First philosophy naturalized: Peirce’s place in the Analytic tradition

Abstract

Charles Sanders Peirce’s epistemology appears paradoxical when compared to Rudolf Carnap’s and W. V. Quine’s. Like Carnap, and unlike Quine, Peirce thinks scientific knowledge rests on logical principles that must hold if talk of truth and falsehood is to be meaningful. He also shares Carnap’s view that these principles are prior to and independent of findings in the natural sciences, a view Quine famously rejects. However, like Quine, and unlike Carnap, Peirce insists that there is no knowledge beyond what is gained through empirical testing, that the truths of logic are epistemologically on a par with truths uncovered in the natural sciences and that they tell us something about the way things are, rather than being empty of factual content as Carnap contends. The air of paradox arises from Peirce’s simultaneous allegiance to views commonly thought to belong to incompatible epistemological theories. Sorting through this paradox by comparing Peirce’s conception of knowledge to Quine’s and to Carnap’s helps us better appreciate his importance in the philosophical tradition and the depth and originality of his views.