A reflexividade da primeira pessoa em Brentano e Husserl: Da psicologia descritiva à filosofia contemporânea

Federico Boccaccini

doi:10.23925/2764-0892.2024.v2.n2.e67606

Autores

Federico Boccaccini CNPq/UFPE

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.23925/2764-0892.2024.v2.n2.e67606

Palavras-chave:

Franz Brentano, intencionalidade, consciencia fenomenal, fenomenologia descritiva, psicologia descritiva

Resumo

O presente trabalho visa mostrar a diferença substancial entre o projeto de psicologia descritiva de Brentano e a fenomenologia transcendental de Husserl e seu impacto na filosofia contemporânea da consciência. Em particular, consideraremos a questão da autorreflexividade da primeira pessoa ou, em outras palavras, o problema da referência do deíctico “eu” do ponto de vista da fenomenologia. Duas teorias de nível único, a teoria da consciência pré-reflexiva e a teoria da autorrepresentação, serão analisadas bem como a relação entre a consciência fenomênica e a intencionalidade.

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