Positivism and moral epistemology

a reflection on values ​​in scientific research in Administration

Abstract

Most management researchers hesitate when faced with the distinction between what is objectively right and wrong. This hesitation is understandable. Values imply a “subjective,” personal dimension that may introduce religious and moral interference into research—the dominant epistemological traditions of positivism and subjectivism in management struggle with the notion of moral objectivity. Empirical research may study values in human behavior, but pragmatic scientists tend to avoid assuming that one value can be objectively better than another. In this article, we invite management researchers to reconsider this assumption. We demonstrate how accepting at least a limited form of moral objectivity—that is, an epistemic orientation that seeks objective moral reasons—can benefit management research by: (1) guiding research practice; (2) using standards of moral objectivity as cues for formulating empirical hypotheses for psychological explanations; and (3) adding prescriptive power to empirical theories.