New Directions in Pragmatic Ethics

Abstract

It is well known that William James used Peirce´s pragmatic maxim to not only develop a theory of meaning, but also a theory of truth - an expansion of the maxim of which Peirce disapproved. Nonetheless, James takes the concept of truth in an interesting direction by claiming it to be "one species of the good." Consequently, the criteria he establishes for true beliefs are also his criteria for good actions and pratices. In doing so, James lays the groundwork for an ethic that is elaborated well by Dewey and consistent with many of Peirce´s ethical ideas. It is one that emphasizes the very practical characteristics of the good as that  which improves the human condition by means of practices that best facilitate problem-solving. The purpose of this paper is to draw out this idea and show how it takes pragmatic ethics in new directions, one that is picked up by neo-pragmatists such as Richard Rorty and Hilary Putnam.