Pragmatism's Contributions to a Study of the Concept of Information

Abstract

This paper aims at investigating some Peircean pragmatism's contributions towards the understanding of the information's concept. We will argue that the Peircean concept of information makes it clear the contemporary controversy on the nature of the meaning acquisition process in the action's domain. The conceptual meaning of an external object, according to Peirce, is given by all its practical consequences for the habitual action. We will put forward the hypothesis that the concept of information is connected to the one of habitual action pattern. A habit constitutes a final conditional cause, of the type that if A happens (the circumstance, efficient causes or antecedent), then to act in B way (the consequent). In other words, a habit express itself in terms of the informational connection between antecedent – environmental state of affairs or its efficient causes – and consequent, a regular way of action. The current discussions about the ontological statute of the information – here understood in terms of a principle of organization –points out to the magnitude of Peirce's philosophical works. Charles Peirce, without the technological resources of today, foresaw the close relationship between habitual information and action.