

Animals wearing combat boots: relationships between bookies and militiamen in the West Zone of the city of Rio de Janeiro

Bichos de coturno: a relação entre bicheiros e milicianos da Zona Oeste

Matheus Vieira [1]

Abstract

This article approaches the relationships between members of the Andrade criminal networks and militias, mostly from the Jacarepaguá and Campo Grande neighborhoods. These criminal networks are known for *jogo do bicho*, an illegal gambling game in Brazil that operates like a lottery in which players bet on numbers that are associated with animals. The analyzed period extends from 1993 to 2008 and covers continuities and discontinuities in the relationships between Castor, his successors, Fernando and Rogério, and three military policemen who joined what I call the “first generation of militiamen”. Intersecting the theory of Criminal Networks with David Harvey’s work and the concept of Illegalism, the article attempts to present, in a synthetic fashion, the history of the territories, the markets that are registered there by the state and the illegality agents, and the intersection of personal and impersonal relations between members of criminal networks and the State.

Keywords: *jogo do bicho*; militias; criminal networks; territory.

Resumo

Este artigo trata sobre as relações entre membros das redes criminais dos Andrade (conhecidas pelo jogo do bicho) e de milícias de Jacarepaguá e Campo Grande, majoritariamente. O período analisado vai de 1993 a 2008, percorrendo continuidades e discontinuidades nas relações entre Castor, seus sucessores, Fernando e Rogério, e três policiais militares que ingressaram eventualmente no que chamo de “primeira geração de milicianos”. Cruzando a teoria das Redes Criminais com a obra de David Harvey e o conceito de Illegalismos, o artigo tenta apresentar, sinteticamente, a história dos territórios, os mercados que ali são inscritos pelo Estado e pelos agentes da ilegalidade e o cruzamento de relações pessoais e impessoais entre membros das redes criminais e do Estado.

Palavras-chave: *jogo do bicho*; milícias; redes criminais; território.



Methodology

This article summarizes some of the reflections and explored in my study on the relationships between the criminal networks of some of the first milícias in the West Zone of Rio de Janeiro and the 'bicheiros' of the Andrade family, which remains one of the great exponents of since the beginning of the last century. The aim of the research was to understand the influence of the animal game actors in the formation of what is classified as a milícia¹ and to define the relations between these networks, the State and the territories they occupy or influence.

From the point of view of the research technique, In order to carry out this study, I mobilized documents, interviews and news reports – which were used in a complementary way. As for the documents, the whole idea of the research arose from the lawsuit 0023098-22.1994.8.19.0001, from the Court of Justice, in which there is a dispute between the Public Prosecutor's Office and the defense of bicheiro Castor de Andrade and 44 other military police officers accused of receiving bribery over more than half a decade. The prosecutors used as the basis for their accusation the Andrade criminal network, seized in 1994 in an operation in the so-called Fortaleza do Castor - no less than the house in Bangu where the bicheiro's grandmother started playing games. Based on the names of the 44 PMERJ agents, I reconstructed the trajectory of three who not only succeeded in crime, but became milicianos with prominent positions in Rio's criminal networks. in Rio de Janeiro's criminal networks. From there I judicial proceedings that would help me understand their path and how I could then dig into the details of how the

networks networks, which in turn led me to the connection between animal games and milícias, from the Andrade family, represented by Castor and his two most active successors, Rogério de Andrade (nephew) and Fernando Iggnácio (son-in-law). To do this, I used the following cases: TJRJ: 0023098-22.1994.8.19.0001, 0044092-22.2009.8.19.0203, 0166918-69.2012.8.19.0001, 2009.068.00004; TRF2: 2007.02.01.004933-4, 2001.001.082015-3/01. All this in addition to the CPI of the Milícias, a document which contains facts and characters that circulate through the sociological research I carried out. Because a wide range of real characters interacting and building direct and relationships, I turned to the theory of criminal networks, explained by Morselli (2009) as a social network in which both confidentiality and risk (of life, legal justice, etc.) become necessary conditions for building to build economic and political relationships in illegal political relationships in illegal activities (Telles, 2009; Foucault, 1997). It is worth remembering that a social network is a network of connections between individuals, groups and institutions (in the most varied sense) based on the types of relationships established between peers and the density of these relationships and the degree of importance of the agents in these networks.

The interviews were conducted under anonymity or semi-anonymity (use of a use of a nickname, but not their real name), as it is necessary to protection of the lives and legal security of the natives who were willing to reconstruct, their personal memories in interviews and, consequently, part of what makes up the collective memory in dispute about the times discussed (Pollak, 1989). "Through interviews it is possible to reconstruct life stories, capture experiences, values,

opinions, aspirations and motivations of the interviewees, chosen according to criteria and interests of the subject under investigation. It is important to remember that the interviewee's speech represents a self-description and a presentation of oneself" (Lima, 2016, p. 26). The interviews complement or contradict the facts narrated in the case files, which also carry versions, biases and endogenous and exogenous and disputes endogenous and exogenous to the members of members of the judiciary who crystallize their political, technical and ideological perspectives (Scheingold, 1975) as they construct the law in the practical action of legal practice and in the unofficial daily routine (Selznik, 1959; Sylbey, 2005).

Finally, the news reports here serve only as an aid to research. In other words, the reports mark public reactions of different actors, such as the state, prominent prominent members of criminal networks and the population as a whole.

This set of theoretical and technical apparatus is also justified by the Bourdieusian perspective. For, according to Bourdieu, Chamboredone Passeron (2010), language imposes barriers, regardless of whether we are by the interviewee or the interviewer. And the solution to facing these barriers is the methodical and dialectical confrontation of two systems of pre-constructions (non-directive interviewing and content analysis). Whether in the interview, in documentary analysis or in the final process, the difference of voices and social and social positions so that we can build research. In the words of the aforementioned authors: "To assume that a question has the same meaning for social subjects separated by differences differences in culture, associated with class origin, is to ignore

that different languages do not differ differ not only in the breadth of their lexicon or degree of abstraction, but also by the themes and issues they convey" (Bourdieu, Chamboredon and Passeron, 2010, p. 57).

Biographical and historical confluences

The origin of the animal game is a well-documented fact in books and academic research (Magalhães, 2007; Chazkel, 2014; Misse, 2011; Labronici, 2012). In short, it is known that in the mid-1890s, the baron João Batista Viana Drummond, after a few years of difficulty with difficulty in sustaining his zoo in Vila Isabel, in Rio's North Zone, asked a Mexican named a Mexican named Manoel Ismael Zevada, who taught him about the flower game, a form of *hermana* lottery that has been transmuted to Rio's reality as the "animal game", thus replacing flowers with zoo animals. The baron, who had previously struggled even with financial aid from the municipality, soon found prosperity through the gambling that took place at the end of the day and within months became a phenomenon beyond the zoo's borders. Before long, street corners in the center of the capital and outlying neighborhoods were occupied with animal stalls, initially targeting the target audience, initially the proletarian population and the lumpen class, at the time represented mainly by former slaves, freed since 1888. The "bicho", as they called it in last century's newspapers, proliferated and in the first half of the 20th century it was already considered the biggest gambling game in the whole country.

And what affects the whole country be any different in the then newly developed neighborhood of Bangu, urbanized in the English style due to the direct influence of the Bangu Textile Factory: “The factory building was erected on land belonging to the Fazenda Bangu, on the left-hand side of the Central Central do Brasil Railway, covering an area of 18,649 m². It has typical characteristics of the neoclassical period, featuring Roman arches, Greek pediments and large, horizontally-oriented platbands. Above the main building is a granderelógio with four mirrors, with part of its base – the roof 3 in slate” (Azevedo Silva, 1989, p. 25).

Founded in 1889, the factory built a factory district around itself with urbanization of a higher quality than other places on the outskirts of the capital of Rio de Janeiro. The promise of work and decent housing attracted impoverished families from all regions of the Metropolitan Region of Rio de Janeiro, and, at the beginning of the 20th century, the Medeiros family, headed by Manuel and Eurides and their four children, followed the path of prosperity. The men worked in the factory, the women did house gigs. Eurides grew coffee in her large backyard in their home at 1040 Rua Fonseca, in Bangu, and this meant that neighbors would often go in search of the coffee grains that quickly became famous in the region.² This eventually drew the attention of an animal game banker, a Portuguese man who wanted to explore more of the region and saw in the flow of people at the Medeiros' house an economic opportunity: to turn the Medeiros' house an economic opportunity: to turn their backyard into a gambling spot, with the 12% of the profits. Done. This happened

around 1905. Soon, just like coffee, the “also prospered there. The Portuguese fled Brazil for legal issues and left a gift to the minority partner, who then became the sole boss. His daughter, Carmem, assiduously helped her mother run the business, her husband, Eusébio de Andrade, became interested in running the gambling business, after being fired from his job as a train driver of trains at the Central do Brasil, he took the lead of the animal game, promising his mother-in-law that he would keep the family well.

Eusébio and Carmem had children, including Castor de Andrade, perhaps the most famous bicheiro in Brazilian history. The Medeiros/Andrade family, under the leadership of Eusébio, expanded the points to neighborhoods in the West and North West and North Zone neighborhoods, both by the bullet and by the and also by monetary policy. Eusébio, according to his relatives, had inherited from other bicheiros in Rio the tradition of “buying” police officers to assist in actions against rivals and also to sabotage investigations against his expanding criminal network. The patriarch built a firm network of political commodities (Misse, 2010) with public security agents who opened the way for new attacks in territories that were still undeveloped from the economic exploitation of the animal game and helped the family and its criminal network from violent attacks by vengeful rivals. At the same time, we see the intertwined relationships between the exploitation of legal and illegal or informal/illegal markets. From the sale of grains planted in the backyard of a family of factory of factory workers to the management of a pursued by the authorities (even even if not exactly illegal), to the expansion of business business

through violence and bribery, we can see that from the outset the family's involvement with this lottery, which was very much in the the gray zone of legality until, finally, it became a misdemeanor³ in 1944 is marked by the logic of illegal management. The so-called market finds and fosters its so-called illegitimate and illegal side and illegal facet in the very production of urban reality, whether through the production of discrepancies of economic power and material capacity of subsistence as a result of the exploitation exploitation of surplus value (Engels and Marx, 2015), or by the the active production of an urbanism centered around the around the exploitation of this labor labor on the factory floor. The bridges built between the state and the market are a mutually visible and invisible web of relationships which, at the limit, do not distinguish between legal and illegal illegal and operate precisely in the field of illegalisms, as can be seen in the biography of the Andrade/Medeiros family.

Castor was born and raised in a family that was already well structured because of its immersion in illegal activities. It was no coincidence that, between 1957 and 1962, he had the opportunity to enter the National Law School, at that time the most important of its kind in Brazil, almost inaccessible to people from the working classes, as was the higher education system as a whole at the time.⁴ While the patriarch had already built up a firm network of influence and business – together with his brothers and sisters-in-law – Castor, who had already graduated in Law, by taking over the family and the criminal network linked to it, expanded his social, symbolic and political capital (Bourdieu, 1980, 1999 and 2009) in such a way as to allow a leap in the income growth curve and the penetration of his criminal network

throughout Rio de Janeiro's urban fabric and within the different sectors of state institutions (courts, police, prisons, assemblies, etc.).

Castor and his generation of colleagues and rivals in the dispute over the monopoly of gambling in Rio de Janeiro managed to take the game from a state of brute violence⁵ to, in the mid-1970s, build a business mediated by the diplomacy of a summit in which the leaders of the main families divided up the territories in such a way as to stop disputes and increase profits by avoiding reprimand from the police, who were always pressured by the Rio de Janeiro press to react to violence between animal game operators. As one of the creators and leaders of this grouping, Castor built up a complex network of social relationships that allowed him to accumulate capital in different ways.

Through Castor's personal accounts and also his criminal network⁶ (with notes from 1987 to 1994), it is possible to observe his strategies for expanding and maintaining power based on the way he spent his money. The investments were diversified, but with the same focus of pleasing as many people as possible, whether they were his employees, artists, sportsmen and residents of the neighborhoods, or law enforcement agents and other sectors of the state who could, if dissatisfied, obstruct the operation of the illegal market run by Castor and his colleagues from the top.

In the first book of the register called *Movimento de Caixa*, we can find expenses for gifts that go beyond the mere exercise of power through bribery, which tends to benefit only certain subgroups or individuals, and expand to a generalized investment in larger groups, regardless of the agents' connivance. For example, in March 1993, there was an

expense for lunch for all the agents present in the 14th Military Police Battalion, located in the Bangu region and surrounding areas, in the West Zone of the capital of Rio de Janeiro. The amount of R\$871,40⁷ was used to pay for meals for the battalion's officers, without discerning who is directly related to the Castor network or not. In this way, the pleasantness of the leader of the bicheiros creates an obstacle to repression by those who prefer to distance themselves minimally. An expense of a similar nature is found in the fourth Cash Movement book, R\$478.65, in October 1993, which in this case refers to lunch for the staff of the 19th MPB, which covers Copacabana.

Other types of expenses express in more detail the financial investment in building trust with direct and indirect employees. It's worth noting that Castor was the head of the Bangu F.C. soccer team, the Mocidade samba school and the Rio de Janeiro Independent Samba Schools League, Liesa, which he co-founded. Although officially it was an exercise of power that was technically independent from his job as head of an animal game family, in practice things became inseparable, with illegal money circulating through these legitimate areas both for money laundering and to actively build a better infrastructure for these institutions. Illegality, in its dichotomies between legal and illegal, legitimate and illegitimate, manifests itself here in the transitivity of different forms of capital (in both a Marxist and Bourdieusian sense) between popular sports and cultural expressions such as soccer and carnival. The liking and respect for Castor's direct and indirect employees as a bicheiro ends up reinforcing the bond of non-violent trust in which Castor invested so much throughout his life.⁸ This form of relationship is expressed explicitly in

expenses such as the R\$227.89 spent on a sick bicho point employee in June 1993; or the fact that, according to Teco, Castor's cousin, the head of the family supported a drugstore. Likewise, there were the gifts for the Bangu players, who drank, ate and even had sexual relations with prostitutes with Castor's bicheiro money – see the R\$4,433.65 paid to the Taco club in Copacabana in May 1993, for the use of the space by the Bangu players.

Castor died in 1997, suffering a massive stroke during an exclusive card game that took place in an apartment in Leblon. His inheritance was divided three ways: around 40% to his son Paulinho; 30% to his daughter Carmem (represented by her husband Fernando Iggnácio); and 30% to his nephew Rogerio de Andrade, who, along with his two brothers, Renato and Rinaldo.

Paulinho [...] had little if any affection for work. Recognized as an expansive and charismatic figure, the capo's direct successor loved the night, but hated the duties of the day, which began to generate internal friction in the family when the inheritance, in the view of Rogério and his brothers, seemed to have been unfairly delegated to those who knew little about it. Among both those who supported the current capo and those who hated him, the version that seems most accurate of what happened is that Rogério had his cousin killed without him really being up for a fight, making the death even crueler in the eyes of his relatives. This fact marked the end of Rogério's public image as a party-going playboy from the West Zone and a highly dangerous criminal. Fernando Iggnácio, Castor's son-in-law and manager of Carmen's inheritance, took his brother-in-law's side and started a war against Rogerio that lasted from 1998 to 2020. (Vieira, 2023, p. 53)

Relational continuities

Accounting can reveal many things about the modus operandi of a network as complex and far-reaching as that of the Andrade family, but for the purposes of this article and this specific research object, one of the most important facts is the monthly bribe payments made by some military police officers who became known as milicianos in the 1990s and 2000s, when the very notion of a milícia was forged between the praxis of paramilitary armed domination and diffuse discourses circulating in different social spheres (press, civil society, politics, etc.).

Major Dilo, Captain Cunha and Álvaro Lins, in particular, made up an “unlucky” group of military police officers who were exposed when their names were linked to the list⁹ of monthly bribes paid by Castor. They were also “unlucky” in that, a few years after the bribery scandal, they became defendants in lawsuits accusing them of incorporating different milícias in Rio de Janeiro, at a time when this type of milícia was being used. Janeiro, at a time when this type

of criminal network had just been molded into an algorithm known by that name and with its own characteristics crystallized in reports and research (Abreu, 2019; Werneck, 2015; Canoe Duarte, 2012). The battalions to which they belonged while allegedly receiving bribes were listed in the accounts as environments that directly benefited from investments by Castor and his network, demonstrating that the supra-individual relationship became very relevant in the construction of the bicheiro's capital.

The three individuals in question maintained direct contact¹⁰ (individual-network or individual-individual) or indirect contact (individual-network or network-network) with the network of Rogério de Andrade and Fernando Iggnácio, building or sustaining a continuity of personal relationships with the branches of Castor's network and expanding these relationships to benefit their miliciano networks, as I will show shortly

The following is the list of bribes related to these three:

Tenente Dilo	14º BPM	PP Fixo	2/12/1992	R\$303,00
Tenente Dilo	14º BPM	PP Fixo	5/1/1993	R\$242,76
Tenente Dilo	14º BPM	PP Fixo	2/2/1993	R\$385,85
Tenente Dilo	14º BPM	PP Fixo	3/1993	R\$300,48
Tenente Dilo	14º BPM	PP Fixo	2/4/1993	R\$238,00
Tenente Dilo	14º BPM	PP Fixo	3/5/1993	R\$369,47
Capitão Cunha	18º BPM	PP Fixo	5/1/1993	400.000
Capitão Cunha	18º BPM	PP Fixo	2/2/1993	600.000
Capitão Cunha	18º BPM	PP Fixo	3/1993	600.000
Capitão Cunha	18º BPM	PP Fixo	2/4/1993	600.000
Capitão Cunha	18º BPM	PP Fixo	3/5/1993	1.000.000
Capitão Cunha	18º BPM	PP Fixo	2/6/1993	1.000.000
Capitão Cunha	18º BPM	PP Fixo	5/7/1993	1.000.000
Capitão Cunha	18º BPM	PP Fixo	6/8/1993	2.000
Capitão Cunha	18º BPM	PP Fixo	1º/9/1993	3.000
Capitão Cunha	18º BPM	PP Fixo	23/9/1993	3.500
Capitão Cunha	18º BPM	PP Fixo	21/10/1993	3.000
Tenente Álvaro Lins dos Santos	23º BPM	PP Fixo	21/5/1993	1.500.000
Tenente Álvaro Lins dos Santos	23º BPM	PP Fixo	2/6/1993	1.500.000
Tenente Álvaro Lins dos Santos	23º BPM	PP Fixo	5/7/1993	1.500.000
Tenente Álvaro Lins dos Santos	23º BPM	PP Fixo	6/8/1993	2.000
Tenente Álvaro Lins dos Santos	23º BPM	PP Fixo	1º/9/1993	2.000

Major Dilo and Rio das Pedras

Preamble

The genesis of the *milícias* in Rio de Janeiro continues to be disputed by the social scientists (Zaluar and Conceição, 2007; Misse and Souza, 2008; Souza, 2020; Canoe loot, 2008). The authors disagree mainly on two related points: whether it is an organic phenomenon or a political project and whether the most relevant territory for the analysis was the Baixada or the West Zone. The works of Zaluar and, in part, Misse, for example, tend to follow the path of analyzing the *milícias* as an organic social evolution of the process of social accumulation of violence, in which the elective affinities between different phenomena, such as political, economic and territorial, mean that, within the historical line of Brazil, the *milícias* become possible from groups of police killers, such as the group of followers of Inspector Milton LeCocq. The theoretical line of *milícias* as the result of a political project deriving from the military dictatorship and having its genesis in the Baixada Fluminense has José Cláudio Souza Alves as its author, who argues for a continuation of the racist and class domination of the military dictatorship in the way extermination groups are built up in the Baixada and slowly establish armed domination over territories. Despite this, it is possible to extract a synthesis from all this endless discussion and still appease it (or not): we can draw from it that both the Baixada Fluminense and the West Zone, in all their convergences and divergences in historical urban constructions, were the stage for long social processes involving recurring manifestations of class domination

with recurring cycles of dispossession – with its genesis in slavery and colonialism – and new facets of capitalist extractivism (Harvey, 2003), all interconnected with what I call the extractivism of terror.¹¹ Both regions had previously been divided into huge slave plantations and farms and their occupation intensified in the 20th century, the Lower Zone from the first half of the period, while a large part of the West Zone was systematically occupied from a more recent process. This was the result of a massive immigration of northeasterners to Rio de Janeiro from the 1950s and 1960s onwards (Burgos, 2002) and violent processes of eviction of residents from poor areas of the South Zone and relocation to outlying neighborhoods during the same second half of the century. Following the logic of Milton Santos (1999), the West Zone and the Baixada become territories used at different times, which also reallocates their specificities in different ways, since temporality modifies the nuances of factors that make up the social relations that shape the urban. In any case, it can be understood that the *milícias* are the result of both the social accumulation of violence (Misse, 2008), built under the aegis of a state that executes an intricate and complex network of illegal management – a network developed from the slavery process that inaugurated Brazil as a modern nation-state – and of political projects to dominate the poor and descendants of former slaves, as described by Alves (2020) when talking about the continuity of the dictatorial project in the wake of re-democratization as one of the essential factors for understanding the exponential increase in urban violence in the Fluminense Baixada and, with this, the emergence of the *milícias*.

This long preamble serves as a justification for choosing to observe the milicianos of the West Zone rather than those of the Baixada as a way of understanding the link between the genesis of this type of criminal network and the animal game. The milícias seem to be the fruit of an intertwined socio-historical process that develops in convergent and divergent ways in both localities, also having in common the concomitant timing of the emergence of this type of organization in which security agents exercise a relatively cohesive armed domination over a territory. If Rio das Pedras is not the first favela to suffer this type of domination, it is certainly one of the first and perhaps, partly because of this, it holds the informal title of “cradle of the milícias” (Lima, 2023).

The milicias take over everything

Despite the “controversy” of having his name involved in Castor de Andrade's list of bribes, Major Dilo reaped good rewards in his career as a military police officer, having already become one of the heads of the Task Force to Combat Organized Crime, created by the government of Anthony Garotinho in 1999 to fight organized crime. Dilo got such a prominent role because of his closeness to Lenine de Freitas, then Undersecretary for Operational Planning. Although he maintained a solid rise in the police ranks, the man who had once appeared on the list of bribes appeared in the newspapers in 2001 with a new association to a crime: the coordination of the kidnapping of taxi driver Sérgio Couto in July 2001, in the North Zone of Rio de Janeiro.

Leading a group of police officers also associated with the Task Force, Dilo organized the kidnapping of the driver in exchange

for 500,000 reais, which he suspected the man would have access to because he was supposedly the boss of Morrode São Carlos, in Rio's North Zone. Sérgio, who was not the head of the slum as his kidnappers believed, did not have the fortune they were demanding for his ransom. Although he had been investigated for his involvement in gambling, his only association with drug trafficking was the fact that he was the cousin of Alex André “Dedé” Gomes, the real boss of the favela. The latter was murdered in early 2002, also after being kidnapped by MPs who, it is suspected, were from the same group that kidnapped the taxi driver.

In a plot with many comings and goings in the courts, Sérgio was killed, it is suspected, by Major Dilo's subordinates, which slowly pushed the case into ostracism, until it ended up in the archives of the Rio de Janeiro Court of Justice, where I accessed the case files in order to better understand the police officer's trajectory. It is well known that the turn of the century was marked by many reports of kidnappings by police officers. In fact, this period seems to be a transition from the supporting police officer to the police officer who plays a leading role in prominent criminal networks. Those three years as one of the Task Force's front men¹² were also very important for Dilo in another endeavor: joining the fledgling Rio das Pedras milícia.

The milícia was founded around 1995 by Rio de Janeiro Civil Police inspector Félix Tostes together with Nadinho de Rio das Pedras, a community leader who in the mid-2000s was elected a city councilor in the capital of Rio de Janeiro with an electoral base formed in the region under his command. “With the departure of Brizola from the government, the police resumed the role of hyper-violence

that had been partially safeguarded by the then governor” (Vieira, 2023). Rio das Pedras was a remote community, populated from the 1960s onwards by northeastern migrants and urbanized by the city council itself, which delegated public functions of space organization and access to social rights to the residents' association.

The study of the process of Rio das Pedras territory reveals that driven by political pragmatism and lack of planning, the government ended up sponsoring the construction of the favela. In this strange logic, the favela does not arise as a result of a lack of housing policy, but as a result of a deliberate deliberate housing policy, which delegated to the residents' association the role of organizing a new occupation and regulating. (Burgos, 2002, p. 45)

This excessive power in the hands of the residents' association was exploited by Tostes, a police officer who began offering the region a form of community/private security, which kept drug traffickers away from the neighborhood, drawing the attention of Burgos and his team (2002) to the fact that it was a favela devoid of characteristics that we consider common today, such as the explicit presence of illegal markets and poorly paved streets – when they are. Rio das Pedras presented itself as an almost utopian favela, as the title of the book that brings together Burgos' research suggests (*Autopia da comunidade: Rio das Pedras, uma favela carioca*). Private security services quickly became their own form of exercising power, based on extorting residents, implementing centralized loan sharking and expropriating homes and businesses. Practices that had previously been committed impulsively by different agents in the illegal markets were

now concentrated in the same hierarchical criminal network, but with flexibility to carry out business, establishing a model for the management of illegal activities that was replicated in such a way as to become something of its own. Here, the management of illegal activities also takes on a different shape. For the state is not just an indiscreet agent that, through its own legitimacy and legality, creates and manages illegal markets, it now forms the top of a criminal network that exercises armed dominance over a territory, further blurring the boundaries between the official state structure and the structure of the armed group. If the police officer and, eventually, the municipal politician are the “masters of the neighborhood” and, with the advent of official and bureaucratic means, they both achieve more progress in the neighborhood's infrastructure and gain even greater shielding from possible denunciations, etc., how do we differentiate between what is and isn't the state?

Dilo joined the milícias directly in the area of money laundering, becoming the head of this type of economic activity. He was in the group's second echelon of power, rising to the top after the death of Félix Tostes, murdered in 2007 by a miliciano from the Liga da Justiça group, created in Campo Grande (Rio's West Zone) almost at the same time as the Rio das Pedras milícia. The case files consulted for this research and the CPI of Milícias show that Nadinho ordered his partner's death, signing a peace agreement with the rival milícia, which, until then, had been in dispute with the Jacarepaguá group. Although the execution was successful, Nadinho was quickly discovered by the authorities, while at the same time he suffered a backlash in Rio das Pedras, as the

state and the entire second echelon remained faithful to the memory of Tostes, ousting him from any executive position within the criminal network. Brothers Dalmir and Dalcemir took the lead in retaking power, bringing other members to the forefront, including Dilo, who became even more respected as he rose to a position of maximum importance.

The dispute between the Justice League and the Rio das Pedras milícia also involved the ties of the Andrade family, at that point fractured by the war between Fernando Iggnácio and Rogério de Andrade. On the one hand, Castor's son-in-law exerted his influence over the Campo Grande region and part of Bangu; on the other, his nephew did the same in Jacarepaguá. The milícias had direct and indirect ties with the bicheiros responsible for their respective territories.

There are a few ways of looking at this. The first is through the individuals who constitute historical connections between the networks. In Rio das Pedras, Dilo continued to maintain relations with Rogério, so much so that part of the dealer's slot machines were exploited in the region of the milícias with the consent of the network that exercised armed control in the area and the mediation of police agents from Álvaro Lins' criminal network, about whom I will speak more shortly. In Campo Grande, the military police officer Róscio, Castor's former security guard, coordinated the second line of command of the Justice League's milícias, mediating relations with other networks, such as Fernando's. Another way of observing these relations is through the police officers' agreement. Another way of observing these relationships is through the division of votes in elections.

On the other side of the electoral race, Fernando Iggnácio, according to the investigations, did not allow Lins, Itagiba and affiliates into his areas of influence in the West Zone. As a result, the civil police connected to Rogério could not campaign in neighborhoods such as Campo Grande, etc, thus clearly demarcating their territory and the invisible alliances imposed on them. Binho, one of Castor's nephew's security chief said, in a phone call with an unknown man, that Jacarepaguá was guaranteed for "Dr. Álvaro". (Vieira, 2023, p. 99)

The division of influences becomes more visible in the map taken from case 2009.068.00004, where there is a list of voters who share the view that those who get elected in Rio das Pedras and Jacarepaguá don't get elected in Campo Grande and Santa Cruz, except, basically, for Itagiba, a civil policeman who succeeded Álvaro Lins¹³ as Rio de Janeiro's Secretary of Public Security. The possibility of Itagiba's transit in some parts of Santa Cruz can be explained by the geographical size of the neighborhood, with an area of 125 km² and more than 200,000 inhabitants, a neighborhood that, like Campo Grande, at the time was not dominated solely by Liga da Justiça, allowing transits from different networks depending on the part of the neighborhood. A map produced by the Public Prosecutor's Office in a legal case against Jorge Babu and his milícia shows precisely the territorial division of devotees in the West Zone. The groups with some connection to Rogério de Andrade were elected with votes from the Jacarepaguá region, while those connected to Fernando Iggnácio were elected from the Campo Grande region and surrounding areas

Coronel Cunha and the other side of the West Zone

At the other end of the West Zone, as the map shows, there is a name that recurs in countless polling stations: Jorge Babu. A civil police inspector involved in cockfighting and later a state deputy elected by the PT, Babu was a member of a milícias that had territories in Pedra de Guaratiba and Campo Grande. Joining him at the head was Coronel Cunha, the former Captain Cunha on Castor's list of bribes. Babu was the political front and Cunha the political front of the network. The milícia established itself in three territories between 2005 and 2006: in the housing estate located in Inhoaíba (Campo Grande), in the Cesarinho housing estate (Paciência) and in the Foice community (Guaratiba). To support these three points in different neighborhoods, Babu and Cunha entered into an alliance with the Justice League

The League and Babu's milícias maintained good relations with the League and Babu's milícia maintained good relations. cousin of the politician who, at his request, Jerominho, in Campo Grande, to teach the man who became the whistleblower a lesson. the man who became the whistleblower of the Guaratiba milícia. In order to please his friend, the League boss slapped the whistleblower so slapped the whistleblower so hard. (Vieira, 2023, p. 102)

Most of the slot machines in the area belonged to Fernando Iggnácio, so in order to use this means of revenue in a territory, it was necessary to negotiate with Fernando's network. The lawsuit states that the meeting point for the milicianos was the bakery on Francisco Brusque Street and that there were four Halloween-themed slot machines at the

back of the establishment, in other words, evidence of a possible economic relationship with Fernando's network. Another possible link is shown in the fact that Cunha met or formed ties with four men from his miliciano network at the Unidos da Ilha do Governador samba school, for which he allegedly worked as head of security. The school in question has belonged to the League of Samba Schools (Liesa) since the bicheiros created it.

The League was presented as a company whose aim was to commercialize the parade, which included the right to broadcast images, then in the hands of Riotur. With the disconnection of the Association, the so-called ten schools – Beija-Flor, Caprichosos de Pilares, Imperatriz Leopoldinense, Salgueiro, União da Ilha and Vila Isabel, most of which were controlled by organized crime – began to negotiate with the government separately, isolating the 34 smaller groups (Jupiara and Otávio, 2016, p. 213).

Babu and Cunha were able to establish a milícias with greater ease and a sense of modus operandi based on the model already established by their colleagues from CampoGrande and Rio das Pedras. Their actions were therefore more precise. For example, in order to take over the Foice community, they first reconnoitered the land and then, according to the testimony of a shopkeeper angry at having lost his establishment to the milícia, a group of 25 men, on foot and in private cars, entered the favela supported by vehicles bearing the PMERJ logo, but without identifying which battalion. Within a few hours, they had expelled the traffickers and broken up the drug dens. They didn't need to slowly approach the residents to then “show their claws”, as happened with the pioneering network that dominated Rio das

Pedras. This distinction is important to note in order to explain the extent to which miliciano domination has become professionalized and has become a model to be copied by other state agents with the intention of maximizing financial and symbolic profits. A report in *Folha de S. Paulo* (Fantti, 2023) shows that the Justice League police officers in Campo Grande also visited their colleagues in Rio das Pedras before becoming de facto milicianos; it is in these exchanges of know-how that we see the establishment of tangible and reproducible models.

Lins: the connector

In order to make fuller and more explicit sense of the relationships between the Andrade family and the *milícias*, it is necessary to turn the analysis to a small network which, in order to satisfy its own interests, mediated the macro networks and those more dependent on defined territories. Let's look at Álvaro Lins' network, the broker¹⁴ of Rio's criminal networks in the 2000s. One of the military men whose name was linked to receiving bribes from Castor's network, Lins changed careers as soon as he found himself in the headlines for the "wrong" reasons. His dirty name in 1993 was given a new meaning when, in 1997, he applied to become a PCERJ police officer and was soon in office, despite the fears of then-Governor Marcelo Alencar about the image of the corporation when he accepted Lins' entry. In just three years, he became head of Polinter, one of the most important sectors for intelligence work and internal communication within the Civil Police. In 2001, with Anthony Garotinho as governor, Lins became head of the PCERJ and, in 2003, with Rosinha Garotinho

succeeding her husband as governor, he rose to the highest position in the Public Security Department.

During his time as head of Polinter, the police officer built up an extensive network of contacts and established a small group of underlings in the criminal network he was consolidating, called the Inhos Group: Fabinho, Jorginho and Helinho. With his trio of loyal policemen under his arm, Lins began to connect different groups: the Garotinho family and Rogério de Andrade; election candidates and *milícias*; Rogério and candidates. His role then became that of mediator of these relationships. This gave him a specific importance because, without Lins, the networks are temporarily weakened and new ties need to be strengthened so that the illegal markets can continue to flow without so many obstacles. Lins was responding to Rogério's interests in sustaining influence at the top level, and so Rosinha and Anthony Garotinho would have received¹⁵ R\$9,320,000 and R\$4,001,142, respectively, between 2004 and 2006, which, in updated values,¹⁶ is equivalent to R\$30,659,797 and R\$13,162,468. Lins also had the sum of his amounts received by Rogério highlighted: R\$437,357, which today would be equivalent to R\$1,438,763. It is notable here that there is a gulf between the amounts Lins received before, when he had a relationship with Castor, and years later when he continued to work with the capo's nephew. This change shows how much Lins went from being a tertiary character in the relations between the Andrades and the state to occupying a place of relevance, in which his transits inside and outside the state are connected to his ability to reconcile the two into a confluence. In the past, the police officers on Castor's bribe list

were paid to pass on information about crimes and fabricate acts of repression, thus creating an impression of fighting crime, basically the fabrication of lies systematized in such a way as to be constituted as truth in the social environment. Lins belonged to this group with low clergy functions.

Elevated to head of Public Security and then to federal deputy, he was even able to arrange operations against Fernando Iggnácio, at Rogério's behest. Iggnácio, by the way, was seen being escorted through the streets of Rio by vehicles from the Police Department for the Repression of Organized Crime (Draco),¹⁷ demonstrating that Lins' influence was limited within the internal fragmentations of the police itself in relation to the Andrade family's fratricidal war. Jorginho and Helinho, who were intercepted by the MPF, spoke about the subject, saying that they had received a sum of more than a million reais from Rogério to carry out the job of arresting Fernando. This fact is also made clear in the following conversation between Tande, Lins' right-hand man in the political campaign for Federal Deputy in 2007, and Fabinho:

Fernando: Did the doctor (Lins) talk to you? Jorginho's people got Fernando this morning. Did you hear?

Tande: No, he called me here but then he started saying he was busy, so I couldn't talk.

Fabinho: But he got in at dawn. Oscars warned me... Zé tried to call me at 7 o'clock in the morning. I didn't answer. Then Zé called me now and told me. We've got Fernando Iggnácio and Marquinho without a brain. Marquinho Sem Cérebro is the one who used to run the Chief's Hotline... they put Sem Cérebro and Fernando Iggnácio in there. And ADULT GAMES, Fernando Iggnácio's

company, says it has about 15 PMs on the payroll. PM, Fireman, Desipe, bandit, bandit, police, police, bandit, son-of-a-bitch - all grabbed. And Fernando Iggnácio was shooting in São Conrado. They've already passed it on to the press. The boss must already know about it. [...]

Fabinho: He didn't have an arrest warrant, so the staff worked out the arrest warrant for him yesterday. Then they did... Then yesterday at nine o'clock at night the MP came out for him. At nine o'clock in the evening the Public Prosecutor's Office came out for him. They stood around waiting for Fernando Iggnácio. Then today, at 4 o'clock in the morning, they knocked on his house. They arrived at his house at 6 a.m. They say he didn't understand a fucking thing. Seven o'clock in the morning he didn't understand a fucking thing. What's going on? ARREST WARRANT. Yeah.

T: YEAH! Nice!

[...]

F: On the other hand, what's he going to say? What's FERNANDO...? Understand? He's powerful too. He has judges and magistrates on his side. What can he suddenly say? He didn't have an arrest warrant. Why did they go after an arrest warrant for him?" (Case n. 2007.02.01.004933-4).

Some of the work that Lins didn't do directly was left to the Grupo dos Inhos, who were even the network's direct mediators with the milícias in Jacarepaguá. Jorginho, for example, became the manager of Rogério's slot machines in Jacarepaguá, starting in 2002, when he was the biche's jailer at Polinter,¹⁸ a fact that brought them so close that he was able to play such a relevant role in Rogério's network. The machines rented by drug dealers, establishments and milicianos from all over Jacarepaguá,¹⁹ were then under Jorginho's

tutelage. Also a resident of this region of Rio's West Zone, Fabinho, in a call intercepted with an unidentified interlocutor, talked about how Lins' political campaign incursions into the milícia favelas in Jacarepaguá were guaranteed and that he, Fabinho, had already contacted everyone in these corners, as he was known in the region and had a contact who mediated where he had no penetration. This contact was a PM corporal who, since the time of Félix Tostes, had been working for the Rio das Pedras milícia, fomenting attacks on rival milícias. His name is Jorsan and he also provided security for Rogério de Andrad in the Bangu neighborhood. Jorsan, who worked for the Rio das Pedras, Lins and Rogério networks, was both well-connected and a weak link. He was murdered in February 2007, shot in the driver's seat of his Audi. His motive? He intended to report Lins and Rogério de Andrade's slot machine scheme to the Federal Police, with whom he had begun contact the previous month. At the end of the same month, his colleague and contractor Félix Tostes was also executed. Tostes had an even more direct connection to Lins' network; in 2006, he was a member of the escort for Ricardo Hallack, Lins' successor as head of the Civil Police.

Conclusion

The animal game constitutes continuous relationships with police officers who have become milicianos, although there are discontinuities in the type of relationship. This is because, at first, many of the police officers occupied positions of low individual relevance to the actors at the top of the Bicho criminal networks; however, after Castor's death, certain

agents who became involved in the world of the then incipient miliciano formation of armed territorial domination positioned themselves in such a way in their respective criminal networks that the bicheiros, based here on the analysis made of the Andrade family, had to build new ties with the now-milicianos, changing the type of symmetry. In other words, at first, police agents were in a profoundly asymmetrical relationship with the bicheiros, then this asymmetry was minimized, although it is not possible to say that it was eliminated once and for all, not least because of the fact that in certain commercial relationships, such as the rental of slot machines, it was the bicheiros who had the power of possession over the rented merchandise, thus creating a relationship of dependence with the miliciano estate agents.

Another important point to note is that although the milicianos of the generations analyzed here were both police and milicianos, in other words, they were able to use the state infrastructure more freely than rivals in the drug trade, for example, the bicheiros had just as much or even more access to the same state actors. Well or not, at the time, there was no direct relationship between the governors and the milícias, while with the bicheiros, as this article has shown, a dense financial relationship had been built up and connected through long-standing intermediaries (Álvaro Lins connected Rogério to the Garotinhos without the need for physical meetings between them, at least as far as we know). This seems to be due to the way milícias tend to accumulate and build symbolic capital and the way bicheiros do it. The Andrades, for example, have always maintained long-standing relationships with their peers and a logic of maintaining a certain

pleasantness for those who are not directly related to the network, such as the police officers who received the benefits of Castor's investments in the batalhões even if they had no contact with him. This learning derives from Castor's time and is related to the construction of a political culture based on maintaining diplomacy as an essential pillar in the execution of business, which is the basic motto of the Cúpula do Bicho. Meanwhile, the milicianos, by the very expropriating nature of the economic activity that configures them as milicianos, acted by instrumentalizing violence and the fear of a possible violent reaction. This in their interpersonal relations and in their relations with residents, something that should be the subject of another article.

Finally, the relationship between these criminal networks and the state shows us that the material and symbolic goods that sustain the economies of animal games and milícias can only circulate under the territorial circumscription of a state that, in different ways, manages illegal activities. The legitimate

private market and the illegal markets mix all the time in these cases, and the state participates in these mixtures from the outset, through laws and repression that also serve to regulate illegal action itself within a spectrum of possible and acceptable actions. All this is not to say that the state controls the flows of illegal activity and the actors that make up these markets. There are symmetries and asymmetries of power and nuances in how these actors develop alongside the state and the legitimized market. However, none of this changes the fact that the very notion of territory and the urban construction of cities is only possible under the circumscription of the legal legitimacy, partial as it may be, of a modern nation-state, normally made up of internal fragmentations and territorial divisions provided for by law. In this context, criminal networks are built alongside the economic and political development of the Brazilian state. There are observable biographical influences between the stories of the Andrades, the milícias and Rio de Janeiro itself.

[1] <https://orcid.org/0009-0001-3429-4065>

Universidade Federal Fluminense, Instituto de Ciências e Filosofia, Departamento de Sociologia e Metodologia de Ciências Sociais, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Sociologia. Niterói, RJ/Brasil.
matheusjorvieira@gmail.com

Notes

- (1) The term continues to be disputed, undergoing metamorphoses over the years, largely because of the constant renewal of the illicit markets run by the milicianos. However, I will base myself on the conceptualization of milícias by Cano and Ito (2008, p. 59): "1) The control of a territory and the population that inhabits it by an irregular armed group; 2) The to some extent pacific character of this control of the territory's inhabitants; 3) The desire for individual profit as the main motivation of the members of these groups; 4) A discourse of legitimization referring to the protection of the inhabitants and the establishment of an order which, like any order, guarantees certain rights and excludes others, but allows for the generation of rules and expectations for the normalization of conduct; 5) The active and recognized participation of state agents as members of the groups. " Although insufficient for today's configurations, the researchers' definition provides a concrete notion of what the first generation of milicianos proper were, which is appropriate, since I am talking about them in this article.
- (2) This information was taken from interviews with Castor de Andrade's relatives. One of the most relevant to reconstructing the history of the Andrade/Medeiros family was Teco, one of Castor's cousins. Castor, whom I will only call by his surname, so as not to expose his identity too much. his identity too much. More details about the interview with him and other family members can be found in other parts of my research.
- (3) "By way of example, the author explains that in the Federal District of Rio de Janeiro, between 1906 and 1917, cases related to animal game had an acquittal rate of approximately 87%, while cases of vagrancy had an acquittal rate of approximately 69%. cases of vagrancy had an acquittal rate of approximately 69%, in other words, this allowed the animal game agents to operate more intensively without fear of being punished. punished. Law n. 3.688, of October 3, 1941, is a historic milestone in gambling. For the first time, the lottery appears in the Criminal Offenses Law, specifically in art. 58º: Exploring or carrying out the lottery known as animal game, or practicing any act related to its exploitation: Penalty simple imprisonment, from four months to one year, and a fine, from two to twenty contos de réis." (Carmo and Medeiros, 2018, p. 49)
- (4) "In the period 1940-1960, the country's population grew from 41.2 million to 70 million (an increase of 70%), while enrollment in higher education tripled. In 1960, there were 226,218 university students (of which 93,202 were from the private sector) and 28,728 surpluses (those who passed the entrance exams of public universities, but not admitted due to lack of places)". (Martins, 2002, p. 5)
- (5) "At the height of the 1950s and 1960s, the violence between the groups that dominated gambling was such that, according to Misse (2008) that, according to Misse (2008), the press of the time compared the capital of Rio de Janeiro to the Chicago of the 1920s, when it was taken over by the 1920s, when the latter was taken over by mafias trafficking in alcoholic beverages, a direct consequence of Prohibition. of Prohibition, which was in force for two decades in the USA. This, added to the context of the increase in violence in general and the high repercussion of these crimes in Rio de Janeiro - since the media media were concentrated in Rio - led to the creation of the Special Diligence Group, 'commanded by a police officer known as LeCocq, who had belonged to the infamous Special Police of the Vargas dictatorship' (Misse, 2008, p. 377)". (Vieira, 2023, p. 34)
- (6) To which I had access through a request to unseal a court case at the Rio de Janeiro Court of Justice.
- (7) All accounting figures have been converted to today's currency and inflation. from the tool provided by the Central Bank of Brazil at the online address: <https://www3.bcb.gov.br/CALCIDADA0/publico/corrigirPorIndice.do?method=corrigirPorIndice>. O initial parameter is the reference date of the expense recorded in the accounting ledger while the final date for inflation correction was, at the time of writing, June 2023

- (8) With numerous investigations behind his back, Castor is remembered in the media, by residents of the neighborhoods he influenced (Bangu and Realengo) and by some of my interviewees and acquaintances, as a diplomat in the first place. In the first place, especially when compared to other peers or successors who use violence as a more recurrent tool than the capo used.
- (9) This list was seized in the police raid that took all the accounting records of the Castor network for 1987 and 1994. Castor's network for the years 1987 and 1994. This material was attached to case no. 0023098-22.1994.8.19.0001, to which, as mentioned, I was granted access by the Rio de Janeiro Court of Justice
- (10) The notion of direct and indirect contact between networks is perceptible in authors of this theory, but the explanation in these terms comes from me. Here I conceptualize "individual-network" as a relationship in which an agent is in direct contact with other agents in a network, representing the network to which he belongs while interacting with others in the related network. As well as "network-network" as relationships in which different individuals from more than one network relate to each other in such a way that the relationship between the networks is more explicit.
- (11) The term "extractivism of terror" is better explained in an article yet to be published in the annals of the 3rd Public Security Congress of the Maré Network. I will supplement the quote with the name, date and page, but in order to respect the anonymity of the submission, the following is the quote: "I will call this process of political capital formation through the production of moral panic 'terror extractivism'. To understand what I mean by this, I need to briefly explain the theory of David Harvey (2003), who, in an advance on Marx and Engel's formulation in chapter XXIV of Capital, and with other thinkers such as Gago and Mezzadra (2017) continuing his line of theory, considered extractivism and dispossession in contemporary capitalism, especially in Latin America. The discussion starts from the principle of over-accumulation of capital and questions about the treatment of this surplus so that money and productive capacity do not remain idle and, therefore, end up slowing down the increase in capital. [Dispossession, in this case, is one of the possible translations for expropriation, i.e. the act of removing someone from somewhere or taking from someone something that already belongs to them. Similarly, extractivism, in the strictest sense, was a term referring to the economic act of extracting raw materials for the production of consumer goods. Harvey and the followers of his philosophy see how these processes take place on a global scale, where over-accumulated capital is applied in peripheral countries, in the exploitation of resources and in the expropriation and theft of local labor for external purposes, in a tangle of relationships that crosses nation-states, private legal groups, illegal groups, etc. By re-observing the micro-regions of the same state or country, we can deduce that the processes of a macro nature explained by Harvey are repeated within the territory circumscribed there. 'In this sense, extractivist logics intersect with the government of the poor, producing violence and creating hybrid forms with the same logic and rhetoric of inclusion proposed by the discourse of citizenship. This perspective leads to a reading of the new social conflicts that allows us to map the intertwining of agribusiness, finance, illegal economies (from drugs to smuggling) and state subsidies, according to complementary and competitive logics. These logics also allow us to escape the victimizing imaginary that tends to be emphasized by the expropriation narrative' (Gago and Mezzadra, 2017, p. 580). The repetition of the macro in the micro is a sign of how the dynamics are produced by the same structuring factors. Within the periphery of the world, there are peripheries of its own limited world, and there the dispossessions are repeated by agents both internal and external to the territory. Harvey's theory finally allows us to see how the violent markings of capital are in all instances of life under the aegis of capitalism. The extractivism of terror comes into play here. This is a form of material extraction of life and symbolic extraction of peace, both at the collective and individual level, in which the state produces terror – seen here as the production of constant tension fueled by violence and the very threat of it, It is the kidnapping of peace for a denaturalized everyday life of physical violence structured by the state and/or private entities – determined territories in order to promote the circulation of ideas that can later be capitalized on for the purposes of elections or the provision of public services (more operations, which allows more to be spent on security) and private services (when private groups, made up of public agents or not, provide their protection work, etc.)."

- (12) With this case being highlighted in the press, the undersecretary who helped Dilo reach the top echelon of the Task Force found himself under pressure to begin a public disassociation of his image from the police: "He's always been the best, like Romário in the national team. But if what they say is true, I'll be the first to ask for his expulsion," he said in an interview with *Jornal do Brasil* on July 17, 2001.
- (13) Itagiba sometimes antagonized and sometimes got closer to Lins, in an ambivalent relationship that, despite the political disagreements regarding the direction of the Public Security Secretariat and the use of relations with the bicheiros, seemed to keep progressing in symbolic and economic capital gains for both. capital for both of them.
- (14) "Brokers are neither clients nor bosses. They play in the middle of the field, and what past research has shown is that individuals capable of holding such a position are well respected, conquerors of objectives and strategic participants in the networks they are part of" (Morselli, 2009, p. 17).
- (15) In 2006, one of Rogério's accountants had his pen drive seized and it contained balance sheets discerning bribe payments to Garotinho, who went by the aliases Madame and Príncipe. This raw material from Andrade's accountant became one of the files used in this research. in this research.
- (16) All accounting figures have been converted to today's currency and inflation. from the tool provided by the Central Bank of Brazil at the online address: <https://www3.bcb.gov.br/CALCIDADAO/publico/corrigerPorIndice.do?method=corrigerPorIndice>.
- (17) The initial parameter, in the case of the former governors' earnings, is the month of June 2006 while the final for inflation correction was, at the time of writing, June 2023.
- (18) It's worth noting that Polinter received numerous investments from Castor while he was alive; it was there that it was there that the Civil Police's first air-conditioning unit was installed, according to Ramir, an alias for a policeman who I interviewed anonymously and who had a direct relationship with Castor. All of the investments were eventually useful when he was put in prison there. His nephew followed suit. Ramir was also Rogério's jailer and explains that the latter differed from his uncle in that he often received prostitutes, while Castor avoided this type of movement in the jail, which he dominated, it must be said
- (19) Rio das Pedras is subscribed in the Jacarepaguá region.

References

- ABREU, A. de (2019). *A metástase*. Disponível em: <https://piaui.folha.uol.com.br/materia/a-metastase/>. Acesso em: 10 dez 2023.
- ALVES, J. C. S. (2020). *Dos barões ao extermínio: uma história da violência na Baixada Fluminense*. Rio de Janeiro, Consequência.
- AZEVEDO SILVA, G. A. de (1989). *BANGU 100 anos: a fábrica e o bairro*. Rio de Janeiro, Sabiá Produções Artísticas.
- BOURDIEU, P.; CHAMBOREDON, J. C.; PASSERON, J. C. (2010). *Ofício de sociólogo. Metodologia da pesquisa na sociologia*. Petrópolis, Vozes.

- BOURDIEU, P. (1980). Le capital social: notes provisoires. Actes de la Recherche em Sciences. *Sociales*. Paris, n. 31, pp. 2-3.
- _____. (1999). *Escritos de educação*. Organização de Maria Alice Nogueira e Afrânio Catani. Rio de Janeiro, Vozes.
- _____. (2009). *O senso prático*. Rio de Janeiro, Vozes.
- BURGOS, M. B. (2002). *Utopia da comunidade: Rio das Pedras uma favela carioca*. Rio de Janeiro, Loyola.
- CANO, I.; DUARTE, T. (2012). *No sapatinho. A evolução das milícias no Rio de Janeiro (2008-2011)*. Rio de Janeiro, Henrich Boll Stiftung.
- CANO, I.; IOOT, C. (2008). "Seis por meia dúzia? Um estudo exploratório do fenômeno das chamadas 'milícias' no Rio de Janeiro". In: JUSTIÇA GLOBAL (org.). *Segurança, tráfico e milícia no Rio de Janeiro*. Rio de Janeiro, Fundação Heinrich Böll.
- CARMO, L. S. do; DE MEDEIROS, D. A. (2018). Território, normas e finanças: reflexões acerca da legislação referente ao jogo do bicho no Brasil. *Revista Contexto Geográfico*. Alagoas, v. 3, n. 5, pp. 45-56.
- CHAZKEL, A. (2014). *Leis da sorte: o jogo do bicho e a construção da vida pública urbana*. Campinas, Editora da Unicamp.
- DELEGACIA pode ter dado proteção a bicheiro no RJ (2006). *G1*. Disponível em: <https://g1.globo.com/Noticias/Brasil/0,,AA1395302-5598,00-DELEGACIA+PODE+TER+DADO+PROTECAO+A+BICHEIRO+N O+RJ.html>. Acesso em: 23 jan 2023.
- ENGELS, F.; MARX, K. (2015). *O Capital-Livro 1: Crítica da economia política. Livro 1: O processo de produção do capital*. São Paulo, Boitempo.
- FANTTI, B. (2023). 'Só me arrependo de não ter ficado mais rico', diz ex-miliciano. *Folha de S.Paulo*. Disponível em: <https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/2023/12/so-me-arrependo-de-nao-ter-ficado-mais-rico-diz-ex-miliciano.shtml>. Acesso em: 8 out 2023.
- FOUCAULT, M. (1997). *Vigiar e Punir*. Petrópolis, Vozes.
- GAGO, V.; MEZZADRA, S. (2017). "A Critique of the Extractive Operations of Capital: Toward an Expanded Concept of Extractivism". *Rethinking Marxism*. St. Mary's City, v. 29, n. 4, pp. 574-591.
- HARVEY, D. (2003). *O novo imperialismo*. São Paulo, Loyola.
- JUPIARA, A.; OTAVIO, C. (2016). *Os porões da contravenção*. Rio de Janeiro, Record.
- LABRONICI, R (2020). Ação entre Amigos: Relações entre Banqueiros do Bicho e Milícias nas Disputas Político-Econômicas da Contravenção. *Revista Antropolítica. Niterói*, n. 50, pp. 150-172.
- LIMA, B. (2023). Berço da milícia no RJ foi alvo de apenas oito operações em três anos. *Metrópoles*. Disponível em: <https://www.metropoles.com/colunas/guilherme-amado/berco-da-milicia-no-rj-foi-alvo-de-apenas-oito-operacoes-em-tres-anos>. Acesso em: 10 dez 2023.
- LIMA, M. (2016). "O uso da entrevista na pesquisa empírica". In: Cebrap. *Métodos de pesquisa em Ciências Sociais: Bloco Qualitativo*. São Paulo, Sesc/Cebrap.
- MAGALHÃES, F. (2007). A fuga dos bichos ou a origem da loteria mais popular do Brasil. *Rev. do Arquivo Geral da Cidade do Rio de Janeiro*. Rio de Janeiro, n. 15, pp. 53-67.
- MARTINS, A. C. P. (2002). Ensino superior no Brasil: da descoberta aos dias atuais. *Acta Cirúrgica Brasileira*. São Paulo, v. 17, pp. 4-6.

- MISSE, M. (2008). Sobre a acumulação social da violência no Rio de Janeiro. *Civitas: Revista de Ciências Sociais*. Porto Alegre, v. 8, n. 3, pp. 371-385.
- _____. (2010). Trocas ilícitas e mercadorias políticas: para uma interpretação de trocas ilícitas e moralmente reprováveis cuja persistência e abrangência no Brasil nos causam incômodos também teóricos. *Anuário Antropológico*. Brasília, v. 35, n. 2, pp. 89-107.
- _____. (2011). Crime organizado e crime comum no Rio de Janeiro: diferenças e afinidades. *Revista de sociologia e política*. Curitiba, v. 19, pp. 13-25.
- MORSELLI, C. (2009). *Inside Criminal Networks*. Canadá, Springer.
- POLLAK, M. (1989). Memória, esquecimento e silêncio. *Estudos Históricos*. Rio de Janeiro, v. 2, n. 3, pp. 3-15.
- SANTOS, M. (1999). O dinheiro e o território. *GEOgraphia*. São Paulo, v. 1, pp. 7-13.
- SCHEINGOLD, S. (1975). *The politics of rights. Lawyers, public policy and political change*. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press.
- SELZNIK, P. (1959). "The sociology of law". In: Merton, R.; Broom, L.; Cottrell, L. (eds.). *Sociology Today*. New York, Basic Books.
- SYLBEEY, S. (2005). "Everyday life and the constitution of legality". In: JACOBS, M.; HANRAHAN, N. (orgs.) *The Blackwell Companion to the Sociology of Culture*. Malden, Blackwell Publishing.
- TELLES, V. da S. (2009). Nas dobras do legal e do ilegal: ilegalismos e jogos de poder nas tramas da cidade. *Dilemas - Revista de estudos de conflito e controle social*. Rio de Janeiro, v. 2, n. 5-6, pp. 97-126.
- VIEIRA, M. L. (2023). *Do bicho à milícia: uma análise das relações entre milicianos e bicheiros no começo do século XXI*. Dissertação de mestrado. Rio de Janeiro, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro.
- WERNECK, A. (2015). "O ornitorrinco de criminalização: a construção social moral do miliciano a partir dos personagens da 'violência urbana' do Rio de Janeiro". *Dilemas: Revista de Estudos de Conflito e Controle Social*. Rio de Janeiro, v. 8, n. 3, pp. 429-454.
- ZALUAR, A.; CONCEIÇÃO, I. S. (2007). Favelas sob o controle das milícias no Rio de Janeiro. *Perspectiva*. São Paulo, v. 21, n. 2, pp. 89-101.

Translation: this article was translated from Portuguese to English by the author himself.

Received: December 13, 2023

Approved: April 15, 2024

