not directly affirm that the decision is motivated by the apprehension of thought. That, however, the notion of motivation is not totally absent from its purview, is seen in other texts if one considers the fact that “*veranlassen*” is in German an equivalent of “*motivieren*.”

The influence of man on man is brought about for the most part by thoughts. People communicate thoughts. How do they do this? They bring about changes in the common external world, and these are meant to be perceived by someone else, and so give him a chance to grasp a thought and take it to be true. Could the great events of world history have come about without the communication of thoughts? (FREGE, 1991, p. 371)

Das Wirken von Mensch auf Mensch wird zumeist durch Gedanken vermittelt. Man teilt einen Gedanken mit. Wie geschieht das? Man bewirkt Veränderungen in der gemeinsamen Aussenwelt, die, von dem andern wahrgenommen, ihn veranlassen sollen, einen Gedanken zu fassen und ihn für wahr zu halten. Die grossen Begebenheiten der Weltgeschichte, konnten sie anders als durch Gedankenmitteilung zustande kommen? (FREGE, (1918) 1966, p. 53)

Here, the motivation is not to make a decision, but to capture a thought.

Establishing the relationship between thinking and deciding, highlights the need to distinguish between two types of deciding, the one that is present in judgment (*Urteil*), and the one that is present as a result of a thinking and that, eventually, also supposes deciding present in the judging. In one case, deciding is a decision about the true value of a thought, in the other, about an action to be performed; in both cases they are, however, always about some kind of act.

The above being said, it is clear not only that thinking, judging and deciding are equally opposed to ideating, but that thinking, judging and deciding have important relationships with each other, relationships of a kind that could not exist between them if they were modes of ideating. Based on it, we can now make a new statement, namely:

- a. Thinking, judging and deciding constitute a unitary class of psychic phenomena, while ideas constitute another unitary class.
- b. If the above is correct, then we have to conceive of psychic life as consisting of two essentially heterogeneous kinds of phenomena, on the one hand, the phenomena of ideating in all its varieties, on the other, the phenomena of thinking, judging and deciding.

We can graphically summarize our conclusions through a scheme:

Superior psychic functions	<i>Denken</i> - <i>Urteilen</i> - <i>Entschliessen</i> (Freedom without physiological conditioning)
Inferior psychic functions	<i>Vorstellen</i> (Mechanical laws; Physiological conditioning)

6. THE CONTEXT OF FREGEAN STATEMENTS: LOTZE ON DECISIONS,
JUDGMENTS AND ASSESSMENTS (*WERTEN*)

At the point we have reached, we have raised certain plausibilities based on clear texts. These are decisively reaffirmed if we pay attention to Frege's historical-philosophical context, since the idea of subjectivity Frege is proposing is common in his time and, more precisely, has been explicitly defended by Lotze.

I will articulate my exposition of Lotze regarding Frege in two steps: first, I will show that Frege's conception of decision comes from Lotze; second, I will also demonstrate the presence in Lotze of a conception of subjectivity that differentiates, like Frege, two essentially different kinds of psychic phenomena. The context of both Lotzean theories is their controversy with Czolbe. Knowingly, Lotze was a critic of teleological explanations in the biological sphere and, for that reason, the materialists, who based their theories on the results of physiology, tended to initially see in Lotze an ally, a fact that provokes Lotze's reaction, which, in this way, becomes the main protagonist of the *Materialismusstreit*.

Lotze follows the classic scheme of the tripartite division of the faculties in ideating, feeling (*Fühlen*) and wanting (*Wollen*). He complements it, however, with an important observation with respect to wanting, namely, that what is usually called that, are only modes of idea and feeling, and that the term "wanting" should be reserved for acts of spontaneity or free choice. This distinction implies, in turn, a clear demarcation line between phenomena such as ideating and feeling, which are subject to deterministic legality, and phenomena that are properly free.

We have already expressed the conviction that, besides Ideation and Feeling, Volition contains a peculiar element of mental activity, not derived from these two, though dependent on them as the occasions of its appearance. Now, however, when we come more closely to consider this new mode of psychic activity, we must premise the acknowledgment that, among the various phenomena which under various names are either directly ranked

with it or attached to it as of kin, there are many in which we can recognize only special forms of ideation and feeling. We are unquestionably too lavish with the terms volition and effort, and denote by them many processes to which the soul is related not as an acting being but only as an observing consciousness; movements of ideas and feelings that merely take place in us on various occasions supplied by the general psychic mechanism, and are noted by us as taking place, we erroneously take for energies put forth by our decided Will or by some less definite effort of our Ego. (LOTZE, 1885-1888, p. 254-255)¹⁵

We are convinced that we meet with an act of will only where the impulses urging to action are apprehended in distinct consciousness, where, moreover, the decision whether they shall be followed or not is deliberated upon and is left to be determined by free choice of the mind, which is unswayed by these pressing motives, and not by the force of these motives themselves. So intimate is the connection between the notion of Freedom and that of Volition; for in this decision concerning a given matter of fact consists the true efficacy of Will. On the other hand, Will can have no content other than that supplied by the involuntary flow of ideas and feelings, and, not being itself an outwardly directed effort, moulding and creative, must be content with unrestricted freedom of choice between the objects thus put within its reach. Now, were it impossible to conceive this freedom or to justify its acceptance as a fact, would we have any further occasion to retain the name of Will? (LOTZE, 1885-1888, p. 256)¹⁶

¹⁵ „Wir haben früher die Überzeugung ausgesprochen, dass neben dem Vorstellen und dem Gefühl das Wollen ein eigentümliches Element geistiger Regsamkeit enthalte, nicht ableitbar aus jenen beiden, obwohl von ihnen als Veranlassungen seines Hervortretens abhängig. Indem wir jedoch jetzt zu einer genaueren Betrachtung dieser neuen Tätigkeitsweisen der Seele geführt werden, müssen wir das Zugeständnis vorausschicken, dass unter den mannigfaltigen Erscheinungen, die man unter verschiedenen Namen ihr entweder unmittelbar zugeordnet oder doch als verwandt an sie anknüpft, viele sich befinden, in denen wir nur besondere Formen des Vorstellens und des Gefühls zuerkennen vermögen. Mit dem Namen des Wollens und Strebens sind wir unleugbar zu freigebig und bezeichnen mit ihm manches Ereignis, zu welchem die Seele sich nur als beobachtendes Bewusstsein, nicht als handelndes Wesen verhält, Bewegungen der Vorstellungen und Gefühle, die in uns auf mancherlei Veranlassungen des allgemeinen psychischen Mechanismus nur geschehen und als geschehende von uns bemerkt werden, fassen wir irrig als Tätigkeiten, die unser entschiedener Wille oder doch ein weniger ausdrückliches Streben unseres Ich ins Werkgesetzt habe.“ (LOTZE, 1856, p. 277)

¹⁶ „Nur da sind wir überzeugt, es mit einer Tat des Willens zu tun zu haben, wo in deutlichem Bewusstsein jene Triebe, die zu einer Handlungen drängen, wahrgenommen werden, die Entscheidung darüber jedoch, ob ihnen gefolgt werden soll oder nicht, erst gesucht und nicht der eigenen Gewalt dieser drängenden Motive, sondern der bestimmenden freien Wahl, des von ihnen nicht abhängiges Geistes überlassen wird. So nahe zeigt sich der Begriffe der Freiheit mit dem des Willens verknüpft; denn in dieser Entscheidung über einen gegebenen Tatbestand besteht allein die wahre Wirksamkeit des Willens. Aller mögliche Inhalt des Wollens dagegen wird über durch den unwillkürlichen Verlauf der Vorstellungen und Gefühle herbeigeführt,

Conditioned in all else, in the forms of our knowledge, in the course of our ideas and feelings, we will be free at least in willing and acting. (LOTZE, 1885-1888, p. 254)¹⁷

But we cannot confine this consideration to sense-impulses; the greater part of what in daily life we call our actions are performed quite in the same way. Ideas start up in us according to universal laws, and to these become attached in part directly, in part through the intervention of various feelings, all sorts of images of bodily movements, which however before our consciousness sometimes as means of reaching an external object, [...] the train of ideas in general passes spontaneously into external movement [...] (LOTZE, 1885-1888, p. 255)¹⁸

Briefly, Lotze explicitly establishes the same Fregean scheme and, moreover, legitimizes it by arguing for its meaning and need. But not only is there a strict conceptual parallel between Lotze and Frege's scheme, but the coincidence is literal, because even when Lotze refers to this mode of wanting sometimes as deciding (*Entscheiden*), in most of the time he explicitly uses the term "*Entschluss*."

...but then the notion of acting must include the peculiar element of approval, permission, or intention, that makes the will such [...] The approval through which our will adopts as its own the *resolution* [...] (LOTZE, 1885-1888, p. 257)¹⁹

und ohne an sich selbst ein nach außen gerichtetes Gestalten und schaffendes Streben zu sein, muss der Wille sich mir der Freiheit unbeschränkter Wahl zwischen dem begnügen, was ihm von dort her dargeboten wird. Wäre es unmöglich, dieser Freiheit zu denken oder ihre Annahme zu rechtfertigen, würden wir dann noch Veranlassung haben, überhaupt den Namen des Willens beizubehalten?" (LOTZE, 1856, p. 279)

¹⁷ "Bedingt in allen Übrigen, in den Formen der Erkenntnis, dem Laufe von Vorstellungen und Gefühle, wollen wir frei wenigstens im Wollen und im Handeln sein." (LOTZE, 1856, p. 277)

¹⁸ „Aber wir können diese Betrachtung nicht auf sinnliche Triebe beschränken; der grösste Theil dessen, was wir im täglichen Leben unsere Handlungen nennen, geschieht völlig in derselben Weise. Vorstellungen tauchen in uns nach allgemeinen Gesetzen auf und an sie knüpfen sich theils unmittelbar, theils durch das Mittelglied verschiedenartiger Gefühle allerlei Bilder körperlicher Bewegungen, die bald als Mittel zur Erreichung eines äusseren Gegenstandes...von selbst geht meistens die Vorstellungsreihe äussere Bewegung über [...]" (LOTZE, 1856, p. 278)

¹⁹ "[...] aber dann wird in dem Begriff des Handelns, jenes eigentümliche Element der Billigung, der Zulassung oder Absicht eingeschlossen sein, welche den Willen zum Willen

How often have fears of a destruction of all actual order been expressed as the result of free *resolve* on the part of an animated being, if it were not found possible to bring it into connection with the rest of Nature as a necessarily conditioned effect. (LOTZE, 1885-1888, p. 258)²⁰

This was to forget within how narrow limits the power of a finite creature would be confined even if its will not only were free, but also had the bodily organization absolutely at its disposal as the instrumentality of its *resolutions*. (LOTZE, 1885-1888, p. 258)²¹

No more than does the Nature around us would our own nature lose all internal connection, as is so commonly thought, by coming into the possession of unlimited freedom of *resolution*. For it would still be only the *resolves* that we left free [...] (LOTZE, 1885-1888, p. 259)²²

...the soul evolves from itself *resolutions*, starting-points for future movements [...] (LOTZE, 1885-1888, p. 261).²³

The greater the seriousness, on the other hand, those doubts arise, which grant no moral dignity to free and unconditional *resolutions*, but only uphold those, which, motivated by the violence of the good, choose the good. (LOTZE, 1856, p. 285)²⁴

But, if there is a full coincidence between Lotze and Frege in what he says about deciding, this coincidence must be placed within the framework of a

macht... Diese Billigung, durch welche unser Wille den *Entschluß* ... als den seinigen adoptiert ..." (LOTZE, 1856, p. 280)

²⁰ "Wie oft hat man nicht von den freien *Entschlüssen* eines beseelten Wesens, wenn es nicht gelänge, auch ihn wieder als eine notwendig bedingte Folge in den übrigen Zusammenhang des Weltlaufes einzuschalten, eine Zerstörung aller Ordnung der Wirklichkeit besorgt!" (LOTZE, 1856, p. 281)

²¹ "Man vergaß, wie eng die Grenzen der Macht auch dann noch dem endlichen Geschöpfe gezogen sein würden, wenn sein Wille nicht nur frei im Wollen, sondern auch die Mittel der körperlichen Organisation seinen *Entschlüsse* unbedingt dienstbar wären." (LOTZE, 1856, p. 281)

²² "Und ebensowenig, wie die Natur um uns, würde durch eine unbedingte Freiheit unserer *Entschlüsse* unser eigenes Wesen, wie man so oft meint, jeden inneren Zusammenhang verlieren. Denn immer würden es nur die *Entschlüsse* sein, die wir jener Freiheit überlassen hätten ..." (LOTZE, 1856, p. 282)

²³ "[...] eine Menge von *Entschlüssen*, Anfangspunkte künftiger Bewegungen, erzeugt die Seele in sich [...]" (LOTZE, 1856, p. 284)

²⁴ This text from the German original was forgotten in the English translation, which is why I translate it. "Wie weit größterem Ernste treten dagegen jene Zweifel auf, die den freien und unbedingten *Entschlüsse* keine moralische Würde zugestehen, sondern nur den hochhalten, welcher bewogen durch die Gewalt des Guten das Gute wählt [...]" (LOTZE, 1856, p. 285)

broader coincidence regarding the way in which the structure of subjectivity is conceived. Indeed, in Lotze the “theory of superior psychic functions” that is simply implicit and presupposed in Frege is explicit and argued.

This also answers our third question above; there is *no organ at all*, of which the soul makes use, but only conditions on which the direction of its activity depends. For these reasons, I previously expressed the opinion *that there is no physical organ for all higher spiritual activities*, that rather the soul is bound only in those of its activities and precisely to the extent to which it is bound to bodily cooperation as it absorbs the external, and shapes the internal. The disapproval that this view received from many sides, caused me to repeat these considerations, because my assumption was by no means only that without it the dignity of the soul would be approached too closely, but also consisted mainly of the conviction that, *even if there were a thousand helpful soul-organs*, they would all be quite clumsy *to establish those higher activities of the soul, they could help neither judge nor infer, they would teach to appreciate neither the beautiful nor the good.* (LOTZE, 1886, p. 144-145)²⁵

Lotze says it clearly: if every psychic phenomena were neurophysiologically determined, the possibility of an objective consideration of value would also tend to disappear. Not only deciding, but judging and valuing are not determined by physiological conditions²⁶.

We have already observed that Frege repeatedly opposes and distinguishes the idea of thinking (and judging) and the above points to linking this opposition

²⁵ There is no English translation of this text. Therefore, I offer a translation. The German original reads:

Hieraus ergibt sich zugleich die Antwort auf unsere dritte obige Frage; es ist überhaupt hier *kein Organ vorhanden*, dessen die Seele sich bediente, sondern nur Bedingungen, von denen die Richtung ihrer Tätigkeit abhängt. Aus diesen Gründen habe ich bereits früher die Meinung ausgesprochen, *dass es für alle höheren geistige Tätigkeiten kein körperliches Organ gebe*, dass vielmehr die Seele nur in denjenigen ihrer Verrichtungen und gerade soweit an leibliche Mitwirkung gebunden sei, als sie Äusseres in sich aufzunehmen, Inneres aus sich äusserlich zu gestalten hat. Die Missbilligung, die diese Ansicht von vielen Seiten erfahren hat, veranlasste mich, diese Betrachtungen noch einmal aufzuführen, denn der Grund meiner Annahme war keineswegs nur der, daß ohne sie der Würde der Seele zu nahe getreten würde, sondern bestand hauptsächlich in der Überzeugung, *dass wenn es auch tausend zuvorkommende Seelenorgane gäbe*, sie doch sämtlich ganz ungeschickt sein würden, *jene höhere Tätigkeiten der Seele zu begründen, sie könnten weder Urteilen noch schliessen helfen, sie würden das Schöne noch das Gute schätzen lehren.* (LOTZE, 1886, p. 144-145)

²⁶ If in Frege there is no explicit link between deciding and its physiological conditions, or between judgment and freedom, this link is explicit in Lotze.

explicitly to an implicit context of Frege's thinking, which links him to Lotze and *Materialismusstreit*. Now, the link between reducing thinking by ideating or affirming a specificity of the first with respect to the second, on the one hand, and between materialistic and anti-materialist positions, on the other, even though it is an implicit link in Frege, is explicit in a long series of authors. Thus, in Czolbe, sensory reduction, that is, the denial of the autonomy and specified of any intelligible structure, acts as a prelude to the materialist argument. This, on the other hand, does not occur merely within the framework of German *Materialismusstreit*, but it is also present, in the opposite direction, in the criticism of Cousin to Condillac, prelude to his spiritualism, and in the derivations thereof. But let us go back to Frege.

7. PSYCHOLOGISM CRITIQUE AND THE CONCEPT OF SUBJECTIVITY IN FREGE

Consciously, by introducing the controversial thesis that there is a certain idea of subjectivity in Frege, we have overlooked the fact that it is a unanimous opinion, founded on seemingly unambiguous texts, that Frege has no interest in subjectivity and refers it to psychology in the framework of its radical critique of psychology and its sharp opposition psychology - logic. However, this does not consider three facts:

- a. Frege's critique of psychology does not exclude the fact that Frege possesses a conception of subjectivity, because if understood it is perceived that such criticism does not merely revolve, as one tends to believe, around the postulation of abstract objects, but around denouncing as false the idea of subjectivity proposed by the psychologist. In fact, criticism of psychology and proposal of an alternative conception of subjectivity are complementary; they are two sides of the same coin. Those who from

Fregean criticism of psychologism claim to be able to derive an absolute indifference from Frege in relation to the subjectivity question simply did not understand that criticism, possibly because they did not understand its novelty either.

b. The link between criticism of psychologism and revision of the idea of subjectivity is not merely a singular feature of Frege, but derives from the fact that the *Psychologismusstreit* revolved around the relativism-objectivism opposition (PORTA, 2020), from Bolzano and Exner (1935, p. 74ff.), Natorp (1918, p. 19) and Cohen, Palagy (1902, p. 3) and Husserl ((1903) 1979, p. 154), Natorp (1903, p. 283) and Husserl, Bauch (1917, p. 136) and Natorp (1918, p. 432) and even Kerry (1887, p. 305) and Frege (1893, (1897) 1990). “Platonism” is only one aspect of anti-psychologism, the other, also essential, is a conception of subjectivity consistent with it. This culminates in Husserl, but it already has a decisive turn in Natorp and Frege.

c. One of the peculiar characteristics of the *Psychologismusstreit* is that it did not take place between two previously defined parties, but largely consisted of the definition of the parties themselves, which is why the dividing line between psychologism and anti-psychologism was permanently re-traced. Now, Frege is the first to establish the “immanence principle” as the ultimate presupposition of all psychologism²⁷ and, consequently, to deny it. I will understand by “immanence principle” the Cartesian-Lockean thesis that the only direct and immediate objects of my knowledge are my own ideas. The identification of the principle of immanence as the ultimate basis of psychologism is achieved by Frege through his controversy with Kerry, which is the first Fregean movement to distinguish between ideating and thinking²⁸, a distinction in which denial

²⁷ Stout also criticized the principle of immanence in 1893, but only in relation to finite spirits.

²⁸ “In my view the reason for the sorry state of affairs we find in Kerry, where the distinctions between concept and object, characteristic mark and property, are effaced is that logical and

psychological questions and viewpoints are scrambled together, which greatly detracts from the value of his articles. He will speak now of a concept, then of the idea of a concept, now of an object, then of the idea of it, without its even being wholly clear whether it is the one or the other that is in question, whether we are engaged in a logical or psychological inquiry. Now it is no particular cause for wonder if we can find no way of distinguishing between the idea of a concept and can be the reference of a subject. It must here be remarked that the words "all", "any", "no", "some", are prefixed to concept-words. In universal and particular affirmative and negative sentences, we are expressing relations between concepts; we use these words to indicate the special kind of relation. They are thus, logically speaking, not to be more closely associated with the concept-words that follow them, but are to be related to the sentence as a whole. It is easy to see this in the case of negation. If in the sentence "all mammals are land-dwellers" the phrase "all mammals" expressed the logical subject of the predicate are land-dwellers, then in order to negate the whole sentence we should that of an object. Perhaps they are often even difficult to hold apart. But here Kerry has simply succumbed to a widespread sickness. Indeed, would not Locke's empiricism and Berkeley's idealism, and so much that is tied up with these philosophies, have been impossible if people had distinguished adequately between thinking in the narrower sense and ideation, between the parts of a content (concepts, objects, relations) and the ideas we have? Even if with us men thinking does not take place without ideas, still the content of a judgement is something objective, the same for everybody, and as far as it is concerned it is neither here nor there what ideas men have when they grasp it. In any case these are subjective and will differ from one person to another. What is here being said of the content as a whole applies also to the parts which we can distinguish within it." (FREGE, 1979e, p. 104-105)

„Den Grund für die bedauerliche Verwischung der Unterschiede zwischen Begriff und Gegenstand, zwischen Merkmal und Eigenschaft bei Herrn K., sehe ich in der Durcheinanderquirlung logischer und psychologischer Gesichtspunkte und Fragestellungen, die dem Wert seiner Abhandlungen erheblichen Abbruch tut. Er spricht bald vom Begriffe, bald von der Vorstellung eines Begriffes, bald von einem Gegenstand, bald von dessen Vorstellungen, ohne dass man immer genau weiss, ob nun von dem einen oder dem anderen die Rede ist, ob man sich in einer logischen oder in einer psychologischen Untersuchung befinde. Nun ist es nicht eben verwunderlich, wenn zwischen der Vorstellung eines Begriffes und der eines Gegenstandes kein trennender Unterschied gefunden wird. Vielleicht sind sie manchmal sogar schwer auseinander zu halten. Aber hierin scheint Herr. K. nur einer weitverbreiteten Zeitkrankheit verfallen zu sein. Ja, wäre nicht schon der Sensualismus Lockes und der Idealismus Berkeleys und so vieles, was sich daran geknüpft hat, unmöglich gewesen, wenn man immer zwischen Denken im engeren Sinne und Vorstellen, zwischen den Teilen des Inhaltes (Begriffen, Gegenstände, Beziehungen) und den Vorstellungen genügend unterschieden hätte? Wenn auch bei uns Menschen das Denken nie ohne Vorstellen vor sich geht, so ist doch der Inhalt eines Urteils etwas Objektives, für alle derselbe, und es ist für ihn gleichgültig, welche Vorstellungen bei den Menschen seine Erfassung begleiten. Diese sind jedenfalls verschieden und subjektiv. Was hier von dem ganzen Inhalt gesagt ist, gilt auch von den Teilen, die wir in ihm unterscheiden.“ (FREGE, (1892?) 1969, p. 114-115)

“Yes, indeed, but it is a process which takes place on the very confines of the mental and which for that reason cannot be completely understood from a purely psychological standpoint. For in grasping the law something comes into view whose nature is no longer mental in the proper sense, namely the thought; and this process is perhaps the most mysterious of all. But just because it is mental in character we do not need to concern ourselves with it in logic. It is enough for us that we can grasp thoughts and recognize them to be true how this takes place is a question in its own right.” (FREGE, 1979d, p. 145)

„Ja! Aber ein Vorgang, der schon an der Grenze des Seelischen liegt und das deshalb vom rein psychologischen Standpunkte aus, nicht vollkommen wird verstanden werden können, weil etwas

of the immanence principle is expressed as its paradigmatic mode. The generally trivialized Fregean thesis, that thinking is apprehension of thoughts, actually brings in the second half of the 19th century German a new idea of thinking made possible by a new conception of subjectivity.

But, certainly, someone might object, and not without reason, that Frege's denial of the immanence principle is too little to affirm that there is a "conception of subjectivity" in Frege. We can answer that objection in three ways:

a. The first is that even if Frege confined himself to denying the immanence principle, he is the first who understands the decisive role that this principle assumes in psychologism; secondly the intense adherence to it by German philosophers in the context of criticism of Hegel in the framework of the *logische Frage*; third, the importance of its review through a complicated process in the Brentano school that begins with Twardowsky and fourthly, the fact that Frege is addressing a central point of the epistemological discussion of his time around realism and idealism, you can hardly fail to see that, even when Fregean manifestations in relation to subjectivity are scarce, the importance of this single thesis is itself decisive. Frege is nothing more and nothing less than breaking with the Cartesian tradition.

b. But, for those who do not want to be convinced by the previous argument (which in my opinion, I assert, is in itself decisive), then we can indicate that our thesis is not based exclusively on the fact that Frege denies the immanence principle, but also on the fact that he makes a set of

wesentlich dabei in Betracht kommt, was nicht mehr im eigentlichen Sinne seelisch ist, der Gedanke; und vielleicht ist dieser Vorgang der geheimnisvollste von allen. Aber, eben weil er seelischer Art ist, brauchen wir uns in der Logik nicht darum zu kümmern. Uns genügt, daß wir Gedanken fassen und als wahr erkennen können; wie das zugeht, ist einer Frage für sich [...]" (FREGE, (1897) 1990, p. 63-64)

See PORTA, 2016.

statements that, derived or linked to that denial, go beyond it and unfold it and, on the other hand, interrelate with each other. From the negation of the immanence principle, Frege derives a theory of thinking, judging, deciding, of the self and of perception. Since we have repeatedly engaged with the first two, some observation should now be made regarding the other two through some decisive quotes.

b.1. The self is not reduced to ideas.

Is everything an idea? Does everything need an owner without which it could have no existence? I have considered myself as the owner of my ideas, but am I not myself an idea? [...] *If everything is idea, then there is no owner of Ideas.* And so now once again I experience opposites turning [...] No reason remains for granting an exceptional position to that object which I call "I" [...] But then there is something which is not my idea and yet can be the object of my awareness, of my thinking; I myself am such a thing [...] Therefore that about which I state something is not necessarily my idea [...] *I have an idea of myself, but I am not identical with this idea.* (FREGE, 1991, p. 335-336)²⁹

b.2. We must distinguish between mere having ideas and perceiving objects.

This consequence [...] will nevertheless perhaps not be accepted without opposition. It will, I think, seem impossible to some people to obtain information about something not belonging to the inner world except by sense perception. Sense perception indeed is often thought to be the most certain, even the sole, source of knowledge about everything that does not belong to the inner world. But with what right? For sense perception has as necessary constituents our sense impressions and these are a part of the inner world. In any case two men do not have the same sense impressions though they may have similar ones. Sense impressions alone do not reveal the external world to us. Perhaps there is a being that has only sense impressions

²⁹ „Alles ist Vorstellung? Alles bedarf eines Trägers, ohne den es keinen Bestand hat. Ich habe mich als Träger meiner Vorstellungen angesehen, aber bin ich nicht selbst eine Vorstellung... *Wenn alles Vorstellung ist, so gibt es keinen Träger der Vorstellungen.* Und so erlebe ich nun wieder einen Umschlag ins Entgegengesetzten... Denjenigen Gegenstand, den ich "ich" nenne, eine besondere Stellung einzuräumen, fehlt jeder Grund... Dann aber gibt es etwas, was nicht meine Vorstellung ist und doch Gegenstand meiner Betrachtungen, meines Denkens sein kann und ich bin von der Art... Also ist das, wovon ich etwas aussage, nicht notwendig meiner Vorstellung... *Ich habe aber eine Vorstellung von mir, aber ich bin nicht dieser Vorstellung.*“ (FREGE, (1918) 1966, p. 46-47)

without seeing or touching things. To have visual impressions is not to see things [...] Having visual impressions is certainly necessary for seeing things, but not sufficient. What must still be added is not anything sensible. And yet this is just what opens up the external world for us; for without this non-sensible something everyone would remain shut up in his inner world. So perhaps, since the decisive factor lies in the non-sensible, something non-sensible, even without the co-operation of sense impressions, could also lead us out of the inner world and enable us to grasp thoughts. (FREGE, 1991, p. 369)³⁰

All the same it is something worth thinking about that we cannot recognize a property of a thing without at the same time finding the thought this thing has this property to be true. So with every property of a thing there is tied up a property of a thought, namely truth. (FREGE, 1991, p. 354)³¹

Now objectivity cannot, of course, be based on any sense- impression, which as an affection of our mind is entirely subjective, but only, so far as I can see, on reason. (FREGE, 1980, p. 38)³²

But do I not then see that this flower has five petals? We can say this, but if we do, the word 'see' is not being used in the sense of having a mere visual

³⁰ „Dieses Ergebnis [we “catch” thoughts]... wird noch vielleicht nicht ohne Widerstand angenommen werden. Es wird manchem, denke ich, unmöglich scheinen, von etwas Kunde zu erlagen, was nicht seiner Innenwelt angehört, ausser durch Sinneswahrnehmung. In der Tat wird die Sinneswahrnehmung oft als die sicherste, ja sogar als die einzige Erkenntnisquelle für alles angesehen, was nicht der Innenwelt angehört. Aber mit welchem Recht? Zur Sinneswahrnehmung gehört doch wohl als notwendiger Bestandteil der Sinneseindruck, und dieser ist Teil der Innenwelt. Denselben haben zwei Menschen jedenfalls nicht, wenn sie auch ähnliche Sinneseindrücke haben mögen. Diese allein eröffnen uns nicht die Aussenwelt. Vielleicht gibt es ein Wesen, das nur Sinneseindrücke hat, ohne Dinge zu sehen oder zu tasten. Das Haben von Gesichtseindrücken ist noch kein Sehen von Dingen... Das Haben von Gesichtseindrücken ist zwar nötig zum Sehen der Dinge, aber nicht hinreichend. Was noch hinzukommen muss, ist nichts Sinnliches. Und dieses ist es doch gerade, was uns die Aussenwelt aufschliesst, denn ohne dieses Nichtsinnliche bliebe jeder in seiner Innenwelt eingeschlossen. Da also die Entscheidung im Nichtsinnlichen liegt, könnte ein Nichtsinnliches auch da wo keine Sinneseindrücke mitwirken, uns aus der Innenwelt hinausführen und uns Gedanken fassen lassen.“ (FREGE, (1918) 1966, p. 50-52)

³¹ “Immerhin gibt es zu denken, dass wir an keinem Dinge eine Eigenschaft erkennen können ohne damit zugleich den Gedanken, dass dieses Ding diese Eigenschaft habe, wahr zu finden. So ist mit jeder Eigenschaft eines Dinges eine Eigenschaft eines Gedankens verknüpft, nämlich die der Wahrheit.” (FREGE, (1918) 1986, p. 34)

³² “Der Grund der Objektivität kann ja nicht in dem Sinneseindrucke liegen, der als Affektion unserer Seele ganz subjektiv ist, sondern soweit ich sehe, nur in der Vernunft.” (FREGE, (1884) 1988, p. 62)

experience: what we mean by it is bound up with thinking and judging. (FREGE, 1979d, p. 137-138)³³

The presence of sense impressions in consciousness is a necessary condition of perception, but not sufficient. The perception of an object implies, in addition to sense content, the capture of something not sensible. What opens the doors of the external world are not sense impressions, in themselves private, but our ability to get something non-sensible and, not so much, totally objective. Now, according to Frege, to have a perception of x it is not enough to capture the thought corresponding to x , but we have to go further and make a judgment. The distinction between thinking and judging, therefore, is contained in the theory of perception and integrated into it.

c. But Frege does not merely deny the immanence principle, he affirms the opposite thesis and builds on its basis, that is, that we have access to something that is not an immanent content of our consciousness, that the subject is able to directly and immediately capture objects that are not simply contained in their consciousness (*Bewusstseinsinhalte*), but they also do not become such because they have been captured. Like Husserl, Frege denies that consciousness is barely directed to its own immanent real content and identifies what is real with what is not intentional and what is intentional with what is not real. The content of consciousness is just the means by which consciousness is directed to something that is not its content. Through something that is real in consciousness, we can address something that is not real in it. Without this, our ability "breaks every bridge to the objective."

³³ "Aber, sehe ich denn nicht, dass diese Blume fünf Blumenblätter hat? Man kann das sagen, gebraucht aber das Wort 'sehen' dann nicht in dem Sinne des blossen Lichtempfindens, sondern man meint damit verbunden ein Denken und Urteilen." (FREGE, (1897) 1990, p. 53)

8. DENIAL OF THE IMMANENCE PRINCIPLE AND THEORY OF SUPERIOR PSYCHIC FUNCTIONS

If negation of the immanence principle is the core of the Fregean conception of subjectivity, this negation has an essential relationship with the theory of superior psychic phenomena and should not be detached from it. The possibility that a real being accesses something that is not real and that does not become real in the fact of being accessed is made possible by the fact that not every activity of the subject is neurophysiologically determined or conditioned.

This relationship is obvious if we consider it in the negative perspective. If everything were reduced to ideas, that is, if our only direct and immediate objects of thought and knowledge were our own ideas, that is, immanent entities, then, our entire cognitive process would be subject to the natural legality of association and fusion, and could be reduced to its neurophysiological conditions. On the contrary, if we are able to directly and immediately capture something that is not idea in character, that is, if we are able to “think”, which is to capture thoughts, then this capacity is only possible because some processes of consciousness are not subject to mechanical legality and neurophysiological conditions.

Now, if there can be a positive relationship between the denial of the principle of immanence and the theory of superior psychic functions, both theses are not identical nor do they necessarily involve each other. Attending to this fact is essential to correctly establish Frege’s relationship with Lotze.

9. FREGE-LOTZE DIFFERENCES

Although there is a clear parallel between the conceptions of subjectivity of Frege and Lotze, this does not imply that there is absolute identity, considering the important differences that we now deal with. These differences are basically three and are related, such that the previous one supposes the subsequent one,

namely: the conception of thinking, the position against the immanence principle and the role of the notion of validity itself (*Geltung*).

Already in the text of Lotze that we cited, it is striking that he places among the superior psychic functions judging and valuing, to which decision could be added, but strikingly not thought. This does not mean that Lotze cannot consider thinking among the superior psychic functions, but it does mean, that, in reality, he is not totally detached from judging and valuing. In effect, Lotze defends a traditional conception of Thinking as an act of spontaneity of the subject or synthesis. However, this synthesis establishes relations between ideas, that is, it legitimizes their link based on points of view of value through a "complementary thought" (*Nebengedanke*) and, for that reason, thinking is essentially linked to judging and valuing.

Frege agrees with Lotze regarding the fact that there is something objective and not real, as well as the fact that we get it. It diverges, however, regarding the explanation of how we get it.

1. The connections which constitute the essence of thinking are of a different order from associations of ideas.
2. The difference is not a mere matter of the presence of some ancillary thought from which the connections in the former case derive their status.
3. In the case of thinking it is not really ideas that are connected, but things, properties, concepts, relations. (FREGE, 1979a, p. 174)³⁴

Lotze remains faithful to the immanence principle and considers that all our objects, in the end, are necessarily our ideas. Frege expressly opposes that

³⁴ "1. Die Verknüpfungen, die das Wesen des Denkens ausmachen sind eigentümlich verschieden von den Vorstellungsassoziationen.

2. Der Unterschied besteht nicht bloss in einem Nebengedanken, der den Rechtsgrund für die Verknüpfung hinzufügt.

3. Beim Denken werden nicht eigentlich Vorstellungen verknüpft, sondern Dinge, Eigenschaften, Begriffe, Beziehungen." (FREGE, (1906a) 1990, p. 23)

solution with the thesis we analyzed, insisting that thought is never about ideas, but about objects and concepts.

Note, Frege does not merely criticize that conception of thinking that reduces it to a union of ideas: “I should say that this question is still far from being grasped in all its difficulty. People are usually quite content to smuggle thinking in through a back door in the imagination, so that they don't themselves know how it really got in” (FREGE, 1979d, p. 145n)³⁵.

It also criticizes the correctness of the previous conception, which aims to overcome its difficulties, by distinguishing the mere fact of the synthesis of ideas of its legitimation based on a legitimizing foundation (*Rechtsgrund*). This was precisely Lotze's position. There is thus a clear opposition between two conceptions of thinking, thinking as synthesis, and thinking as apprehension of thoughts. That thinking (*denken*) is apprehension of thoughts (*Fassen von Gedanken*), is an important Fregean thesis, which establishes new coordinates for a definition of thinking, but tends to be banalized, simply because its context is unknown and, therefore, also its novelty. The thesis that thinking is to capture thoughts is not just a corollary of the postulation of logical objects, but a specific thesis in relation to subjectivity based on an express critique of rival conceptions, partly empiricist-associationist, although in part also platonic³⁶.

The difference in the conception of thinking between Frege and Lotze refers to an even more fundamental difference from the immanence principle. While

³⁵ “Diese Frage ist in ihrer Schwierigkeit wohl noch kaum erfasst. Meistens begnügt man sich wohl damit, das Denken durch eine Hintertür in das Vorstellen einzuschmuggeln, so daß man selbst nicht weiss, wie es eigentlich hineingekommen ist.” (FREGE, (1897) 1990, p. 64n)

³⁶ Perhaps this is an intermediate text along the way of the formulation of thinking as apprehension of thoughts, which shows what leads him to abandon Lotze's conception, but which does not place the definitive formulation of the position itself. The text is from 1892, just from the time when the notion of thought and thinking as apprehension of thoughts is finally consolidating. Note that in the previous text Frege does not oppose Lotze's conception to his conception of thinking as apprehension of thoughts, but directly to his denial of the principle of immanence. In other words, he is clear that what is at the base of Lotze's conception and that, ultimately, is the real difference.

Frege denies it, Lotze explicitly maintains it and places it at the base of all his reflection.

All we know of the external world depends upon the ideas of it which are within us; it is so far entirely indifferent whether with Idealism we deny the existence of that world, and regard our ideas of it as alone reality, or whether we maintain with Realism the existence of things outside us which act upon our minds. On the latter hypothesis as little as the former do the things themselves pass into our knowledge; they only awaken in us Ideas, which are not Things. It is then this varied world of ideas within us, it matters not where they may have come from, which forms the sole material directly given to us, from which alone our knowledge can start. (LOTZE, 1884, p. 421)³⁷

The fact that Lotze remains faithful to the immanence principle decisively determines the way in which he conceives the problem of objectivity, as it is exposed in his *Logic*, in which the question is to show how objectivity can be constructed from data that are ultimately subjective. It is about explaining how private data in the first instance are capable of being objectified. The problem of knowledge is basically the problem of objectification of ideas, something common to Lotze's position and to Baden's neo-Kantianism. Ultimately, the difference in thinking between Frege and Lotze is linked to the difference between the idea of validity (*Geltung*) as a central idea and the clear distinction between meaning (*Sinn*) and truth value (*Wahrheitswert*), which introduces two types of problems of objectivity, the objectivity of meaning and the objectivity of truth.

³⁷ „Alles, was wir von der Aussenwelt wissen, beruht auf den Vorstellungen von ihr, die in uns sind; es ist völlig gleichgültig zunächst, ob wir idealistisch das Vorhandensein jener Welt leugnen und nur unsere Vorstellungen von ihr als das Wirkliche betrachten, oder ob wir realistisch and dem Sein der Dinge ausser uns festhalten und sie auf uns wirken lassen; auch in dem letzten Fällen gehen die Dinge doch nicht selbst in unsere Erkenntnis über, sondern nur Vorstellungen, die nicht Dinge sind, erwecken sie in uns. Die mannigfaltigen Vorstellungen in uns also woher sie auch gekommen sein mögen, bilden das einzige unmittelbar Gegebene, von dem unsere Erkenntnis beginnen kann [...]“ (LOTZE, (1874) 1912, p. 493, §306)

In no way do we deny that there is an important relationship between the notion of validity in Lotze and Fregean Platonism, the only thing we pointed out is that we cannot account for both at the same level. What matters in Lotze is the radical distinction between these two types of relationships, causal relationships of determination, and relationships of justification. If difference between the two types of relationships is absolute, however, what happens in them is the same, that is, ideas.

That is why in Lotze validity says something not about abstract entities, but about relationships that, ultimately, can occur between real entities. In Frege's case, however, the situation is totally different, since it is thought as an abstract object that really deserves ownership.

10. CONCLUSION

Criticism of psychologism, either with its postulation of abstract objects or of transcendental subjectivity, has always faced the psychologist's response of demanding a correlative adequate theory of subjectivity. There is no doubt that Husserlian phenomenology will be the culmination of this development and that, in comparison with Husserl, there is nothing like the fulfilment of such demand in Frege. However, and despite everything that has been said, there are clear texts in Frege that cannot simply be ignored or overlooked. They show that there are important points in his reflection towards a certain conception of subjectivity that is coherent and adequate to his anti-psychologism.

Acknowledging the above certainly does not imply proposing a revolutionary reading that dramatically changes Frege's interpretation. However, it certainly implies placing Frege properly in the evolution of the *Psychologismusstreit*, something that, until now, has not been done.

Does this mean to suggest that there exists in Frege something like an incipient philosophy of mind that until now had not been perceived? We come

to the famous problem of the glass half empty or half full. And the undeniable fact is that the glass, though not even half full, is certainly not completely empty.

REFERENCES

- BAUCH, B. *Immanuel Kant*. Berlin/Leipzig: Göschen, 1917.
- BOLZANO, B. Der Briefwechsel B. Bolzano's mit F. Exner. In: WINTER, E. (ed.). *Bernhard Bolzano's Schriften*. Vol. 4. Praga: Königliche Böhmisches Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften, 1935.
- CURRIE, G. *Frege on Thought*. *Mind*, Oxford, v. XCII, n. 370, p. 234-248, 1984.
- FREGE, G. *Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik* (1884). Hamburg: Meiner, 1988.
- FREGE, G. Über den Begriff der Zahl. 2. Auseinandersetzung mit Kerry (1892?). In: HERMES, H.; KAMBARTEL, F.; KAULBACH, F. (eds.). *Gottlob Frege: Nachgelassene Schriften*. Hamburg: Meiner, 1969, p. 96-127.
- FREGE, G. Über Begriff und Gegenstand (1892). In: PATZIG, G. (ed.). *Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1966, p. 47-60.
- FREGE, G. *Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, begriffsschriftlich abgeleitet*. vol. 1. Jena: Verlag von Hermann Pohle, 1893.
- FREGE, G. Logik (1897). In: GABRIEL, G. (ed.). *Schriften zur Logik und Sprachphilosophie. Aus dem Nachlaß*. Hamburg: Meiner, 1990, p. 35-73.
- FREGE, G. 17 Kernsätze zur Logik (1906a). In: GABRIEL, G. (ed.). *Schriften zur Logik und Sprachphilosophie. Aus dem Nachlaß*. Hamburg: Meiner, 1990, p. 23-24.
- FREGE, G. Kurze Übersicht meiner logischen Lehren (1906b). In: HERMES, H.; KAMBARTEL, F.; KAULBACH, F. (eds.). *Gottlob Frege: Nachgelassene Schriften*. Hamburg: Meiner, 1969, p. 213-218.

- FREGE, G. Einleitung in die Logik (1906c). In: GABRIEL, G. (ed.). *Schriften zur Logik und Sprachphilosophie. Aus dem Nachlaß*. Hamburg: Meiner, 1990, p. 74-91.
- FREGE, G. Der Gedanke (1918). In: PATZIG, G. (ed.). *Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung*. Gottingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1966, p. 30-53.
- FREGE, G. 17 Key Sentences on Logic. In: HERMES, H.; KAMBARTEL, F.; KAULBACH, F. (eds.). *Gottlob Frege: Posthumous Writings*. Translation: Peter Long and Roger White. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1979a, p. 174-175.
- FREGE, G. A Brief Survey of My Logical Doctrines. In: HERMES, H.; KAMBARTEL, F.; KAULBACH, F. (eds.). *Gottlob Frege: Posthumous Writings*. Translation: Peter Long and Roger White. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1979b, p. 197-202.
- FREGE, G. Introduction to Logic. In: HERMES, H.; KAMBARTEL, F.; KAULBACH, F. (eds.). *Gottlob Frege: Posthumous Writings*. Translation: Peter Long and Roger White. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1979c, p. 185-196.
- FREGE, G. Logic. In: HERMES, H.; KAMBARTEL, F.; KAULBACH, F. (eds.). *Gottlob Frege: Posthumous Writings*. Translation: Peter Long and Roger White. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1979d, p. 126-151.
- FREGE, G. On Concept and Object. In: HERMES, H.; KAMBARTEL, F.; KAULBACH, F. (eds.). *Gottlob Frege: Posthumous Writings*. Translation: Peter Long and Roger White. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1979e, p. 87-117.
- FREGE, G. *The Foundations of Arithmetic: A logic-mathematical enquiry into the concept of number*. Translation: J. L. Austin. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1980.
- FREGE, G. Logical Investigations: I Thoughts (1918-19). In: McGUINNESS, B. (ed.). *Gottlob Frege: Collected Papers on Mathematics, Logic, and Philosophy*. Translation: Peter Geach and R. H. Stoothoff. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991, p. 351-372.
- FREGE, G. *The Basic Laws of Arithmetic*. vols. I & II. Translation: Phillip A Ebert. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016.

- GABRIEL, G. Wahrheit, Wert und Wahrheitswert. Freges Anerkennungstheorie der Wahrheit und ihre Vorgeschichte. In: GREIMANN, D. (ed.). *Das Wahre und das Falsche. Studien zu Freges Auffassung von Wahrheit*. Hildesheim/Zürich/New York: Georg Olms, 2003, p. 15-28.
- HUSSERL, E. Philosophie der Arithmetik (1891). In: ELEY, L. (ed.). *Philosophie der Arithmetik*. Den Haag: Nijhoff, 1970.
- HUSSERL, E. Besprechung von: K. Twardowski, Zur Lehre von Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellung. Eine psychologische Untersuchung (1896). In: RANG, B. (ed.). *Aufsätze und Rezensionen (1890-1910)*. Den Haag: Nijhoff, 1979, p. 349-356.
- HUSSERL, E. Besprechung von M. Palágyi, Der Streit der Psychologen und Formalisten in der modernen Logik (1903). In: RANG, B. (ed.). *Aufsätze und Rezensionen (1890-1910)*. Den Haag: Nijhoff, 1979, p. 152-161.
- KERRY, B. Ueber Anschauung und ihre psychische Verarbeitung IV. *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie*, Leipzig, v. 11, n. 1, p. 249-307, 1887.
- LOTZE, H. *Mikrokosmos: Ideen zur Naturgeschichte und Geschichte der Menschheit. Versuch einer Anthropologie*. vol. 1. Leipzig: Verlag von G. Hirzel, 1856.
- LOTZE, H. Logik (1874). In: MISCH, G. (ed.). *Drei Bücher vom Denken, vom Untersuchen und vom Erkennen*. Leipzig: Verlag von Felix Meiner, 1912.
- LOTZE, H. *Logic: In Three Books, of Thought, of Investigation and of Knowledge*. Translation: Bernard Bosanquet. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1884.
- LOTZE, H. *Microcosmus*. vol I. Translation: Elizabeth Hamilton & E. E. Constance Jones. Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1885-1888.
- LOTZE, H. *Kleine Schriften*. Vol. 2. Leipzig: Verlag von S. Hirzel, 1886.
- NATORP, P. *Einleitung in die Psychologie nach kritischer Methode*. Freiburg: Mohr, 1888.
- NATORP, P. Bericht über deutsche Schriften zur Erkenntnistheorie aus den Jahren 1894 und 1985 (Erstes Stück). In: NATORP, P. (ed.). *Archiv für Geltung*, vol. 1, n. 1, 2021

- systematische Philosophie*. Vol. 3. Berlin: Verlag von Georg Reimer, 1897a, p. 101-121.
- NATORP, P. Bericht über deutsche Schriften zur Erkenntnistheorie aus den Jahren 1894 und 1985 (Zweites Stück). In: NATORP, P. (ed.). *Archiv für systematische Philosophie*. Vol. 3. Berlin: Verlag von Georg Reimer, 1897b, p. 193-215.
- NATORP, P. Bericht über deutsche Schriften zur Erkenntnistheorie aus den Jahren 1894 und 1985 (Drittes Stück). In: NATORP, P. (ed.). *Archiv für systematische Philosophie*. Vol. 3. Berlin: Verlag von Georg Reimer, 1897c, p. 391-403.
- NATORP, P. Zur Frage der logischen Methode: mit Beziehung auf E. Husserl. Prolegomena zur reinen Logik. *Kant Studien*, Mainz, v. 6, n. 1-3, p. 270-283, 1901.
- NATORP, P. *Allgemeine Psychologie nach kritischer Methode. Erstes Buch: Objekt und Methode der Psychologie*. Tübingen: Mohr, 1912.
- NATORP, P. Bruno Bauchs "Immanuel Kant" und die Fortbildung des Systems des Idealismus. *Kant Studien*, Mainz, v. 22, n. 1-2, p. 426-459, 1918.
- PALAGY, M. *Der Streit der Psychologen und Formalisten in der modernen Logik*. Leipzig: W. Engelmann, 1902.
- PORTA, M. Kerry and the evolution of Frege's critique of psychologism. *Brentano Studien*, Würzburg, v. XIV, p. 281-300, 2016.
- PORTA, M. "Entschlüsse" (Frege on decisions). In: DRUMMOND, J.; HOPKINS, B. (ed.). *The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy*. Vol. 18. Abingdon: Routledge, 2019, p. 11-22.
- PORTA, M. Psychologism. In: *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 2020.
Available at:
https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/psychologism/v-1?fbclid=IwAR2X1z_92im2eac3Ubema5yii_31ELX8sQZ6_0owaWyzKJbSb3KI90seQRI.
- SIGWART, Ch. *Logik 2 Bände* (1873). Tübingen: Mohr, 1904.
- Geltung*, vol. 1, n. 1, 2021

STOUT, G. F. The Philosophy of Mr. Shadworth Hodgson. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Oxford, v. 2, n. 2, p. 107-120, 1893.

TWARDOWSKI, K. *Zur Lehre von Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellung. Eine psychologische Untersuchung* (1894). München: Philosophia Verlag/A. Hölder, 1982.

[Received: 28 October 2020. Editorial decision: 20 December 2020]