Firm’s Strategic Responses in Standardization

Authors

  • Nguyen Huu Phuc

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.24212/2179-3565.2014v5i2p36-41

Keywords:

Standardization, Cross license, Patent pool, Game theory.

Abstract

From the perspective of game theory, this paper examines 1) Why do companiesparticipate in standardization activities and patent pools, even if the activities benefit their rivalcompanies; 2) When there are multiple standards of similar products, under what conditionswill these multiple standards be replaced by a de facto standard, 3) When will these multiplestandards coexist together? 4) What are the strategic responses of the companies then?

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Published

2014-01-31

Issue

Vol. 5 No. 2 (2014)

Section

Papers

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