Motion to relief a judgment and evaluation of evidence:

The violation of legal rules of evidence as a cause for the rescission of judicial decisions

Abstract

The aim of this thesis is to demonstrate the suitability of motion to relief a judgment, based on art. 966, item V, of the CPC/15, in the face of final and unappealable decisions that have valued the evidence in an illegal manner, violating the rules and principles that apply to this activity. To this end, it will be shown that the activity of evaluating evidence is not entirely free, but is governed and guided by legal rules and principles. When these rules and principles are violated, it will be demonstrated that it is possible to objectively assess the existence of a flaw in the assessment of evidence. This is relevant in order to set limits on the suitability of the rescission action, so as to avoid its abusive use. In summary, the proposed thesis is based on the following ideas: (a) the CPC/15, by providing for motions to relief a judgment to be brought against decisions that have manifestly violated a legal rule, has expanded the suitability of motions to relief a judgment; (b) in the current legal philosophy paradigm, there is a dissociability between text and rule, and the use of the method of concretization of the law is required over subsumption; (c) the legal rule is the product of the interpretation of normative statements in the light of the facts; (d) a flawed fixation on the factual premise implies a flawed application of the law; (e) there are rules and principles that affect the activity of evaluating evidence, and it is possible to assess whether or not they have been violated; (f) the judge does not have freedom or discretion to decide, including on the evaluation of evidence, and is always limited by the law.