A well-trodden path

from phenomenology to enactivism

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https://doi.org/10.23925/2316-5278.2024v25i1:e58254

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References

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Published

2024-04-22

How to Cite

Rolla, G. (2024). A well-trodden path: from phenomenology to enactivism. Cognitio: Revista De Filosofia, 25(1), e58254. https://doi.org/10.23925/2316-5278.2024v25i1:e58254