Inquiry and Experience in the Pragmatic Tradition

Abstract

An exploration of some issues raised by Victorino Tejera's recent book, American Modem: The Path Not Taken, this paper considers the extent to which C.S. Peirce's philosophy may be regarded as a direct New World departure from Early Modern European Philosophy. After detailing some problems with upholding any sharp distinction between Cartesian and Peircean metaphilosophies, I conclude that Peirce may be credited, first, with a radical revision of the European Modern conception of experiences, with what might be called a semiotic view of them (as mediated by signs, fraught with inferential processes, and bound up with actions); and, second, with a distinctive, still compelling conception of scientific as well as philosophical inquiry. Turning next to the heir-apparent philosophizing of John Dewey, I note its more obvious affinities to Peirce's thinking but then emphasize that Dewey's own reconception of experience is a still more dramatic departure from the whole European Modern tradition. Experience, Dewey teaches us, is essentially active; it is never entirely passive. This lesson, which I take to be Dewey's single most valuable, philosophically most transformative insight, remains largely unlearnt by contemporary philosophers. I end the paper by suggesting that Dewey's conception of experience affords a formidable challenge to John McDowell's Peirce-friendly outlook in Mind and World.