Discussions on Supposed Fregean Platonism

Abstract

The question whether Frege did support or not the platonic realism with respect to the thoughts has been widely discussed in the secondary literature. According to the standard interpretation that was invented by Dummett and followed by Burge, he there would be held such a metaphycal position; however, others writers like Sluga, Ricketts, Weiner and Carl suggest a review to the usual way to interpret his philosophy and they assign that his logic must be as a system ontologically neutral. In front of this noise, this paper intend to expose two existing lines of discussion between the standard interpretation and the revisionist one, namely, that which occurs between Burge and Weiner and that which occurs between Sluga and Dummett. The first of these lines of discussion has as one of its main questions to know whether the declarations of Frege, where he seems to attach autonomous existence to the thoughts, exert a theoretical or simply elucidatory role in his philosophy. The second line of discussion has as a central point the interpretation of the notions of objectivity and “wirklichkeit” in the fregean writings. The conclusion obtained is that we must to consider the need for a reading more detained of the Frege´s declarations that led to his interpretation as a platonic realistic, because that is, as can be inferred from the exiting divergences, a question that still raises discussions.