Para uma Crítica ao (Não-)Pragmatismo de Marx

Abstract

This is an essay of immanent critique, tentatively pragmatist, centrally of Marx’s Theses ad Feuerbach, but not only, which tries to interpret, approximate and distinguish its formulations from what is here conceived as pragmatism as a detranscententalized ground. The paper suggests that Marx’s practical-normative materialism may be read as basically encompassing five interpenetrated moments: 1) a refusal of "dogmatic empiricism", passive-intuitionist, Cartesian-mentalist, as well as of subjective idealism; 2) the overcoming of an understanding of world and subject as static, exterior to one another, and therefore the possible abandonment of the "spectator’s point-of-view" and of the objectivist-representationalist fixation of reality; 3)a disqualification of the "abstract individual" of empiricist perception, i.e. of the fiction of the individual as dissociated from the whole of social relations and from a determinate social form; 4) a critique of social reality as both essentially severed and atomized by dominant "bad" social relations, which entail the supposed duplication of the world, also in religion and philosophy; 5) this critique supported by the deduction-construction of an "essentialized" foundation, although allegedly earthly, which determines the practical suppression of the contradiction and the restoration of social unity-solidarity, as the end of "man’s self-alienation" opens the way, beyond the individualist point-of-view of today’s civil society, to the humane society of tomorrow, to the need and imperative of its realization. All that, traversed by a problem of "political epistemology", i.e. of the congruence of epistemological points-ofview with social and political, practical, circumstances and points-of-view, to which Marx perhaps does not answer adequately, even beyond the Theses.