Novel metaphor and conceptual stability

Helena Martins


This paper discusses three radically different approaches to the issue of novel metaphor: the classic view, according to which metaphor is itself defined by its novelty with respect to our established conceptual systems; the cognitivist view, in which novel conceptual metaphors are considered a possible but relatively rare phenomenon; and the deconstructionist view, in which novelty in metaphor is seen as either impossible or a non-issue. The possibility of reconciling valuable insights yielded in each of these approaches is explored, and the case is made for taking the matter under a non-representationalist, Wittgensteinian angle.


novel metaphor; conceptual stability; representationalism; Wittgenstein

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Revista Delta-Documentação e Estudos em Linguística Teórica e Aplicada ISSN 1678-460X