Among people
on the possibility of an epistemology of conversation
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.23925/2316-5278.2022v23i1:e58222Abstract
This paper discusses that an Epistemology of Conversation should be understood as a field of Social Epistemology that is devoted to investigating the strictly epistemic norms that govern the interaction between two or more people about their beliefs and other epistemic states. An elementary definition of conversation is: a cooperative communicative act in which participants assume common purposes and commit themselves to contribute relevant statements (assertions). Starting from this elementary definition, I present four issues that should be considered by an Epistemology of Conversation: a) that disagreement is a relevant motivation for conversation; b) that conversation is a means or method of inquiry in cases of disagreement between peers; c) that the expected virtues of participants are epistemic virtues; and d) that any outcome of a conversation will realize an epistemic good.
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