Are we capable of being conscious of the initial activity of consciousness? An analysis of transcendental deduction based on Kemp Smith

Abstract

The present work will focus on the thesis of transcendental deduction (A) and will examine the question of the original synthetic activity of consciousness: are we capable of being conscious of this transcendental activity? To this end we shall set out the reason for privileging deduction A, on the basis of Kemp Smith’s interpretation; we shall investigate how the problem concerning the constitution of consciousness arises in Modernity; and, finally, we will analyze how this problem is specifically addressed in subjective deduction, relative to the central thesis established by Kant in deduction as a whole. It is in the subjective deduction that the question concerning the transcendental constitution of the unity of consciousness arises – a synthetic unity that is contained within the pure forms of sensibility and in the pure concepts of understanding. After all, can we describe the processes that constitute transcendental synthesis in the same way that we can describe empirical synthetic processes? Finally, we argue that, although this matter falls within the critical project as such, it cannot be analyzed with the theoretical elements that it comprises.