Reformulating historical alliances
Deflating the significance of Frege's departure from Kant's philosophy
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.23925/2764-0892.2024.v2.n2.e64793Keywords:
Judgement, Cognitive Foundationalism, Anti-skepticism, InferentialismAbstract
We argue that the recent debate over the meaning and identification of content has led to a shift in the theoretical circumstances that favored Frege’s divergence from Kant. Quine’s critique of the theoretical distinction of intensional identities removed the certainty that we can distinguish necessary from accidental identifications of content. The decline of the stability of language as a central object for the study of recognizable and predetermined attributes of meaningful information marks the end of the era of philosophical optimism about the superiority of language analysis over psychologism and leads to a resurgence of philosophical emphasis on the study of mind and cognition. The extent of this shift is such that the central discrepancy between Frege's formal methodology of second-order quantification and Kant's synthetic theory of content identification has lost its significance. With the removal of these circumstances and the erosion of this discrepancy, we can now perceive the aspects in which Frege's theory is consistent with, rather than in direct opposition to, the cognitive perspective that Kant himself endorses. These aspects have always been present, but under unfavorable conditions they have been suppressed or disregarded.
References
BAR-ELLI, Gilead. Three Kantian Strands in Frege’s View of Arithmetic. Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 2 (7), 2014.
BRANDOM, Robert. Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994.
CARNAP, Rudolf. Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956, pp. 205–221.
DUMMETT, Michael. The Philosophical Basis of Intuitionistic Logic. In Truth and Other Enigmas. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1974, pp. 215--247.
DUMMETT, Michael. The logical basis of metaphysics. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991.
FREGE, Gottlob. Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens (BS), in Frege, Gottlob (1964) Begriffsschrift und andere Aufsätze. Edited by I. Angelelli. Hildesheim: Georg Olms, (1879) 1964, pp. 1–88.
FREGE, Gottlob. Sense and reference. Philosophical Review 57 (3), 1948, 209-230.
FREGE, Gottlob. Function and Concept. translation by P. Geach in Geach and Black, 1960, pp. 21-41.
FREGE, Gottlob. The Foundations of Arithmetic. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1950.
FREGE, Gotlob. The Thought. Mind, 65(259), 1956, pp. 289–311.
FREGE, Gotlob. Diary entries on the concept of numbers. In Frege, 1979, pp. 263–64.
FREGE, Gotlob. (1924b). Number. In Frege, 1979, pp. 265–66.
FREGE, Gottlob. 'Boole's Logical Calculus and the Concept-Script' (1880-1881), Posthumous Writings. Edited by Hermes, et al. (Blackwell), 1979.
GEACH, Peter. Assertion, The Philosophical Review 74 (4), 1965, pp. 449–465.
GOLDMAN, Alvin I. Epistemology and cognition. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986.
HUSSERL, Edmund. Logical Investigations Volume 1. New York: Routledge. Edited by Dermot Moran., 2001.
KANT, Immanuel. Guyer, Paul & Wood, Allen W. (eds.). Critique of Pure Reason. Cambridge University Press, 1998.
KANT, Immanuel. Trans. Guyer, P., & Matthews, E. Critique of the Power of Judgment. Cambridge University Press, 2000.
KANT, Immanuel. Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, translated and edited by Gary Hatfield, revised edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
KlEMENT, Kevin C. Higher-Order Metaphysics in Frege and Russell. In Peter Fritz & Nicholas Jones (eds.), Higher-Order Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming.
MARTIN-LOF, P. “An intuitionistic theory of types: Predicative part”, in Logic colloquium ’73, H.E. Rose and J. Shepherdson (eds), Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1975, pp. 73–118.
MARTIN-LOF, P. Truth of a proposition, evidence of a judgement, validity of a proof. Synthese 73, 1987, 407–420.
QUINE, W. V. O. Two Domgas of Empiricism. From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,1953, 20 - 46.
QUINE, W.V.O. Epistemology Naturalized. Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. New York: Columbia University Press, 1969.
RYLE, Gilber. Systematically misleading Expressions, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 32, Issue 1, 1, 1932, pp. 139–170,
SCHANG, Fabien. How to Hintikkize a Frege. In Amirouche Moktefi, Alessio Moretti & Fabien Schang (eds.), Let’s be Logical (Studies in the Philosophy and History of Logic). Londres, Royaume-Uni: 2016, pp. 161-172.
STALNAKER, Robert. (2007). Critical Notice of Scott Soames’s Case against Two-Dimensionalism. The Philosophical Review, 116(2), 2007, pp. 251–266.
SULLIVAN, P. M. ‘Frege’s Logic’, in Gabbay D. M., Woods J. (eds.), Handbook of the History of Logic, 3, Elsevier BV, 2004, 659-750
SUNDHOLM, G. “Inference versus consequence” revisited: inference, consequence, conditional, implication. Synthese, 187(3), 2012, 943–956.
Downloads
Published
How to Cite
Issue
Section
License
Copyright (c) 2024 Geltung - Journal of Studies on the Origins of Contemporary Philosophy
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
