Doing Epistemology Scientifically: Dewey versus Russell

Abstract

Dewey argues that Russell is wrong to think there is a legitimate philosophical problem concerning our knowledge of the external world. He further claims that Russell’s attempt to ground knowledge on self-evident claims presupposes a theory of experience that science has discredited. In reply, Russell argues that Dewey’s criticisms are irrelevant to scientific epistemology properly understood and that far from being undermined by contemporary science, the epistemological questions he addresses are forced on us by contemporary physics. I argue that far from settling their differences, the exchange between Dewey and Russell shows that their disagreement is more profound than either of them acknowledges. Dewey does indeed misunderstand Russell’s epistemological project. Yet Russell misidentifies the source of Dewey’s error and as a result fails to appreciate the appeal of the approach to epistemology Dewey recommends and the challenge it poses to his epistemology. As I see it, the disagreement between Dewey and Russell about knowledge turns on deeper disagreements about the way to settle philosophical questions and these deeper disagreements are not “scientific” in nature—at least, not in the sense that either Dewey or Russell uses this term.