Hegellian Syllogism and Inferentialism in Brandom

Abstract

In Science of Logic, Hegel addresses syllogism, in the book Logic of Concept. Our goal is to present and analyze the Hegelian syllogism and relate it with the inferentialism of Robert Brandom. What is Hegel’s argumentative strategy by proposing the syllogism in the Logic of Concept? How does he operate the dialectization of classic syllogism? To what degree can the theory of inferentialism of Robert Brandom be related to the dialectical speculative Hegelian syllogism? Hegel performs a dialectical transformation of the syllogism, presenting it as the moment when subjectivity recovers rational figures as self-motion, providing an objective reality. The inferentialist proposal of Brandom is part of the legacy of German Idealism, focusing especially on Kant and Hegel. We propose an inferential reading of Brandom as an interpretation of Hegelianism from the viewpoint of American pragmatism, updating the syllogism of Hegelian Logic.