Wittgenstein and his indebtedness to James: the philosophical atmosphere of praxis in the constitution of a pragmatic moral cognitivism

Abstract

The present study aims to argue for the possibility of pragmatic moral cognitivism, supported by works of Wittgenstein and his indebtedness to James’ thoughts. Therefore, the article intends to show that moral judgments, to pragmatic moral cognitivism, are cognitive to the extent that they meet their objectivity in the praxis of the language-game. Thus, on the one hand the metaethical debate between realists and anti-realists, particularly McDowell and Blackburn, seems to be completely insufficient by disregarding in their theories the problems dissipated by James’ pragmatism. On the other hand, the core that resists in Wittgenstein, unlike pragmatism, is to understand that words are only meaningful in their use, forgoing the search for an experience that increasingly allows for an approximation to the truth. Finally, we show that the affinity of horizons between the authors seems to lie in the fact that they both share an anti-foundational attitude, that is, basic beliefs cannot be self-justified.