Contributions from Pragmatism to an Understanding of the Concept of Ecological Information

Abstract

Based upon Peirce’s processual conception of information, in this paper we analyse the concept of ecological information, in the context of perception-action. We argue that the notion of structural and transformational invariance, which constitutes the fundamental ingredients of ecological information as originally formulated by Gibson (1979/1986), can be better understood on the basis of Peirce’s methodological presuppositions. Of special interest here is Peirce’s conception of genuine information that is, in a certain specific sense, independent of thought, but directly connected to experiences and possible habits or forms of action. We shall also argue that the externalist method of investigation, which contrasts with the introspective internalist approach to perception-action, characterises a common element between Peirce’s pragmatism and Gibson’s ecological view, which allows an approximation to be reached between both of them in the study of information.