A reflexividade da primeira pessoa em Brentano e Husserl: Da psicologia descritiva à filosofia contemporânea

Federico Boccaccini

doi:10.23925/2764-0892.2024.v2.n2.e67606

Authors

Federico Boccaccini CNPq/UFPE

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.23925/2764-0892.2024.v2.n2.e67606

Keywords:

Franz Brentano, intentionality, phenomenal consciousness, descriptive phenomenology, descriptive psychology

Abstract

This paper aims to show the substantial difference between Brentano's project of descriptive psychology and Husserl's transcendental phenomenology and its impact on contemporary philosophy of consciousness. In particular, I shall consider the question of the self-reflexivity of the first person or, in other words, the problem of the reference of the deictic “I” from a phenomenological point of view. Two one-level theories - the theory of pre-reflective consciousness and the theory of self-representation - will be analyzed as well as the relationship between phenomenal consciousness and intentionality.

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