“All our Puzzles will Disappear”: Royce and the Possibility of Error

Abstract

An argument for the possibility of error was at the center of Royce’s first major philosophical work, The Religious Aspect of Philosophy. The argument led, on one hand, to a conception of a transcendent Absolute, and, on the other, to a conception of human agency and meaning.  In light of the argument, he concluded “all our puzzles will disappear at a stroke, and error will be possible.”  Although the novelty of the argument helped to establish Royce as America’s leading advocate of idealism, the argument faded into obscurity after World War One and its significance was lost with the rejection of idealism by academic philosophy. Writing in 1920, George Santayana concluded that Royce’s argument for the possibility of error turned on “a romantic equivocation.” In the 1960’s, John Herman Randall recalled Santayana’s critique and concluded that Royce’s argument was “clever” at best. The impression of Royce’s work as a failed idealism with limited historical and philosophical value persists today. Even as Royce’s work faded from view, however, the need to account for error remained important. As a result of its inability to provide a successful account error, the New Realist movement—fresh from its victory over idealism—was replaced by the Critical Realists, led by Santayana, who, in turn gave way to the logical positivist’s demand for a theory of verification. Difficulties in accounting for error continue in the 21^st century in the work of philosophers who seek to connect knowledge production with theories of truth, especially in contexts of cultural diversity. In this paper, I will reconsider Royce’s error argument both in order to set aside mistaken notions of the theory and to show how it can engage present concerns about knowledge, truth, and pluralism. The key to this reconsideration is the criticism of Royce’s theory by C. S. Peirce in his 1885 unpublished review of The Religious Aspect of Philosophy. I will argue that Peirce’s criticism anticipates Royce’s own reconstruction of the theory in his later work. Peirce rightly concludes that Royce’s original argument that ties error to “general terms” (or complete descriptions) is incorrect. Instead, error turns on the operation of “indices” that serve to connect knowledge claims and objects in a way that requires the participation of other agents. Royce’s development of his theory of error leads to a logic of agency and a redefinition of transcendence with relevance to present problems in philosophy and in the wider world.