Explication of the Cognitive Process as a Problem-solving Activity in Herbert Simon

Abstract

The object of this article is to reconstruct the explanatory model of the cognitive process according to Herbert Simon, Who interprets the cognitive process as a problem-solving human activity. To this end, three central theses are assumed: (i) an onthological thesis, related to his model of individual, according to which its cognitive processes can be represented by computational programs destined to solve specific-domain problems; (ii) a normative thesis, that supports rationality as a regulatory idea of his theory; (iii) another thesis, of an epistemological nature, according to which a greater empirical substance in the interpretation of the economic concept of rationality must be sought. The upshot of these theses is that, in the Simonian program, rationality is interpreted as a bounded and adaptive rationality. The method to reach the object of this article is to rationally reconstruct cognitive processes by means of the computational metaphor, identifying them as a problem-solving activity bounded by the three theses cited.