C.S. Peirce’s Normative Triad

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to trace the evolution of Peirce’s thinking about ethics from dismissing it as a “useless” and “dubious” kind of knowledge in the second half of the 1890s to reviewing it as a major philosophical concern in the 1900s. I will show how his distinct positions appear to correlate with his theory of the categories. While a diachronic approach will be necessary to correct some common efforts to resolve the inconsistencies in Peirce’s moral theory, a categorical account is essential to perceive its inner coherence and to support the view that Peirce moved from a nominalist to a realist position in ethics. With the help of Peirce’s diagram of the degenerate forms of Thirdness, I will attempt to offer a sub-categorical account of the “threefold” notion of the normative ideal.