The imperative for non-rational belief

Abstract

The varieties of belief and the grounds for believing have long been of concern for philosophers (as well as theologians and psychologists). Typically, we distinguish between practical and theoretical beliefs but usually it is supposed that a proposition is at the core of every belief, thereby providing an intellectual or rational basis for justification. Sometimes, though, core beliefs seem to be more a matter of practice than of intellect, especially those beliefs contemporary philosophers of mind refer to as our folk beliefs. If we accept Peirce’s idea that it is more accurate to say that we are in mind rather than that mind is in us, then we may also suppose that we participate in systems of belief that belong more to our society than to us as individuals. These systems of belief may plausibly be supposed to have evolved to harmonize our personal lives with the broader goals and imperatives of our society at large. Such systems of belief may be rooted in and perpetuated by a variety of cultural traditions and practices and are typically absorbed during childhood as we learn our way of life. Not only are these core beliefs not the products of rational consideration, it is essential that they are not grounded in reason, clearly separating them, as matters of vital importance, from the purview of science, and bringing into question the reach of pragmatism. The treatment of belief in the writings of Peirce and James continues to shed light on these important questions.