The Anomaly stands: revisiting some objections to anomalous monism

Marcelo Fischborn

doi:10.23925/2316-5278.2024v25i1:e65267

Autores

Marcelo Fischborn Instituto Federal Farroupilha

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.23925/2316-5278.2024v25i1:e65267

Palavras-chave:

monismo anômalo, filosofia da mente, anomaly of the mental

Resumo

O monismo anômalo de Donald Davidson foi criticado repetidas vezes desde sua defesa inaugural no artigo Mental Events, publicado em 1970. Apesar da ampla rejeição, não parece haver acordo sobre por que o monismo anômalo falha. Este artigo sistematiza duas objeções fortes ao monismo anômalo. Primeiramente, o argumento de Davidson a favor do monismo exige a suposição problemática de que a física possa fornecer leis causais estritas para relações causais em geral. Em segundo lugar, o monismo de Davidson exige uma ontologia de eventos para a qual nenhum critério de identidade satisfatório foi fornecido. Apesar desses problemas, o artigo defende que as teses sobre a anomalia e irredutibilidade do mental permanecem aceitáveis, apesar da dificuldade de se reconstruir com precisão os argumentos que Davidson usa para defendê-las.

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