Objectivity of Knowledge and the Autonomy of Cultural World

Abstract

In this paper, I use Peirce’s distinction between the anancastic and agapastic modes of evolution to pinpoint what I regard to be the strategic tensions in Karl Popper’s evolutionary account of objectivity. The distinction between subjective and objective knowledge constitutes one of the central themes in Popper's philosophy of science. Popper locates the subjective in the realm of conscious experiences and beliefs; and the objective, in the realm of the cultural products of human mind, such as theories, artworks, etc. Interestingly enough, Popper maintains that the denizens of the latter realm ("world 3," in his idiom) enjoy certain autonomy with regard to the realm of conscious experiences (or "world 2"). In other words, on Popper's view, the content of our theories must be determined by something over and above the explicit content of our discursive practices. This suggestion is all the more intriguing since Popper explicitly denies the possibility of an unmediated confrontation between our theories and events in the world of physical things ("world 1"), which serves as our intuitive paradigm of the real. My argument indicates that the interpretation of Popper’s account of autonomy and objectivity of the cultural world depends on the way in which he construes the pivotal notion of intersubjectivity, which can be read either along adjusted anancastic or agapastic lines, with the latter being the more promising alternative.