Remarks on Tarski’s Nominalism

Daniel Nagase

doi:10.23925/2316-5278.2023v24i1:e58224

Autores

Daniel Nagase USP

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.23925/2316-5278.2023v24i1:e58224

Palavras-chave:

Comprometimento ontológico, Nominalismo, Pragmatismo, Tarski

Resumo

Neste artigo, farei algumas observações sobre o nominalismo de Tarski. Primeiro, mostrarei que, embora tenha sido desenvolvida principalmente em conversas e palestras privadas, Tarski tentou desenvolver uma teoria nominalista rigorosa, que mostra que a questão tinha alguma importância para ele. Em particular, mostro como a formulação de Tarski se baseia na ideia de uma linguagem humanamente compreensível e mostro como ele tentou desenvolver essa ideia ao longo de sua carreira. Infelizmente, embora sua formulação seja interessante, parece enfrentar um obstáculo intransponível, que examino detalhadamente no artigo. Finalmente, apresento algumas observações sobre o que correu mal com o programa nominalista de Tarski.

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