The Pragmatic Maxim and the Proof of Pragmatism (2): After 1903

Abstract

In “The Pragmatist Maxim and the Proof of Pragmatism” (Cognitio v.6, n.1), I tried to clarify the strategy Peirce employed in Lectures on Pragmatism (1903) to argue for (or “prove”) his pragmatism maxim. This proof was designed both to clarify the content of the maxim and to demonstrate its correctness. The current paper is a sequel to that one, and it considers Peirce’s attempts to argue for pragmatism in writings from after 1903. As in the earlier paper, I am concerned with identifying the strategies he employed for defending the doctrine rather than the details of his execution of his strategies. And an important issue concerns why he did not rest content with the 1903 argument and, apparently, looked for a different sort of approach. Was this because he thought that the earlier argument failed to establish its conclusion? Or was it because he thought that the earlier approach did not provide a fully perspicuous “explanation” of why the maxim was correct?