O conceito de verdade pragmática em uma perspectiva lógico-formal

Abstract

It's our goal to analyse the concept of pragmatic truth in a perspective that could be called pragmatic. Therefore, we intend to present, from a formal-logic point of view, the idea of pragmatic truth, as meaning a proposition which is pragmatically truthful, if and only if, in a determinate context, everything runs as it was truthful in a correspondential perspective. In 1933, A. Tarski, while examining the truth concept in formalised languages, gave (or intended to) a precise definition of truth (from the point of view of correspondence) inaugurating with it the semantic studies and creating what we understand, in our days, as theory of models. In the same way, Mikenberg, Chuaqui and da Costa, in a work of 1986, conceived a precise notion of almost-truth, which can be considered as a version of pragmatic truth conception. We intend to show, in general ways, the formal concept of almost-truth among some developments obtained from this same concept in philosophy of science.