Fato, valor, significação, pragmatismo

Arthur  Araújo

doi:10.23925/2316-5278.2023v24i1:e60854

Autores

Arthur Araújo Universidade Federal do Espírito Santo

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.23925/2316-5278.2023v24i1:e60854

Resumo

considerando o debate nos contextos moderno e contemporâneo da filosofia, exploro a resposta pragmática ao dualismo fato-valor. Nesse sentido, levando em conta que o pragmatismo considera mente e mundo como partes de um continuum experiencial e os humanos como seres sociais, chamo a atenção para a “exigência” de significação e valor nas práticas de vida. Traçando um paralelo entre William James e Wolfgang Köhler relação à noção de “interesse”, como forma de exigência, a ideia central que desenvolvo neste artigo é que “interesse” faz diferença em alguns contextos de experiência e então abre espaço para significação e valor em múltiplos níveis da vida. Em termos do pragmatismo de James, como alternativa aos dualismos tradicionais (fato-valor, teoria- prática, conhecimento-realidade etc.), essa visão pluralista supõe que cada forma de interesse representa condição e gênese de sentido e valor nas práticas humanas.

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