Logic as the Outcome of an Evolutionary Process

Abstract

William Cooper's book, The Evolution of Reason (Cambridge University Press, 2001) advances the bold thesis that not just our powers of reasoning, but hte logical standards by which we reason, and many of our conclusions, can be explained as the result of evolutionary pressures. Any other canons of rationality, he suggests, woul be (in the long run) disadvantageous. The story that Cooper tells begins with 'life-history strategies', continues to what is usually called Bayesian decision theory, and then encompasses probability theory (here called 'inductive logic'), classical deductive logic, classical mathematics, and even some non-classical systems of deduction into the bargain.

As a critical rationalist who does not believe that there is such a discipline as inductive logic and, moreover, regards the directive to maximize expected utility as uncharacteristic of, even in conflit with, genuine human rationality, I am (to say the least) unenthusiastic about many of Cooper's starling conclusions. The aim of this paper is to identify some of the differences between us, and to determine whether either of us right.