Superveniência e causalidade: abordagens alternativas ao argumento causal de Martin

Ícaro Machado

doi:10.23925/2316-5278.2026v27i1:e74017

Autores

Ícaro Machado Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1759-2930

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.23925/2316-5278.2026v27i1:e74017

Palavras-chave:

Argumento Causal, Disjuntivismo, Michael Martin, Realismo Ingênuo, Superveniência Local

Resumo

O objetivo deste estudo é fornecer uma defesa do Realismo Ingênuo/Disjuntivismo, apresentando uma nova resposta ao Argumento Causal de Michael Martin que resista ao seu compromisso de que as percepções instanciam a propriedade fundamental das alucinações. Para alcançar esse objetivo, conduzimos uma análise crítica da premissa do argumento, que sustenta que meros processos cerebrais são suficientes para a exemplificação das propriedades fundamentais das alucinações, o que que se baseiam na conjunção de duas proposições. Uma dessas proposições, nosso foco no presente estudo, afirma que as experiências, em geral, são exclusivamente causadas por processos cerebrais. Essa razão é principalmente respaldada por regularidades observadas entre o cérebro e eventos mentais. No entanto, questionamos esse último passo com base na concepção de que ele implica uma conclusão inadequada a partir de dados empíricos. Em primeiro lugar, isso ocorre por desconsiderar possíveis hipóteses causais adicionais que, segundo o modelo de causação de propriedades determináveis, admitem padrões extras sobrepostos. Em segundo lugar, a razão ignora algumas observações fundamentais sobre subdeterminação empírica.

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