A incompletude explicativa do materialismo
Palavras-chave:
Materialismo, Lacuna conceitual, Reducionismo, Funcionalismo, Naturalismo.Resumo
A lacuna conceitual entre o físico e o mental tem sido fonte de importantes dificuldades impostas ao materialismo, destacando-se as objeções fundadas em intuições cartesianas. Todavia, o maior obstáculo ao materialismo não são tanto as intuições antimaterialistas decorrentes de sua lacuna conceitual, mas sim a própria lacuna. Não obstante, o materialismo pode coexistir com tal incompletude na medida em que explora sua adesão ao naturalismo científico.
Métricas
Referências
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