The application of the principle of insignificance by the police chief and its consequences in the criminal process

Abstract

This article deals with the application of the principle of insignificance by the police chief. As the police authority is the first to be aware of the criminal offense that occurred, it may or may not use insignificance, upon verifying the existence of a minimally relevant injury to the legal asset protected by the State and the presence of the vectors listed by the Federal Superior Court for the use of the principle of insignificance. We will be faced with the constitutional principles of procedural economy, considering the lack of need for a process, given the insignificance, as well as the presence of the principle of procedural speed, configuring a more agile justice in addition to the observance of the principle of human dignity. Initially, we will present the historical considerations on the emergence of the principle of
insignificance, based on Claus Roxin's teleological functionalism, the functions of the position of police delegate, and subsequently, the analysis of the possibility of the use of the principle of insignificance by the police authority and its consequences for the criminal process. Regarding the methodology, theoretical research will be carried out on aspects of criminal functionalism and its intervention in the origin of the principle of insignificance. Subsequently, the function of the police chief, the nature of the position and the existing doctrinal and jurisprudential currents for the use of the principle of trifle, including the opposing currents, will be examined. And for the conclusion, the practical application of the principle of insignificance by the police authority and its repercussions in the criminal process.